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# All Azimuth

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In This Issue

In this issue of *All Azimuth*, we present a selection of interesting articles on a variety of important current, historical and theoretical questions analyzed from different perspectives.

The issue begins with a research article by C. Akça Ataç, in which she elaborates on the reform proposals for the United Nations (UN) and Turkey’s position on the issue with particular focus on Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision for UN reform as the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. She highlights that the political cosmopolitan reform proposals which emphasize the individual rather than the states, would overcome the democratic deficit in the organization and transform the UN into an international organization that is pluralist and inclusive. In this connection, the article critically discusses Davutoğlu’s views on UN reform. It argues that Davutoğlu’s proposals which have focused only on the reform of the Security Council, have displayed a statist mind-set. The article concludes that discarding the transformation of the UN as a whole with a hostile tone towards the organization and placing efforts on Security Council membership as a means to pursue certain Turkish policies would not only undermine the UN as the sole international organization that provides a global platform to resolve issues of humanity, but also would have significant implications for Turkey as well.

In the second research article, Ayşe Ömür Atmaca, examines Turkish-American relations during the Cold War from a critical geopolitics perspective, and provides an alternative reading as well as understanding of foreign policy-making in relation to a particular time-frame. The article explores how the alliance between the United States (US) and Turkey was shaped through the American geopolitical discourse of the Cold War. It argues that although the American geopolitical thinking provided the basis for Turkey’s role and its cooperation with the US, it proved to be limited when the Cyprus problem emerged as an issue between the two states.

Peter Rudloff and James M. Scott deal with the question of the impact of foreign assistance allocations on conflict between the recipient states and third party rivals, when the recipients too are in rivalry with the donor’s rival and/or in geographical proximity with it. Building on the theoretical arguments with regards to the link between foreign aid and conflict, the article investigates whether foreign aid increases or decreases conflict in such circumstances of indirect rivalry. Rudloff and Scott test the contending hypotheses by examining empirical data with regards to the US foreign assistance and the conflict situations between the recipient and rival states from 1962 to 2000.

Following the research articles, Soeren Keil and Trish Moore analyze the social protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey. Their commentary highlights that while each of these movements of social unrest was prompted by specific policy decisions, they both represent deeper public discontent with regards to several policies of their respective governments as well as with the authoritative style adopted by their leaders. The commentary examines both the immediate reasons for the citizen unrest in each country, and the responses of each government to the movements as well as to international reactions to the way they were handled. The commentary argues that while the short-term effects of these citizen movements were seemingly limited, they will have significant effects on the citizen-state relations in both states in the long-run.

The second commentary which is written by the Deputy Director-General for Research in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yönet C. Tezel, dwells on the ever-questioned issue
of the link between theory and practice in international relations. After providing an overview of the academic perspectives on the theory-practice debate in international relations, Tezel argues that the quest of mainstream approaches in international relations and foreign policy analysis for universal generalizations and patterns divorced from spatial and temporal elements creates a “false certainty”. The commentary then offers a proposal for a research project to be carried out by scholars and practitioners together with a reflexive method that values personal experience and subjectivity.

The final piece in this issue of *All Azimuth* is a review article of three books on the global capitalist system and its crisis by Gülten Üstüntağ. Tackling the questions of whether or not the global capitalist system is in crisis, what financialization and monopolization suggest for the capitalist system and what kind of novel arrangements capitalism gives rise to, the review demonstrates that all three authors engage in the analysis of sustainability of the global capitalist system in the face of “emerging powers, regions, and/or ideologies”. While they concur that the capitalist world economy is confronted with a grave crisis that simultaneously threatens the US dominance in the global economic system, the authors appear to offer different conclusions as to which powers and/or ideologies would replace American economic hegemony.

We believe this selection of articles offers a broad perspective for our readers and will stimulate much thought and some debate.
Turkey’s New Vision for “Man’s Best Hope for Peace”: United Nations Reform and Reorganization of the Security Council

C. Akça Ataç
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The UN…can never be anything but a mirror of the world as it is. It merely assembles together the multiplicity of individual national states with all their imperfections. If the states are bellicose, the UN will be full of bellicosity. If the world is a world of cold war, the UN will be a system of cold war (as in its first fifteen years)…If the world is beset with nationalism, so too must the UN be. If there are conflicts and disagreements among continents, races or ideologies, these will manifest in the UN as well. It is no use blaming the UN, therefore, for deficiencies, which are those of the world it reflects. The UN is as good or as bad as the states, which compose it.1 …that each nation develop its peculiar genius to the fullest extent, and in order to be able to do this, let each nation become a member of a World-State under the guidance of a Central Court of Justice. Dante, De Monarchia2

Abstract

Despite its present reputation as weak, inefficient, and discreditable, the United Nations is one of humanity’s most noble endeavors. Although the structure of the Security Council prevents its decision-making procedures from being more democratic, the UN still seeks to suppress aggression, respect self-determination, and promote human rights and well-being. Furthermore, political cosmopolitans’ proposals for comprehensive UN reform, which goes far beyond increasing the number of permanent members of the Security Council, give us hope for substantial improvement. Nevertheless, the UN is still the sum of the states it is comprised of and UN reform depends on the broader and ambitious project of state reform as both concept and practice. Within this context, this paper argues that focusing exclusively on the Security Council and the geographical distribution of permanent membership only harms the comprehensiveness of the analyses seeking to reform the UN from a larger perspective. The fact that the success of a UN reform is closely related with the enhancement of member states’ ethical capacities should also be taken into consideration.

The next round of debates for a proper solution to the UN impasse takes place in 2015, and Turkey is emerging as an enthusiastic voice for further reform and for its own potential permanent membership in the Security Council. However, Turkey has also developed a significantly anti-UN discourse unprecedented in its foreign policy, which now runs the risk of curtailing the country’s capacity to partake in substantial change in UN decision-making procedures. Turkish

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Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu currently acts as a statesman, insisting on a statist reform (which focuses more on states’ individual interests) of the Security Council. Interestingly, in the 1990s, when Davutoğlu was a university professor, his views of the UN tended to be more cosmopolitan and suggested a civilization-based solution. This paper, while elaborating on the discussions of reforming the UN from a cosmopolitan perspective, also probes Davutoğlu's conflicting approaches to the issue. It thus seeks to argue that Turkey, instead of pushing for a purely statist model, should consider supporting pluralistic, multi-level, and more-complex participation in the UN's decision-making procedures.

Keywords: United Nations Reform, Security Council, Turkish Foreign Policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu

1. Introduction

It has been decades since the United Nations (UN) was sanctified as “man’s best hope for peace.” The Cold War has since ended, but war continues, genocides have occurred, and famine and epidemics persist. The use of the veto right at the Security Council, which was supposed to be an exception, has become a common procedure, blocking resolutions that would have in fact healed the wounds of humanity. Only in 1995, on the occasion of the UN’s fiftieth anniversary, were the first comprehensive attempts of reform drafts made public. Despite its good intentions, the UN, which was founded to promote peace, security, equality, and collaboration at the global level, has been marginalized in decision-making processes in the international system because of its inefficacy. Currently, it hardly provides an appropriate ground for ensuring peoples of the world can pursue a high-quality life. Owing to particular deficiencies embedded in its structure, most proposals concerning its reform become dead letters. In this respect, despite unprecedented developments in the political, economic, and social spheres, the UN Charter has undergone few changes since its implementation in 1945. The general tendency among actors of the international system is to reject UN reform as too complicated. The UN, however, is too precious to be cast aside or neglected. It is not an exaggeration to call it one of the greatest enterprises of humanity in world history.

