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# All Azimuth

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International Relations theory is in crisis: it does not appear to have been successfully accumulating in an integrated manner. Despite abounding theories and concepts aiming to explain what happens globally and to draw lessons for improvement, casualties continue to pile up, and the world is not becoming a safer place to live in. Our supposedly revolutionary new concepts and approaches still tend to remain ‘event-driven’, and in fact follow things that happen in the field, rather than precede them. One needs only to look at the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Arab Spring for recent reminders of this shortcoming.

The problem is perhaps even more acute when we look at one of the earth’s ‘old worlds’, a region sometimes referred to as ‘Eurasia’, and sometimes as ‘The Greater Middle East’. Geographers have, since the ancient world, made numerous proposals to establish borders between Europe (the West) and Asia. All these attempts to determine acceptable and meaningful geographic lines of delimitation have at best, remained fuzzy and disputable. These efforts of separating Europe from Asia have only confirmed that Europe is not even a separate continent, but a peninsular prolongation of Asia, stretching to the Atlantic Ocean. For our purposes therefore, we will refer to that vast zone of the globe stretching between Western Europe and China; and from Russia to the Maghreb—a ‘Middle World’, where ‘West’ meets ‘East’, and ‘North’ meets ‘South’; where encounters lead to interpenetration as well as confrontation.

This Middle World is old in many ways. It was here that the first agricultural produce was grown, the first cities were built, the first coins minted, the first translations of Greek philosophical texts were made and kept in libraries, the early organized states and universal religions emerged, algebra was conceived, gunpowder was invented, the first conventional wars were fought, and the first peace treaties were signed. At the same time, these ancient lands are very much a part of the complications connected with ‘new’ aspects of the discipline of International Relations, from globalization to transnational movements.

The Middle World takes on additional importance when we consider that the gravity of global politics is increasingly bound to this area. In the Middle World we find evidence not only of traditional IR issues such as major power rivalries and interstate competition, nuclear weapons, state-building related civil strife, or terrorism, but also of relatively newer dynamics such as transnational social movements, demands for political development and better welfare distribution, the evolving role of religion in politics, and energy security. More than ever therefore, there is a need to develop better conceptual and practical tools to understand and explain this world and the areas it impacts upon (the rest of the world), and to present innovative and feasible visions for peace, security and development in the Middle World and beyond. All Azimuth aims to give voice to those who envision and want to help create a new International Relations—in theory and policy—for peace, security, and development.

How can we best accomplish this? As has been argued many times in past decades, IR scholarship and theorizing have traditionally stemmed from the newer ‘West’, and spread Eastward or towards the so-called periphery—perhaps due at times to a lack of adequate voices coming out of the latter region, and at times because of a failure on the part of the core to listen. A starting point to understanding both ‘why’ we are launching this journal and
'how’ it should be done, therefore, is our belief that we should try to explain and understand this Middle World, with its ancient philosophies, traditions, and practices, both as problems and as sources of potential solutions. Relying only on the ‘new world’s ideas and proposals cannot allow us to fully understand the old world, and also means that we are wasting this potential treasure of reason, experience, and information for understanding the whole world.

It is vital therefore, that our analyses and approaches come from every angle; that they be without methodological, theoretical, or political prejudices. In James N. Rosenau’s words, we must escape from our conceptual jails. We must understand that we should not be prisoners of primarily Western-produced concepts and ideas (though not being so naïve as to dismiss the immense accumulation of theoretical and empirical knowledge in social sciences as developed in the United States and Europe). On the contrary, we should assume that something potentially better has or could come out of these lands of ancient history and practice. For this primary reason, we have selected the name of All Azimuth for this journal, from the navigator’s term meaning from all angles; a term that exemplifies ‘globalness’, as it has been borrowed from Arabic into French and later to English.

It is also important that in launching this journal, we do not intend to shy away from being normative—in the sense of openly prioritizing the end point to which we hope the knowledge produced here will serve: peace, security and development. All Azimuth seeks therefore to give voice to scholarly and intellectual efforts stemming from within the Middle World, for the purpose of promoting peace, security, and development throughout the region and beyond. In terms of who may be a part of this discussion, we do not wish to impose geographical discrimination on our writers and contributors. In terms of the ideas and approaches discussed, however, they should stem historically, culturally, or philosophically from this region and/or aim to contribute to the peace and well-being of this region, and globally.

As the founders and members of the İhsan Doğramacı Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, and editors of All Azimuth, we believe that the ancient history and practice of international relations in this part of the world, centuries of dealing with problems of peace, security, and development, must surely have produced local visions and voices as responses. We would like to revitalize these indigenous ideas and voices, and allow them the opportunity to become promising components of current knowledge production.

On a final note, we would like to mention why we believe Turkey to be a relevant location in which to launch this initiative. Turkey is one of the leading places in the ‘Middle World’ to highlight the aforementioned meeting of the old world with new dynamics. Turkey has a centuries-old history of relationship with the West and, as such, it reflects most vividly the paradoxes of modernity. Moreover, emerging Turkish visions and interests in the broader region are greater than ever and need to be both conceptualized but also supported with intellectual foundations. Finally, as Turkey grows politically and economically, it also does so academically. Though scholarship is booming in Turkey, the Western ‘core’ concepts remain dominant in the Turkish disciplinary community. This limits the academic expansion—not only for its own potential in understanding the region, but also for not materializing its great potential to contribute back to IR theorizing overall. Turkish scholarship can be more constructive in linking this region, and its homegrown concepts and ideas, to the core, rather than trying to simply fit external, younger constructs into these ancient
lands. Therefore, a new approach with indigenous resources and sensibilities is very much needed for this exploding scholarship. We believe All Azimuth will serve best for this aim.

Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Ersel Aydınlı
January 2012, Ankara, Turkey
In This Issue

For this first issue of All Azimuth we are very pleased to present three articles, two commentaries, and one review article. This format will be the general intended structure for each issue, one that reflects our goals of combining research and policy-based works in the journal. We also intend to include regular review articles on topics with significant future research implications—in this case, energy politics.

This opening issue begins with an article by Ziya Öniş and Mustafa Kutlay, “Beyond the Global Financial Crisis: Structural Continuities as Impediments to a Sustainable Recovery,” which tackles a very timely topic. The article highlights an on-going critical scholarly and policy debate surrounding the current worldwide economic crisis—do the short-term measures taken against an economic crisis introduce an effective anti-crisis strategy? The article argues that the prompt short-term measures that were enacted in this case prevented adequate questioning of the dominant paradigm that actually caused the crisis. The structural problems leading to the crisis were therefore not addressed, and the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression failed to shake the neoclassical economic paradigm—a shake-up which was highly needed. The article offers answers to why this has happened and how the conventional wisdom has survived and reproduced its intellectual hegemony even in such a deep crisis.

Müge Kınacıoğlu’s article, going beyond the realist and utilitarian approaches which focus on political and strategic evaluations of military interventions aiming at ‘regime change’, deals with the question of the legality of pro-democratic military interventions in terms of the law and practice of the United Nations and general international law. The article traces the evolution of the legal norms and analyzes their present state of relevance by developing arguments not only on the basis of classical and contemporary international law literature but also widely referring to official UN documents.

İlter Turan examines the emergence and development of area studies in international relations field with a focus on American studies in Turkey. His brief survey of publications, research centers and academic institutions on American studies reveals that in contrast to intensifying relations between the United States and Turkey, there has been surprisingly limited academic research and publications on the matter. The article concludes by suggesting various explanations supporting this observation.

In the following article, Dr. Willem F. van Eekelen deals with timely and important questions about the changing nature of security conceptualizations. He elaborates on the last two decades and explores how different systemic, regional, political and economic factors have shaped our understandings of security. These dynamics have also changed the traditional military structures and the nature of security provision. Van Eekelen concludes that the EU and NATO must remain capable and coherent to meet these challenges related to security and military sectors.

Charles Mallory King offers our second opinion piece of the issue, looking at the nature of Turkish-EU-US relations specifically when dealing with politics in the Middle East. In order to make his analysis he first provides an assessment of the current state of Turkey’s relations with the EU and the US. He then goes on to describe the major strategic challenges that face Turkey, the EU and the US in the region of the ‘Greater
Middle East’. Finally, he offers his analysis and assessment of both the opportunities for and the challenges to possibilities for cooperation among these three with respect to politics of the Middle East.

Ali Oğuz Diriöz’s review article of three books highlights the increasingly important policy issue of energy security. In light of two important questions, namely, “Is energy security in foreign policy a goal or an instrument/weapon?” and; “Is energy conflictual or cooperative in the arena of international politics?” the review reveals that all three authors addressed the problem on how to ensure continual access to secure and uninterrupted energy at affordable prices. Accordingly, the books’ authors are suggesting increased international cooperation and especially the development of new technologies as a general solution to energy security. However, their points of view are very different and they look at the same problem through different lenses. Thus, the review concludes that overall, energy has the potential to be both conflictual and cooperative, depending on the context and on the way the different actors perceive the particular situation.
Beyond the Global Financial Crisis: Structural Continuities as Impediments to a Sustainable Recovery

Ziya Öniş and Mustafa Kutlay
Koç University

Abstract

There has scarcely been a day in the last three years when we have not read depressing headlines in the newspapers about the global economic crisis. The current turmoil, which many experts concur in seeing as the worst jolt to the world economy since the Great Depression, is pushing the parameters of the established system to its limits. One could say that we see, in the short-term measures taken against the crisis at the time, an effective anti-crisis strategy. But ironically, the promptness with which these short-term measures were enacted prevented adequate questioning of the dominant paradigm which had caused the crisis. As a result, the structural problems leading to the crisis were not reduced. Despite the occurrence of the deepest economic crisis to be experienced since the Great Depression, the present economic emergency did not shake the neoclassical economic paradigm as strongly as was needed. A puzzle that this study aims to solve arises here: Why and how has the conventional wisdom survived and reproduced its intellectual hegemony even after the “most devastating economic crisis” since the Great Depression?

Keywords: Global economic crisis, structural continuities, regulatory capture, dominance of mainstream economic paradigm, Wall Street lobby

1. Introduction

There has scarcely been a day in the last three years when we have not read depressing headlines in the newspapers about the global economic crisis.¹ The current turmoil, which many experts concur in seeing as the worst jolt to the world economy since the Great Depression,

Ziya Öniş, Professor, Department of International Relations, Koç University. E-mail: zonis@ku.edu.tr, Mustafa Kutlay, PhD candidate and research assistant, Department of International Relations, Koç University. E-mail: mkutlay@ku.edu.tr

¹ The earlier version of this paper presented at Koç University-Kyoto University International Symposium on “Sustainable and Innovative Development”, Koç University, Istanbul (September, 2011). We are grateful to the participants for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Beyond the Global Financial Crisis...

is pushing the parameters of the established system to its limits. Orthodox economic theories have been powerless to produce a solution and the solutions which have been devised are not applicable in an international system dominated by nation states. What is more, xenophobic behavior and racist political rhetoric have begun to increase, especially in Europe. In this regard, the outbreaks of violence in Spain, Greece, and the United Kingdom are in the nature of a preface to the social consequences of the economic crisis. The economic meltdown of 2007/08 provided an example of a crisis strategy in which governments in every part of the world intervened vigorously. Led by the American government and the Fed, political and economic decision-makers in many countries intervened with unprecedentedly large rescue packages and were surprisingly well coordinated in the implementation of them. One could say that we see, in the short-term measures taken against the crisis at the time, an effective crisis strategy. Ironically, the promptness with which these short-term measures were enacted prevented adequate questioning of the dominant paradigm which had caused the crisis. As a result, the structural problems leading to the crisis were not abated.

This article takes this paradox as its point of departure. It asserts that despite the occurrence of the deepest economic crisis to be experienced since the Great Depression, the present economic emergency did not shake the dominant neoliberal economic paradigm as strongly as was expected. The first section of this article discusses the main features of the short-term measures and examines how the structural fault lines are still threatening the world economy. The second section will explain the failure of the latest crisis to upset the neoliberal paradigm sufficiently in terms of three independent but mutually interlinked variables. The conclusion will offer forecasts of the future of neoliberal globalization and global economic governance.

2. The Paradox of Global Financial Crisis: Changes versus Continuities

The immediate global response to the financial meltdown was spectacular in comparison to previous crisis-management experiences. Governments all around the world, foremost the U.S. government and Federal Reserve, acted in a reasonably swift manner to curb the devastating effects of the financial turbulence. Similarly, international financial institutions, mainly the IMF and World Bank, have arisen from their ashes and taken strong measures to tackle the first global economic catastrophe in the 21st century. Therefore, it appears possible to argue that the immediate responses to the crisis, which we call “proximate changes” and group under the unprecedented bailouts and coordinated interventions on a global scale, are impressive by historical standards.

The first component of the proximate changes is the unprecedented bailouts organized mainly under the auspices of Federal Reserve-Treasury nexus. The Federal Reserve and the Treasury took a relatively proactive stance starting from the outset of financial turbulence without hesitating to take unconventional measures. For example, the U.S. government nationalized the country’s two mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; took

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over AIG, the world’s largest insurance company; and, pledged to take up to 700 billion dollars of toxic mortgage-related assets onto its books in October 2008\(^3\). Though the huge bailouts helped avoiding financial havoc, the financial contagion spread to the rest of the global economy with unexpected promptness. During the course of 2009, many countries implemented new policy measures to calm down the markets. For instance, the U.S. Congress passed a 787 billion dollar economic stimulus package, whereas China undertook a stimulus plan described as having cost around 500 billion dollars. Central banks across the globe followed the Federal Reserve’s demonstrative role in cutting interest rates to almost zero; and its other extraordinary measures, inter alia, buying up more than a trillion dollars in mortgage-backed securities. The severity of the crisis became more obvious when European economies plunged into debt mire after Greek authorities declared their inability to put public finances in order in early 2010. The jointly designed IMF-EU rescue package to make nearly 1 trillion dollars available to euro zone states was implemented in early May.

The other crucial aspect of the proximate changes was the transformation of the Bretton Woods’s architecture and global economic governance structures. The IMF, which was a relatively marginalized organization in the pre-crisis context, rose from its ashes immediately after the meltdown and became the key actor in coordinated bailouts. Since September 2008, the IMF has extended its approved commitments from SDR600 million in 2007 to SDR79.8 billion in 2010. Several middle-income countries severely hit by the financial turmoil like Hungary, Greece, and Ireland applied for IMF loans to overcome their balance-of-payments difficulties. Accordingly, the IMF’s lending commitments reached a record level of about 250 billion dollars in March 2011. The IMF’s sister institution, the World Bank, also responded to the financial meltdown swiftly by increasing its lending capacity from 25 billion to more than 58.5 billion dollars over a period of two years. In order to become a more active actor in tackling the crisis, the IMF overhauled its lending practices by phasing out the die-hard conditionality principles and implementing new types of loans such as the Flexible Credit Line and Extended Credit Facility. The second linchpin of international coordination has been the establishment of the G20 as the primary forum of global economic governance. The hitherto G7 was replaced by the G20 in 2008. The recognition of the G20 as the primary mechanism of economic governance sent a strong message in embarking upon the crisis because nearly half of its members are composed of emerging market economies, and the platform represents almost two-thirds of the world population as well as 90 percent of the global economic output.\(^4\) In addition to promoting countercyclical expansionary macroeconomic policies, G20 summits are used as effective coordination platforms so as to avoid undesirable and destabilizing beggar-thy-neighbor policies. In the April 2009 London summit, G20 members pledged not to “repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras.”\(^5\) The third linchpin of global economic governance has been the establishment of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in April 2009 with all G20

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3 “When Fortune Frowned,” The Economist, October 9, 2008, 3
countries as members. In fact, the FSB evolved from the hitherto insignificant Financial Stability Forum established in 1999, and its mandate has been expanded to a considerable extent so as to empower the board to lead global financial supervision and regulation. In a nutshell, the financial reforms aimed at strengthening the quality and quantity of capital, reducing procyclicality in the financial system, toughening the regulatory framework for financial institutions, and regulating the payments and bonus systems for financial giants.

2.1 Structural continuities
The initial reform spirit to restructure the international financial architecture, however, has lost momentum in a short time period. Therefore there are still vital structural fault lines intimidating a sustainable economic recovery in the incoming years. Structural continuities in the post-crisis period can be divided into broad categories: (1) the perpetuation of financialization in a still largely under-regulated global economy and (2) the solidification of global imbalances and aggravation of the global economic governance crisis.

One of the most significant structural factors which triggered the global financial crisis concerns the phenomenon of “financialization.” Financialization, a term initially coined by Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff refers to the “inverted relation between the financial and the real [sectors].” Krippner defines the term “as a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production.” In a broader sense, financialization depicts “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies.” At the heart of it, there is the changing balance and inverted relationship between financial corporations and non-financial firms. The neoliberal globalization project opened up plenty of space for ever-increasing uncontrolled financialization and the rise of a shadow banking system relying on the principle of “originate and distribute.” Accordingly, financial instruments like mortgage-backed securities, credit default swaps, and collateralized debt obligations have become the main profit extraction mechanisms over the last decade. Especially after the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve’s and other leading countries’ accommodative monetary stances, the persistently low real interest rates, credit market distortions, and the sharp financial engineering skills of financial consultants have jointly contributed to the “toxic mix” in financial system. The toxic mix in turn caused the world financial markets grow far beyond its means. As Crotty points out, the financialization of the U.S. economy created mountains of debt with huge risks accumulated in the system:

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The value of all financial assets in the US grew from four times GDP in 1980 to ten times GDP in 2007. In 1981 the household debt was 48 percent of GDP, while in 2007 it was 100 per cent. Private sector debt was 123 percent GDP in 1981 and 290 percent by late 2008. The financial sector has been in a leveraging frenzy: Its debt rose from 22 percent of GDP in 1981 to 117 percent in late 2008. The share of corporate profits generated in the financial sector rose from 10 percent in the early 1980s to 40 percent in 2006, while its share of the stock market’s value grew from 6 percent to 23 per cent.

The uncontrolled neoliberal liberalization policies were accompanied by overly lax, fragmented, and ineffective regulatory mechanisms and the globally integrated financial markets were not supervised by regulatory bodies of a global scale. Indeed, during the era that the neoliberal doctrine deepened its hegemony, a fundamental flaw dominated the political economy of global finance, namely deeply integrated and sophisticated financial markets “managed” by shallow regulatory institutions, which are domestic in scope and neoliberal in philosophy. As a result, global financial integration has been promoted without paying adequate attention to prudential mechanisms on a global scale. The “paradigm dependence” embedded in the neoliberal doctrine still remains as the basic systemic fault line even after the crisis, because the post-2008 discussions on financial regulation do not adequately concentrate on the deep-seated phenomena of financialization and under-regulation. On the contrary, the lackluster solution proposals fall short of digging deeper on the structural causes of the recent debacle. The ambitious statements of G20 leaders during the initial phases of the financial crisis were gradually replaced by orthodox rhetoric and perennial tug-of-wars at international summits turned into business as usual.

The other structural component of the recent global financial crisis is the systemic deficits/surpluses, the oft-mentioned global imbalances, and the legitimacy crisis of the global governance mechanisms. During the 2000s, trade and financial flows expanded spectacularly, economic growth was kept extraordinarily robust and inflation and interest rates were caged at tolerable levels. The seemingly favorable global economic conditions, however, were impeded by two major developments that distorted global equilibrium. The first development was the asymmetric growth of current account deficits among countries. In this regard, the tug-of-war between the world’s biggest economies, the U.S. and China, deserves major emphasis. Over the last decade, U.S. economic growth has increasingly depended on current account deficit, which is mainly financed through the astonishingly high savings of emerging countries, mainly lead by China. As we demonstrate in the following figure, in this period, the U.S. current account deficit and China’s current account surplus have become the two faces of the same coin.

The asymmetric growth of current account balances was in fact the result of unsustainable growth models pursued by U.S. and Chinese policy-makers. The consumption-led growth deteriorated saving rates in the U.S., whereas the Chinese gradually increased their savings as a result of their export-oriented and consumption-discouraging domestic economic policies. According to one perspective dominant in U.S. policy circles, “the high
savings of China, oil exporters and other surplus countries depressed global interest rates, leading investors to scramble for yield and under-price risk.”\textsuperscript{11} The “global saving glut”, in Bernanke’s jargon, has pushed the interest rates down and encouraged investors to borrow at cheaper rates but invest in riskier assets.\textsuperscript{12} Not surprisingly, the U.S. Treasury is one of the primary actors in this scramble. Though the exact linkages between global imbalances and global economic crisis remain to be clarified, what is quite obvious is that the over-consumption by Western countries led by the U.S. and over-saving by Pacific states led by China proved unsustainable and nothing meaningful has been accomplished to address these global imbalances in the post-2008 era. On the contrary, the diverging opinions between Chinese and American policy-makers in terms of appropriate exchange-rate policies and a reorientation of Chinese growth toward domestic demand have so far dominated international summits. Therefore, the improvement of a coordinated response to large-scale global imbalances remains an urgent necessity because as Obstfeld and Rogoff succinctly put it, in the incoming years, “the Asian model of export growth becomes more problematic if the U.S. is no longer the world’s borrower of last resort.”\textsuperscript{13}

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\caption{Current account surplus/deficit, China vs. U.S. (% of GDP, 1996-2010)}
\textit{Source: IMF}
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\textsuperscript{13} Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes”, 35.
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Second, the global economic growth was fuelled in an unsustainable manner due to the increasing debt leverage of advanced economies. The mounting levels of debt in many countries in this period, especially in developed Western states, significantly contributed to global imbalances. The global economic meltdown and the accompanying government bailouts paradoxically led to further deterioration of global macroeconomic balances. In this context, the policy responses to the recent crisis did not alleviate the problem of global asymmetries; on the contrary, the asymmetric debt burden turned into a new risk factor that opened up new fault lines because the aggregate debt of advanced economies is projected to rise from 18.1 trillion dollars in 2007 to 29.5 trillion dollars in 2011, and is expected to increase to 41.3 trillion dollars in 2016. The same numbers for emerging market economies will not be more than 3.8 trillion dollars, 4.9 trillion dollars, and 6.7 trillion dollars, respectively. In other words, the ratio of aggregate debt to aggregate GDP for advanced economies will rise from 46 percent in 2007 to 70 percent in 2011 and further to 80 percent in 2016.

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*Source:* Brookings and Financial Times
The corresponding ratios for emerging market economies are just 28 percent, 26 percent, and 21 percent, respectively.\(^\text{14}\)

The deepening global imbalances in terms of systemic deficits/surpluses and the asymmetric debt burden dispersed throughout the world economy underpinned the legitimacy crisis of global economic governance as well. The established international financial institutions have legitimacy problems due to the asymmetric representation mechanisms. These financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank have taken their roots from the Bretton Woods architecture and represent the perspective of U.S. hegemony in terms of institutional mindset and voting-principles. Although much water has passed under the bridge over the last two decades and the global economic ground has shifted dramatically, the newly rising BRICS is still being underrepresented in these organizations. The recent amendments of the IMF and World Bank put forward after the Pittsburgh G20 summit in 2009 are nothing more than mere lip service paid by established powers in order to mitigate the voices pointing out governance asymmetries in the global economy. Given the growing importance of emerging markets’ contribution to world economic output, trade, and finance, these new power blocs demand a stronger political voice at international platforms so as to stand on an equal and just footing with their Western counterparts. Their demands have so far fallen into the deaf ears of core capitalist economies. Yet, global governance is a double-edged sword for emerging powers as well because power sharing also means accepting new responsibilities in terms of burden sharing. Understandably proud of their strategic capitalist model, the newly rising powers have little incentive to change their policy preferences so that they are “expected to continue playing hard ball in global trade and environmental talks”.\(^\text{15}\) For example, BRICS does not show an eager stance to take more responsibility in improving the global coordination problems in economic, political, and environmental realms and drags its foot in reducing surpluses to make it easier for Western economies to diminish their huge deficits. Therefore, the governance of the global economy still skids around in a cul-de-sac in the post-2008 process, thereby representing more of the same vis-à-vis the pre-crisis period.

### 3. Explaining the Persistence of Structural Continuities

Having taken the “proximate changes” and “structural continuities” into consideration simultaneously, the global financial crisis makes us face a peculiar paradox: The unprecedented government bailouts and coordinated public interventions created a sense of “difference” in terms of dealing with the crisis effectively. The necessary steps were taken quickly to mitigate the proximate causes of the global turmoil. However, proximate changes overshadowed the underlying structural problems of global economic governance and made it practically impossible to strongly tackle the deep-rooted causes of the recent economic fluctuation. It is hardly possible to argue that the crisis opened up an adequate epistemological space to discuss the material and intellectual fundamentals of a possible “paradigm shift.” The main

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characteristics of the post-crisis discussions, consequently, still revolve around the orthodox paradigm. In fact, the post-2008 discussions resemble “paradigm dependence” more than a “paradigm shift.” A puzzlement that this study aims to solve arises here: Why and how has the conventional wisdom survived and reproduced its intellectual hegemony even after the “most devastating economic crisis” since the Great Depression? The rest of this paper concentrates on three main reasons to explain this “paradigm dependence” by scrutinizing these points in detail.

3.1. ‘Not widespread, deep, and long enough’

One of the immediate reasons for the persistence of structural problems is directly related to the intensity level of the recent global economic crisis. This becomes a more palpable fact especially in comparison to the Great Depression of 1929. If we borrow from Kindleberger, the recent global crisis is not as “widespread, deep, and long” as the Great Depression.\(^{16}\) First of all, the world economy had shrunk in 2009 by merely less than 1 percent. The total export volume declined 10.5 percent, yet it quickly recovered in a year’s time.

![Image: The “Depth” of Global Financial Crisis (World, % change)]

*Source: IMF*

The impact of the global crisis is more profound on developed economies in the sense that the contraction in G7 economies is more than 3.5 percent with an accompanying export decline of almost 15 percent. Nevertheless, the advanced economies also quickly recovered in 2010 and the prospects of growth turned positive.

The intensity of the shocks and the depth of the crisis is the key independent vari-

able in attracting people’s attention to the structural problems rather than satisfied with shallow proximate changes. In the Great Depression of 1929, it was the depth of the economic shock that enabled people to overcome the interregnum threshold and search for alternatives to the existing mechanisms.\textsuperscript{17} In three years’ time, up to Roosevelt’s declaration of a four-day bank holiday in March 1933, thousands of banks failed, destructive deflation set in, and output plunged. In the Great Depression, the average length of time over which output fell was 4.1 years and countries took an average of ten years to increase their output back to pre-crisis levels. The rate of unemployment in the U.S. rose from 3.2 percent to 24.9 percent.\textsuperscript{18} The protectionist tendencies intensified remarkably as a result of which President Hoover approved the Hawley-Smoot Tariff that sharply raised duties on a large variety of items imported into the U.S. in the early 1930s.\textsuperscript{19} In comparative perspective, however, the impact of the recent economic crisis is not as “widespread, deep, and long” as the Great Depression. One of the reasons for this puzzlement is the proactive interventionist policies and huge bailout packages implemented by national authorities. The Federal Reserve and Treasury intervened in the markets at an early time when it was not even clear whether the economy had plunged into a recession. The “learning effect” of the Great Depression for the U.S. authorities is striking. Moreover, the coordinated response of central banks all around the world avoided an acute liquidity crisis in the financial system. Ironically, the proximate measures taken immediately after the crisis created a psychological atmosphere to overlook

the structural problems. The swift yet unsustainable economic recovery in this sense alleviated the legitimacy crisis of the existing economic system without fixing the root causes of the global economic turmoil.\(^{20}\)

### 3.2. The rigidity of mainstream ideas

The other important factor that underpins the structural continuities is the rigidity of mainstream ideas, which has developed an unshakable belief in the self-adjusting mechanisms of financial markets. Having taken its roots from neoclassical economics, orthodox ideas relied on the efficient market hypothesis that argues that the prices of traded goods reflect all the information available. In the financial realm, the “perfectly competitive markets”\(^{21}\) assumption is taken to its extreme idealistic forms. The financial markets are regarded as highly competitive places in which information is symmetric/perfect and arbitrage opportunities are rare.\(^{22}\) Rational choice theory, efficient market hypothesis, and quantitative research methodology reinforced one another in the way that an intellectual consensus is established in the neoliberal era.\(^{23}\) The ideational contours of mainstream economics are framed in such a way that two points have become the standard norms in economics courses. First, dominant economic models heavily relied on individual agents as completely rational and socially isolated actors that have no capacity to change their “preferences” in a socially interactive manner. Second, the markets were regarded as perfectly competitive places in which agents acted as “price-takers” devoid of all kinds of information asymmetries problems.\(^{24}\) The testable hypothesis and empirical analysis have turned out to be the standard approach of mainstream macroeconomic analysis over the years. Since formal modeling dominated the subject field, mainstream studies have concentrated on sophisticated, yet particularistic analysis of the events, as a result of which the social whole is left behind the scope of inquiry. The dominant approach to the study of finance, in this regard, has become more and more particularistic and despite its sophistication and methodological rigor mainstream economics failed to appreciate the risky transformation of financial markets during the neoliberal era. It is important to underline at this point that quantitative studies are quite useful in improving theory-testing in political economy, and do not pose any problem by themselves. The problem occurs when they pave the way for methodological blindness by ignoring the holistic approaches on grounds of finding them too wide-ranging and vague to be tested. The conventional wisdom of finance, unfortunately, has suffered from this kind of methodological bias at least due to two main reasons. First, in terms of financialization and global financial

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\(^{20}\) It is important to underline that “swift recovery” is different than “sustainable recovery.” The recovery after the recent crisis is swift but proved unsustainable. Therefore a possible “double dip” in the following months may change the entire story.


crisis, mainstream political economy reasoning did not ask the relevant questions due to the methodological constraint; therefore, “[it] leaves too much out [and] in its preference for reductionism, risks limiting our vision to individual trees.” Putting the issue another way, the very methodology has determined the questions to be asked in the subject field. Not surprisingly, the relevant big questions on financialization and global financial crises were not asked by the orthodox perspectives. Instead, the technicalities of the financial instruments such as pricing derivatives, futures, and forwards dominated the research agenda without recognizing their destructive potential as “war machines.” Wade felicitously captures this problematic:

[Orthodox analysis] should be alert to the dangers of elevating formalization and quantification as primary criteria for the selection of research subjects. When the existence of a ‘data set’ suitable for rigorous analysis becomes an almost necessary condition for selection, big questions and propositions not amenable to ‘rigor’ get marginalized… It is like unraveling a colorful tapestry in order to end up with piles of different color wools. It prompts the question, ‘I see your bridle, but where is your horse?’

Second, as Krugman underscores, the neoclassical approach lacks both a temporal and spatial dimension and assumes that economic activities take place in an abstract universe devoid of history and geography. Having relied on neoclassical methodology, conventional wisdom has become more prone to study finance within the context of a static taken-for-granted approach and ignored the historical evolution of the financial markets over the last three decades. The methodological individualism, as a consequence, has not enabled pundits to develop a comprehensive approach in discovering vital interaction between the state and financial markets on the one hand, and its system-wide repercussions on the other. The “dominance of technique over substance,” in Hodgson’s terms, has prioritized the tools of analysis instead of the historical, institutional, and ideational context in which research questions about economic crises arise.

The mainstream economic reasoning, consequently, left no room for the possibility of financial bubbles and irrational market exuberance. In the case of bubbles and short-term disequilibria, state intervention is dismissed in favor of self-attributed market dynamics as

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the most efficient adjustment mechanisms.\textsuperscript{31} Hence, the question of financialization as a structural phenomenon and its broader socio-economic repercussions was never taken into the mainstream political economists’ research agenda. Even though four years have passed since the beginning of the global financial crisis, it is still too difficult for conventional perspectives to meet this burning reality.

3.3. The power of the Wall Street lobby
The ideational rigidity by itself, however, is not capable of explaining the persistence of structural continuities. The vested interests and institutional embeddedness of the financial lobby also play their role in the regulatory tug-of-war. From this point of view, rather than appropriately discussing proposals for a solution, the point is to thrash out the possibility of putting alternatives into practice due to the naked fact that it is truly a herculean task to circumvent the incumbent anti-reform lobby clustered around Wall Street operators. The anti-reformist Wall Street lobby’s intense power stems from three interrelated yet separate sources, which are material resources and lobbying power, links between public authorities and financial actors, and intellectual superiority.\textsuperscript{32} In terms of material resources and lobbying power, the thirty-year long neoliberal policies have tilted the power balance decisively in favor of the financial elites. The financial deregulation of the 1980s that scrapped capital controls opened up a large room for the investment banks to expand their trading capabilities and accrue huge amounts of profits. Consequently, proprietary trading in financial assets on their behalf has become the central activity for investment banks. By the end of 1990s, trading income was a third bigger than income from commissions for trading on behalf of others, and five investment banks with more than 4 trillion dollars worth of assets had become the key players in the New Wall Street System.\textsuperscript{33} Similarly, the after-tax profits of financial companies jumped from below 5 percent of total corporate profits in 1982 to 41 percent in 2007.\textsuperscript{34} The hitherto secondarily important financial firms have turned out to be the so-called “masters of the universe.” In this conjuncture, Charlie Wilson’s famous gaffe of the 1950s, “What’s good for General Motors is good for the country,” was gradually replaced by the motto of “What is good for Wall Street is ‘all that matters’.”\textsuperscript{35} Since financial elites have become the foremost benefactors of neoliberal globalization and an unregulated financial system, they have gained the upper hand by sustaining the status quo via intense campaign financing and lobbying activities. The financial sector spent 1.7 billion dollars in federal election campaigns and 3.4 billion dollars to lobby federal officials between 1998 and 2008.\textsuperscript{36} Therefore, every bold reform proposal today hits the anti-regulatory coalition

\textsuperscript{34} Martin Wolf, “Why it is so Hard to Keep the Financial Sector Caged,” \textit{Financial Times}, February 5, 2008.
\textsuperscript{35} David Harvey, \textit{A Brief History of Neoliberalism} (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2005), 33.
clustered around key posts in “Wall Street-Washington corridors”.37 One striking example is the January 2010 reform proposal, the oft-mentioned “Volcker Rule” by which U.S. President Barack Obama and his economic team called “for new restrictions on the size and scope of banks and other financial institutions to rein in excessive risk taking and to protect taxpayers.”38 Obama’s ambitious assault paved the way for the next round of lobby wars in the U.S., and in a short time period, it became apparent that implementing bold reforms by way of circumventing the Wall Street lobby is not child’s play.

The second source of Wall Street lobby’s power stems from links between public authorities and financial actors. Over the last thirty years, the combined effects of prevailing ideas and intense lobbying activities resulted in the “extraordinary harmony between Wall Street operators and Washington regulators”.39 For example, many Goldman Sachs alumni like Robert Rubin, Henry Paulson, and William C. Dudley have taken up key posts at the Treasury and the Federal Reserve. The close connections between public authorities and private financial firms created a “regulatory capture” in the sense that “bureaucrats, regulators and politicians cease to serve some notion of a wider collective public interest and begin to systematically favor vested interests, usually the very interests they were supposed to regulate and restrain for the wider public interest”.40 Due to the overlapping interests and parallel mindsets between public authorities and financial actors, the decisions beneficial for a small cluster of financial firms are assumed to be beneficial for the entire economy. The international organizations, in this period, have become the staunch supporters of abolishing all kind of barriers to capital flows. For example, the International Monetary Fund amended its Articles of Agreement “to make the promotion of capital account liberalization a specific purpose of the IMF” in May 1997.41 At the state level, the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated investment banks and depository banks in the U.S., was formally repealed in 1999. By doing so, financial globalization was boosted by facilitating the growth of a shadow banking system of hedge funds, mortgage funds, and other similar special investment vehicles.42 Other leaders of developed countries joined the U.S. in liberalizing the institutional designs of their financial markets. British Labor Party leaders, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, subsequently declared their strategy to create “not only light but also limited regulation” in the UK financial system.43

The third source of the Wall Street lobby’s power stems from the attitudes of orthodox scholars. Many influential financial political economists bandwagon the “Wall Street-

4. Revisiting the Paradox of Global Financial Crisis

This article has examined the 2007-08 global economic turmoil, a crisis which many experts agree to be the biggest economic crisis we have experienced since the Great Depression. It stresses that the short-term measures and global interventions used to counter the crisis were integrated and concerted in a way which had not been the case in previous crises. However, this study proceeds by establishing the fact that the policy measures taken were short term in orientation, and that in the fight against the structural elements which contributed to the crisis of neoliberal globalization, the reforms agreed upon as necessary at international platforms, including the G20, lacked the courage and determination that was needed. We aim to resolve the paradox that the reforms were also short term, incremental, and piecemeal, despite the depth of the crisis and offer an explanation relying on three independent variables which were interconnected. This account subjects the structural problems of neoliberal globalization to thorough criticism and argues that attempts to create a political base to counter the effects of the crisis, as happened after the Great Depression, were insufficient because (1) compared to the Great Depression, the recent crisis has not been sufficiently “long, wide-spread, and deep.” Instead, in the post-crisis process, the risk of recession in the form of a “creeping crisis” has established itself as the basic characteristic of the global economic system; (2) the recent crisis has come up against the sturdy walls of the dominant economic paradigm, but it has not been able to open an intellectual breach in the walls of neoclassical economic paradigm so as to create breathing space for alternative paradigms. Finally, (3)

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46 Ben Fine, “Neo-liberalism in Retrospect- It’s Financialization, Stupid,” (paper prepared for Conference on Developmental Politics in the Neoliberal Era and Beyond, Center for Social Sciences, Seoul National University, 22-24 October 2009).
well-established power blocs within the system, which it would be appropriate to call the Wall Street lobby, have opposed comprehensive structural reforms with all their might and have been largely successful in their efforts.

What have we learned from the first global crisis of the 21st century and what sort of morals for the future of neoliberal globalization can be extracted from these lessons? Three points which arise from this article need to be stressed. First, the global economic crisis demonstrates the importance of preserving the balance between industry and finance in the globalizing world. Financial growth occurring independent of industrial production and not keeping step with real economic growth, i.e., “financialization,” has turned out to be the Achilles’ heel of economic globalization in a most striking fashion. Excessive dependence on finance has shown a face in the central countries of the capitalist system which creates an instability that stretches far beyond the prevailing economic theories that capital would be directed from unproductive channels into more productive ones. Consequently, in order to achieve sustainable economic growth and a non-damaging form of globalization, there must be top priority efforts at every economic platform, notably the G20, to reverse the process of financialization. Second, it is now clear that the efforts of a single hegemonic power or even of a single bloc are insufficient to achieve sustainable globalization. The newly rising economic forces in the world, notably China, should play a more active role in producing better-balanced sustainable economic growth—they need to roll up their sleeves. Because the two key actors linked in the global economic crisis and with structural imbalances such as an extreme surplus or deficit of savings, are the U.S. and China. As a result, neither the U.S. by itself nor the developed Western economies now possess the ability to effectively dispose of the global imbalances by themselves. This brings us to the third and most important point relating to the governance of the global economic system: the limits upon global governance. There is no doubt that the recent upsets have had a global aspect and that the structural reforms needed to cope with them also have a global characteristic. Thus the G20 has become an important platform because it offers a suitable base where developing countries can present their contributions. Yet short-term measures being invoked to cope with the crisis and the discussions held so far regarding reforms ironically demonstrate how very different the ideas held by G20 members are from one another when it comes to global governance and the future of the global economic system. Even among Western economies, there are serious differences regarding the form the financial system should take, but when countries like China, India, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey are added to the equation, then the differences in ideas and policies may become insurmountable. What is more, just when the world economy is experiencing a desperate need for global coordination, it has been found that the power of nation states has grown well beyond what it was in the period before the crisis. This is because at a time when rescue packages are paid out of the taxes collected from the people of nation states, leaders cannot leave the decision-making process in the hands of technocrats who do not have to worry about being re-elected or in those of politicians from other countries. Therefore, we are at a crossroads and facing challenging hurdles in establishing the stability of the world economy. As Gramsci put it, “the old order is dying and the new cannot be born.” When the constraints above are borne in mind, one must express concern over whether or not the birth, if it does indeed happen, will be very painful.
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Forcing Democracy: Is Military Intervention for Regime Change Permissible?

Müge Kınacıoğlu
Hacettepe University

Abstract

This article intends to go beyond the consequentialist utilitarian approaches to forcible regime change by addressing the question of forcing democracy-building from an angle of appropriateness. It aims to analyze the admissibility of pro-democratic military interventions in international society by focusing on the UN and state practice. Is military intervention to remove a tyrannical regime permissible in international law? To what extend does international society condone an outside force to impose a democratic regime? Does the practice of the UN Security Council in promotion of democracy by force point to an emerging norm with regards to expansive concept of humanitarian intervention? To analyze such questions, this article first provides for a discussion of the concept of intervention. Second, it overviews the normative framework of the use of force in international relations. It continues with the analysis of unilateral and multilateral pro-democratic military interventions, and the UN Security Council practice of condemning, authorizing or consequently endorsing democratic regime change in the target states. In the conclusion part, the article assesses the legality and legitimacy issue regarding the pro-democratic intervention and regime change in light of main norms enshrined in the UN Charter and in general international law.

Keywords: Pro-democratic interventions, use of force, regime change, legality, United Nations

1. Introduction

Since the end of superpower confrontation, several aspects of foreign military interventions have been subject of many scholarly works. The optimism of early 1990s about a functional UN collective security mechanism after repelling Iraq from Kuwait and the hopes for the willingness of the UN Security Council to take action to prevent humanitarian atrocities were followed by a more grim picture with the UN’s failure to thwart crimes against humanity in places like Rwanda. The US military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 and the inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003 after the phenomenal events of September 11, 2001, provoked further concerns regarding the new American security doctrine, namely preemptive self-defense, and the new security threats, particularly fundamentalist terrorism. In this context, democratization has increasingly come to be seen as part of the strategy to fight against terrorism. However, the question of whether or not democracy can be imposed by an outside force remained to be controversial. Most recently, the NATO military campaign against Libya has once again raised questions as to whether use of force is an effective tool to promote democracy.

Part of the debate has focused on the nature of the intervener. In this respect, some scholars analyzed whether or not broad multilateral coalition of democratic states, a single democratic state taking action on its own or a force under the UN make a difference regarding democracy building. One group of studies concerning the impact of intervention argued that although democratic interveners brought about democratic reform in the target states, in the long run, these democratic reforms would not lead to stable political systems.\(^1\) Another group of studies which addressed the question mainly from the angle of impact of interventions carried out by the United States, suggested that American military interventions did not generally bring democracy.\(^2\) Among the scholars analyzing the reasons why American military interventions usually failed to result in democratization, some identified the US military and political interests as the cause.\(^3\) Some others, on the other hand, contended that democratization did not follow, as it was imposed by an outside power. Yet another group maintained that under certain circumstances, the United States had been successful and effective in advancing democracy and liberal regimes.\(^4\) Finally, there is also work on how the intervener’s motives influence the institution-building in the target state.\(^5\) As such, the existing literature contributes significantly to the various aspects of the effect of military intervention on democratization. Notwithstanding the variety of such studies on the relationship between intervention and democratization, the legality and legitimacy issues regarding the use of force to change regimes remain far from settled.

This article intends to go beyond the consequentialist utilitarian approaches by addressing the question of forcing democracy-building from an angle of appropriateness. More precisely, rather than assessing whether military occupation can be a midwife to democracy, this article aims to analyze the admissibility of pro-democratic military interventions in international society by focusing on the UN Security Council.

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and state practice. Is military intervention to remove a tyrannical regime permissible in international law? To what extent does international society condone an outside force to impose a democratic regime? Does the practice of the UN Security Council in promotion of democracy by force point to an emerging norm with regards to expansive concept of humanitarian intervention? To analyze such questions, this article begins with a discussion and working definition of the concept of intervention. It then overviews the legal framework, within which use of force in international relations is governed. The following section addresses the question of whether there is a right to democratic governance by examining the debate for and against the use of force to liberate a country from a non-democratic regime. The article continues with the analysis of unilateral and multilateral pro-democratic military interventions, and the UN Security Council practice of condemning, authorizing or consequently endorsing democratic regime change in the target states. In the conclusion part, the article assesses the legality and legitimacy issue regarding the pro-democratic intervention and regime change in light of main norms enshrined in the UN Charter and in general international law.