Within its traditional foreign policy, Turkey has always been respectful of the UN's priorities, mission, and decision-making procedures. There have been, of course, gloomy episodes in the history of UN-Turkey relations, such as the Cyprus conflict and the Bosnian genocide. Even then, Ankara treasured its involvement with this most universal platform of peace negotiations. Turkey’s attitude towards the UN began to change in 2011, however, as the country’s attempts at passing resolutions at the Security Council to launch an intervention against the Assad regime have failed. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is considered the architect of the foreign policy pursued in the past decade, places high importance on the UN and treats the Security Council as a means to underpin Turkish foreign-policy priorities. This paper argues that focusing on the Security Council and the geographical distribution of permanent membership harms the comprehensiveness of analyses seeking to reform the UN from a larger perspective. By this argument, the paper aims to delve into the political cosmopolitan view of UN reform, as it is the most encompassing one, and concentrate on Davutoğlu’s vision of the UN.

The next round of debates for proper resolution to the UN reform impasse occurs in 2015,

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Turkey’s New Vision...

and Turkey is emerging as an enthusiastic voice for further reform and for its permanent membership on the Security Council. However, Turkey has developed a significantly anti-UN discourse unprecedented in its foreign policy, and this new approach now runs the risk of curtailing its capacity to partake in substantial changes in UN decision-making procedures. This paper thus seeks to argue that instead of pushing for a purely statist model and aiming at a veto right for itself, Turkey should consider supporting pluralistic, multi-level, and more-complex participation in the UN. The foremost reason why the UN model malfunctions today is the rigid, unchanging, reform-intolerant approaches produced by the states within; no substantial progress on world peace can be achieved without first enhancing states’ ethical capacities.

2. Are We Ready to Discard the UN system?

The UN, whose members represent “more than 99 per cent of humanity,”4 is the quintessential international organization to reflect global social, political, and economic conditions in their entirety. All topics that prevail on the agenda of the international system are among the concerns of the UN. For that reason, it has until now retained its realistic features and continued to exhibit “the geopolitical status quo in relation to the outmoded 1945 structures of authority.”5 Particularly because the political order post-World War II was shaped, sustained, and promoted by states, the UN – alongside other international organizations – has become fundamentally statist. Therefore, even though its charter begins with the phrase “We the Peoples,”6 the UN remains under the strict control of its member states. This statist character has become “the source of the greatest problems”7 and has devalued initiatives dwelling on any feasible solution to these problems. The virtues embedded in the UN system thus need to be elaborated on so that those in favor of a world without the UN can reconsider their position.

Despite its present reputation as weak, inefficient, and discreditable, the UN is one of humanity’s most noble endeavors. Among international organizations, the UN has adopted the most-inclusive and -impartial rhetoric, promising “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors,” and intended to take actions accordingly. Its institutions were designed to prevent it from repeating the mistakes of its predecessor, the League of Nations. It encourages the centuries-old expectation that a new world order can be achieved through an appropriate institution.8 It seeks to suppress aggression, respect self-determination, and promote human rights.9 In doing so, it also aims to provide an international forum (the General Assembly) in which member states are equal, under the principle of “one state one vote,”10 and thus to reach a consensus on solving international problems. There is no doubt that since the UN’s 1945 inception in San Francisco, it has succeeded in introducing new principles of diplomatic behavior, such as the commitment of member states – though in varying degrees – to care for others, promote human rights, ensure the redistribution

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5 Ibid., 114.
8 Ibid., 24.
of wealth, and protect global goods. Areas of international cooperation have been thus accomplished within the UN system. More specifically, it has achieved considerable success in decolonization, peacekeeping operations, disease control, demographic control, disaster relief, nuclear disarmament, maritime regulations, managing world food production, and aiding the fall of communism. Through agencies such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN has taken effective action on many global issues. In making this world a better and a more-equal and -just place, the UN and its agencies have overcome many major difficulties and initiated an unprecedented amount of “collaborative international conduct.”

Be this as it may, the UN has also become a great failure and disappointment in equally as many aspects. Since 1945, the world has undergone fundamental, and mostly unforeseen, changes. Consequent to the tightening and widening interdependence in economic, political, military, social, and environmental issues, the borders of nation-states have been eroding. Such interdependence requires the UN to generate and operate policies of genuine collaboration and cooperation, and its Charter and agencies have proven woefully inadequate numerous times in their dealings with the resulting social, economic, political, and security needs of states and peoples. The UN has fallen spectacularly short in maintaining world peace, as evident in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, and recently Syria, mostly because “an effective global security system based on the Charter scheme” has not been implemented by the Security Council. Although it was designed to strengthen the organization, the Security Council currently fails to create common grounds for common action.

The Security Council, which is the main decision-making body of the UN, as described in Article 23 of the Charter, has played a crucial role in preserving the “international power structure as it was understood in 1945.” For that reason, today it is nothing but a glaring anachronism. None of the great powers – economic, political, or demographic – that emerged after World War II is included in the UN’s decision-making procedures. Making amendments in the Charter to allow the new prominent actors of global politics to have permanent seats at the Security Council requires a unanimous vote of the current five permanent members (P5), acting in concert with two-thirds of the General Assembly. Such a consensus, which is called virtual unanimity, has rarely been reached in UN history. During the Cold War, rather than have to amend the Charter, the United States (US) and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council, used their influence to disable it. The lack of “a consent of a reliable kind” is most evident during the weeks of hesitation over humanitarian intervention.

More than once, the UN has fallen into the “intervention trap.” In fact, the incompatibility between the concepts of sovereignty and intervention within the Charter system sets this trap for the entire international community. Since 1945, the UN has rested on the principle of a sovereign nation state as defined by the Westphalian order, and accordingly, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a member state has been the norm and intervention has remained an exception. Chapter 7 of the Charter regulates enforcement measures by the UN, including the

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14 The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood*.
16 Ibid., 114.
use of force, all of which require unanimity at the Security Council. When masses of people were suppressed, undermined, and killed by their own states, as in Bosnia and Rwanda, the UN remained tragically ineffective; the Security Council could not reach a consensus owing to the “realist mind-set of leaders”17 defending national sovereignty. As a result of the catastrophic outcomes of delayed or absent initiatives in humanitarian intervention, today the UN is almost completely cut out of international arrangements concerning conflict resolution.

Among the UN’s many other deficiencies, such as US hegemony and difficulties adhering to budgetary limits, its inability to act in cases of extensive human suffering is the main reason why the organization is perceived as outmoded, irrelevant, and unwieldy. However, still the most universal international organization in global politics, the UN does not deserve to be discarded unless it will be replaced by a perfect model. Fortunately, the number of people, groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who invest hope in this noble endeavor of humankind and envisage reform is significant. Furthermore, although the UN has not surmounted its difficulties concerning humanitarian intervention, this does not mean it has failed to “add a human dimension to international law and international relations.” Through its human touch, by emphasizing “accountability of all states for their respect – or lack of respect – for human rights,” and its “acceptance of the principle of criminal responsibility of individuals,” the UN has inspired some solid norms to increase quality of life.18 In the words of eminent international lawyer Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, the provisions of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the UN Charter “were adopted, with deliberation and after prolonged discussion before and during the San Francisco Conference, as part of the philosophy of the new international system and as a most compelling lesson of the experience of the inadequacies and dangers of the old.”19 Their future reform should therefore be handled with equal care and labor and even more dialogue and empathy.

3. Reforming the UN

During the UN’s fiftieth anniversary, reform was placed forcefully at the top of the global agenda. Calls for reform drew from Article 109, which underlines the necessity of “a General Conference of the Members of the UN for the purpose of reviewing the present charter.” Interestingly enough, Paragraph 3 of the same article utters that “if such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly…the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly.”20 Despite reform proposals such as the Jackson Report (1969), Gardner Report (1975), Bertrand Report (1985), and the Nordic UN Project (1991), the conference mentioned in the Charter was not held before 1995. Yet, if then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had not spoken out for reform at that time, those attempts would not have happened then either. Boutros-Ghali’s ‘An Agenda for Peace’ and ‘An Agenda for Development’ were followed in 1997 by his successor Kofi Annan’s ‘Renewing the UN: A Program for Reform.’ Subsequent to the efforts by the secretaries general, eminent political theory and law scholars such as Daniele Archibugi and David Held also tried their hands at reforming the Charter.