2. Conceptual Framework

The concept of intervention is usually defined as the breach of sovereignty and encroachment of independence in international law. Thus, the norm proscribing intervention in the internal affairs of states has come to represent the flip side of the norm upholding sovereignty.\(^6\)

The leading legal scholar Hersch Lauterpacht defined intervention as the “dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things.”\(^7\) Generally speaking, international relations literature also reflects the legal-normative definition of the term. For example, Max Beloff argues that intervention is an attempt by one state aiming to “affect the internal structure and external behavior of other states through various degrees of coercion.”\(^8\) In this sense, intervention involves the activities that impair a state’s external independence or territorial authority by imposing a certain order of things on a state without its consent, thus violating its sovereignty. Similarly, one of the leading IR scholars, Hedley Bull defines intervention as “dictatorial or coercive interference in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an independent political community.”\(^9\) Bull argues that the target of intervention is the jurisdiction of a sovereign state, whereby “the jurisdiction that is being interfered with can be a state’s jurisdiction over its territory, its citizens, and its right to determine its internal affairs or to conduct its external relations.”\(^10\) One other significant discussion of intervention in


\(^{10}\) Ibid.
the literature is Rosenau’s attempt to operationalize the concept of intervention. During the 1960s’ behavioral approach to international relations, Rosenau argued that intervention was distinguished from other types of state activity by two characteristics. First, it represents a clear break with the prevailing pattern of relations between the intervening and target states; and second, it is essentially directed to either change or preserve the structure of political authority in the target state.11

For the purposes of the present article, drawing mainly upon the definitions of Rosenau and Bull, intervention is defined as the coercive interference of an external agency, whether a state, a group of states or an international body, in the internal affairs of another state in a manner that disturbs the conventional pattern of their relations, with the aim of rearranging its domestic political order, including its authority structure and domestic policies, in a particular fashion. To narrow the concept further for the context of this study, pro-democratic intervention is defined as the use of armed force by one state or group of states against another state—the target state—with the intention to change the government of that state in general, and the character of the political and legal institutions in particular. Therefore, in this article the key guides to the incidence of intervention for regime change are the organized physical transgression of the borders of a recognized sovereign state and the conception of intrusion in its domestic affairs.

A further conceptual delineation concerns the relationship between forcible regime change and humanitarian intervention. The difficulty arises from the fact that pro-democratic interventions are often addressed within the context of expanded version of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, in the final analysis, bringing a democracy to a state can be assumed to serve to ensure the basic human rights of the citizens of that state. However, use of force for humanitarian purposes does not necessarily include an intention to or end up with a regime change. One obvious example in this respect is the 1991 intervention in Northern Iraq. During the Operation Provide Comfort, the Allies set up a no-fly zone to protect the Kurds, but did not attempt to oust the Baath party regime of Saddam Hussein. Thus, in this article, the term pro-democratic intervention is distinguished from humanitarian intervention used in general and denotes the use of force with clear stated intention to topple the regime in power in the target state.

3. The Legal Framework

3.1. Use of force

Notwithstanding the prevalence of the incidents of intervention in international politics, under international law, it is firmly established that interference in domestic affairs of other states is an illegal act. Consequently, the debate on intervention in the scholarly literature has sought to discern exceptions to the rule of non-intervention. Thus, the question is whether removal of a tyrannical regime and building democracy qualify as an admissible ground for military intervention.

Within the UN Charter framework, the two most relevant provisions are Article 2 (4) and Article 2 (7), which concerns use of force by states and the principle of non-intervention in domestic matters respectively. Article 2 (4)\textsuperscript{12} requires that states refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. In this respect, Kelsen maintains that by establishing the obligation of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations, Article 2 (4) implies the obligation of states to refrain from intervention in the domestic matters of other states.\textsuperscript{13} The substantial majority of legal scholars attribute the norm contained in Article 2 (4) to a \textit{jus cogens} character.\textsuperscript{14} The \textit{jus cogens} status of Article 2 (4) is also confirmed in the \textit{Nicaragua} judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where it referred to statements by government representatives who considered the prohibition of force in Article 2 (4) as not only a principle of customary international law but also “a fundamental and cardinal principle of such law.”\textsuperscript{15} Nonetheless, the prohibition of force by states is not absolute. The UN Charter provides in Article 51 for an exception to this rule in relation to measures of collective and individual self-defense.\textsuperscript{16} Article 51 specifies the conditions under which individual states may resort to force.\textsuperscript{17}

With respect to the interference of the United Nations as an organization in the internal affairs of the member states, Article 2, paragraph 7 directs the organs of the UN to respect domestic affairs of states and lays down a principle of non-intervention.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Article 2 (4) reads as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
  \item \textit{Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua} (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports (1986), para. 190.
  \item In addition to these, there are two other exceptions to Article 2 (4). The changed circumstances however, since then, have rendered the above exceptions practically void. Hence, for the purposes of the study, force used in self-defense and force authorized by the Security Council are presumed to be the two exceptions pertinent under current international standards. For an elaboration of other exceptions, see for example, Brownlie, \textit{International Law}, 336-337; Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, \textit{International Law and the Use of Force, Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm} (London. Routledge, 1993), 32-33; Bruno Simma, ed., \textit{The Charter of the United Nations} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 119; Hüseyin Pazarç, \textit{Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, IV. Kitap} (Lectures in International Law, Book IV), (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2000), 121.
  \item Article 51 states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
  \item Article 2 (7) reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”
\end{itemize}
In this sense, it represents “an interpretative guideline” for UN organs in “dealing with matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.” The enforcement measures under Chapter VII which includes resort to force, represent the only exception provided by the Charter to the rule of non-intervention in domestic affairs stipulated in Article 2 (7). Thus, the United Nations system, while prohibiting the threat and use of force by states, designates the United Nations as the sole authority able to use force legitimately as a means of maintaining international peace and security. In other words, the Charter places the right of resort to force under the monopoly of the United Nations except in self-defense.

Under Chapter VII, the Security Council is first required to determine whether a “threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” exists before it can take measures pursuant to Chapter VII (Article 39). Chapter VII does not, however, furnish explicit definitions as to what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. It leaves this completely to the judgment of the Security Council. Hence, as one scholar notes, “a threat to the peace is whatever the Security Council says is a threat to the peace.” Nor does Article 39 qualify the threat to, or the breach of “international” peace. In spite of the stated aim of maintaining or restoring “international” peace, it refers to “any” threat to peace. Consequently, according to the wording of the article, the Security Council’s definition of a threat to peace does not need to derive from instances that are specified in Article 2 (4). To put it in other words, a threat to peace does not necessarily have to be a conflict between two states. Moreover, read in conjunction with Article 2 (7), the Organization is authorized to intervene in matters of domestic jurisdiction in cases where there is judged to be a threat to, or breach of, the peace as determined by the Security Council in accordance with Article 39. Therefore, a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression may well be extended to include domestic affairs, such as civil war, violations of human rights, or the existence of a repressive regime. In this context, Article 39 leaves it to the exclusive discretion of the Security Council to decide what factors constitute a threat to, or breach of international peace and against whom the enforcement action for the maintenance or restoration of the international peace is to be carried out. In practice, on many occasions, the Security Council has found a number of such situations as constituting a threat to or breach of peace. In this sense, Article 39, combined with Articles 41 and 42 which state non-military and military measures respectively, implies the “forcible interference in the sphere of a state.” As a result, the notions “threat to peace, breach of the peace” permit a highly subjective interpretation, compared to, for example, the “threat or use of force” under Article 2 (4), which is a more “objectively determinable conduct.”

20 Article 39 reads: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decided what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
23 Ibid., 735.
24 Ibid., 737.
Hence, by allowing for only one condition as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force i.e. self-defense, the Charter has considerably confined the scope of what are considered legitimate self-help measures. On the other hand, while the UN Charter is restrictive with respect to the use of force by states, it is fairly open-ended when it comes to the use of force and intervention by the UN itself.

In addition to the UN Charter, from the very inception of the United Nations, the General Assembly has repetitively underlined the non-intervention principle as the principle duty of states. For example, Article 3 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States of 6 December 1949, stated that: “Every state has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal and external affairs of the any other state.”25 The duty of non-intervention in internal affairs was strongly emphasized in subsequent resolutions. In Peace Through Deeds Resolution for example, the General Assembly condemns “the intervention of a State in the internal affairs of another state for the purpose of changing its legally established government by the threat or use of force.”26 The 1957 Resolution of Peaceful and Neighbourly Relations among States reiterates the duty of non-intervention as one of the main principles the Charter was based on.27

General Assembly Resolution 2131, the Declaration on the Admissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty adopted in 1965, provides the first detailed formulation of the principle:

“No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal and external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned.”28

The following paragraphs further condemn the use of “economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State,” subversion, and all other forms of indirect intervention. Specifically, the second operative paragraph is relevant for the purposes of the present article. It declares that:

“No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.”

The question of definition of the duty of non-intervention was also taken up in the drafting of the Resolution 2625, which aimed to outline the fundamental principles of inter

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25 UN General Assembly (GA) Res. 375 (IV), Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States (6 December 1949).
26 UN GA Res. 380 (V), Peace Through Deeds (17 November 1950).
27 UN GA Res. 1236 (XII), Peaceful and Neighbourly Relations among States (14 December 1957).
28 UN GA Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty (21 December 1965).
The subsequent Declaration of Principles of International Law of 1970 adopts essentially the same definition of non-intervention as that provided in Resolution 2131. It links “the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other State” with the international peace and security. Restating the principle concerning “the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State,” it additionally proclaims that acts of “armed intervention and all other forms of interference” constitute violation of international law.\(^{29}\) The following Resolution 2734 on the Strengthening of International Security once again calls upon all States “not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.”\(^{30}\)

The principle of non-intervention was further developed in a more detailed way in the 1981 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of the States. Regarding the “full observance of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal and external affairs of States” as having the utmost significance for the “maintenance of international peace and security,” and violation of it as a “threat to the freedom of peoples, the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of States” as well as to “their political, economic, social and cultural development,” the Resolution embarks on a detailed elaboration of the scope of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal and external affairs of States, and prescribes a series of specific duties. According to it, states are:

“…to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever…to disrupt the political, social or economic order of another State, to overthrow or change the political system of another State or its Government…, to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at another State or group of States, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of another State.”\(^{31}\)

As such, intervention in the internal affairs in general and intervention to oust the political system of another state in particular is condemned in a number of General Assembly resolutions.\(^{32}\) Although General Assembly resolutions are not binding over states, there is a general agreement on the authoritative character of the resolutions on notions like intervention, self-determination and human rights. In this respect, they are argued to represent concrete interpretations of the Charter and assertions of general international law.\(^{33}\)

\(^{29}\) UN GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1970).

\(^{30}\) UN GA Res. 2734 (XXV), Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (16 December 1970).

\(^{31}\) UN GA Res. 36/103, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of the States (9 December 1981).

\(^{32}\) Among other resolutions that emphasized the principle of non-intervention are UN GA Res. 34/103, Inadmissibility of the Policy of Hegemonism in International Relations (14 December 1979) and UN GA Res. 37/10, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (15 November 1982).

Judgments of International Court of Justice also support this view. For example, in the *Nicaragua* case, the Court referred to Resolution 2131 and Resolution 2625 as reflecting customary law.34

### 3.2. Right to democratic governance and intervention for regime change

After the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy was championed to be the dominant ideology.35 It has been contended since then that notable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world. One prominent law scholar, for example, maintained that there was a newly emerging law which called for democracy to validate governance and thus, democratic entitlement was transformed from a mere moral obligation to an international legal norm.36

Within the UN Charter framework, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms forms the very basis for democratic entitlement.37 In this respect, UN has increasingly supported democratic governance particularly within peacekeeping activities. Notwithstanding, use of force for democratization remains quite problematic as the principle of nonintervention is firmly embedded in the present international system despite the changes in the aftermath of the Cold War.

One of the most earliest and ardent proponents of pro-democratic intervention, Michael Reisman argued that liberating a country from an oppressor would not conflict with Article 2 (4), for the use of force would not have been aimed at the political independence and territorial integrity of the target state. Rather, such interventions, Reisman contended, would improve opportunities for self-determination. Thus, he called for a fundamental reinterpretation of Article 2 (4) that would provide states with a unilateral right to overthrow despotic governments or leaders in a state.38 The opponents on the other hand, typically argue that such a doctrine of pro-democratic intervention would provide the most powerful states with an unconstrained power to oust the governments allegedly repressive and nondemocratic.39 Further, it is maintained that foreign armed intervention for regime change in fact exemplifies use of force against the political independence of the target state, regardless of its internal political structure, since it contradicts with the spirit of Article 2 (4) and its clear intention to prohibit unilateral resort to force on *just war* premises by deeming the Security Council as the only authority to use force in circumstances other than self-defense, not to mention several General Assembly declarations and ICJ decisions.40 In this respect, one prominent legal scholar...
points out that using force for changing the government of another state might be considered aggression, since such uses of force for “value extension” is prohibited under Article 2 (4) and resort to force is only allowed for “value conservation.”

Another argument in support of pro-democratic intervention rests on a notion of sovereignty based on people rather than states. According to this liberal view, international rights of governments stem from the rights and interests of the individuals that make up the state. Only representative governments have international rights, since in view of this Kantian account of the state, the ultimate ethical agents are not states but individuals who vest in governments the obligation to secure basic human rights. It follows that tyrannical governments are deprived of the protection accorded to them through sovereignty by international law. In other words, “tyranny and anarchy cause the moral col-lapse of sovereignty.” Hence, this view holds that “any nation with the will and the resources may intervene to protect the population of another nation against … tyranny.”

For the liberal account, democracy appears to be both a cause for peace and a reason for war. It should be noted that the idea that international community should oppose tyranny and prevent violations of fundamental human rights is usually presented in connection with the general arguments put forward for the right to humanitarian intervention.

Nonetheless, ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment founded that there is no unilateral right to intervene on the basis of political and moral considerations:

[[t]here have been in recent years a number of instances of foreign intervention for the benefit of forces opposed to the government of another State...It has to consider whether there might be indications of a practice illustrative of belief in a kind of general right for States to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in another State, whose cause appear particularly worthy by reason of the political and moral values with which it was identified. For such a general right to come to existence would involve a fundamental modification of the customary law principle of non-intervention.]

In addition to the international litigation, the opponents further point out that although the idea of sovereignty has changed to a certain extent since the adoption of the UN

43 Ibid., 96. For a similar view, see also W. Michael Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,” American Journal of International Law 84 (1990): 866-76.
44 Anthony D’Amato, “The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny,” American Journal of International Law 84 (1990): 519.
Charter, it is still not clear that democracy has replaced peace as the main interest of the UN and of the international normative order. Moreover, it is not clearly articulated how “democratic governance” as a right might reign over a peremptory, *jus cogens* rule, namely prohibition of the use of force.\(^{47}\)

One of the most recent reformulations of the issue of intervention on behalf of people under a repressive regime is the concept of the “responsibility to protect,” which suggest that it is not the “right to intervene” of any state, but “responsibility to protect” of every state “in the event of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.”\(^{48}\) In the context of “responsibility to protect” however, military intervention should be considered as a last resort and authorized by the Security Council.

4. The Practice

4.1. Unilateral pro-democratic interventions

The state practice during the Cold War does not point to a general acceptance of unilateral military interventions for regime change. The most illustrative cases are the United States’ interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965) and Panama (1989), as well as the United States and East Caribbean intervention in Grenada (1983), whereby the interventions were justified among others, on the grounds that they aimed to “reinstate order” or “restore democracy.”

After the overthrow of the freely elected government in the Dominican Republic by a civilian junta in 1963, the US troops landed in the country in 1965. In the Security Council, the US representative asserted that the US action was undertaken due to the collapse of law and order in the Dominican Republic. The US justifications were rejected by most of the states. States condemning the intervention laid emphasis on the principle of non-intervention.\(^{49}\) On the other hand, the French representative expressed that the intervention seemed to have been undertaken “against those who claimed to have constitutional legality.”\(^{50}\) Nonetheless, a Soviet resolution calling for the withdrawal of US forces was voted down.\(^{51}\)

The alleged legal grounds for the US and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States’ (OECS) intervention in Grenada in 1983 paralleled to those presented in the Dominican case: consent of the target state, protection of nationals and regional peacekeeping action.\(^{52}\) Nevertheless, the justification based on invitation by the Governor-General of Grenada was more emphasized in this case, for at the time of intervention, as opposed to the Dominican internal situation of full-scale conflict, there was only a general internal unrest

\(^{47}\) Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, “‘You the People’,” 269.


\(^{49}\) *UN Yearbook* (1965), 140-45.


\(^{51}\) *UN Yearbook* (1965), 147.

in Grenada. Thus, the initial US justifications did not include a doctrine of pro-democratic intervention. However, it was later revealed that the military action was carried out in order to free the people of Grenada from a military dictatorship. The operation was condemned even by close US allies. For example, depriving the intervention, France pointed out that international law and the UN Charter authorized intervention only in response to a request from the legitimate authorities of a country, or upon a decision of the Security Council. Also, British government stated that it regarded the US action as clearly illegal because “the invitation had come from those not entitled to make such a request on behalf of Grenada.”

A number of states underlined that the armed intervention had denied the people of Grenada the right to self-determination. As to the US argument of restoration of peace and order, the Polish representative, for example, characterizing the US action as aggression, expressed his government’s regret that the US had presented “violation of basic norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations” as “restoration of peace and order.” In the Security Council, the norms referred to by the majority of states condemning the intervention in the Assembly debate were prohibition of the use of force, prohibition of any act of aggression, the rule of non-intervention and the rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of states so as to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination. However, as in the Dominican Republic case, the overwhelming condemnation could not be translated to a corresponding Council resolution, which would have deplored the intervention as violation of international law and the independence of Grenada due to the US veto. Nonetheless, a General Assembly resolution was adopted, which condemned the intervention as a “flagrant violation of international law and the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Grenada, and reaffirmed the “sovereign and inalienable right of Grenada freely to determine its own political, economic and social system.”

The case of Panama differs from the above cases with the absence of an internal conflict at the time of the intervention, but relevant to the extent that the United States also claimed, among others, to have been invited to restore democracy by the democratic government that had sworn at a US base some thirty minutes before the intervention.

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55 UN Yearbook (1983), 212.
57 Among those were Yugoslavia, Guatemala, Venezuela, UN Yearbook (1983), 211-13.
58 UN Doc. S/PV.2489 (26 October 1983), 21.
59 UN Yearbook (1983), 214-216.
60 Draft resolution sponsored by Guyana, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, S/16077.Rev.1 (27 October 1983). Failed by 11 votes in favor, 1 against (United States) with 3 abstentions (Togo, United Kingdom, Zaire).
61 UN Doc. A/RES/38/7 (2 November 1983).
began.\textsuperscript{63} Defending democracy in Panama was therefore one of the justifications US presented.\textsuperscript{64} Although the US did not argue for a legal right to use force to restore democratic governments, during the Security Council debate, the US representative asserted that it was the “sovereign will of the Panamanian people” that they were defending, and that the US was seeking to support their pursuit of democracy, peace and freedom.\textsuperscript{65} The Panama intervention was condemned by the Soviet Union as a “flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and the norms of relations between states.” The intervention was also condemned by a large majority of the Latin American states.\textsuperscript{66} Despite this wide disapproval of states, in the Security Council, a draft resolution condemning the US intervention failed.\textsuperscript{67} A similar resolution was, however, adopted by the General Assembly. Recalling Article 2 (4) and the right of a state to determine freely its social, economic and political system and to conduct its foreign relations without any form of foreign intervention and interference, the resolution strongly deplored the intervention in Panama.\textsuperscript{68} Many criticized the US claim to justify the action as a means to restore democracy in Panama as violating international norms of the use of force.\textsuperscript{69}

Common to all these cases of military intervention is the alleged aim of restoring order or democracy, among others. In this respect, in all the interventions above, the United States seems to have based its claims on a broad interpretation of Article 2 (4), as reflected by the statement of the US representative, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, during the Grenada intervention, who at the time argued that “the prohibitions against the use of force in the UN Charter are contextual and not absolute,” and that the language “or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” in Article 2 (4) provides “ample justification for the use of force in pursuit of other values also inscribed in the Charter–freedom,

\textsuperscript{63} For the details of the reinstatement of Guillermo Endara, who was widely held to have won the May 1989 presidential elections, whose results were annulled by General Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian dictator, see “US Invasion and Installation of Endara Government” and “Inauguration of President Endara – Confirmation of Election Results,” Keesing’s 35 (December 1989), accessed July 2011, http://www.keesings.com.

\textsuperscript{64} For all US justifications, see UN Doc. S/PV.2899 (20 December 1989), 31.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 36.


\textsuperscript{67} Draft resolution submitted by Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and Yugoslavia, failed to be adopted by 10 (joining the sponsoring countries were Brazil, China and USSR) to 4 (Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States) with 1 abstention (Finland), UN Doc. S/21048 (22 December 1989).

\textsuperscript{68} UN Doc. A/RES/44/240 (29 December 1989). The resolution passed with 75 votes in favor and 20 against with 40 abstentions. Among the countries voting against were mostly the Western states, but also Dominica, El Salvador, Israel, Turkey and Japan. Abstaining countries were mainly the African states.

democracy, peace.”70 Nevertheless, the states’ responses and the UN practice did not lend support to a general right of unilateral pro-democratic intervention. On the contrary, it was maintained that the US interventions were not compatible neither with the norms governing the use of force between states. The UN reactions further demonstrate that enforcing universal values as such is not perceived as superseding the right of every people freely to choose their own form of government without outside interference. In this respect, commenting on the US invasion of Panama, Farer maintains that since the central structural principle of the postwar international legal system is the “equal sovereignty for all nation-states,”

“One state cannot compromise another state’s territorial integrity or dictate the character or the occupants of its governing institutions. If the law allows any exception to this constraint on state behavior, surely it is only where the exception is required to preserve the rule.”71

It appears from above analysis that even when the issue is the enforcement of generally accepted virtuous values like peace, order and democracy, military action is not considered legal under the present norms governing use of force. Lack of support other of countries further confirms that there is no demonstrable evidence for opinio juris, sufficient to change the existing legal regime of the use of force.