In his Democracy and Global Order, Held argues that UN reform ought to take place

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17 Falk, The End of World Order, 119.
beyond the state level, that is, within the framework of cosmopolitan democracy, which
endorses a system of global and divided authorities governed by a “democratic public law
entrenched within and across borders.” By “divided authorities,” he means individuals,
NGOs, regional organizations, and parliaments/assemblies at the local/regional level.
Archibugi, too, without dismissing ways to recapacitate the state to support a better UN
system, emphasizes the national and global roles to be played by non-state actors. To these
scholars, the UN has the potential to provide a democratic platform to all members of the
international community. If a new organization were to be founded, Archibugi holds that it
would be the UN all over again:

It has to be an international actor with the legitimacy and the impartiality that can enable it
to engage in states’ internal affairs, an actor with the authority to mediate among states and
the scope to represent a point of reference for civil society. In other words: it has to be the
United Nations.22

There will always be politicians, such as US Republican John McCain, who call for “a new
international organization that can accept as members only countries with a democratic
government, a kind of League of Democracies.”23 Supporters of the UN should outnumber
them, however, and continue working for global democracy under the one-roof module.

Because conflicts within states, among states, and between states and non-state actors
never cease, UN reform is a pressing issue. Visions of that reform, however, widely vary
according to the visionaries’ political ideology, culture, citizenship, and even religion.
Scholars such as Archibugi and Held, for instance, represent the group that seeks a reform
of the nation-state along with a reform of the UN. A reformed state is expected to provide
the ethical framework in which human beings can maintain their individualities. Archibugi
has even contemplated the possibility of “creating an Assembly of the Peoples of the United
Nations, which would directly represent citizens rather than their governments.”24 Statesmen,
on the other hand, not dwelling on enhancing the moral capacity of states, mainly insist
on reconsidering who can enjoy permanent membership to the Security Council. In fact,
renovating the Security Council according to the new geopolitical realities is a common
theme on the agenda of political cosmopolitans and realists alike.

In 2005, Annan launched another extensive debate of reform issues and programs and
seventieth-anniversary goals were set for 2015. The proposal, known as ‘In Larger Freedom,’
foresaw the expansion of the Security Council up to 24 seats through two models: A and
B. Model A encompasses “the creation of six new permanent seats with no veto power and
three new two-year non-permanent seats.” Model B offers “a new category of eight four-
year-renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent and non-renewable seat.”25
Although these models are still on the bargaining table, a will cleansed of national prejudices
and agendas to solve the conundrum of the Security Council is not present. If this momentum
of reform is not fueled by fresh reassurances and new perspectives by 2015, another chance
for global peace and prosperity will fade away.

21 Held, Global Order, 227.
22 Daniele Archibugi, Sveva Baldini, and Marco Donati, “The United Nations as an Agency of Global Democracy” in Global
23 Quoted in Archibugi, “A League of Democracies or a Democratic United Nations,” Harvard International Review
(September 2009).
Since 2002, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has almost singlehandedly implemented a foreign policy substantially divergent from the traditional, western-oriented one. He also harbors a vision of an ideal UN, but this vision has also changed over time. The earlier version, with its cosmopolitan convictions, is rooted in his idea for a new world order, developed while he was a university professor in Malaysia in the 1990s. His suggestion for civilization-based instead of state-based UN representation caught the attention of Richard Falk, a scholar preoccupied with UN reform as much as Archibugi and Held are. Davutoğlu’s current approach to the UN, which emerged after he became foreign minister, demonstrates realist tendencies with a dominant statist discourse. As a matter of fact, when assessed within the context of Turkey’s Syria policy, he has adopted a rather hostile attitude towards the UN, which is uncommon in traditional Turkish foreign policy. Here, I argue that reforming the UN by enhancing states’ ethical potentials would avoid attacks that could result in diminishing the organization beyond recovery. Davutoğlu’s current vision of the UN, discussed below, does not support such a possibility and contradicts his previous civilizational approach.

4. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Vision of the UN

In his ‘False Universalism and the Geopolitics of Exclusion,’ Falk underlines that the end of Cold War unleashed an international system in which non-Western actors have been excluded despite their geopolitical significance. To him, “dominance of statist identity bound up with the role of the state in the modern world order system”26 and “Western civilizational hegemony”27 particularly perpetuate the exclusion of Islamic countries. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s writings in this context deserve the attention of political cosmopolitans who are not indifferent to the grievances of the Muslim world. His emphasis on Muslims’ distrust of the Western world and its institutions leads Falk to reconsider why the international community has lost its power as a “Neutral-Problem-solver.”28 Such distrust and exclusion could be eliminated if the nation-state domination in international organizations were mitigated by introducing a membership based on civilizational identity.29 According to this vision, a just and inclusive world order could be created by including authentic civilizations together with their extended geographies into global decision-making procedures. Prior to having undertaken a party position, Davutoğlu’s vision of a new international system included such political cosmopolitan elements in it.

The 2002 election victory of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (JDP; in Turkish, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) launched a new political process in which the country’s institutions, political elite, policy-making procedures, and, of course, state ethos have undergone a significant change. In terms of foreign policy, Davutoğlu (long-time advisor to the government even before his foreign minister posting), through his best-selling book Strategic Depth: Turkey’s Place in the World,30 has guided the ongoing transformation by emphasizing Turkey’s historical and geographical depth. Unlike his almost-cosmopolitan approach in the 1990s, Davutoğlu’s new approach adopts an explicit realist tone, using Cold War terminology. And parallel to the acceleration of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the tone of

27 Ibid., 8.
28 Ibid., 7.
30 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Strategic Depth: Turkey’s Place in the World (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2000)
Davutoğlu’s criticism of the UN has become less and less friendly as the Security Council continues to decline to militarily intervene against the Assad regime. He considers the failure of the UN to act on the Syrian civil war as a missed opportunity to reform the UN, or, more simply, to elevate Turkey to a permanent position on the Security Council. For the reasons mentioned above, the UN’s reluctance to interfere in Syria has of course been disappointing (to put it mildly), as it was with Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia. Davutoğlu’s frustration about the absence of “a single binding resolution on Syria where more than 30 thousand people have gone missing, more than 2 million people have been displaced and more than 500 thousand people have been refugees” justifies the humanitarian diplomacy subsequently conducted by Turkey in the form of establishing refugee camps along its border with Syria. Asking, “So why do we need the UN?,” however, diminishes UN reform to merely increasing the number of permanent members of the Security Council and limits its mission to humanitarian intervention.

The Arab Spring was the first substantial crisis to test Turkey’s recently assumed role in the Middle East as a regional soft power, a role that Davutoğlu envisioned in Strategic Depth. Turkey’s attitude towards Assad’s presidency is particularly significant in this context. Davutoğlu has repeated on several occasions that the Syrian question is a “litmus test” of the credibility of the current international community and international organizations. As true a statement as that is, Turkey’s dealings with Syria serve as a litmus test of Davutoğlu’s own vision. Turkey-Syria relations were almost non-existent till 1998, especially because of Syria’s undercover support of the terrorist PKK, conflict over the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, and of course the Hatay question (a dispute over the province of Hatay, currently part of Turkey). In a much broader context, the diplomatic impasse between the two neighbors was the result of Turkey’s years of accumulated discontent with Syria over its facilitation of religious sectarianism, drug trafficking, smuggling, terrorism, and espionage. When Davutoğlu became foreign minister in 2009, in accordance with his strategy of ‘zero problems with neighbors,’ he enhanced a diplomatic operation to improve Turkey’s relations with Syria.

The Turkish-Syrian High Level Strategic Cooperation Council first met in Aleppo, on October 13, 2009, when 50 agreements were signed in just one week, and next on December 23, 2009, this time at a ministerial level. According to the protocols signed, visa requirements were reciprocally lifted and cooperation in the areas of shipping, aviation, energy, transport, finance, tourism, education, communication, electricity, agriculture, health, industry, and other sectors was established. The main accords to govern these economic relations were the Prevention of Double Taxation and the Reciprocal Stimulus and Protection of Investments. Through these measures and previous steps of trade liberalization, a Turkey-Syria Free Trade Area was planned to emerge within 12 years.

When Turkey’s opposition to the Assad regime, on the grounds of human-rights violations, became open in August 2011, the zero-problem policy had deteriorated. The process of multi-level, multi-track integration with Damascus was frozen and the new Turkish foreign policy had failed its first serious test. On October 30, 2012, Davutoğlu labeled any possibility of

32 Ibid.
dialogue with Syria as “futile.”34 With no subsequent interaction between the two countries, the UN was the remaining platform from which Turkey could pursue its plan of overthrowing Assad. At the Arab League’s twenty-fourth Ordinary Summit in Doha, Davutoğlu campaigned for a UN seat to be granted to the Syrian opposition.35 To Davutoğlu, then, the UN seems instrumental to his desire of a Syria without Assad on the one hand, but on the other still shelters the Cold War paradigm, which is the greatest impediment to Turkey’s emerging leadership in the new world order. In the meantime, Turkey’s ungrounded good reference for opposition leaders partaking in the Free Syrian Army has given the world the impression that Turkey’s foreign policy is being “Sunnified.”36 As the Syrian crisis takes the form of a civil war between the Sunni opposition and Assad’s Shia regime, Davutoğlu’s vision has begun to demonstrate a certain particularism in favor of Sunni-ism.

As the Assad regime remains in power, Turkey has further extended its “overt and covert support for al-Qaeda affiliated groups”37 and Davutoğlu has shifted his frustration from Damascus to the UN. The lack of common interest to the speech he delivered on August 30, 2012 at the Security Council on an international intervention in Syria and the fact that “[n]ot even all members are represented in this meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers”38 increased his dis contempt significantly. To add fuel to the fire, the Security Council’s subsequent resolutions to intervene in Libya and Mali show that the UN is not against every intervention, but deliberately against intervention in Syria.39 Davutoğlu had already expressed the possibility of excluding the UN from making decisions in the Syrian crisis by “other options and measures,”40 envisaged in Turkey’s new foreign policy. On February 15, 2013, in a rather ominous tone, Davutoğlu told the international community “to be ready for newly drawn borders in the Middle East.”41 The UN may deny the possibility that the borders in that region, including Syria’s (which were drawn by Sykes-Picot in 1916) may change, but Davutoğlu maintains that the Middle East will be reshaped and that Turkey will be the region’s pivotal actor.42 For that reason, at the forty-ninth Munich Security Conference in 2013, he proposed to expand the Security Council from 5+1 (with Germany) to 5+3 by including Turkey and Saudi Arabia.43

Davutoğlu’s vision for a new world order foresees a cardinal role for Turkey regardless of its capabilities and resources. Underpinned by a claim of the authenticity of the Turkish

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43 “FM Calls for UN Resolution.”
civilization, this vision assigns Turkey the critical mission that the P5 has failed to fulfill, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Western civilization, therefore, has had its chance to design a new world order, but has led the international system to an impasse:

[W]e have to be aware that the Eurocentric culture reached the limits. Now there is a rise of authentic cultures, of old traditions. We have to admit them, we have to create a cultural inclusiveness. Otherwise global cultural order could not be restored... There is a need for a new paradigm of cultural inclusivity and interaction of authentic cultures and modernity.\(^\text{44}\)

Within this context, Turkey, not long after its non-permanent membership appointment to the Security Council in 2009 and 2010, once again announced its candidacy for another round of temporary membership in 2015 and 2016. The press release concerning the subject emphasizes Turkey’s “constructive, pro-active and reconciliation-oriented posture in the UN.”\(^\text{45}\) Through frequent non-permanent membership, Davutoğlu thus seeks permanent influence on the UN’s decision-making procedures.

Another major disappointment for Davutoğlu with the UN system was the 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla incident. As retaliation to Israel’s attack on the ships, which were carrying Turkish activists and humanitarian aid to Gaza, he insisted that the Security Council issue a presidential statement condemning Israel “in the strongest terms.”\(^\text{46}\) The statement that was sent out urged “a prompt, independent, credible and transparent investigation conforming to international standards,”\(^\text{47}\) considerably less-forceful language than Davutoğlu had wanted. Unable to influence decision-making procedures in the UN, Turkey experienced a moment of truth, which displayed how Davutoğlu’s vision did not yet represent actuality. When its temporary membership to the Security Council proved inadequate to effect its desired change, Turkey subsequently applied for the 2015-2016 term. And now, because Davutoğlu’s requests for an intervention in Syria have been declined, he feels Turkey’s presence at the Security Council is increasingly important.

Despite his earlier advocacy for a broader vision of UN reform, Davutoğlu has begun to perceive the UN only as a tool for intervening in conflict within neighboring states. Although he once received the recognition of cosmopolitan scholars preoccupied with writing a new UN Charter, his current anti-UN discourse offers no solution to the lack of universality in global politics. His insistence on Turkey’s permanent membership in the Security Council and the arguments that he provides in favor of it imply that no substantial improvement in the world order can be achieved without that development. His utterance of a “united humanitarian conscience under the flag of the United Nations”\(^\text{48}\) and efforts to organize a summit of least-developed countries remain rather trivial in face of the particularism that he calls for. Amin Maalouf’s \textit{Le dérèglement du monde} (Disordered World) argues that only a fresh start, focusing on universality alone, can save our civilization, which is lethally endangered by partiality.\(^\text{49}\) In this respect, Turkey too should be able to partake in re-creating universality rather than creating yet more partiality in the international community.


\(^{47}\) “UN Security Council Members.”

\(^{48}\) “FM Calls for UN Resolution.”

5. Conclusion

Of all its deficiencies, states’ unwillingness to subordinate their national interests to the global good has most weakened the UN. The imperfections and partiality embedded in the modern state system have been brought into the UN system. Member states have used every means possible to pursue power politics and national interests in the international system. In the end, although its Charter was proclaimed in the name of the world’s peoples, UN policies have failed to represent the general will of ‘us.’ The UN has been abused, disabled, and sometimes bypassed by ‘them’ – the member states.

From the political cosmopolitan point of view, the UN is the most appropriate institution to operate as a global government because it is the most suitable and the only global platform from which to promote a universal set of norms and values. In this view, a new organization must be built “on the foundations – not the ashes – of the former, keeping the name but changing many of its standard operating procedures and guiding concepts.” The new UN ought to go beyond realism and provide a solution to the democratic deficit undermining individuals’ right to self-determination. Within the new system, the principle of autonomy would be divorced from the idea of being a member of a particular kind of state or nation. For political cosmopolitans, then, UN reform is not simply about whether more states ought to be brought into the permanent Security Council, but about questioning the intrinsic value of the state, and whether the UN, an imperfectly constructed entity, can reform itself.

A global government evidently remains a Utopian dream of political cosmopolitans. Before aiming at making the UN such an institution, however, the international community should reach a consensus to better the UN’s decision-making procedures. Within this framework, states need to first engage in internal self-analysis and evolve to provide citizens with the necessary self-determination and empowerment. As the UN places value on the individual, it will become more pluralist and inclusive. Davutoğlu’s vision of the UN, however, will not reflect such an understanding as long as his emphasis simply rests on permanent membership to the Security Council to be able to pursue the JDP’s foreign-policy priorities. Furthermore, his persistent and non-constructive criticism may in the end harm the rare but precious initiatives of substantial UN reform. Democratization and perfect inclusiveness in the UN depend on member states’ own harmony, effective legislation, and commitment to their citizens’ well-being as much as humanity’s. It is important to remember that the UN is only the sum of its states.

The Turkish public has historically viewed the UN as an appropriate platform from which to stay involved with groundbreaking global changes, and Turkey’s participation in UN missions has always been supported as a part of its “greater involvement in international politics.” For example, after the end of the Cold War, Ankara, witnessing the emergence of a new world order, joined the “efforts to bring peace and stability to the Horn of Africa” in 1992 by contributing troops to the mission in Somalia (which was overseen by a Turkish general). Such demonstration of Turkey’s commitment to internationalism under the UN has been followed by its participation in disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and peace missions.