4.2. Multilateral pro-democratic interventions

After the Cold War, with revitalization of the Security Council, the Security Council authorized collective action to restore democratically elected government in two cases –Haiti and Sierra Leone- whereby it determined the existence of a threat of international peace and security. Although in these instances, the Security Council undertook action particularly for the principle of democratic entitlement; its decisions are far from being explicit with regards to a right to foreign armed intervention to enforce democratic governance.

In 1991, the democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti was removed from office by a military coup d’etat. Following the failure of economic sanctions, the Security Council passed a resolution affirming the goal of international community to restore democracy in Haiti. To this end, the Security Council authorized the member states “to form a multinational force under unified command and … to use all necessary means.”72 However, close examination of the Security Council debates reveal the Council members’ concern that possible erosion of state sovereignty should not set a precedent. The desire for avoiding a precedent can be seen from the emphasis in the texts of relevant resolutions on “the unique character of the present situation in Haiti and its deteriorating, complex, and

extraordinary nature requiring an exceptional response.”

Some scholars point to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Sierra Leone and its *ex post facto* approval by the Security Council as an example of an emerging collective right of pro-democratic intervention. In May 1997, the democratically-elected government of Sierra Leone was overthrown by a military junta. A week later, Organization of African Unity (OAU) authorized ECOWAS to take military action in order to restore the constitutional order. In October 1997, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1132, in which it determined the situation as constituting a threat to international peace and security and demanded that “the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order.” With the same resolution, the Security Council authorized ECOWAS under Chapter VIII of the Charter to ensure the implementation of the economic sanctions decided upon in the resolution. Although the Security Council did not authorize ECOWAS military action, *ex post* endorsement of the military intervention, can be discerned from the statement of the President of the Security Council on 26 February 1998, which stated that “the Council welcome[d] the fact that the rule of the military junta has been brought to an end, and stress[ed] the imperative need for the immediate need for the restoration of the democratically-elected government.” Additionally, in subsequent resolutions, the Security Council welcomed “the return to Sierra Leone of its democratically elected President” and commended “the positive role of ECOWAS and ECOMOG in their efforts to restore peace, security, and stability throughout the country at the request of the Government of Sierra Leone.”

One prominent scholar argues that the Sierra Leone case presents “the best evidence … of a fundamental change in international legal norms pertaining to “pro-democratic” intervention.” According to him, the fact that the Security Council resolutions did not this time bother “to take refuge in assertions of “extraordinary,” “exceptional,” or “unique” circumstances in invoking Chapter VII,” further evinces that “coup against elected governments are now, *per se*, violations of international law, and that regional organizations are now licensed to use force to reverse such coups in member states.” However, most legal scholars contend that for customary international law regarding the legal consequences of a regime change to change, it takes more than a Security Council determination that a particular coup poses a threat to international peace and security. Scholars

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73 Ibid., 2. See also UN Doc. S/RES/841 (16 June 1993) where the Security Council characterized the situation of Haiti as “unique and exceptional” that warrants “exceptional measures.”

74 For details see Brad R. Roth, *Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 405-406.

75 UN Doc. S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), para.1.

76 Ibid., para.8.


80 Roth, *Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law*, 407.

81 Ibid.
also argue that the Council’s retrospective approval of certain actions cannot be taken as giving of a license to carry out such acts in future.\(^{82}\)

Two cases of military interventions in the aftermath of the September 11 events, namely Afghanistan and Iraq, are relevant in so far as both resulted in drastic change in internal political structure, although neither of the operations was justified on the basis of regime change. In Afghanistan, military action was authorized by the Security Council and justified on the basis of individual and collective self-defense.\(^{83}\) Following the US-led military intervention, the Security Council expressed its support for “a new government which should be broad-based, multiethnic and fully representative of all the Afghan people.”\(^{84}\) Contrary to the Afghanistan case, no authorization was issued by the Security Council for military action against Iraq.\(^{85}\) Nonetheless, the Security Council resolution 1511 stated that the “Coalition Provisional Authority” would terminate upon the creation of an “internationally recognized, representative government established by the people of Iraq.”\(^{86}\) Subsequently, in Resolution 1546, the Security Council welcomed Iraq’s transition to a democratically elected government and the Interim Government’s commitment to establish a “federal, democratic, pluralist, and unified Iraq.” Thus, through its relevant resolutions, Security Council appears to have recognized the regime change in Iraq despite the lack of an initial authorization for the use of force against Iraq.

Finally and most recently, the Security Council authorized military action against the Gaddafi regime of Libya. In February 2011, violent clashes between the security forces and the protesters erupted, resulting in many civilian deaths. Upon Gaddafi regime’s harsh repression of the rebels, and to stop Gaddafi’s forces from getting any further towards the city of Benghazi, the Security Council passed a resolution which imposed a no-fly zone and other measures over Libya. Acting under Chapter VII, the Council defined the situation as constituting a threat to international peace and security, and authorized all member states “acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements to take all necessary measures” to enforce the no-fly zone as well as to protect the civilians.\(^{87}\) The resolution passed with 10 affirmative votes. Five members including two permanent members, namely Brazil, Germany, India, China and Russia abstained. The states abstained maintained they had serious reservations about the use of military action force.\(^{88}\) While constituting the legal basis for the military intervention followed, it is noteworthy that the resolution explicitly indicated that the ensuing use of force to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas would not involve ground forces by stressing that military action would remain short of foreign occupation.\(^{89}\)

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82 See Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, “You, the People.” 289-90.
85 UN Doc. S/RES/1511 (16 October 2003), para. 1.
86 UN Doc. S/RES/1546 (8 June 2004), para. 9.
It follows from the above cases that the Security Council has increasingly assumed a pro-active role in situations, which traditionally are not defined as threats to “international peace and security.” Nevertheless, it seems far from clear that disruption of democracy or presence of a despotic government alone and by itself has been characterized as amounting to meet the Chapter VII threshold. For the Security Council authorizations in the above cases underlined other grounds such as the request of the government, the plight of refugee flows, self-defense as well, it remains unclear whether there emerged a collective right to use force to ensure democratic governance in states.

5. Conclusion

This article has examined the arguments for and against pro-democratic military interventions in the framework of the legal norms governing the use of force, and the practice in this context in order to discern whether or not there emerged a right to intervention for regime change, more specifically to install a democratic government.

The above analysis of the unilateral pro-democratic interventions hardly demonstrates evidence that restoring democracy forms the basis for a claim to a unilateral right to use force. Strong opposition raised by many states in the Security Council, the General Assembly resolutions condemning such acts, and presentation of other justifications along with restoration of democracy confirm that unilateral pro-democratic intervention is prohibited legally and not endorsed politically. In addition, despite the strong rhetoric of the consequentialist views of Article 2 (4), such analysis remains to be seriously problematic. First, the arguments do not substantiate that democracy has become a peremptory norm or an equivalent to self-determination, which is considered by many as a peremptory norm. Thus, it is difficult to argue the norm of prohibition of force as *jus cogens* is superseded or should be equally treated with the principle of democratic governance. Second and a more practical issue is the difficulty to determine the actual “will of the people” by the international community. Whether or not the faction foreign intervention is assisting in the target state represents the “will of the people” and intends to install a democratic government is yet to be seen for example in the Libyan case. Third, the view that states can unilaterally interpret Article 2 (4) as they see fit not only bears the grave political risk of arbitrary exercise of power, but also remains fundamentally in contradiction with the main principles of international legal norms. In this respect, the unilateral state practice demonstrates that the fear of weaker states that such a normative change would pave the way for great power abuse is not without basis.

As for the multilateral pro-democratic interventions, the practice shows that the authority of the Security Council does not translate to an automatic obligation to take military action to change nondemocratic governments. Thus far, in every case, the Security Council has evaluated the special circumstances to justify Chapter VII measures. This said, it should be noted that the Security Council practice does reflect substantial commitment to democratic governance, for it has pronounced violations of human rights due to the lack of democracy or denial of democratic processes -in exceptional instances- as constituting a threat to international peace and security. In such special cases, the Security Council has demonstrated willingness to authorize the states to take action or endorse the regional organizations’ endeavors to end an ongoing human plight arising out of tyrannical rule. Having
broad discretion and authority under the UN Charter, the Security Council is legitimately equipped to interpret the circumstances as constituting threats to international peace and security. Nonetheless, the Council’s critical deliberations as such are representation of the political will rather than substantiation of an emerging legal norm of forcible regime change. Hence, even for authorized multilateral interventions, it is not legally accurate to argue for a right to pro-democratic intervention. It can be inferred from the practice of multilateral interventions that the Security Council shall evaluate each instance carefully by examining the specifics of the situation under consideration, and determine whether or not Chapter VII measures are justified.

In an increasingly interdependent world, sovereignty and principle of domestic jurisdiction are no longer shields for undemocratic governments. However, the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention are equally important for the right to self-determination, for democratic entitlement is ultimately a right vested in people. This is not to say that the international community should sit back and watch widespread human agony. It is just to underline that a unilateral right to pro-democratic intervention carries with it the danger of undermining the very right to self-determination for democratic governance. Thus, within the existing imperfect international order, pro-democratic collective action authorized by the UN Security Council in cases where there is widespread international support is both legally permissible and politically desirable.

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Area and International Studies in Turkey: The Case of the United States

İlter Turan

İstanbul Bilgi University

Abstract

Area studies in the international relations discipline have evolved in response to specific needs of countries and particular conditions of the world affairs at a given time. This article addresses a set of conditions and needs that influenced the development of area studies in international relations with a focus on the emergence and growth of studies on the United States in Turkey. Accordingly, it is argued that Turkey has historically conceptualized external relations as state-to-state relations and not prioritized initially a research program on area studies. However, the shift from import substitution to export-led growth and the end of the Cold War created an environment in which Turkey’s needs to research about other societies have intensified. This has led to the establishment of research programs and centers at universities as well as the opening of think tanks, some funded by the public, others privately. In light of the assessment of the growth of these research and teaching institutions focusing on the United States, it is concluded that American studies are less developed than what might be expected given Turkey’s close relationship with the United States. Some explanations are also offered for such an observation.

Keywords: Area studies, foreign policy, research centers, think tanks, United States, Turkey

1. Introduction

A brief glance at the history of the Turkish Republic shows that the country has generally been inward looking, displaying little interest in other parts of the world. For decades, neither state or private institutions nor Turkish academic institutions were engaged in area studies about other societies or regions of the world. The growing number of think-tanks, research centers at universities as well as intensifying efforts of private enterprise to collect and evaluate information about different regions of the world in recent years point to a new and growing Turkish interest in the external world.

İlter Turan, Professor, Department of International Relations, İstanbul Bilgi University. E-mail: ilter.turan@bilgi.edu.tr

1 Hande Bitlis, a graduate student in the Department of International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University has helped with the documentary research for this article. Her help is gratefully acknowledged.
This article examines the underlying factors that influenced the slow progress in the emergence and development of teaching and research programs at various institutions in Turkey that focus on the United States. American studies in Turkey are modest and appear to be in need of further development. Rather than being a product of willful negligence, however, this has been simply a consequence of a general pattern that is only beginning to change now. Accordingly, it is important to elucidate why Turkey showed such little interest in external developments in its earlier history and the reasons that have stimulated the current rising interest.

These questions can be addressed within a broader framework of understanding area studies as a response to specific conditions and needs of a country at a given time. Thus, the article is organized into five sections. After the introduction the next section presents the specific conditions and needs that led to the development of area studies in international relations discipline. The third section assesses the reasons for the emergence of academic and research programs on area studies in Turkey. While the fourth section focuses on the development of American studies, its scope and a general survey of publications about the United States, the following section previews the research institutions and think tanks that have American studies as part of their area studies. The article concludes that American studies are less developed than what might be expected given Turkey’s close relationship with the United States; and some explanations are offered for such an observation.

2. Development of Area Studies as Responses to Needs
A particular country’s interest in the history, politics, economics, culture, art, literature of other countries and world regions is not an accidental development but rather a product of specific conditions and response to specific needs at a given time. There may be no single specific need and condition to be observed across the board. However, a set of conditions and needs may vary in each case. Therefore, an examination of the countries in which area studies have developed and the stage in their history during such development has taken place, may help us uncover the patterned nature of this evolution.

Within this framework, six major reasons are offered to examine the emergence and growth of area studies in international relations. To begin with, we may note that colonial countries have chosen to study the countries that they have colonized if for no other reason than enhancing their competence in sustaining their rule over them. Such interest has continued even after decolonization since former colonial powers have often striven to maintain their existing ties or develop new privileged relationships with their former colonies. A major instrument that has constituted the informational and the intellectual basis of this endeavor has been area focused think tanks, teaching programs and research centers at universities. It is no accident that interest in area studies and institutional developments occurred most comprehensively in Britain and France which were the leading colonial powers until almost the first half of the twentieth century.

Second, those countries whose economic prosperity depends on engaging in extensive economic relations with the outside world, those countries whose volume of external trade and investments abroad reach sizable quantities, understandably, develop an interest in building institutions that collect and process information that will enable them to
know and understand the economic, political and the sociological peculiarities of societies in which they operate, and predict what is likely to transpire in the future. A similar need also exists with regard to the rules, the institutions and the workings of the contemporary international economic and political system and how it is likely to evolve in the future. The Institute of Developing Economies in Tokyo, for example, serves exactly these purposes, focusing on countries, regions and the international system. The support that some American multinationals extend to area studies and similar research centers at universities as well as foundations, intends to produce similar outcomes. It is also important to remember that some multinationals develop their own research teams and expertise to meet their needs.

Third, those countries that tend to perceive themselves to be world powers, judging that it is natural or incumbent on them that they reach all countries and the regions of the world, both encourage and support the development of area studies oriented academic and research programs as well as institutions pursuing such purposes. Expressed differently, the self perception of a state as an important international or global actor brings with it a need to develop capabilities to know, interpret and influence the developments in all countries and regions of the world. It is not coincidental that area studies programs in the United States flourished after the Second World War when the United States decided to break out of its historical isolationism and claim a place in the world as a superpower. In a similar fashion, the proliferation of area study institutes and programs in the Soviet Union, in addition to other factors such as being the ideological leader of the communist world, derived from the Russian perception that they were a superpower and as such had global interests and responsibilities.

Fourth, any country may set up country or area studies programs to achieve specific or meet specific needs. For example, the establishment of a chair of Hungarology in the Faculty of Language and History, and Geography at Ankara University, rather than deriving from major economic or security interests Turkey might have in connection with Hungary, derived from Turkey’s search to find relatives of Asian origin in an effort to develop a Turkish national identity as distinct from the Arabo-Islamic identity with which the population of Turkey often associated itself during the life of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the efforts of the well known Hungarian composer Bela Bartok, joining the Turkish composer of renown Ahmet Adnan Saygun, in transcribing Turkish folksongs by traveling throughout Anatolia, appears to have been motivated strongly by the search of the Hungarian composer for common cultural roots of his people with other Asian origin peoples in the region, to help strengthen a Hungarian identity in what appeared to be a Slavic Sea.

Fifth, area oriented institutions, particularly those in the nature of think tanks, are sometimes promoted or welcome by governments because they constitute for a through which ideas that they do not want to express officially are developed, discussed and debated, often also by involving actors the legitimacy of which states are even reluctant to recognize. In addition, governments may develop their own non-official and unofficial organizations to serve similar ends. Such institutions may facilitate communications between contesting actors who are not on speaking terms with each other, they may search to find common ground between what appears to be irreconcilable positions, explore the possibilities for devising creative solutions. Furthermore, some of these institutions may produce reliable research
that governments use in the development and advancement of their own foreign policies. The Brookings Institution and the German Marshall Fund constitute such examples on the American side. Swedish Institute of Peace Research and German Foreign Policy Institute are examples in Western Europe. One should also recall here the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada headed by its powerful director Georgii Arbatov, during the times of the Soviet Union which offered information and advice to the Soviet government on running smooth relations with the United States. The Institute also served as a channel of informal communication between the United States and Russia to prepare the ground for official contacts.

Sixth, the growth of area and international studies programs and research institutions in a country may be promoted by another country. Some countries work to build institutions in others that correspond to those that they themselves possess in order to insure the presence of suitable counterparts with whom cooperation is undertaken. Some German foundations, to cite an example, have extended support to the establishment of similar organizations in Turkey, in order that they may plan joint activities to conduct research, as well as to discuss and debate topics of common interest, exchange information and popularize ideas. Another related reason as regards why one country encourages the development of area and international studies and research centers in another country is to initiate a circle of people in the latter who are familiar with the former, so that it is better known, understood and appreciated. As we examine in the next sections, the United States supported the establishment and the growth of American Studies programs at some Turkish universities after the two countries became allies after the Second World War. In a similar fashion, in recent years, Turkey has turned to the establishment of endowed chairs of Turkish history, society and politics in the United States and in Great Britain as well as extending support to the teaching of Turkish language, literature and history at colleges and universities.

A combination of the reasons cited above may be operating in any specific instance. A program or an establishment, after all, may constitute a response to more than one need and perform more than one function. Furthermore, the performing of one function may facilitate the discharging of another. In some instances, the emergence of multi-purpose programs and institutions may be an outcome of the small size of a society or a lack of sufficient means to support many programs and establishments.

3. Academic and Research Programs on Area Studies in Turkey

Turkey compares unfavorably with countries that have a strong tradition of research centers on area studies. It is only within the last two or three decades that interest in area studies has begun to grow in a significant way in Turkey. What were the reasons behind Turkey’s late entry into this domain of activity?

First, Turkey has only recently begun to engage in comprehensive relations with foreign countries. This is not to say that earlier Turkey was closed to the outside world, but contacts had been less frequent and their content narrow, often confined to matters of security. International relations were conceived to be a “state to state” matter in which the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were considered to be sufficient. As new needs developed over time, diplomatic missions were expanded to include attachés with different
specializations. After large number of workers was sent to Germany, for example, labor and religion attachés were sent to expand the services that the embassy and the consulates offered. After Turkish diplomats began to constitute targets of terrorist attacks, security attachés were added to the list of support personnel that Turkish diplomatic missions housed.

Two events, the so-called 24 January Decisions of the Turkish Council Ministers in 1980 and the end of the Cold War, transformed both Turkish foreign policy and the way Turkey related to foreign affairs. The 24th of January decisions of 1980 moved Turkey from a strategy of import-substitution oriented industrialization to one of export-led growth. The change of economic policy necessitated that Turkey expand its exports to existing markets, search for new ones, and hence get to know the external world in multiple ways. The end of the Cold War, on the other hand, expanded the both the geographical and substantive content of foreign policy to cover areas in addition to that of security which had previously given direction to Turkey’s international relations. When Turkey’s growing relationship with the European Union was added to these developments, it became apparent that a model of “state to state” relationship that had provided the institutional framework for Turkish foreign policy thus far was no longer sufficient to meet its contemporary needs. Multidimensional links had to be established, different segments of society had to be brought into foreign policy making and implementation, and instruments of public diplomacy had to be developed.

These developments intensified the need of both government and the expanding private enterprises to have information and knowledge about other countries and regions. For example, as the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU gained currency, many universities introduced European Studies programs that offered bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degrees as well as opening research centers at various universities. These programs and institutions received support not only from the Turkish government but the EU as well. Private enterprise was also supportive. Similarly, the growth of exports and the search for new linkages in a changing global security environment promoted the growth of think tanks focusing on Eurasia, the Middle East, Africa and other parts of the world. These were sometimes financed by the government as in the case of the Strategic Research Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SAM) but more often quasi official sources such as the Union of the Chamber of Industries, Commerce and Commodity Exchanges and private sources.

The growth of academic programs, research centers and think tanks were supported by the expansion of the Turkish university system after 1980. Many young Ph.D.s who had studied abroad privately or under government (mainly Council on Higher Education) scholarship programs and well trained to do research, found employment in the newly opened state and foundation run universities. The more stringent rules about research and publication promoted a greater volume of research in all fields, area and international studies not excepted.

To conclude, the changes in the Turkish economy and the international system produced new information and knowledge needs for Turkey that were met by developing academic programs and research institutions on area studies.
4. American Studies in Turkey
The United States was one of the major countries with which Turkey had developed extensive relationships after the Second World War. It was through American efforts that Turkey was incorporated into the Western defense system. It was American economic assistance that stimulated significant economic growth during the 1950s. However, the growth of American studies in Turkey has been somehow slow. In the following subsections historically the start of American studies, its scope and a general survey of publications on the United States are defined.

4.1. The start of American studies in Turkey
The first development in the field of teaching and research about the United States with whom relations grew rapidly after the Second World War took place with the opening of an American Culture and Literature chair at the Ankara University in 1957. During those years, the number of universities in Turkey was indeed limited and further expansion of such programs had to await the growth of new universities in the country. For example, one had to wait until 1982 for yet another similar program to open at Hacettepe University, also in Ankara. Table I gives a list of Turkish universities at which there are American Culture and Literature programs and the year of their founding. Currently, ten universities have such programs while Istanbul University (not listed) offers a Master’s degree without a corresponding undergraduate program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Founding year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ankara U.</td>
<td>1957</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hacettepe U.</td>
<td>1982</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilkent U.</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>Ege U.</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Başkent U.</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>Haliç U.</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Fatih U.</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>Kadir Has U.</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahçeşehir U.</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Source:* The web pages of the universities.