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52 Kemal Kirişçi, “New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior,” in Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s, eds. Çiğdem Balm et al. (Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 1995), 5.
to the Ivory Coast, Haiti, Kosovo, and East Timor. The International Labour Organization (another UN agency), UNESCO, and UNICEF have exerted tangible impacts on Turkish socio-economic and cultural policies in terms of the statistics, reports, and surveys they conduct. Gender equality, mother-child health, water, sanitation and hygiene, workplace safety, and world heritage sites are a few of the many issue areas that require and benefit from seriously committed, uninterrupted cooperation with the UN. Grounded in the conviction that “social peace is as important as strategic or political peace,” the UN acknowledges its obligation to end “discrimination and exclusion” by developing and providing “technical assistance” for “the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities.”53 Turkey too appreciates the power and aptness of this kind of support.

Recently, however, statements by Turkish officials, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, reflect widespread anti-UN sentiments among the JDP government. Erdoğan’s suggestion of establishing an alternative UN is significant in that sense. The following statement demonstrates how much the Turkish government associates the UN, an overarching and multi-dimensional structure, solely with the Security Council and its intervention capacity: “If we are really saying that the world is bigger than ‘the five’ then with other countries coming out, they would form their own United Nations.”54 Mehmet Görmez, President of the Directorate General for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), was so enraged about the UN unwillingness to intervene in Syria that he rejected UN money for stopping violence against women in Turkey. This decision can only be seen as another example of anti-UN sentiments. According to a 2011 UN report, in Turkey, “39 percent of women…had suffered physical violence at some time in their lives,”55 and the number increases daily. A public vow not to spend “a single penny of the UN’s money”56 on an issue as serious as violence against women not only harms the Turkish public’s perceptions of the UN, but also the cause itself.

The UN’s history of safeguarding human security, especially its efforts of protecting individuals from state violence, is not impressive. Nevertheless, because of its size, scope, discourse, and commitment, the UN still appears to be humanity’s best hope for global, political, and social peace. The fact that current Turkish foreign policy displays the most hostile attitude in its history towards this international organization should worry those who believe in the UN’s authority and reform potential, as well as in the role that Turkey could play in sustaining global peace and bettering the world order. Davutoğlu’s attempts to initiate efforts to discard the UN altogether and his attempts to use the Security Council as a platform from which to pursue Turkey’s Middle East policies may have profound implications not only for Turkish citizens, but also for the rest of the world.

Turkey’s New Vision...

Bibliography


The Geopolitical Origins of Turkish-American Relations: Revisiting the Cold War Years

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Abstract

Critical geopolitics provides ways of looking at the world and questioning the role of geopolitics in foreign policymaking processes, as opposed to accepting them as objective and natural. From this theoretical perspective, this article aims to apply critical geopolitics to the case of Turkish-American relations with respect to how the United States (US) viewed Turkey's geography and how the Turkey-US alliance has been shaped by the foreign and security policies of the latter. The article argues that the alliance was a product of the US’ Cold War geopolitical discourse, wherein the US considered Turkey to be a strategic ally against Soviet expansion. Thereafter, the declaration of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, led to increased US military ties with Turkey and became the basis for Turkey’s inclusion in NATO in 1952. As a consequence, Turkey began to be defined as the anchor of NATO’s strategic southern flank and a barrier against the communist threat in the Middle East and the Mediterranean throughout the Cold War. Turkey has also been a major recipient of American military equipment and was a supplier of important military facilities for monitoring the Soviet Union. The paper also argues that while Turkey generally fits within the US’ geopolitical designs and that these two countries cooperated on numerous efforts during the Cold War, the Cyprus problem in that period revealed the limits of US geopolitical discourse.

Keywords: US Foreign Policy, Cold War, Turkish-American relations, geopolitical discourse, critical geopolitics

1. Introduction

Critical geopolitics examines the geopolitical imagination of the state. The main premise of this theory is described as “the contention that geography and historical discourse [are] always intimately bound up with questions of politics and ideology.”¹ Thus, the Cold War geopolitical narrative, while proposing different political and economic models, also offered different ‘imaginations,’ made possible by the language of ‘blocs,’ ‘containment,’ and ‘dominoes.’ Ó Tuathail and Agnew assert that “[t]he simple story of a great struggle between a democratic ‘West’ against a formidable and expansionist ‘East’ became ‘the most influential and durable geopolitical script of [the Cold War] period.’”²

Critical geopolitics also demonstrates how places were defined as a ‘threat’ or as ‘strategically important,’ and how these definitions have changed over time. Within this

framework, this study outlines the roots of Turkish-American relations and Turkey’s geopolitical position in US foreign policy during the Cold War. It also aims to understand the basis of this relationship and the factors affecting it.

It has been said that the US’ primary interest in Turkey during the Cold War was its geopolitical location. Because of Turkey’s proximity to the Soviet Union and its historical ties with the Middle East, the US saw benefits in improving its relations with Turkey. Under the Cold War conditions, the US created a geopolitical discourse that shaped its foreign policy and aimed to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s geographical position suited this policy of containment: the US perceived Turkey as a barrier against the Soviet Union, a guardian of NATO’s southern flank, and an important military base in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean.

To understand the relationship between Turkey and the US in the post-Cold War period, it is necessary to know why the two countries established and maintained their alliance in spite of internal and international crises that could have easily discouraged and severed such ties. In this paper, the relationship is studied within the context of critical geopolitics, which shows how geopolitical discourse shapes, and in turn is shaped by, foreign policymaking.

2. The Political Dimension of Turkey-US Relations

2.1 The Turkish Straits question and the beginning of relations

When the Ottoman Empire attracted the attention of the great powers in the late nineteenth century, there was no geopolitical relationship between the US and the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the most important issues bringing the US and Turkey together were the post-World War II environment and the Soviet Union’s territorial demands on Turkey. The question of the Turkish Straits can be taken as one of the first geopolitical crises of the Cold War era. Indeed, the issue existed between Turkey and the Soviet Union before World War II; rules about passage through the Straits had been determined by the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. As a response to the Turkish government’s demands for revising these rules, on July 20, 1936 the Montreux Convention on the Regime of the Turkish Straits was signed.

Accordingly, the international regime of passage rights was abolished and Turkish military control over the Straits was established. This new regime added valuable assets to the Turkish geopolitical image.

However, World War II changed the international environment, and the Turkish Straits became more crucial for the Soviet Union. In September 1939, Turkish Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu visited Moscow to sign a mutual aid pact with the Soviet Union. Soviet officials asked for mutual defense of the Straits, which would give them the opportunity to control strategic bottlenecks, but the Turkish government refused. After the war, Stalin reiterated this request at the Yalta Conference (February 1945), and Britain and the US agreed in principle. When Turkey demand a renewal of the 1925 Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression, the Soviet Union responded on March 19, 1945 that this demand would be met only if Turkey agreed to the joint defense of the Straits. On June 7, the Soviet Union increased the pressure, demanding Turkey’s Kars and Ardahan provinces (a historically contested region), as well as

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5 Ibid., 51.
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...a base on the Straits. Stalin raised the question again with Britain and the US at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. At that time, President Truman described Turkish defense of the Straits as a “selfish control of the waterways of Europe” and “one of the persistent causes of wars in Europe in the last two centuries.”

In November 1945, the US Department of State informed the Turkish government of its proposed revisions to the Montreux Treaty. Britain perceived these demands as a serious threat to British interests in the Middle East, but due to economic difficulties, it needed US support to challenge the Soviet threat. At the Moscow Conference in December 1945, British Foreign Secretary Bevin asserted that “His Majesty’s Government could not be indifferent to a Russian threat to Turkey and would stand by her. We could not agree to the Soviet request for a base in the Straits and for the return of Kars and Ardahan.” Secretary of State Byrnes supported this idea and the US backed the British position thereafter. Indeed, the main US aim was to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East, where oil was the most important strategic concern. Within this framework, Turkey’s geopolitical position became vital for containing the ideological and territorial expansion of the Soviet Union.

The above assessment by the US administration established the strategic and ideological borders of the Cold War in the region. According to Edwin C. Wilson, the American ambassador in Ankara at the time, the Russians’ real purpose was to dominate Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean. The main reasoning for this argument was similar to that of the domino theory: If the Soviet Union were strengthened by access to the eastern Mediterranean, the American and British positions would be weakened, and western Europe’s vital oil supplies would be jeopardized. It can be argued that Soviet demands justified the US’ perception of the strategic importance of the Turkish Straits. In December 1945, US Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson privately guaranteed the Turkish government that the US would support Turkey in resisting Soviet demands, and Turkey thus refused the renewed Soviet proposal of July 1946.

The US battleship Missouri arrived in Istanbul on April 5, 1946, ostensibly to return the body of Turkish Ambassador Mehmet Münir Ertegün, who had died in Washington in November 1944, to his home country. In fact, the US sent the battleship to show that it would not allow the Soviet Union to expand into the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, and that it would support Turkey as a barrier against Soviet expansion.

The Soviet Union sent a note to Turkey on August 7, 1946, repeating its demands regarding the Straits. On August 19, the US replied that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. The British administration sent a similar response

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7 Kamuran Gürün, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri, 283.
10 “Position on Question of the Turkish Straits-Exchange of Notes Between the Soviet Chargé d’affaires and Acting Secretary Acheson,” Department of State Bulletin 374 (September 1, 1946), 421.
13 Oran, Türk Dış Politikası, 525.
14 Cemil Bilsel, “The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence,” The American Journal of International Law 41 (1947), 739.
15 “Position on Question of the Turkish Straits,” 421.
to the Soviet Union on August 21, 1946. The *Missouri*’s visit and the American answer to the Soviet note can be taken as signs of the US’ new geopolitical interests in Turkey and the Near East. The exchange of notes ended without revision to the Montreux Convention.

On August 23, a memorandum was prepared by US State Department Assistant Chief of Near Eastern Affairs John D. Jernegan, and approved by Secretary Byrnes and Undersecretary Acheson on October 21, 1946, which asserted that the Soviet Union aimed to weaken Turkey in order to dominate it and use it both as a defense against possible outside attack from the Mediterranean and as a tool for political and military expansion into the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey’s position in the Cold War became more apparent in this memorandum. Accordingly, Turkey’s key location in the Middle East and its decision to resist Soviet pressure (with the backing of the US and Britain) would become an important example to all Middle East countries. In a potential war, Turkey would be perceived as a natural barrier against an advance by the Soviet Union into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

### 2.2 The Truman Doctrine

As noted, during the Cold War years, Turkey’s geopolitical location was regarded important for Soviet containment. Indeed, control of the Straits was the raison d’être of American strategic policies in the region. At that time, President Harry Truman heeded George Kennan’s warnings in the “Long Telegram,” which argued that the US should follow a policy of “containment” to stop Soviet expansion.

In this framework, the first concrete proof of American interest in Turkey can be found in Acheson’s statements, providing a private guarantee to Turkey that Soviet territorial demands extended into “spheres of world peace and security” in which the US took the “deepest interest.” Similarly, Loy Henderson, Director of the State Department’s Near East and African Affairs, considered Turkey “the most important military factor in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East” and added that “by its geographical position, Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.” Acheson also pointed out that “the West had to keep Greece and Turkey out of Soviet hands – or be prepared to accept the subsequent loss of the strategic bases, lines of communication and resources of the Middle East.” These remarks can be accepted as the initial signs of Turkey’s position in the new American geopolitical discourse.

Then, on February 21, 1947, the British government declared it was withdrawing its soldiers from Greece and ending its military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. The US administration stressed in Congress that without US support, Greece would be taken over by communists and Turkey would find itself in a weak position in the region, and the eastern
Mediterranean and the Near East would fall under Soviet domination. On March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman came before Congress and made one of the most important speeches of the post-war era, requesting authorization to extend military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. This speech is considered to be the first important announcement in the US Cold War geopolitical discourse and is thus taken as the official declaration of the Cold War.

Briefly, it can be argued that the Truman Doctrine was a product of the American geostrategic and geopolitical perceptions of Greece and Turkey as key nation-states in the context of security in the Middle East, and crucial to the protection of American national interests in the Mediterranean region. It codified the differences between the US and the Soviet Union; like a classical geopolitical, Truman used the simple and abstract categories of “the free world” and “the enslaved world,” which is black-and-white reasoning. His geopolitical understanding divided the world into two camps, good versus evil, capitalism versus communism, the West versus the East, and the US versus the Soviet Union.

For Truman, Greece and Turkey had become crucial because “the failure of the West to prevent a communist takeover in Greece would not only put the Russians on a particularly dangerous flank for the Turks, but strengthen the Soviet Union’s ability to cut off allied supplies and assistance in the event of war.” It can be argued that the threat of a regional domino effect influenced the US’ decision.

The Truman Doctrine can be taken as one of the most important steps of the US Cold War containment policy, and it was put into effect through economic restoration of Western Europe via the Marshall Plan, and military containment facilitated by the establishment of NATO in 1949. Thus, after President Truman’s speech before Congress, geopolitical discourse on the US began to be institutionalized, and these efforts helped justify US interventions throughout the world. The document, called the National Security Council Resolution (NSC)-68 and published in 1950, is one of the key documents outlining the US’ Cold War geopolitical discourse.

Resolution-68 outlines the goals of world leadership in the face of the geopolitical challenge of the Soviet Union and communism. The document asserts that “[t]he assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.” The geopolitical implication of this statement is that all parts of the world have equal strategic importance, and thus a world leader would have to assert authority in all countries. The Soviet system was perceived as incompatible with the US system, and an obstacle to the establishment of ‘order’ in the international system. The geopolitical role of the US as world leader was clarified in the document as follows: “Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.” Accordingly, this American system would need to

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27 Ibid., 59.
30 Ibid.
establish global geopolitical rules. Here, its main enemy was defined as the Soviet Union, and its allies were described as the countries advocating “free institutions.”

The triple policies of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and document NSC-68 led to billions in economic and military aid for Western Europe, and for Greece and Turkey. With these policies the US administration showed the world that it took over Britain’s role in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. Greece’s and Turkey’s military roles in the Marshall Plan and later in NATO were the key factors in the balance of power of the geostrategic system.

2.3. The Korean War and NATO

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and NATO was established. It was perceived as an institution of the Cold War’s geopolitical order. Turkey applied for membership in NATO in May 1950, but was rejected, mainly because of its location in the geopolitical imaginations of the US and Britain. For them, “Turkey did not belong either to Western Europe or the Atlantic and consequently she could not join the Atlantic regional group.”

However, as Altunışık and Tür underline, while the US military was not willing to enlarge its institutional commitments in the Mediterranean region, the State Department was concerned about a possible Turkish-Soviet rapprochement as a result of Turkey’s exclusion from NATO; the acceptance of Turkey into NATO was linked to Greece’s acceptance because of political and geographical considerations. A US State Department report of June 13, 1949 asserted that “[t]he loss of Turkey would critically affect US security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.” The memorandum notes that “[i]t would be unrealistic to include Turkey if Greece were not included.”

In the wake of Turkey’s rejection by the US and Great Britain for membership in NATO, Turkish policymakers increasingly began to emphasize Turkey’s geopolitical importance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and express concerns about the country’s security. These early attempts at reversing the decision had no effect on the Americans and the British, but Turkey got a second chance at NATO membership when the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. Turkey re-applied for NATO on August 11, 1950, and to pad its application sent 4,500 troops to Korea on October 18, 1950.