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The sudden expansion of the American Culture and Literature Programs during the 1990s and 2000s after a slow beginning in 1957 may reflect a combination of two forces at work. The opening of the initial program in 1957 aimed at strengthening the cultural dimension of the growing political and economic relations between Turkey and the United States, supported in part by American faculty and library support. It is also to be remembered that in 1957, the distribution of foreign language competence among the Turkish educated was skewed in favor of German and French, reflecting pre-Second World War realities. There was a shortage of persons who had English language competence that needed to be remedied. The learning of English was in high demand. To the extent that English language competence continues to be in high demand today, it is understandable that new institutions have chosen to incorporate American Culture and Literature programs in their curricula.

That six of the ten universities that have American Culture and Literature programs are foundation universities suggest that a second force may be at work. These institutions, in contrast to virtually tuition-free state universities that enjoy high demand, are interested in attracting students to fill their classrooms. While the foreign language teaching at state high schools is usually unsatisfactory, most major cities have a number of private high schools where English is taught reasonably well. The graduates of these schools generally obtain high scores in the foreign language test which renders it relatively easy for them to enroll in an American Culture and Literature program. Thus, if other scores of a middle class student indicate that his or her chances of gaining admission to another department of their choice are not good, then using the language option is a way of getting a university education.

The establishment of American Culture and Literature programs at ten universities has constituted a background against which an American Studies Association of Turkey has been established. Since 1995 the Association has been publishing the Journal of American Studies of Turkey which, according to the information provided in the journal, focuses on such diverse topics as literature, history, the arts, music, cinema, popular culture, institutions, politics, economics, and geography among others. An examination of the table of contents of all issues since the journal started its publication reveals that almost all contributions in the field of literature and culture, while little has been written on politics or economics.

In one of the institutions that have an American Culture and Literature program, Bahçeşehir University, an American Research Center (AMERS) that focuses on American domestic and international politics as well as Turkish-American Relations has been recently established. There seems to be no similar development at other institutions.

4.2. Publications focusing on the United States
An examination of publications related to the United States would be helpful since institutional developments are limited and have only begun to flourish during the recent years.

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4.2.1. Academic and scholarly journals
The growing relations between Turkey and the United States after the World War constituted the background against which articles about American foreign policy, political institutions and political life have appeared in Turkish academic journals. Furthermore, the U.S. government has lent support to reforming the public administration in Turkey, promoting the publication of articles in that domain.

A beginning point in examining academic publications may be to look at the Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi (Journal of the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University) that has been published with reasonable regularity from before the Second World War until now. Between 1943 and 2010, 34 items related to the United States comprised of original articles, translated articles and book reviews were published in the quarterly journal. The first article appeared in 1947 and a total of thirteen articles were reached by 1960 focusing on foreign policy, public administration and aspects of the American political system. Interestingly, the number of articles written between 1961 and 1980 has decreased to only seven, with interest moving into economics. From 1981-2010, the number of articles has again risen to 14, with focus on foreign policy and security issues.

Remembering that the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University constituted the center of research on foreign policy, international relations and public administration in the country for a long time, it is not surprising that the Journal is not the only publication of the institution. The Faculty also published with reasonable regularity an annual called the Uluslararası İlişkiler Türk Yıllığı (Turkish Yearbook of International Affairs) which contained writing on American foreign policy and Turkish-American relations on a yearly basis.

A new institution called the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE) was opened in Ankara in 1958 as a part of an American assistance program intended to help reform Turkey’s public administration system⁶. The Institute soon initiated a quarterly periodical, the TODAIE Amne İdaresi Dergisi (The Journal of Public Administration). In 1979 an additional publication, TODAİE İnsan Hakları Yıllığı (Annual of Human Rights) and in 1992 Çağdaş Yerel Yönetimler (Contemporary Local Government) was added to its publication activities.⁷ Although some writing on American public administration appeared in these journals, their numbers were surprisingly low. For example, during the 1968-2010 interim, only seven articles about the United States appeared in the Amne İdaresi Dergisi. Between 1992 and 2010 carried only three articles concerning American local government. It is equally surprising that among the books the institute published, none was about American public administration. Despite the fact that the United States was closely involved in the founding of the Institute, the limited attention American public administration has received may derive from the fact that the American system, being very different from the Turkish, which is based on the French model, failed to arouse the interest of the Turkish administrators. It may also owe to the fact that a strong wave of anti-Americanism swept the country after the mid-1960s, reducing interest in “things American.”

Most Turkish academic institutions publish journals although their publication

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⁶ Law 7163 published 5 July 1958. Article 1 explains that the Institute is established in conformity with the Technical Assistance Program.

schedule has not always been regular. While a thorough search of such publications has not been conducted, there seems to be no convincing reason to expect that these publications would contain a wealth of articles focusing on the United States. For example, an examination of the volumes of the quarterly İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası (Journal of the Faculty of Economics of Istanbul University) during the 2001-2009 period shows that only one article pertaining to taxation in the United States was published.

Naturally, a number of articles, focusing especially on the American economy and foreign policy have been published in a variety of non-academic journals. It is known that during the last decade, the number of think tanks that on foreign policy and international relations, many with active research and publications programs, have registered significant growth. The United States is included in much of the security analyses, in discussions of NATO strategy, peacekeeping and peace building activities under the auspices of the United Nations, energy politics etc. What is interesting is that it is very difficult to find research or even description how American institutions work, how policy domestic or foreign policy is made, the questions of state and local government, civil society political activism in the United States and other similar topics. Yet, as is well known, American domestic actors tend to influence foreign policy significantly and often in directions which is not necessarily to the liking of the Turks. This observation in itself may be judged sufficient to show that there is greater need for the development of further American Studies programs in Turkey.

4.2.2. Books
An examination of the stock of a major bookstore in Istanbul presents a contrasting picture to the paucity of articles in scholarly journals. Leaving aside the five books in stock that were written before 1990, no less than 189 books published after 1990 are listed as being in stock. The first observation to be made is that most of these are about American foreign policy and international politics, although books on American culture and literature, travelogues, memoirs and descriptions of life in the United States are also available.

The second observation relates to the fact that most of the available books would not qualify as being scholarly in nature. Books with scholarly orientations tend to be in the realm of culture, literature and film. In the social sciences, those with an academic orientation are history books containing archival materials. Examples of these publications include the late Fahir Armaoğlu’s Turkish-American Relations as Reflected in Documents; Çağrı Erhan’s The Historical Roots of Turkish-American Relations; Nasuh Uslu’s Cyprus in Turkish-American Relations; Şenol Kantarci’s Armenian Lobby and the Armenians in the United States; Yusuf Sarınay and Recep Karakaya’s work Armenian-American Relations in Ottoman Documents and Nurdan Şafak’s Ottoman-American Relations. There also

10 Çağrı Erhan, Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri (Ankara: İmge, 2001)
11 Nasuh Uslu, Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs (İstanbul: 21. Yüzyıl, 2000)
12 Şenol Kantarci, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinde Ermeniler ve Ermeni Lobisi (İstanbul: Alfa, 2004)
13 Yusuf Sarınay and Recep Karakaya, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Amerikan İlişkileri (Ankara: Başbakanlık, 2007)
14 Nurdan Şafak, Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003)
some but fewer studies of a contemporary nature such as Tayyar Arı’s *American Political Institutions: The Lobbies*\(^\text{15}\) as well as translations of some important works by American authors such as Samuel Huntington’s *Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s Identity*\(^\text{16}\), Joseph Nye’s *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Superpower Can’t Go It Alone*\(^\text{17}\), and Immanuel Wallerstein’s *The Decline of American Power: America in a Chaotic World*\(^\text{18}\).

The third observation is that the most frequently published books are those of a non-academic nature that aim to popularize positions and bearing highly accusatory tones even in their titles. Some among them are translations of works in English, but not all necessarily written by Americans. It does appear that the writings of American and European authors pursuing “causes” generate major interest among Turkish readers. The strongly worded titles of the following written by Turks constitute striking examples: Yücel Kaya’s *America is Collapsing: America’s Imperialalist History*\(^\text{19}\); Nihat Genç’s *American Dogs: What’s Your Business in Iraq*\(^\text{20}\); Nedret Arsanel’s *Pardes Guide to the Spirit American Interests*\(^\text{21}\); Hakan Yılmaz Cebi’s *The American Deep State: The Secret Masters of the World Empire*\(^\text{22}\) and Yılmaz Polat’s *American Hawks and American Crows*\(^\text{23}\). A similar tendency may be observed in books that have been selected for translation. Rowland Morgan and Ian Hansall’s *9/11 Revealed: The Unanswered Questions*\(^\text{24}\) and Jonathan Neale’s *What’s Wrong with America: How the Rich and Powerful have Changed America and Now Want to Change the World*\(^\text{25}\) are examples. Not all the names of non-academic works are, of course, “exciting” as those in the examples we have cited. Non academic but serious works include analyses written by journalists and diplomats such as Ulagay and Abramowitz\(^\text{26}\).

This brief survey of books on the United States points to a need for serious academic research on the United States. This leads us to the next question of who shall do this research?

### 5. Research Institutions and Think Tanks

The number of research institutions has registered impressive growth in Turkey during the

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19 Yücel Kaya, *Amerika Yakıdo: Amerika’nın Emperyalist Tarihi* (İstanbul: Güçlü Yayıncılık, 2006)
21 Nedret Arsanel, *Amerikan Ruhunun Menfaat Fihristi Pardes* (İstanbul Hayy Kitap, 2006)
22 Hakan Yılmaz Cebi, *Amerikan Derin Devleti: Dünyanın İmparatorluğu’nun Gizli Efendileri* (İstanbul: Karaküt, 2006)
26 Examples of such works would include Osman Ulagay, *Hedefteki Amerika* (İstanbul: Tişas, 2002) and Morton Abramowitz, *Türkiye’nin Dönüşümü ve Amerikan Politikası* (İstanbul: Liberté, 2001)
recent years. However, if we go by names only, there is only one research center that focuses on the study of the United States, the American Studies Center at Bahçeşehir University. Even that center is of reasonably recent vintage and it is too early to judge whether it will serve as a genuine center of research on America.

The most frequently seen research centers in Turkey are those that either focus on the European Union or the Eurasia (meaning non-EU Eastern Europe, Russia, Caucasus, Central Asia). There are also a number of general purpose research organizations whose names include the words sociological, political and economic. They do produce policy papers, policy research, and other documents of interest both regarding domestic and international politics. In recent years, the Turkish Council on Higher Education has encouraged the establishment of the so called Strategic Research Centers at universities, another instrument that may at some future point lead to more foreign policy and security research.

When we look at centers at universities, we may note that the word “strategic” is employed with little care. Increasingly the meaning of term is blurred. What is clear, however, is that many of the centers that bear the name “strategic” do little in the way of actual research but serve as instruments for accommodating visiting lecturers and organizing conferences that come under the broadest sense under the umbrella of strategic, often meaning nothing more than issues having to do with foreign policy. It is also the case some of these centers exist only on paper and do not offer much activity.

On the other hand, research institutions and think tanks that are not associated with universities are comprised of four types: 1) those that are part of government, 2) those that are directly or indirectly funded by the government; 3) privately funded establishments, and 4) those that are funded by public or private foreign foundations. In addition, some foreign foundations have local branches and representative offices.

An example of a fully funded center that is reasonably autonomous from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that supports it, is the Strategic Research Center (SAM) which has published since its foundation the quarterly journal *Perceptions* as well as occasional reports on specific foreign policy questions. Since its beginning in 1995, *Perceptions* has published nine articles that have focused specifically on American foreign policy and its relations with Turkey and other countries. Additional articles in which the United States does not constitute the major focus but frequently mentioned also abound.

Another fully government funded but considerably less independent center is the Strategic Research and Studies Center (SAREM) attached to the Turkish General Staff. The work of the center is entirely security oriented. Since 2003 when the center was initiated, its journal *Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi* (Journal of Strategic Research) has published three articles that examine topics related to the United States. Appearing in 2003 and 2004, two of the articles discuss the changes in the global strategy of the United States while one looks at Turkish-American relations. Much of the writing in the journal is devoted to the study of other regions and topics such as Eurasia, European Union, terror, and energy security with little reference to America per se.

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The oldest think tank in the domain of foreign policy is the Foreign Policy Institute (DPE) established in 1974. Especially prior to the establishment of its own Strategic Research Center (SAM), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs extended support to the DPE in order to organize conferences with foreign think tanks. The Institute has had an arrangement with the Council of Europe, sending out a periodical internet bulletin on the activities of the Council.

During the recent years, two new institutions, each receiving some of their funding from government sources, have entered the research arena. The first, Political, Economic and Social Research Foundation or SETA, is a very active organization that publishes policy papers as well as descriptive and analytical research on matters of both domestic and foreign policy. It also publishes the quarterly journal Insight Turkey. Similar to other foundations, SETA does not have a specific American focus but differs from others in that it does have an office in Washington, D.C. which organizes lectures, conferences on matters that relate to American foreign policy and Turkish-American relations.

The second partly government funded organization is the Eurasian Strategic Research Center of Turkey or TASAM. Although TASAM focuses on Asia, it does actually have a research desk on America. The responsibilities of the desk include “studying American political institutions and culture, voting behavior, election campaigns and political communication.” The desk is of recent vintage and has not yet published reports or similar documents.

Those institutions which are financed by private sources are many. A well known think tank is International Strategic Research Establishment or USAK. USAK houses a center for American Studies AMERAM that aims to study the domestic and international politics of the United States, America’s global policies and Turkish-American relations in order “to keep the citizens, the decision makers, the business world and the media informed about the United States.” USAK publishes on the internet a weekly bulletin which often carries items about the United States. A similar observation may be made regarding the journal USAK Stratejik Gündem (Strategic Agenda) that has included articles on the US. In addition to producing occasional reports, USAK has also published a book by Ömer Kurtbağ: entitled Amerikan Yeni Sağdı ve Dış Politikası (The New American Right and American Foreign Policy).

In 2004, another privately funded center called Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analyses or TURKSAM was established. The center has an American Studies Division. Although the internet page of the center contains a number of articles on American foreign policy and Turkish-American relations, much of this writing comes from the pen of the same individual. Similarly, the website of another institute, 21st Century Turkey Institute (21.Yüzyıl Türkiye Enstitüsü) established in 2006 contains a section with

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32 Ömer Kurtbağ, Amerikan Yeni Sağdı ve Dış Politikası (Ankara: USAK, 2010)
articles on American politics and foreign policy on their website.\textsuperscript{34}

The four year old Wisemen Strategic Studies Center or BILGESAM has shown some interest in the United States. The journal of the Center, currently in its second year of publication, has contained two articles about the United States. Among the short reports that the center publishes, 62 has been about the domestic politics of the United States or its foreign policy\textsuperscript{35}. It has also published a report on the United States. It does appear that BILGESAM takes deeper interest in America than similar organizations such as USAK.

Two other institutions organize roundtables and conferences on topics relating to Turkey’s foreign policy and external relations that often include the United States. These are the Ankara based Institute of Strategic Thinking (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü) and the Foreign Policy Forum of Turkish Businessmen’s and Industrialists’ Association (TÜSİAD). Turkish Economic and Political Studies Foundation (TEPAV) in Ankara funded by the Unions of the Chambers of Industry, Commerce and Commodity Exchanges has also recently announced the opening of an American Studies Center. The nature of the activities of this center will only become known in the future.

6. Conclusion

After the Turkish economy turned to export led growth and began to grow rapidly and after the end of the Cold War, the way was opened for Turkey to develop multilateral relations with almost all regions and countries of the world. This has been accompanied by the emergence of research centers and think tanks focusing on the economies, politics and external relations of the societies with which Turkey’s relations have been expanding. In this context, it is surprising that research centers on the United States have not expanded rapidly and ahead of others. Some reasons may be offered for such an observation.

First, this may derive in part from the fact that there exists a body of individuals in Turkish society comprised of academics, businessmen, diplomats, journalists etc., many having studied in America, who are very familiar with the United States and who did not feel the need for information that would be made available by centers. While more systematic information might be useful, as long as the need was not felt, progress on the research front may be modest.

A second reason for the modest growth of research centers might be that Turkey’s trade with the United States is not big and is limited to specific areas in which defense dominates. Trade with the United States is gradually expanding but Turkey’s trade orientation has mainly been toward the European Union with which Turkey has a Customs Union.

Third, some of the growth of research centers and think tanks owes to the idea that Turkey should take a greater interest in the regions surrounding it where it aspires to exercise leadership. This proclivity is occasionally enhanced by Islamist or Turkish ideological considerations. Regions like the Middle East and Central Asia have been quite present in some of the political ideologies that have prevailed in parts of the Turkish political spectrum.


Currently, Turkey’s relations with the United States is expanding and coming to cover many areas in addition to defense, they are becoming more complex. Therefore, we may expect that there will soon be an expansion of research on the United States in Turkey, much in line with the general direction of development research centers and think tanks in Turkey as the country becomes a more important actor in the global system.

Bibliography


International Security - One Paradigm Change after the Other

Willem F. van Eekelen
Former Minister of Defense of the Netherlands & Former Secretary General of the WEU

During the past two decades our basic notions of security underwent repeated changes. To account for these changes, this piece deals with the most important historical events that shaped our understanding of security as well as the new challenges ahead such as the systemic changes, regional security initiatives from the EU, changing roles of militaries in advanced democracies and recent austerity measures’ effects on the security sector.

1. The Last Two Decades and the Evolution of the Security Concept
The fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union put an end to the overriding priority given to collective defence against the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. The ideological challenge of communism disappeared when Gorbachev’s attempt at communism with a human face petered out and Russia failed to become a modern power. Subsequent years saw the emergence of ethnic violence in the post-communist states, especially in former Yugoslavia. The international community was still in the mode of peacekeeping as it had been practiced during the Cold War - only when a cease fire was in place and holding, and the parties to the conflict agreed to the UN peacekeeping operation. The crises in Africa made ‘robust’ peacekeeping acceptable and the Bosnian conflict transited from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. In the meantime NATO had overcome the assumed prohibition of ‘out-of-area’ operations (which had given a rejuvenated Western European Union a brief spell of activity in clearing mines in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war and in enforcing an embargo on Serbia on the Danube).

The shock of the Al-Qaeda attacks on the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon – the symbols of American economic and military power – changed the focus again. NATO invoked its article V, but not because of an attack on Western Europe but on the US. Washington declared a war on terror, which it wanted to fight largely unilaterally: “Don’t call us, we’ll call you” was the answer to helpful allies, and NATO was relegated to an American tool with the maxim that “the crisis determines the coalition”, instead of the Alliance responding to a common threat. Oddly enough, the Bush administration soon shifted its focus from Afghanistan to Iraq, where it obtained a quick military victory but almost lost the peace. International relations should not occupy itself much with ‘what if’ questions, but in view of the subsequently prolonged engagement in Afghanistan one might wonder whether we would ever have gone there if the Taliban had agreed to expel Osama Bin Laden. Far too long the link between Taliban and Al Qaeda was assumed to be a determining characteristic of the terrorist threat. Not surprisingly President Obama had great difficulty in finding an answer to his question what the US were doing in Afghanistan, especially after

Dr. Willem Frederik van Eekelen, Former Minister of Defense of the Netherlands & Former Secretary General of the WEU, E-mail: wfvaneeekelen@casema.nl
Osama Bin Laden had been caught and killed (in Pakistan)\(^1\). Too much policy was being driven on the automatic pilot. Was the main purpose to kill terrorists in counter-insurgency operations or the much larger task of protecting the population and promoting good governance? The final paradox was that the war on terror - which most Europeans thought to be unwinnable because terrorism is a method and not a cause in itself – was becoming a legal pretext for using drones for eliminating acknowledged terrorists on the territory of a sovereign state, even if the victim was a US national.\(^2\)

Partly due to the fear of terrorism, but more on account of the overall process of globalization, external and internal securities were merging. Internally, terrorism was largely a matter of the police and the intelligence services. Border controls became important against organized crime, drugs trade, human trafficking and illegal immigration. Conversely, Western Europe with its graying population needed immigrants over time, but wanted to restrict them to skilled labour.

NATO and the European Union struggled with the new threat environment. In 2003 Xavier Solana developed a strategic document for the EU which regarded terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failed states, often in combination with organized crime, as the main threats. But he added the need for a multilateral approach with the UN Charter as the main framework, and made the point that today crises could not be resolved by military means only. In November 2010 NATO finally was able to agree a new strategic concept of its own, which now mentioned weapons of mass destruction before the terrorist threat. Much of the delay was due to the fact that the new members of the Alliance gave priority to the collective defence clause of Article V, while the old members saw a modern NATO dealing with new threats. A compromise was found by emphasizing the consultation clause of Article IV.

The revolts in Tunisia and Egypt were not a clash of civilisations, not religiously inspired, but rather provoked by high food prices and lack of jobs for the young plus a feeling that the old regime no longer was adequate to deal with these problems. Yet, an announcement by President Mubarak that he would not stand for re-election might have changed the course of events. The Libyan crisis of 2011 was different because the population was neither poor nor hungry. NATO played an important role, but not under American leadership and only after France and the UK had, without much consultation, decided to aid the rebels in Benghazi. Without their early support the revolt against Colonel Gaddafi might not have succeeded. The crisis was remarkable in several ways: the UN Security Council agreed to ask the International Criminal Court to examine whether Gaddafi was guilty of crimes against humanity. Furthermore it authorised “all necessary means” to protect the civilian population, including a no-fly zone, but short of the dispatch of ground forces.\(^3\) China and

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\(^2\) Anwar al-Awlaki, a top Al-Qaeda cleric, was killed in Yemen on 30 September 2011, apparently aided by intelligence from the Yemen government. Michael Peel, “Yemen Says Tip-off Aided Awlaki Killing,” *Financial Times*, October 2, 2011.

Russia abstained as well as Germany and India, and in the implementation less than half of the NATO members took an active part. This raises the question whether this is a prelude for not only a new division of labour in transatlantic relations, but also whether in future ‘coalitions of the willing’ within the Alliance might become a model. In itself it is not necessary for all members to contribute forces to every operation, as long as the principle of the action is endorsed by all, or at least not contested. In the EU the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly mentions the possibility of ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ among a group of members willing to enter into more binding commitments towards each other.