After the Korean War, it became clear that the Western Bloc would need Greece and Turkey in the event of a war with the Eastern Bloc. At the North Atlantic Council’s meeting in September 1951, Acheson informed the Europeans that Turkish and Greek memberships would be the best way to strengthen the alliance. Finally, despite opposition from Britain and the Scandinavian states, and thanks to the positive reputation Turkish troops earned

33 Meliha Altunışık and Özlem Tür, Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change (New York: Routledge Curson, 2005), 104.
35 Ibid., 39.
in the Korean War, along with the change in American attitudes toward Turkey’s strategic importance after 1951, Turkey became a member of NATO on February 18, 1952.\footnote{NATO, “NATO Enlargement,” accessed April 1, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm.} For the US administration, Turkey’s geopolitical role in the alliance was to stop Soviet expansionism by serving as NATO’s southern flank.\footnote{Richard Perle and Michael J. McNamara, “US Security Assistance for Turkey and the Challenge of Aid for the Southern Flank,” NATO’s Sixteen Nations 32 (1987): 94-97.}

With its involvement in the Korean War, Turkey not only became a strategic ally, but also a symbol of how successful US foreign policy could be in ‘containing’ the Soviets. Turkey’s inclusion in NATO was perceived not only in military but also in political and cultural terms as a new role for the country: partner of the West.\footnote{Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and NATO: Past, Present and Future,” ORBIS (1983): 422.}

### 2.4. Turkey and the US in the Middle East

For George Harris, the Middle East “formed a major testing ground for the Turkish-American alliance in the first decade of Turkey’s membership in NATO.”\footnote{Harris, “Turkey and the US,” 54.} During the Cold War years, the US as a global power had several geopolitical objectives. For example, it aimed to prevent a possible Soviet attack in the region, to secure NATO’s southern flank, to support Israel, to maintain western supply lines in the Mediterranean, and to access and control Middle Eastern oil.\footnote{Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 57.} Although Turkey’s main role in the alliance was to engage the Soviet Union, Ankara also played a major role in the strategy to preserve Western interests in the Middle East.\footnote{Nasuh Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2003), 104.} In fact, Turkey contributed to the stability of the region, which was crucial to US interests and provided an important access point to the Middle East.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the US administration located Turkey by using various geopolitical metaphors such as a natural “barrier” against Soviet expansion, a “deterrent” to a Soviet attack and a “challenge” to the Soviet Union’s southern flank. Another geopolitical image, the “Northern Tier” (comprised of Turkey, Greece, and Iran), was also used at this time, during British-American talks on the Middle East held in Washington. Accordingly, it was agreed that the security of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East were crucial to both powers, that both must support it and that the independence and territorial integrity of the Northern Tier countries must be maintained. It can be argued here that the term Northern Tier stressed the strategic significance of Turkey in Anglo-American plans for defending the Middle East against an attack from the Soviets on the Suez Canal.\footnote{Harris, “Turkey and the US,” 54.}

During the 1950s, Turkey proved its geopolitical importance to the US administration and cooperated with other US allies within the Middle East, including Iran, Israel, and Jordan, to contain the influence of Soviet clients such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. As evidence of its allegiance, Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955, allowed the US to use its military bases in Operation Lebanon for extra-NATO purposes after the Iraqi revolution in 1958, allowed Jupiter Missiles to deploy in its territory in 1959, was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949, and proved to be a significant partner in the US Middle East policy determined by the Eisenhower Doctrine, outlined in March 1957. In 1959, after Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, it was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and mainly aimed
to guarantee US military and financial aid to the region.\textsuperscript{46}

As a result of the East-West détente during the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey’s geopolitical significance to the US decreased, and relations between the two countries deteriorated. For example, Turkey refused to allow the US to use its military bases to support Israel during the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973.\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, the Bilateral Defense and Cooperation Agreement of 1969 limited US military activities in Turkey.\textsuperscript{48}

However, the end of the détente strengthened the Turkish-American alliance in the 1980s, and the reasons for this rapprochement were similar to those in the 1950s: the Soviet threat and Turkey’s ‘strategic importance.’ For US Ambassador George McGhee, “The fluid situation in Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal, the withdrawal of Iran from cooperation with the West, and the uncertainty regarding Greek NATO commitment leave Turkey as the only reliable element in the northern tier of the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{49}

During the 1980s, the Carter Doctrine applied the US containment policy to the Gulf region. On January 23, 1980, President Carter claimed that the US would use military force when necessary to protect its interests (oil) in the Middle East, and thus it attempted to increase its military capabilities in the region. Turkey and the US signed a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) on March 29, 1980 (the first was signed in 1969, after the US refused to support Turkey in intervening in the Cyprus crisis).\textsuperscript{50} After Turkey’s September 1980 military coup, US military aid increased tremendously and Turkey strengthened its role as a pillar of Washington’s strategy to protect American interests in the Middle East. Turkey also received large amounts of economic aid, principally organized by the OECD.\textsuperscript{51}

In light of the above synopsis, it can be argued that the Cold War as a geopolitical narrative was created by the superpowers’ strategic elites. The Cold War geopolitical discourse consisted of powerful political ideology, representing world politics as a struggle between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Overall, as Ó Tuathail argues, “the discourse of Cold War geopolitics helped to secure and emphasize a set of geographical identities like ‘the West’, ‘the Soviet Union’, ‘the United States’, while serving to discipline domestic social and cultural differences within these spaces.”\textsuperscript{52} As argued above, an alliance with Turkey was an important part of US geopolitical discourse in the Cold War. From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter and Reagan doctrines, Turkey was part of every strategic plan developed by Washington in that era. From the time World War II ended, the US aimed to ‘contain’ the Soviet Union and Turkey perceived Turkey as “the stopper in the neck of the bottle,” as quoted above. As a result of this geopolitical significance, which was critical to the containment of Soviet expansion, Turkey and the US became allies and consequently established close military ties.

3. The Military Dimension of Turkey-US Relations

Strategic/military relations have always been the vital element in Turkish-American relations.
During the Cold War, the US administrations divided the world into ‘friendly’ and ‘hostile’ spaces, and military activities and political alliances were justified on the basis of this geographical and ideological division. In this period, the US perceived Turkey as a barrier against the Soviet Union and perhaps more importantly, as a military base in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. Thus, supporting and modernizing the Turkish army and establishing military and intelligence facilities in Turkish territory were the major methods by which the US achieved its global aims in the region.

During the Cold War, US security assistance programs were designed by the Truman Administration, which conveyed that military/economic assistance was an important instrument in US post-war policy. Between 1947 and 1950, Turkey and Greece received $600 million in US military and economic aid. Thereafter, Turkey became one of the most important recipients of US grants. The US also gave assistance to Turkey through the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT).

In official documents, it was argued that US assistance would enable Turkey “to strengthen its security forces and to maintain the stability of her economy.” Continuation of this aid was justified by Turkey’s geopolitical importance. In May 1949, the US State Department defended US military aid to Turkey as follows: “Turkey’s military strength will make available to the US and to our allies the use of this vitally strategic area as a base of operations in the event of war, and conversely deny the Soviet Union and its satellites access to its land and resources.”

The Turkey-US Military Facilities Agreement in 1954 formalized the opening of US bases on Turkish territory, through which the US administration attempted to defend its global geopolitical interests. Thus, the issue of military bases is accepted as one of the most important aspects of the Turkish-American relationship. However, Turkey used these facilities as a bargaining chip during the détente years, such as when it refused to allow the US to use them to support Israel during the Arab-Israeli Wars. They also became sources of conflict, particularly in the 1970s, when the Turkish administration and the Turkish people wanted all of them closed.

It should be noted that Turkish-American intelligence cooperation against the Soviet Union became crucial during the 1980s, as Turkey also represented a critical location for intelligence monitoring stations. The collapse of the Iranian regime in 1979 and the ensuing end of the US-Iranian intelligence relationship created a gap in US intelligence coverage of the southern part of the Soviet Union and US military installations close to the oil regions of the Gulf.