The resolutions of the UN Security Council on Libya revived the notion of “Responsibility to Protect”, the initiative of Secretary General Kofi Annan which in 2005 was only partially successful and had not been implemented. The principle was restricted to flagrant violations of human rights: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crime against humanity. Nevertheless, R2P as it became known, was important in reducing absolute notions of sovereignty which had bedeviled the UN since its inception. It formulated a duty of the state which could be discussed in an international context. It was similar to the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975, which made the way a government was treating its own population a legitimate subject of international intercourse. Before 2011, however, the Security Council did not base its resolutions on R2P and preferred to base its resolutions on a ‘threat to peace and security.

2. Models of Future World Order and Security

Should we elevate the undermining of many of our acknowledged assumptions to the Olympus-like status of paradigm change? Or is it just a new proof of the complexity of international affairs which takes unexpected turns and can best be described in Murphy’s laws that things will go wrong and everything will take longer than expected? Paradigms should assist us in understanding the nature of international relations, like the Realist school, Liberalism or the English school of constructivism. They are the scientific spectacles through which we perceive the many signals from the world around us.

Looking at models of future world order the Netherlands Future Policy Survey came up with four generic models. The least attractive was the trend of fragmentation which can be observed in some regions but also within existing states. In this model multilateral cooperation loses its significance and everybody is thrown back on his narrow national or regional interests. This situation leaves little room for solving trans-border issues and mitigating extreme nationalist behavior.

Another model is a network society, which leaves little governance to the State, but uses all kinds of formal and informal networks available in an age of globalization. Some good like ICT networks and many non-governmental organizations in the field of human rights and development, but some bad like the Mafia or hackers disrupting our communications networks. For the time being, however, the Westphalian states-system shows surprising staying power.

Much discussed but poorly defined is the model of multipolarity, an absurdity in terms of physics, but a reality by the rise of new economic powers. Several countries show growing economic clout, but there are few political linkages among them. The BRIC coun-
tries – Brazil, Russia, India and China, soon to be joined by Indonesia and South Africa and perhaps Turkey – have little in common. There is no cement among the bricks and most of them have few friends in their region. To the contrary, Chinese assertiveness around the Spratley islands leads the previously primarily economic group of ASEAN to take a political profile and to rise its defence spending. Multipolarity as a concept is not so much the possession of more or less equivalent (and largely economic) power, but rather a model in which other smaller states coalesce around the various poles. So far, such groupings do not seem to materialize. Moreover, it would be difficult to compartmentalise the world into a set of regional hegemons. Issues like world trade, energy, environment and nuclear proliferation require global approaches.

In his keynote address to the 8th IISS Global Strategic Review of 2010 under the title “Power-shifts and Security” Henry Kissinger quoted Niall Ferguson, who coined the term “a-polar world”: a model in which an overstretched United States gradually recedes from its hegemonic role around the globe, but is replaced by … nobody. China would be too focused on maintaining internal stability and economic growth to take on broad international commitments. Europe was hobbled by its long-term demographic decline. Thus, in the absence of a global rule-keeper, religious strife, local internecine conflict and non-state rogue actors like Al-Qaeda would rent the world.

The most attractive model is the one of multilateral organization in which states consult and cooperate in regional organizations on a broad spectrum of issues and use the United Nations as an overarching framework. Most international organizations are intergovernmental, which puts severe limitations on their effectiveness in carrying out joint programmes. Only a few have a mix of rights and duties and arrangements for dispute resolution, like the World Trade Organisation.

As a rules-based organization the European Union still has the pride of place. No other organization has such a wide spectrum of activities and such a complete decision-making system. Nevertheless it is far from ideal: a mix of an intergovernmental (for foreign affairs, security and defence) and a communitarian system (with initiative for the European Commission, decision making in the Council of Ministers with majority voting and co-decision by the European Parliament, and a Court of Justice to enforce the law throughout the Union). Moreover, as shown during the Greek financial crisis of 2011, there is a certain tension between on the one hand the regulation of fair competition in the internal market, and the cooperation and solidarity required on other issues.

The European Union was a reluctant security actor, but might be forced to take more responsibility, particularly on its periphery, like in North Africa. Most of its operations have been small and of a civilian or mixed civilian-military character. Its largest operation is Althea in Bosnia, taken over from NATO’s Stabilisation Force. For large operations only NATO will be qualified, but then with the assistance from the United States. In the Libyan case during 2011 American assets were needed to suppress air defences, for mid-air refueling and for satellite information. Subsequent bombing, however, was done by European forces, which supported the rebels, but did not contribute ground forces. The rebels were

4 While China refers to the South China Sea, ASEAN countries call the area the West Philippines Sea. ASEAN has developed a model of its own by focusing on topics where the members agree, rather than on controversial issues.
strong enough on the ground, which negated the earlier argument that for a substantial victory air-power alone would not be sufficient and would involve large collateral damage. The latter assumption is being increasingly contradicted by the great precision made possible by new targeting and delivery means.

3. Regional Efforts for Security Building: The EU Enlargement
After the fall of the Berlin wall the division of Germany ended and thereby also the division of Europe. NATO and the EU underwent a rapid process of enlargement, culminating in 2004 with the accession of ten new members to the EU. Bulgaria and Romania followed a few years later, but did not live up to the expectations of the reform of their legal and judicial systems. As a consequence other candidates for membership were subjected to much tougher standards of conditionality. The earlier assumption that reform would be accelerated by being taken into the Union rather than staying out a bit longer, no longer was valid. Instead the process is becoming more political, enhanced by growing skepticism in the old member states about the benefits of European integration. The negative outcomes of the referenda in France and the Netherlands have contributed to a re-nationalisation of political objectives and of the way they should be pursued. The same applies to military force planning. In this respect the model of fragmentation casts an ominous shadow.

In the meantime NATO grew to 29 members, with Croatia and Albania joining the Alliance. Ultimately all countries of former Yugoslavia should join both organizations, but the pace undoubtedly has slackened. Macedonia is blocked by Greece and Serbia still has to overcome the legacy of the war and the independence of Kosovo. Bosnia made little progress in forming a truly multi-ethnic state. Both NATO and EU will follow the line that they should refrain from importing new problems. The entry of Cyprus in the EU without a solution for the relationship with its Turkish minority resulted in a serious blockade in NATO – EU relations and a suspension of many chapters in the EU accession negotiations of Turkey.

Further East not much progress is to be expected. After the Georgian war and the change of government in Ukraine the time for accession does not seem ripe. More than an intensification of the Polish EU Presidency to move this process further. In any case, security sector reform (or the more palatable term of security sector governance) will continue to be an important subject, not only for future accession prospects, but also for internal transparency and accountability. A clear definition of competences between, president, prime minister, minister of defence, and the Chief of the General Staff, and of the modalities of parliamentary scrutiny are essential in any system of good governance.

4. Changing Role of Military in Advanced Democracies
Increasingly a distinction is made between wars of necessity and wars of choice, the latter being inherently selective and subject to political debate and parliamentary scrutiny. New elements were introduced in the decision making process: the intensity of the crisis, the chances of success of the intervention, the cost involved, and a comparison with what others were doing.
Whether peacekeeping or peace-enforcement, the tasks of the military have been expanded beyond their traditional skills. Military personnel became mediators, fulfilled functions in local government, repaired roads and other infrastructure and tried to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people in their sector of responsibility. Europeans were familiar with this new approach in their peace support operations in the Balkan. In the US the change from outright war-fighting was made by General Petraeus in authoring the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, which – probably too ambitiously - saw the modern soldier also as a social worker, urban planner, anthropologist and psychologist.\(^5\)

Even in a more narrow definition of ‘peace support operations, the spectrum of activities has broadened substantially. They stretched from preventive action, intervention, post conflict stabilisation, reconstruction, security sector reform and ultimately good government on the basis of transparency and accountability. Obviously those new tasks made high demands on the training of missions and on the preparation for each specific operation. The time is past that the commanders could say that forces equipped for the end of military operations could also deal with lesser levels of violence. Close cooperation with civilian authorities and experts and non-governmental organizations became essential for the success of a mission. The US learned that hard lesson in Iraq where the military campaign was short and successful, but the peace was almost lost in an ethnically divided country.

A special complication arose in those situations where the use of force becomes a major part of the operation, such as in Afghanistan. Then national governments insist on the application of ‘caveats’, limiting the range of duties their personnel might be asked to perform by the international force commander. Varying caveats make his constraint management a daily headache.

The degree of parliamentary involvement in military missions abroad varies widely. Some insist on approval of a special budget, others demand periodic reporting on how the missions fulfill its original mandate. More general practice is parliamentary approval of the dispatch of their soldiers abroad. For civilian missions this requirement usually is much less severe, because the use of military force inherently involves matters of life and death. Parliamentary approval takes time and adequate preparation, which clashes with the need for rapid intervention. In those cases a form of pre-delegation for a specific scenario might be considered. This is particularly relevant for multinational forces like the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups.

5. Challenges of Austerity

The most recent paradigm in understanding new challenges to security is austerity, which obliges states to curb budgets in the light of deficits in many fields of government expenditure. Housing bubbles, over-consumption and little savings, greying populations demanding more health facilities and upsetting pension calculations, are leading to fundamental questions about the basic functions of the state. Already they are affecting defence budgets all over the West ‘Pooling & Sharing’ is the new slogan, which should lead to greater efficiency

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at less cost, thus liberating funds for the necessary modernisation of our military and the procurement of new equipment. This becomes particularly necessary when individual inventories fall too low to remain militarily feasible and overhead costs rise beyond proportion. But who is prepared to pool and share? There are some examples in the bilateral sphere and the initiative for an air transport pool is promising. A naval surveillance system links headquarters in eight countries. The Netherlands participate in the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, in far-reaching naval integration with Belgium, and in the German Netherlands Army Corps which proved its value as a headquarters in Afghanistan. All are valuable initiatives, but most of them have not resulted in joint deployment at the unit level.

As Tomas Valasek noted⁶, many countries seem intent on maintaining irrelevant forces rather than thinking about new ways of making them more efficient. He suggested ‘islands of cooperation’ between countries with a similar strategic culture and comparable interests, and to focus more on the pooling of assets than on joint deployment of forces. Common use of assets would be the best force multiplier. Clearly, much could be gained by pooling expensive training programmes, perhaps even air-bases and port facilities. But ultimately some multilateral framework should be preserved. The standard operating procedures and rules of engagement are some of the most valuable achievements of NATO. The islands of cooperation should not deviate too much from each other and in this respect the term ‘clusters’ seems preferable to ‘islands’.

Unfortunately, the European Defence Agency which started in 2004 did not yet live up to its expectations. The intention was to bring requirements, research and development, and joint production and common production much closer together. EDA had some success in making the defence equipment market more transparent, but even today the number of common projects does not exceed that of its predecessor, the Western European Armaments Group, which had a much narrower focus. Much would be gained if defence planning would be multilateralised, at least regionally. Today the austerity measures take place in splendid isolation, with unforeseen consequences for the maintenance of important capabilities. Currently, however, the trend seems to be bilateral, with the Franco-British agreement taking away much of the momentum of the EDA.

Earlier, on 6 December 2010 the foreign ministers of France, Germany and Poland had written to the High representative, Baroness Ashton, to ask her to work on the improvement of EU – NATO relations and on the creation of permanent civil–military planning and conduct capabilities. This move from the so-called ‘Weimar group’ was repeated on 5 May and 2 September 2011. The last letter, also signed by the foreign ministers of Italy and Spain, encouraged the High representative “to examine all institutional and legal options available to member states, including Permanent Structured Cooperation, to develop critical CSDP capabilities, notably a permanent planning and conduct capability”. Lady Ashton had shown herself rather reluctant by saying that she did not take hasty decisions on the final set up of crisis management structures, but obviously she was aware of British opposition to

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establishing a civil-military headquarter. Nevertheless, this would be the only way to mobilize all instruments of the EU efficiently and to do so in a manner which would minimize competition with NATO. The High Representative was more supportive of the idea to increase the preparedness and responsiveness of the battle groups which would be on stand-by in 2013. One of the ideas is to make the group of countries forming an ad hoc battle group into a permanent team, which would make them more cohesive and better trained. Using Valasek’s ideas, this would foster clusters of cooperation.

6. Conclusion

The security sector and the military profession have changed and will continue to change. Large scale ground warfare seems to be a thing of the past. In fact, the resistance to the dispatch of sizeable ground forces is likely to grow. Instead we see special forces, highly trained and professional, mobility with helicopters, drones for reconnaissance (also for many civilian purposes like disasters and surveillance at sea and on land) but also for precision strikes. In peace support operations the army is doing abroad what the police do at home, but adds their protection capabilities. It will be a revolution in military affairs, but different from the predictions of some time ago when network enabled capabilities were supposed to replace boots on the ground. Future operations will be of a mixed military-civilian character from the start and will slowly obtain a larger civilian profile. Also in the field of development activities the nexus with security should be recognized more. Without a minimum level of security, all development assistance will be a waste of money. And as far as the threats are concerned, terrorism has become a matter for the police and the intelligence services, area defence against ballistic missiles does not yet seem urgent, but failed or failing states (with the wonderful euphemism of Low Income Countries Under Stress, LICUS) should get priority in a globalizing world. Together with organized crime in all its new modalities, like hacking and cyber war. Whether paradigm change or not, defence and security need a close look in order to set priorities for the near future. Traditionally defence is a matter for the long haul, and our equipment will have to serve for decades. But we can hardly look ahead for more than a decade. Consequently, we have to be able to switch direction quickly to be able to meet new contingencies, like a nuclear armed Iran, but the primary need for NATO and EU is to remain capable and coherent for meeting the problems we face now.

Bibliography


The Transatlantic Relationship in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities

Charles King Mallory
The Aspen Institute, Germany

1. Introduction
When one has the opportunity to visit the heart of Anatolia, it is often an eye-opener. While we may read about developments in Turkey, it is quite different to absorb with all of your senses the numerous signs of a flourishing, vibrant, growing, modernizing Democracy. As such, Turkey is more important to U.S. foreign and security policy than ever before. Turkey can act as a strategic bridge along multiple azimuths. Turkey can also become a greater stakeholder and can act as a stabilizer, persuader, facilitator, mediator, as well as an example, as the global community struggles to cope with the challenges and opportunities presented by the new, emerging post-Cold-War strategic landscape.

In this article I will touch on three topics: First, I will offer a brief assessment of where Turkey’s bilateral relations with the European Union and the United States stand from a U.S. point of view; next, I will describe three major strategic challenges that I believe Turkey, the European Union and the United States face in the Greater Middle East; and finally, I will attempt to analyze where the opportunities for and challenges to cooperation between Turkey, the European Union and the United States lie, given where bilateral relations stand and the challenges facing them.

2. Bilateral Relations between Turkey, the European Union and the United States
At the outset, I have to say that I believe that – more than twenty years after the fact – relations with Turkey are developing within the context of an international system that is still seeking to find a new equilibrium as it continues to adjust to the far-reaching impacts of the end of the Cold War. New powers such as Brazil, India and China are rising while older powers such as Europe and the U.S. struggle to get their economic houses in order. The institutional structures of the Cold War era are showing signs of age. In all probability they may be replaced or supplanted by new, emerging entities better able to cope with the challenges posed by the new strategic landscape. The potential changes that these trends will bring with them are profound and are just beginning to be felt.

2.1 Turkish – U.S. relations
Looking back on the broader span of history, Turkey has had a long and complicated relationship with some of its immediate neighbors, for example, Russia. Thirteen different conflicts have taken place between Turkey and Russia – not always ending in a fashion that was...
satisfactory to the Turkish side. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire also left its imprint on modern Turkey, with the “Great Powers” fighting over the division of the spoils in a manner that can hardly have left Turkish participants with savory memories. Moving ahead a few decades, although the principal focus was a communist political insurgency in Greece, the Soviet Union’s demands for a military base on the Straits of Marmara and its boundary claims versus Turkey provided an additional impetus for the implementation of the Truman doctrine in March 1947. Soon thereafter Turkey joined NATO and dispatched combat troops to Korea. Given the nature of the Soviet threat, the benefits for Turkey of a security relationship with the United States were relatively clear throughout the course of the Cold War.

However clouds soon began to gather on the metaphorical horizon of bilateral relations. In 1963, during the Cyprus crisis, the administration of U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson qualified its commitment to Turkey stating that it might not come to Turkey’s defense if Turkish intervention in Cyprus prompted a Soviet response. Some years later, after Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1975, the United States imposed an embargo on the exportation of armaments to Turkey, which was surely an unpopular move for Ankara. With the end of the Cold War, the basic rationale for the U.S.-Turkish security relationship disappeared.

Significant financial losses and a rather intangible series of benefits accrued to Turkey as a result of the War to Liberate Kuwait, and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq led to a serious erosion of Turkey’s security situation. In short, as the world adjusted to the new, emerging post-Cold-War strategic landscape, Turks could be forgiven for wondering: “Who is the net beneficiary of the Turkish-U.S. security relationship – Turkey or the United States?”

Turkey’s decision not to permit the transit of troops through Turkey into Iraq in 2003 sat poorly with some in Washington. Difficult as it may have been for some Americans to accept, Turkey’s decision was actually the outcome of a healthy democratic process. For Turks, one of the more complicated consequences of the invasion of Iraq was the establishment of a Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq that bears many of the hallmarks of an independent state. Turkish-U.S. relations were also not helped by the inaction of the U.S. military in the face of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) use of Iraq’s Kandil Mountains as a sanctuary from which to mount terrorist attacks on Turkey. How could a U.S. government that had invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries, now be so inactive in the case of the PKK? Matters reached a point where the Turkish armed forces were mobilized along the Turkish-Iraqi border in 2006 and parliament voted to approve a cross-border incursion into Iraq on Turkey’s part in 2007.

This tension in bilateral relations was – to a degree – defused by a 2007 Turkish-U.S. summit at which greater efforts at fighting PKK terrorist activities were agreed upon. But a certain bitter taste may have remained, particularly after the U.S. government did not rush to denounce the “e-coup” of 2007. Because of the end of the Cold War, the primary focus of Turkish security interests had already been shifting to address the security challenges it faced to the South in the Greater Middle East. These challenges were made more acute, however, by an Iraq war instigated by Turkey’s ally, the U.S., which led to the drive for Kurdish autonomy and separatism receiving additional impetus, and the PKK obtaining a safe haven from which to mount terrorist attacks. Sectarian violence and disintegration of central authority took place in Iraq – with large questions of direct relevance to Turkey’s
future security still left unresolved. And a, if not the, net beneficiary of this entire tendency in Iraq has been the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Where do these developments leave Turkish-U.S. relations in the new strategic landscape that is being fashioned after the Cold War? Although Turkish-U.S. relations are somewhat improved after the visit of U.S. President Obama in March 2009, my impression is that much ground has been lost over the last ten to fifteen years. Turkey is strategically important to the United States because it is a Democracy successfully executing profound economic modernization in a region largely bereft of such governance and growth. Turkey forms a strategic bridge to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In this latter role Turkey can play a general stabilizing role, one that serves U.S. interests in, for example, Syria, or Turkey can mediate – for instance, until recently, between Iran and Israel. Turkey also can serve as an example of how to kick-start economic development and growth in a region badly in need of both. For the United States, therefore, Turkey remains a vital strategic partner that is more, not less, important, to U.S. national policy given the generational challenges the international community faces in the regions that Turkey borders. However, the benefits to Turkey of close security cooperation with the United States are not as obvious as they once were. For this reason, the nature of the Turkish-U.S. relationship will in all probability with time be redefined to be more reflective of this new balance of interests.

2.2 Turkish-EU relations

While there is inadequate space here to discuss the extensive pre-history to Turkish-EU relations, suffice it to say that the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire and Europe were an interface between cultures at which friction and cooperation took place over the course of many years. In a sense, Turkey has been looking to Europe at the latest since the 1920s—since the instigation of its new Republic. Turkish membership in NATO has already been mentioned, but what few in Europe seem to remember is that Turkey, through its membership in NATO, tied down twenty-four Soviet divisions that might otherwise have been employed on NATO’s central front in Europe.

Turkey thus played a central role in assuring the security that was necessary for Western Europe to rebuild, grow and attain the standards of living that it enjoys today. To my mind, there is something profoundly dishonorable about being prepared to let Turkey take the point of the spear in this manner for almost forty years and then turning around – once the danger has passed – and effectively stating to Turkey: “you don’t belong in our club”. I do understand, however, that national interests determine relations between states and that questions of “honor” therefore often receive rather short shrift.

Clearly, integrating a country of Turkey’s size – with 70 million citizens it has the second largest population in Europe – would require major changes in the way that Brussels does business. But to those who say that Turkey is “simply not European”, I would say that there are a number of important strategic reasons for reconsidering that position.

For one, with the sole exception of Germany, which only seems able to grow thanks to a series of external capital account imbalances, Turkey is one of the few economies in Europe showing any signs of real growth. Rather than forming a potential economic millstone around Europe’s neck – a common image promulgated in
Germany and beyond – Turkish membership in the EU might actually kick-start the growth-prospects for what might otherwise remain a collection of low-growth post-industrial societies that are struggling to finance bloated social welfare systems on the backs of shrinking domestic workforces. And demographics tell us that this situation is unlikely to change. In fact, if one looks to economic performance, it is Turkey that should be asking why it should marry its future to such a sorry group that seems to be structurally incapable of making timely and effective decisions to assure their own economic futures.

Turkish membership in the European Union is also in the strategic interest of Europeans, because of the role that Turkey can play in assuring Europe a greater degree of energy independence. Such independence is critical if Europe ever hopes to attain a geopolitical role resembling the one that it is striving for. The Baku-Ceyhan and Nabucco pipelines offer the potential of diversifying Europe’s sources of energy supply in a manner that would make Brussels less susceptible to political pressure from Moscow. Those in German public and business circles who argue that such pressure would never be applied by their newfound Russian friends, or make similar arguments based on inter-dependence, display profound political naiveté about Russia and the way that its elites have historically done business. In addition to assuring Europe greater energy independence, with Turkey as a member, the EU could exert more political influence to bring about independent political and economic growth trajectories for countries in Central Asia and the Greater Middle East.

While one cannot translate Turkish experience one-for-one to other countries, there are many lessons that both Central Asian countries and the countries of the Greater Middle East can draw from the growth of civil society and from economic modernization in Turkey. By further anchoring Turkey’s tremendous economic growth record into the European tradition, Turkey can serve as an even stronger light-house for those seeking to reign in authoritarianism, modernize their economies and implant the rule of law in their own societies. The staggering social and economic consequences for Europe of not more proactively pushing for greater economic growth democracy and human rights on its southern and other borders are now becoming very apparent; they highlight why it is in Europe’s strategic interest to be acting in partnership with a new member that has undergone the historical trajectory that Turkey has.

A sour note has been introduced into the bilateral relationship by conservative elements that have been less than diplomatic about their aversion to Turkish membership in the EU – particularly following the debate about Turkey’s European credentials that took place after the 2004 Brussels summit. In 2004 a bold attempt to reach political accommodation in Cyprus was also undertaken. Unfortunately, this effort failed and the EU and Turkey found themselves in a standoff over the EU’s promise to lift its economic embargo of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey’s refusal to open its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels after joining a customs union with the EU. The EU suspension of negotiations on eight accession chapters that ensued from this standoff appears, to an outsider, to be a rather disproportionate way of going about business with a neighbor, partner and potential future member-state and certainly cannot have improved the atmosphere. More recently, the Cyprus issue has received new impetus due to the dispute over drilling rights off of Cyprus. With all of this static already in the air, the decision of the European Court on Human Rights
to uphold the headscarf ban in Turkish universities may not have been a useful reminder of potential future European interference in Turkish social affairs.

It is not up to the United States to decide who may and may not join the European Union. But, as a friend, I would submit to those of my European colleagues who oppose Turkish membership that it would be a mistake to deny Turkey membership or to draw out the accession process to a point where Turkey no longer has any interest in joining the EU. The bloom already appears to have come off of the red European rose in Turkey as a consequence of recent developments in bilateral relations. Partly for this reason, but also because the new geostrategic environment has forced a change of strategic focus Southwards, Turkey has increasingly chosen its own path in its foreign and security affairs.

3. Strategic Challenges in the Greater Middle East

While what was once termed the “War on Terror” and is now termed the “Struggle Against Violent Extremism” will continue to be a preoccupation for the international community as the United States and its allies disengage from Iraq and Afghanistan, I would like to focus on three other strategic challenges facing Turkey, the European Union and the United States of America here: (i) the Arab Spring; (ii) Iran; and (iii) Palestine.

3.1 The Arab Spring

For many U.S. policy makers, the United Nations Development Program’s 2001 Arab Human Development Report was the first warning of things to come in the Greater Middle East. The report, which was authored by Arab intellectuals, highlighted a series of shortcomings in human development in the Arab world.

- It pointed to a “demographic bulge” of younger persons who would soon be entering the workforce due to high birth rates in the Middle East and North Africa;
- The writers highlighted the fact that education systems in the region were not producing graduates endowed with the skills needed in the workplace and that as a consequence youth unemployment and under-employment was high in Arab countries;
- The report pointed to a “lost decade” of stagnant real economic growth in the Arab world that had taken place due to economic mismanagement;
- The authors highlighted the lack of political participation and democratic rights;
- Finally, the report pointed to the very circumscribed rights of women in the region.

Policy makers in the United States understood that this was a potentially explosive combination of trends that could unleash widespread social unrest if allowed to continue unaddressed. For this reason, U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell launched a $400 million initiative designed to provide material support to educational, economic and political reformers in the region – including by providing aid to reform elements directly, bypassing reluctant incumbent political regimes. The United States also sought to re-engineer its assistance program to Egypt in order to have it address the challenges

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2 The U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative
identified by the 2001 Arab Human Development Report more directly and efficiently.

At the start of his second administration, U.S. President George W. Bush elevated the effort to achieve broader political participation in the Greater Middle East to the position of a central pillar of the foreign policy of his second administration. Unfortunately U.S. efforts to highlight the challenge posed to the international community by developments in the region fell largely on deaf ears. In the Arab world, President Bush’s democratization initiatives were regarded as a sorry post facto justification for the invasion of Iraq after the initial rationale offered (Iraq’s attempts to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction) proved to have been fatally flawed. My personal observations were that EU bureaucrats’ aversion to the Bush administration was so great that they wanted little to do with Bush’s initiatives to promote reform and democratization, despite the fact that the rationale behind these initiatives was solidly grounded in facts that impinged upon the EU’s interests much more directly than those of the United States.

Ultimately, it was of little surprise to me when the flames of political revolt were kindled in Tunisia and spread from there to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria. We may not have known where revolt would originate, but we had a very good sense that major disruption was coming soon in the Middle East and North Africa.

The first strategic challenge that Turkey, the European Union and the United States face, therefore, is how to deal with the consequences of the tectonic shift that the Arab Spring represents for the Greater Middle East. To put it succinctly, we all have a strong national interest in ensuring the emplacement of new political regimes in these countries that are at once more stable and more participatory than their predecessors. To make this happen we have to help ensure that significant real economic growth takes place in these countries. Achieving this goal might be termed the generational challenge facing us.

Should economic development and growth of the kind we have recently witnessed in Turkey fail to develop in the region, then we can expect democracy to be still-born and discredited in the eyes of domestic populations, much as it became discredited in Weimar Germany between the two World Wars. The problem with such a potential development is that it opens the way to power for revanchists. We have seen this movie at least three times before: once or twice in Europe in the 1930s and twice more recently in South America. In every case we ended up saddled with demagogue leaders who have led their countries in the wrong direction.

3.2 The ascent of Iran

For many U.S. policy makers, the United Nations Development Program’s 2001 Arab Human Development Report was the first warning of things to come in the Greater Middle East. The report, which was authored by Arab intellectuals, highlighted a series of shortcomings in human development in the Arab world. It may not come as a very welcome message in Turkey, but Western intelligence agencies believe that Iran’s nuclear program is configured in such a way that its only true purpose can be military. While one can debate whether a developing country should or should not have access to nuclear technology, one thing is clear: Iran has led the international community on a wild goose chase for over a decade by delaying and obfuscating and refusing to provide full transparency concerning its nuclear
program. My personal view is that Iran intends to attain the nuclear threshold and that it will succeed in doing so relatively soon.

My principal argument with Iran lies not with its theocratic structure (that is a matter for Iranians to decide), but in its past attempts to export its revolution throughout the region and beyond. By arming a Shi'ite militia in Southern Lebanon, Iran has interfered in the internal affairs of that country, destabilized Lebanon politically and contributed directly to the unleashing of a war with Israel that no one in Lebanon or Israel needed or wanted. By arming Hamas in the Gaza strip, Iran has provided a rationale for Israel to blockade the Gaza strip and has stopped Arik Sharon’s plan unilaterally to withdraw from the West Bank dead in its tracks. After witnessing the rocketing of the Israeli city of Sderot and other Israeli cities by Hamas that followed on the heels of their unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza strip, very few people in Israel are willing to run the risk of a repeat performance emanating from the West Bank.

Moreover, Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons poses both a global and a regional challenge:

• Left unchallenged it would represent a further erosion of the global non-proliferation regime – a regime that has already come under significant pressure due to nuclear developments on the Korean Peninsula;
• In a regional context, the possession of nuclear weapons may lead Iran to feel inoculated against retaliation with conventional weapons for its interference in the affairs of other countries. This in turn may embolden certain elements in Iran, such as the Pasdaran, and cause them to become more risk seeking by engaging in a greater number of bolder actions than those they have engaged in the past. Nor can one expect other regional powers to simply sit by and do nothing, should Iran attain the nuclear threshold. The launch of nuclear weapons development programs in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf states and, perhaps, Turkey are all entirely conceivable responses to Iran’s attaining the nuclear threshold. Any one of these potential developments would spell further deep trouble for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The second strategic challenge that Turkey, the European Union and the United States face in the Greater Middle East therefore lies in finding closure to the challenge that the Iranian nuclear program has posed to the international community over the course of at least the past decade.

3.3 Palestine

For over sixty years the international community has been involved in attempts to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The irony is that we know from opinion polling that large majorities on both sides – both Israelis and Palestinians – support a two-state solution. This fact notwithstanding, small minorities on both sides (e.g. Israeli settlers, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade) have continually succeeding in manipulating the situation on the ground through acts of violence or otherwise in such a way as to prevent the will of the majority from being implemented.
Lest anyone doubt the United States’ and the EU’s commitment to achieving peace between Israelis and Palestinians, it warrants reminding that it is Europe and the United States who bear the lion’s share of the cost of paying for Palestinian government institutions. More often than not the Palestinians’ Arab “brothers” have been slow in paying or have totally failed to come up with the funding that they have promised in order to implement the two-state solution. Just to be clear, these payments are not insignificant amounts. In the U.S. case, the amount in question involves some $900 million in transfers to the Palestinian authority annually.

From an Israeli perspective, time is running out. Demographics tell us that differences in birth rates place Israel’s democracy in peril. Either Israel reaches closure with the Palestinians soon, or it will be forced to abandon democratic methods of government in order to rule an Arab majority within its own borders. Frankly, most experts know that the issue that dominates the headlines in this connection is a canard. Land swaps agreed between Palestinians and Israelis at Wye have long shown the way to a solution to the “settlement issue”, showing that it is not the real outstanding issue between the two sides. The two real outstanding issues are: the fate of East Jerusalem and Haq al-Awda or the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

I do empathize with the suffering that displaced Palestinians have endured for over fifty years. But I also empathize for the victims of an enduring and, to my mind, senseless campaign of terror that is not the answer to the question of how to solve this issue. Frankly, the Palestinian issue is abused by Arab regimes. It is used as an escape valve through which pent-up frustrations that have much more to do with the domestic policy failures are released. Nonetheless, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute represents an enduring humanitarian disaster, a vast drain on resources, and a tremendous distraction from dealing with other pressing challenges facing the Greater Middle East. For this reason, it is the third, but by no means least, strategic challenge that we face in the Greater Middle East.

4. Что делать (What to Do)
How, then, should we deal with these challenges that we face?

4.1 The Arab spring
The Arab Spring is a special case of a broader post-Cold War phenomenon, namely the challenge of dealing with failed and/or failing states that can become incubators of violent extremism. Whereas the principal security challenge that we faced during the Cold War was primarily military in its presentation, the principal set of security challenges that we will face (in the Greater Middle East) over the next decade may very well be developmental in their primary presentation. Military alliance structures that were created to fight set-piece naval engagements on the flanks (Turkey, Scandinavia) or tank battles on the plains of Germany are ill suited to addressing such problems. We have been undergoing a form of cognitive dissonance about this fact for a number of years. Both the Afghan and Iraqi engagements have repeatedly forced us to confront the reality that existing strategies, doctrines, force and alliance structures are not fully up to the task of dealing with the development challenges involved in any successful preventative assistance delivery or counter-insurgency strategies.
What this means is that – with apologies to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev – we have to engage in “new thinking” when it comes to how we organize ourselves and the policies that we adopt in tackling the challenge presented not only by the Arab Spring, but also by situations such as Somalia, Sudan, Darfur, the Balkans and beyond. The principal strategic challenge has now become how best to mobilize resources and organize effectively in order to preemptively or retroactively mitigate the deleterious effects of arrested development, and how to kick-start economic growth in countries at risk or countries involved in intra- or international conflict.

I believe that development assistance has taken on a much greater significance in this connection than it had previously. What was once a bauble to be handed out to Third World client states to keep them “on-side” during a global standoff with the Soviet Union, has now become a key tool by which to address our principal security challenge. The problem is that the implications of this paradigm change are taking quite some time to register within national and international bureaucracies and policy elites. For the United States—and perhaps Turkey as well—it means that we have probably over-invested in military means and under-invested in developmental tools and management systems. Structural and, much more importantly, management changes are required to our ability to deliver a more suited “product mix” of development assistance and military intervention in failed, failing or “at risk” contingencies.

Whereas providers of development assistance were previously held to the level of accountability of a pawn on the strategic chessboard, they now need to be held to the level of accountability of a bishop or a queen—given the change in this set of tools’ relative significance. This means that the Gutmenschen in the development world need to realize that yes, we will continue to do development for development’s sake and yes, there is a place for projects that will only come to fruition—if at all—in ten to fifteen years time, but national security needs dictate that in designing and delivering their services, the Gutmenschen deliver results within politically meaningful short- and medium-term timeframes as well. Management systems need to be developed to hold development assistance providers much more accountable for achieving a series of clearly defined—and, if possible, quantifiable—goals on an intra-year and annual basis. If these goals are not achieved within a reasonable time frame, then resources must ruthlessly be reprogrammed into areas where progress is occurring.

Too frequently, the mental approach adopted towards development assistance is an extensive, as opposed to an intensive one. It is not a question of mobilizing huge amounts of additional resources—although significant additional resources will undoubtedly be required to manage the consequences of the Arab Spring. It is more a question of ensuring much more efficient use of existing resources. A number of national and supra-national approaches to tackling this challenge are available.

Because most development decisions involve questions of domestic political and/or economic reform, they also involve mobilizing political will within domestic policy elites in order to implement needed changes. Intra-national elite politics are therefore a key nexus in achieving the development and economic growth goals that are needed to address our newfound national security challenges. The influencing of foreign elites is the preserve of diplomats. In order to successfully apply the “treatments” required by the new security para-
digm or emerging New World Order (with apologies to George H. W. Bush), we need to change the way we incentivize our diplomats. In the U.S., the promotion prospects of an ambassador are relatively independent of the success or failure of in-country development projects under his/her command as chief of mission. This needs to change—particularly since political will within domestic elites, much more than money, is often what is required to achieve real change.

Another implication of the emerging New World Order is that our military needs to change the way it is organized in order to work more effectively with civilian agencies in the delivery of development assistance in conflict or near-conflict situations. Much stronger cross-linkages need to exist between development and military organizations and development assistance managers need to be incentivized and promoted much more on the basis of their success in working with diplomats and soldiers to deliver such services.

This argument is—of course—anathema to many in the development world. They abhor the stigma of association with military activity and argue, not unpersuasively, that any such association undermines the credibility of their work. But facts remain facts. Development assistance will continue to need to be delivered along a continuum of contingencies ranging from peace, to at risk, to conflict and post conflict situations. To the purists I would borrow from the argot and say: “wake up and smell the coffee”. Either they will succeed in converting themselves into organizations capable of delivering services along all points of this spectrum, or resources will be diverted to other or new organizations more capable or suited to rising to meet these national (an international) challenges.

In this vein, we may also need to be much more active in managing the providers of development assistance. There is a myth in circulation that such organizations are by definition benign. I do not subscribe to this view. In the first place, a number of these organizations operate on a for profit basis creaming some thirty-six cents in overhead off of every development dollar before these scarce resources even arrive at the metaphorical shores of the intended recipient country. If such a major cost item faced the private sector, it would actively manage this cost-center and target a one to two percent annual reduction.  This is something we are quite capable of achieving in the public sector via legislation—should we manage to realize our overriding national interest in breaking free from the hidebound domestic political economy of development assistance.

Even Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) acting on a not-for-profit basis can end up debilitating efforts to kick-start development. Too frequently, well-intentioned NGOs come into a country and apply too many resources to hire all of the indigenous talent away from local governments for their own purposes. They thereby drain the brain and capacities of the government whose very functioning they are supposed to be improving. In this respect, not-for-profit NGOs too are not necessarily by definition the benign actors that we like to think of them as being. Clearly, much more sophisticated thinking is needed about how to approach the management of non-governmental development assistance providers.

There are a number of steps that one can take on an international level as well. While nobody should be engaging in any form of Diktat to countries “targeted” for development assistance, we should not allow “target” countries to play providers of development assistance off against one another either. What this means is that we need much better mac-
roscopic coordination to agree on a set of broad targets for development assistance at top (i.e. foreign minister, Secretary of State) policy levels. Turkey, the European Union and the United States of America are an eighty percent monopsonystic provider of development assistance into the Great Middle East. If our efforts become better coordinated we can use our combined market power to promote change more effectively.

In addition to macroscopic coordination of sectoral targets relating to the delivery of development assistance, greater coordination may be required in diplomatic and political messaging to incumbent policy elites in target countries in order to improve the chances for mobilizing the political will to implement change and reform. Turkey may be able to play a more effective role than either the European Union or the United States, as both of the latter bring certain, more recent, “baggage” to the table when it comes to providing policy advice to rulers in the Greater Middle East.

We may need to accept that, if it is to have a future, NATO must be retooled to deal with these challenges more effectively. For European militaries a first step would involve making large and brutal cuts to administrative staff in order to dramatically improve the so-called “tooth to tail ratio”. Such cuts to administrative staff may also be required in Turkey as well. In a second step, the activities of national development and EU development assistance organizations may need to be interlinked more closely with existing NATO command, control, training and doctrinal development organizations.

There may be a place for a paramilitary form of organization of development assistance. Such an organization could either exist within or in parallel to existing structures. Finally, we may need to engage in “new thinking” at the supra-national level about mobilizing and engaging organizations and tools that are not ordinarily thought of in the national security context for national security purposes.

Turning to some specific cases, if the challenge to France is to persuade more Moroccans to stay home instead of immigrating to France, then France may need to think about acting within EU structures to provide Moroccans with a greater economic incentive to stay at home. As over fifty percent of the Moroccan economy is agricultural in nature this means opening European end markets to Moroccan agricultural goods. The French farmer may have to pay for a solution to the Moroccan immigration problem. The Common Agricultural Policy would thereby become an instrument of EU national security policy. For, what is applicable to Moroccan farmers is equally applicable to Egyptian (cotton) farmers as well.

Similarly, if one of the challenges in Afghanistan is to persuade poor, illiterate farmers to halt their production of opium, then one must offer them a viable alternative cash crop with which to assure their survival. We need to think “out of the box” in such situations by—for instance—agreeing to lift all tariff and quotas on agricultural exports meeting basic phytosanitary standards from Afghanistan to the Gulf, the United States and the European Union for a period of ten years. International trade policy thereby becomes a non-traditional vehicle for implementing transatlantic security policy.

These suggestions are not offered in the sense of facile cure-alls that might miraculously resolve long-standing Gordian problems. Rather, they are intended as illustrations of how solutions to the challenges posed by the emerging New World Order may need to be sought for in places usually thought of as relatively distant from the hard national security realm.
Turkey can play a constructive role in efforts to prospect the contours of the new international security landscape outlined above. Turkey’s development path can serve as an example to many countries in the region and may be more effective than any imprecations coming from past colonialists or recent invaders. If you accept the analysis given above, then there is room for greater Turkish integration into transatlantic policy coordination, designed to achieve these goals and there is room for a Turkish voice in efforts to reshape transatlantic institutions so that they may more effectively rise to meet the new challenges that we face.

Finally, Turkey too faces choices related to resource allocation. If Turkish military spending were brought in line with the highest spenders within the transatlantic alliance – i.e. five percent of GDP, then some three percent of GDP would be freed to address the developmental challenges outlined above. On an annual basis we are talking about circa $22 billion in potential additional assistance resources that are worth $550 billion on a discounted present value basis, more than enough to ensure Turkey’s seat at the top table.

4.2 Iran

Turning to the question of how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, many Israelis and Americans may be appalled to hear this, but I can understand why Iran wants to acquire nuclear weapons. Given the history of Western intervention in that country and the enduring trauma that it caused, given U.S. and Western intervention to prevent Iran from prevailing in the Iran-Iraq war, given the fact that neighboring Pakistan (which Iranians consider culturally inferior) has acquired nuclear weapons, I can understand why Tehran would seek to acquire nuclear weapons for reasons of deterrence, prestige and regime survival.

The challenge that the United States, the European Union and Turkey face is: how to mobilize the diplomatic, economic and other tools at our disposal to dissuade Tehran from its current course and how to prepare for the contingency that we (in all probability) will fail in this effort.

To date, the international community has adopted a policy combining both pressure and incentives towards Tehran. Without listing the entire litany of international measures undertaken over the course of more than a decade, suffice it to say that our actions of late have tended more in the direction of pressure than of incentives. And pressure does not appear to be having the desired effect. This policy of pressure has also been accompanied by one of isolation that plays into the hands of the incumbent régime.

More mileage might be had from efforts to engage Iran. Turkey, the EU and the United States can do better in explaining to the Iranian leadership and public that the security that they seek via Tehran’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons will not be achieved. Much as in the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, attaining the nuclear threshold will impair, not improve Tehran’s security in the short- medium- and long-term.

In the short-term, Iran’s security will be impaired for a number of reasons. There will be a strong incentive to attack Iran militarily before it builds a nuclear arsenal that

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3 Based on 2010 estimated Turkish GDP of $740 billion at official exchange rates (CIA World Factbook); 2010 Turkish defense spending of $57 billion, i.e. 8% of GDP (Turkish Ministry of Defense) and a discount factor of 4%.
comprises a hardened counterforce, capable of mounting a viable counter-strike in the context of an actual putative nuclear exchange. Stability in any future crisis instigated by Iran, (e.g. by yet another asymmetrical attack on international interests) will be impaired by the presence of nuclear weapons and the risk of escalation of any such crisis to the nuclear level will have increased. In the medium- to long-term, Iran’s neighbors will target their existing nuclear weapons on Iran, launch nuclear weapons programs of their own, augment conventional military forces directed at Iran and the United States will alter its nuclear force posture in the region to meet the challenge that an Iranian nuclear arsenal would pose.

A tremendous strain would be placed on Iranian national resources, should it – in turn – attempt to react to the steps undertaken by its neighbors and the United States in response to its nuclear efforts. Yet Iran is not that rich and it is hardly a model of development. The country faces serious economic challenges in order to be able to provide an adequate standard of living for a bulging cohort of youth whose potential dissatisfaction might ultimately result in internally generated regime change. Iranians came close to effecting such change in 2009 and I do not believe that 2009 was the last word.

The international strategy of pressure and isolation in the context of Iran’s nuclear program has yielded little over the course of the last ten years. Perhaps further mileage can be achieved by engagement. I am not naïve about what engaging Iran means or entails. But there is big money to be made by Iranians in assuring the economic viability of the Nabucco pipeline with their natural gas. There is great geostrategic benefit to be had by emplacing a route of energy supply to the Balkans and Europe that lies outside of Moscow’s control. There is also huge advantage to be had for the international community by cooperating with Iran to provide yet another corridor for energy resources to exit the Caspian and Central Asian areas via the Gulf and or Turkey.

While it is probably too late to prevent Iran from attaining the nuclear threshold, cooperation not confrontation may be the path to ensuring that the nuclear threat that Iran eventually poses does not become acute. And in essence what this boils down to is a two-pronged argument: (i) the profits to be had from cooperating with the international community; and (ii) the foregone economic opportunity costs and the greater economic growth opportunities (and by implication greater chances for regime survival) to be had from a policy of détente between Tehran and the international community. Because of its long-standing ties to Iran and the policy position it has chosen to adopt, Turkey is well positioned to facilitate a transition from an international policy of confrontation and isolation to one of engagement and bigger incentives. I hope that Turkey will rise to the challenge and that international policy makers will show the flexibility of mind to allow it to do so.

Ad interim the international community can make efforts to mitigate the risks that nuclear-armed Iranian ballistic missiles might eventually pose. Turkey has agreed to the emplacement of an early warning battle management radar that would form part of a ballistic missile defense system on its territory. This was an important step that went a long way to repairing some of the damage done to institutional ties between the U.S. and Turkey. Admittedly however, I am skeptical of efforts to invent technological solutions to what are essentially human not technological problems. True, such systems may provide employment and advance technological development in participating countries, but as the Maginot line taught
us, they can be out-flanked and are unlikely to be militarily effective over the long-run as anything other than an early warning system. Given the tremendous resources involved in constructing such systems, the burden of proving that this is not the case lies firmly on the shoulders of those promoting these expenditures.

4.3 Palestine
As I have indicated above, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is an enduring humanitarian tragedy, a diversion of resources and a distraction. I am not going to dwell on the causes of current dissonance between Israel and Turkey. Except to say that in my view, the Mavi Marmara incident was an act of political provocation and that in the context of an existing blockade against Gaza, Israel’s actions were fully justified under international law—even if the loss of human life engendered by a poorly conceived and executed military operation is deplorable. Turkey will not achieve its declared goals with Israel by continued public posturing – if these are indeed the Turkish government’s true goals. Quiet diplomacy is needed, if Turkey is to have any hope of receiving an apology or compensation. Given Turkish behavior to date, the chances to me now appear pretty slim.

Nor do I see how any of this helps resolve the basic conflict. Although the United States is not happy with the official contacts that have taken place between Hamas and the Turkish government, if Turkey wishes to make a positive contribution then instead of posturing in public, it can use its ties to Hamas to persuade them to come to the negotiating table and accept Israel’s right to exist – something Turkey has done since the late 1940s. Turkey could also make a positive contribution by lobbying Iran to halt weapons shipments to Gaza and Lebanon.

5. Conclusion
The transatlantic alliance, having survived the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and withstood the political and military strains of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq stands on the threshold of an emerging New World Order to which it probably has no choice but to respond, adapt or die.

We face a generational challenge in ensuring that economic growth lends political credibility to the regime changes brought about by the “Arab Spring”. Bureaucracies and elites have yet to internalize and adapt to the new paradigm. In this new order, improved incentives, accountability and resource utilization will probably be need to be applied across a broad continuum of potential future contingencies to achieve the international community’s security goals. New approaches may have to be developed to how we manage providers of development assistance and the costs that they incur. These changes in policies and procedures will probably have significant organizational implications for NATO and for national diplomatic, development and military organizations. New tools may also need to be developed or borrowed from realms not considered within the purview of hard national security policy.

We have probably long passed the point of avoiding the risk of a nuclear Iran. In all likelihood, we are already in the phase of deciding how to mitigate this risk.
Missile Defense may be a useful source of alliance cohesion and provider of jobs for engineers and technologists, it is not a cure-all or a substitute for a negotiated settlement. Pressure and isolation have not only failed to yield the desired results, but have also played into the hands of the Iranian political régime. It may now be necessary to engage Iran in order to mitigate the risk of its building a nuclear counterforce and to explain the potential profits and avoided opportunity costs of a more accommodating position on its part. The international community might do well to focus on the positive geostrategic benefits that such engagement with Iran would entail—both for Europe, the Caspian region and Central Asia.

Continued posturing and acts of political provocation directed at Israel and relations with Hamas are not only hypocritical – given Turkey’s excoriation of U.S. inaction versus PKK terrorists in 2006 – but will probably fail to help Turkey achieve its avowed strategic goals. Turkey should, instead, consider making positive contributions towards a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis by getting Hamas to the negotiating table and lobbying Tehran to stop delivering weapons to Gaza and Lebanon. Turkey can be a facilitator of renewed international engagement with Iran and can use its suasion and otherwise non-productive resources to help make the Arab Spring an economic success.

As we approach the challenge of finally integrating the contours of the new strategic landscape into transatlantic policies and institutions, there is an active role available for a Turkey newly confident in its abilities and of greater importance to U.S. foreign and security policy than ever.
Energy Security, Politics, Markets, Peace

Ali Oğuz Diriöz
Bilkent University

Review article of 3 books:


Energy products are often traded as market commodities, yet the resource extraction process and the ability of these resources accessing markets can be very often a political tool. Then the following two questions about energy immediately come to mind:

Is Energy Security in foreign policy, a goal or an instrument/weapon? and;
Is Energy Conflictual or Cooperative in the arena of International Politics?

Three books published in recent years, give insight on 3 different aspect of Energy Security. These books would be useful in addressing the above questions from different perspectives. These are Michale T. Klare’s *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy*, Sanam S. Haghighi’s *Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and Gas Supplying Countries*, and Robert L. Evans’ *Fueling our Future: An Introduction to Sustainable Energy*. The basic problem highlighted by all the authors is on how to ensure continual access to secure and uninterrupted energy at affordable prices. While all of the books are suggesting increased international cooperation and specifically the development of new technologies as a general solution, the authors’ points of view are very different and look at the same problem through different lenses. All three

Ali Oğuz Diriöz, PhD. Candidate, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University. Email: dirioz@bilkent.edu.tr

authors have academic backgrounds and yet specialize in different fields, and have written books that are policy relevant in terms of assessing current concerns of energy security and broader concept of energy policy.

Energy Security has become one of the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. The ability to have access to secure and uninterrupted energy at affordable prices is the main concern of consumer countries, while the access to secure markets is the main concern of producer countries and multinational corporations. The goal of most experts writing about energy security is to provide insight on the possible solutions on the energy problem; access to adequate amounts of energy at affordable prices. (It is worth mentioning that sometimes, authors writing on the broader topic of energy policy, also deal with the issue of adequate energy at affordable prices, but tend to treat the issue more in terms of efficiency rather than international access.) And yet the approach to energy security is very different according to the point of view of the author. While the energy literature, especially works on energy policy and public policy, are not necessarily fitting along the lines of International Relations Theories’ main views, the general concerns of the writers share some of the main highlights of IR theories. For instance, some view energy security as a “security” issue and a geopolitical game or potential resource wars dominated by nation-states. Others see a similar problem of security access to unaltered flows at affordable prices to be best secured by corporate and intergovernmental institutionalized cooperation under free market mechanisms. While a third broad category calls for Energy to be seen as a main field in and of itself, with an interdisciplinary approach to solve the technological, environmental, economic and policy problems of the energy conversion chain in general. Such approaches are sometimes referred to as a “Wells to Wheels” approach; which is often seen energy policy as an economic problem, and yet interpret the environmental problems as a concern for human security that transcends borders and thus an issue of energy security.

1. “Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet”

Michael T. Klare’s *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy* would is a realistic book laying out the geopolitical challenge of securing energy needs. As the title suggests, the concern is about the access to diminishing resources in a more competitive environment; particularly due to the rise of emerging powers such as China and India. Michael Klare, focuses on the Geopolitics in Energy Security.

Klare’s book begins with the case of CNOOC-UNOCAL case. The bid by Chinese Oil Company, CNOOC, to acquire an American oil company, UNOCAL, was blocked by the U.S. Congress due to strategic security concerns. This affair “offered the first window into the global fear of resource scarcity and the new geopolitics of energy that will likely accompany it” (p. 6). A new international energy order is dividing countries between energy surplus countries and energy deficit countries. (p. 14) Klare subsequently mentions how around the world, National Energy Companies of energy surplus countries, as opposed to Multinational companies, have gained strength in recent years. And this has caused a rise in “resource nationalism/ neo-mercantilism” (p. 23).

The major “supply” problem of energy resources is that the planet’s resources are shrinking, and those remaining resources (particularly for Oil and Gas) tend to be concen-
trated in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Klare identifies how increasing scarcity will make the remaining resources of geostrategic significance. Furthermore, that the climate-change challenge is only exasperating the problem. Events, such as tropical cyclones (ex: 2005 Hurricane Katrina) altering the steady flow of oil is worrisome to national governments as well as energy companies and consumers (p. 59).

On the “demand” side, the growing economies of emerging powers, and particularly of China and India, put further pressure on the demand for energy. The author uses the term “Chindia” to highlight how much the potential for consumption is with a combined population over two billion people. But also the term alludes to India’s tendency to cooperate with China rather than to fight (p. 83).

On the following chapters, Klare assesses different regions such as Russia’s policy to use energy as a political tool under Putin’s rule (ch. 4); the competition over the Caspian region (ch. 5) which is sometimes termed as “...a 21st century energy version of the imperial ‘Great Game’ of the 19th century...” (p. 115)⁴; the scramble over the untapped African resources (ch. 6); and for the strategic interests and rivalries in the Persian Gulf (ch. 7).

Klare evaluates the current trend in global energy landscape as one that is coming closer to a threshold whereby if the line is crossed, armed conflict and even Great Power confrontation may occur (p. 210). Though Klare acknowledge that as things are standing today, it is unlikely that violent confrontations would occur in the near feature, but ever scarcer energy supplies pose such a potential for the future. Klare indicates that there are already proto-blocs (Shanghai Cooperation Organization on one hand, and USA-Japan lead one on the other) forming over such energy politics (p. 228).

The aspect dominant in Klare’s account is one of competition over scarce resources potentially begin cause of conflict. Consequently, the author is warning about energy becoming increasingly a political tool than a market commodity and thus the global order becoming more conflict prone. As such, Energy Security is a goal to achieve and yet many countries can use it as an instrument of foreign policy. While Klare warns about the dangers of competing over depleting resources he does suggest increased collaboration as a way to “avert catastrophe.” (Chapter 9). Yet the collaboration in Klare’s conclusion is a state-centric partnership (such as between the United States and China – (p. 244). Hence, although new technological developments are seen as key, the author’s point of view is closer to a state-centric alliance focusing on coalition building (particularly among consumer states to lessen dependency on producer states). While acknowledging the necessity for states to cooperate, Klare spends much time warning about the potential on how competition over accessing resources of energy could be conflict prone. Klare does not preclude the possibility of institutionalized cooperation, yet does not see it as automatic. Rather has an outlook that assesses the possibility of alliance formation among countries or blocs. Klare’s scope is also a global scope, and writing such a book is as such a daunting task.

2. “Energy Security”
Sanam S. Haghighi’s Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and Gas Supplying Countries provides an overview of the challenges facing the EU and proposes a triangulation of economics, politics and development. Haghighi’s work is mainly a legal domain of study and proposes institutionalizing cooperative relations with supplying states in the Middle East, North Africa and Eurasia. Thus, Haghighi focuses more on International Organizations such as the European Union as a basis for legalized and institutionalized cooperation as a way to ensure energy security. The very concept of institutionalizing the framework of multilateral international cooperation has the flavor of a more Liberal agenda. While the triangulation gives much importance to politics, ultimately establishing a legal framework to relations with neighboring states is an attempt to make the ground suitable for market forces to operate smoothly. The EU should, accordingly, develop Common Foreign and Security Policy within its institutional framework, and then through these regulations to develop cooperation with neighboring states.

Sanam S. Haghighi examines the energy security of the European Union from a legal perspective, but goes further by describing the EU energy policy. Indeed she provides a complex and thorough account. The author successfully manages the daunting task of assessing myriads of EU legislations, court cases, panels, EU regulations, protocols, and directives, while providing the conceptual definitions of Energy security and presenting an analytical account of proposals to establish institutionalized framework of external relations.

Though it is mainly a text focused on legal perspectives, its ultimate subject matter is to establish legality of external relations with energy supplying countries. Haghighi mentions how “…in a context of growing liberalization of energy markets, the question arises of the appropriate extent of government intervention…” (p. 3). She immediately highlights how this is now more complex since there is the European Community and individual Member States.

Haghighi’s domain of study, accounts for energy shows features of a political tool and of an economic good. Yet the writer focuses on the legal framework of establishing “Market Mechanism” as best way to achieve energy security. Although there is ample discussion of European Common Foreign and Security policy as to what is lacking, what it ought to be and how its legal basis should be, the economic and development focus suggests an economic outlook slightly outweighing politics. As such, Energy Security is a goal to be achieved rather than an instrument of foreign policy.

The EU was actually founded on the basis of energy cooperation as the Coal and Steel were the two most important products powering European Industry, and the subsequent formation of EURATOM, showed how the attempt was there to pool together resources including energy markets. Yet “Overall, a common energy policy, encompassing all forms of energy from coal to gas, electricity and oil, did not materialize.” (p. 4).

The first chapter defines energy security and assesses the factors in guaranteeing energy supply security. A practical definition of energy security adopted in this text is “adequacy of energy supply at a reasonable price” (p. 14). The following chapter deals with a historical overview of the energy industry and the concept of energy security since the origins of the EU. While the third and fourth chapters examine existing EU setup to deal
with energy in foreign policy. The fourth chapter especially discusses a series of Green and White Papers of the Commission such as “The 2006 Green Paper on a European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” (pp. 171-177). The fifth chapter looks at the multilateral measures already in place, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The author particularly mentions the importance of the ECT for the trade, investment and transit of energy. In this respect it focuses on how to provide the ground for market mechanisms to operate. Haghighi, further mentions in a very fittingly way, that while Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are party to the ECT, and Russia is signatory (and applied the treaty provisionally until 2009), the Persian Gulf or Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Iran and Algeria are only observers. Appropriately, the author mentions how important it is to have the GCC countries become party to the ECT, in order to institutionalize the cooperation with these supplier countries (p. 337). Hence, in this extremely tedious and well documented text, it is well highlighted that the Persian Gulf countries are important to have on board the ECT. The remaining two chapters discuss the relations with Russia, Mediterranean and Persian Gulf countries in detail, as well as how the policy Development Cooperation is a missing piece in the Economic-Politic-Development triangulation.

In this study, Haghighi, attempts to address in a mainly legal scholarship, the external level security to guarantee EU energy Security. The author claims that it is equally important to address three issues, a triangulation of economics-politics-development, for the 27 member state EU to establish a common energy security framework. First a framework of economic relations with energy-supplying countries should be established. Then the EU member states should establish a common foreign policy towards energy-supplying countries. Aside from Russia, the importance of Mediterranean countries (mostly Middle East and North Africa), and cooperation with countries of the Persian Gulf are given particular attention. Overall, her approach to energy is that it has more potential to be cooperative rather than focusing on its conflictual facet.

Haghighi’s work is on a more regional perspective and as such is examining the relations between EU countries and mostly neighboring countries. From a regional lens, however, one of the relatively surprising aspects in Haghighi’s account from our perspective is how little Turkey is mentioned. As an important partner of the EU in terms of Energy Security, as well as a country which has a Customs Union with the EU, Turkey is mentioned a few times (such as pp. 328: 321-339), and alluded a few more times in the examples of relations with transit countries, and possibilities of new pipelines. And yet, as an EU candidate that is involved with so many of the energy projects, more attention could have been given on the legal framework of the relationship with Turkey. As it stands, Turkey is not only a transit country but is a big consumer market itself, and issues about the quantities of the

5 When Haghighi had published her book in 2007, Russia was considered a member of the Energy Charter Treaty, even though it had not ratified it; because as a signatory state, Russia was an active participant to the practical and technical work of the energy charter process. Yet its situation remained in ambiguity. The official announcement by Russia in 2009 that it would not be a contracting party to the Energy Charter Treaty came two years after the publication of Haghighi’s book in 2007. (“Energy Charter: FAQ”, Energy Charter, accessed 14 January 2012 GMT+2, 2:10, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=18).
gas to be transited or to be fed to the Turkish market often come to the forefront. The author could have paid a little more attention to such cases.

3. “Fueling Our Future”

Robert L. Evans’ *Fueling our Future: An Introduction to Sustainable Energy* draws attention to the need to change the existing energy cycles. Evans, as a Professor of “Clean Energy Research,” provides a concise account about sustainable energy, and energy cycles. With his engineering background, he provides a multi-disciplinary yet succinct account that goes beyond the economics, politics or engineering of sustainable energy. The book is accompanied with schematic diagrams giving “snapshots” of different energy chain and conversion concepts. Evans also takes energy itself as a total good rather than a geo-strategic sub-category of security studies and mentions the multidisciplinary activity in solving the energy problem. He focuses on the need to develop a new energy cycle. Thus, energy security is neither a political tool nor an economic good but rather a goal with its own politics, economics, environment, and engineering. However, the emphasis is more on the economics of energy supply chain and demand patterns. He particularly stresses that the solutions tend to be long-term from 10 to 50 years, which is far beyond the time-frame of most politicians and decision-makers. And yet it is a period that requires strategic thinking and planning (p. 8). His “Wells to Wheels” approach takes energy policy as an economic problem, and yet interprets the environmental problems as concerns for human security that transcends borders and thus an issue of energy security. (He sees as concern according to the worst case scenarios of climate change, but mentions that it could be beneficial to some in the optimistic scenarios about climate change).

After the introduction chapter 2 starts with the concept of the energy conversion chain; claiming that there are only three forms of primary energy. Namely; Fossil Fuels, Nuclear Energy, and Renewable Energy. Electricity, refined petroleum products, and natural gas, are energy carriers (p. 12). The concept of energy density and difficulty of storing energy are also discussed in this chapter. Interestingly, only 17% of the crude oil extracted at the wells can be put into useful works at the wheels (p. 15). This is why “soft” issues of energy efficiency are as important as the “hard” issues of accessing primary resources, in energy security. The following chapters make a good debate about energy and the environment in which the basics of the greenhouse effects and global warming are laid out. Then, Evans provides an account of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that lead to the Kyoto Protocol. Evans account about the international “politics” of climate change, highlights the importance to have China and India become party to the Kyoto Protocol while the USA itself did not ratify it (p. 31). These sections see environmental problems as transnational and threatening human as well as energy security, and in order to solve such problems, it is imperative to have international cooperation. Energy security is discussed from an implied concern on the security of society.

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The remaining chapters are on energy economics, particularly on the supply and demand sides of energy. It is well illustrated how most energy consumption is apparently not from transportation (25% of it) but from commercial, residential industries. Evans underlines that most of the pressure is coming from emerging economies (developing countries) such as China and India, and that World energy consumption is presumably going to double in just 12 years (pp. 40-42). These are projected to remain approximately in the same mix at least until 2030, and proven recoverable reserves are mostly in the Middle East. Non-conventional fossil fuels (ex: oil shale, clean coal); the Renewable Energy sources (ex: Solar, Wind, Biomass, etc.), Nuclear Power, and the possibility of fuel switching, particularly from petroleum to electricity are discussed in further detail in chapters 6-9.

There is a particular section addressing public acceptance of nuclear power (pp. 135-138). One particular shortcoming of this text is that it has discussed very little about the negative externalities of large scale hydro-electrical dams, as well as smaller scale hydropower. Due to the alleged damage to the natural environment, hydroelectric projects have been an issue of much protest in Turkey. On the other hand, the book does mention that similar protests occurred in Europe over Wind power; which is rapidly developing in Turkey.

Evans suggests that the future solution involves a mix in economy, technology, and policy (domestic and foreign) (p. 165). Although his book mentions the importance of sustainable energy, global warming is questioned. Evans claims that if there is little increase in temperature (optimistic scenario), it would hurt some countries while benefiting others such as Canada and Russia. The conclusion of the book foresees a future where a Renewable and Nuclear energy would equally dominate the energy mix in the first scenario, and “clean coal” dominating it in the second scenario. It would have been peculiar to find such conclusions by an author who were an ardent environmentalist. But the realistic approach of Evans is energy-centric rather than state-centric, economic-centric, ecology-centric. Hence, the implicit view perceived is that energy has more potential to be cooperative than conflictual since multiple disciplines and multiple countries and corporations should collaborate to resolve the energy problem.

4. Conclusion

In sum, the three texts offer a broad view of energy policy, geopolitics, and sustainable energy. The three of them together would provide readers a comprehensive understanding about Energy Security. The different domains of study of the authors, would allow a reader of the three texts to shift between domains of study to have a general understanding of energy challenges, which is important both at a conceptual and at a policy relevant level. Klare’s book was more state-centric while Haghighi’s was more focused on International Organizations (such as the EU) and the institutionalization of cooperation, while Evans’ book was focusing on the economics of energy supply chain and demand patterns. Overall, energy has the potential to be both conflictual and cooperative, depending on the context and on the way the different actors decide to approach the general, as well as the particular situation. For instance, the recent stand-off between the United States and Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, is an example how energy security could be conflictual, or how threats could be made to
important “Choke Points.” On the other hand, the ongoing processes of cooperation within institutions such as the Energy Charter Treaty or the International Energy Agency may provide the necessary frameworks to appease potential conflicts and foster cooperative goals. Furthermore, all three authors agree on the importance to have international cooperation for security issues concerning environmental safety and climate change.

Given the different insights of the three books on how to address energy security the all three authors addressed the problem on how to ensure continual access to secure and uninterrupted energy at affordable prices. The authors are suggesting increased international cooperation and especially development of new technologies as a general solution to energy security. Their points of view are very different and look at the same problem through different lenses. All three books are policy relevant in terms of assessing concerns of energy security in foreign policy and on how to address the broader concept of energy policy.

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