The end of the détente and the beginning of the ‘second’ Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union reinforced the Turkish-American alliance. It is important to note that Turkey’s September 1980 military intervention did not negatively affect relations. On the contrary, the US did not criticize the military administration and confirmed that American aid to Turkey would not be interrupted. Indeed, the logic of this support was mirrored in the rhetoric of the Truman era. According to Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe Admiral

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53 US Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearings, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 385-386.
55 United States, “Agreement Between the United States of America and Turkey Respecting Aid to Turkey,” United States Statutes at Large 62 (1948): 2953.
William J. Crowe, “Turkey sits on the flank of any Soviet thrust into Iran or the Persian Gulf and is the only alliance nation which is Muslim and geographically located in the Middle East.” He also added that “[n]o Western or Soviet planner can address the Middle East challenge without considering Turkey’s orientation, terrain, airspace, forces, and bases.”

In this context, Turkey’s geopolitical importance significantly increased given the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War. At that time, Turkey began to change its foreign policy by taking into consideration American sensitivities, and consequently withdrew its veto over Greece’s entry into the military branch of NATO.

Meanwhile, in accordance with the Carter Doctrine, Defense Secretary Alexander Haig developed the idea of the Rapid Deployment Force to protect the US’ “vital interests” in the region. This task force, which would become the US Central Command (CENTCOM), was to command operations in the Gulf region. Turkey and the US had a shared policy to support multilateral and bilateral reactionary conduct against the communist bloc, and as a consequence of this policy, Ankara accepted deployment of the task force project.

The 1980 DECA reflected US objectives to maintain a strong Turkish-American bilateral defense relationship and preserve its military facilities in Turkey, and the Turkish-American Defense Council was established in 1981. On November 29, 1982, a memorandum of understanding was signed and accepted as a supplementary agreement to DECA, which approved upgrading the three US bases in Turkey (Erzurum, Batman, and Muş). Military aid levels from the US during this period were the highest since the Korean War. Turkey ranked fourth in the number of US nuclear weapons deployed overseas in this era – about 489 in 1985 – but economic and military aid from the US began to decrease in 1984.

The Özal government was established after the Turkish general elections in 1983. In 1985, Özal requested a revision of DECA, and on December 18 the agreement was renewed for another five years. However, largely on the basis of US Congress discussions related to the Cyprus and Armenian issues, Turkey did not put the agreement into effect until 1988.

It can be summarized that as a result of the close relationship between the two countries, Turkey provided critical base facilities to the US and the US provided economic and military aid to Turkey. As it can be seen, military relations were the most important aspect of US strategic interests. Strategically, the US perceived Turkey as a base from which to reach Middle Eastern oil and problematic areas near the Soviet Union. At the end of the Cold War, the question of Turkey’s strategic importance increased concerns in Turkey and the US, which led to changes in their relationship.

4. Limits of the Alliance: The Cyprus Problem

Between 1960 and 1975, the decrease in tension between the US and the Soviet Union, also decreased Turkey’s geopolitical significance to the US. Indeed, the golden years of the
US-Turkish alliance ended with the Cyprus crisis, which is considered the most important problem between the two countries during the 1960s and the 1970s. Cyprus was perceived as a ‘national cause’ for Turkey and Greece; because of its geographical proximity to Turkey and considerable Turkish population, Cyprus became a security concern for Turkey in the case of annexation of the island by Greece, and thus became a driving factor in Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War.

For the US administration, Cyprus has been strategically significant because of its geopolitical position at the crossroads of three continents and its geographical position on the major routes between the West and the East; it is also the only island in the southeastern Mediterranean.\(^{65}\) Cyprus also controlled the passages of the gas and oil pipelines north of the Suez Canal. For the above reasons, it became a crucial base for operations in those regions.

The main focus of US administrations regarding the Cyprus question was to contain the conflict and to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey, both of whom were strategically important allies of the US. In Monteagle Stearns’ analysis, the US needed to address several dangers. First, in the event of war between Turkey and Greece, NATO could be destabilized and weakened, and thus its southeastern flank could collapse. Second, the political, military, and economic cooperation between the US, Greece, and Turkey could be undermined and the presence of American base facilities in these countries could be threatened. Finally, the prestige of the Western alliance could be damaged because such hostility could be considered a symbol of Western disunity.\(^{66}\)

By the mid-1950s, ethnic conflicts began to increase between the Turkish and Greek populations of Cyprus. Moreover, tension continued to rise between Greece and Turkey until 1959, when both states agreed to form a united Cyprus under one constitution and one flag at the Zurich and London Conferences. The Republic of Cyprus was established in August 1960.\(^{67}\) The Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Britain, Turkey, and Greece, was added to the Cypriot constitution. As a result, these three nations became guarantor states of Cyprus’ security and independence.

In November 1963, Greek Cypriot President Makarios moved to limit the political rights of the Turkish Cypriot community by way of constitutional amendment. This action led to violence, especially against the Turkish community,\(^{68}\) and turned the situation into a crisis.

In June 1964, conditions worsened for Cypriot Turks, and responding to public pressure, the Turkish government decided to intervene militarily under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.\(^{69}\) When Ankara informed Washington of its intentions, President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü a letter that US Undersecretary of State George Ball called “the most brutal diplomatic note [he had] ever seen.”\(^{70}\) Johnson warned İnönü that NATO would not defend Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey intervened in Cyprus. He also stated Turkey could not use military equipment supplied by the US if it did choose to intervene. In his response, Prime Minister İnönü stressed that this perceived conditional

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\(^{65}\) Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 58.


\(^{67}\) Theodora Kalaitzaki, “US Mediation in Greek–Turkish Disputes since 1954,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16 (2005): 112.


\(^{70}\) Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship*, 170.
commitment of the NATO alliance would damage its credibility, but in the end the Turkish government withdrew its intention to intervene in the Cyprus conflict.\textsuperscript{71}

The Johnson letter had a long-time impact on Turkish-American relations. The letter showed that the US was not willing to trigger the NATO mechanism in support of Turkey, “even though the most vital Turkish interests were at stake.”\textsuperscript{72} The Turkish government was disappointed that “their most important ally, the United States, not only would not help them in a deeply felt cause, but apparently disagreed profoundly on the force of [the] NATO commitment to defend Turkey.”\textsuperscript{73} After the shock of the Johnson letter, the Turkish government decided to limit US military activities on Turkish territory. In July 1969, Turkey and the US signed the first Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement, in which the US was made to accept Turkish sovereignty over all installations.\textsuperscript{74}

The Cyprus issue returned to the agenda when the ruling military junta in Greece supported a coup attempt against Makarios in July 1974.\textsuperscript{75} Consequently, acting under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, on July 20, Turkish troops intervened on the island to protect the Turkish community. Although diplomatic efforts were initiated, the Turkish government intervened again, this time on August 14, taking control of approximately 40 percent of the island and with the aim of resolving the security concerns of the Turkish community there.\textsuperscript{76}

Perhaps the most difficult period in the Turkish-American relationship followed the Cyprus intervention. In response to this intervention, the US Congress imposed a military embargo against Turkey to force it to withdraw from Cyprus. While the US did not generally consider embargoes as effective tools to achieve its policy objectives in the eastern Mediterranean, Congress insisted on prohibiting arms sales to Turkey. The provisions of Section 620 (X) of the Foreign Assistance Act went into effect on February 5, 1975. As a result, over 200 million USD in arms purchases, grants, and commercial military sales to Turkey were cancelled.\textsuperscript{77}

Supporters of the embargo asserted that Turkey illegally used US arms during the Cyprus operation.\textsuperscript{78} Those opposing the embargo, including President Gerald Ford, argued that refusing to help Turkey would damage US efforts in the Cyprus peace negotiations. Ford added that this aid ban would also negatively affect Turkish-American relations and weaken the “crucial position of the United States in the East Mediterranean.”\textsuperscript{79}

The anti-embargo argument justified its opposition with geopolitical language and made several significant points. First, that it was impossible to solve such a problem using blunt force. Second, that it would damage the US’ geopolitical interests in the region;\textsuperscript{80} indeed, the arms embargo did not compel the Turks to cooperate, but instead resulted in loss of US influence over Turkey. Third, that closing US military bases on Turkish territory would put an end to its intelligence facilities, and thus to its monitoring of Soviet military activities. And finally, that the embargo would weaken NATO’s southeastern flank.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{73} Uslu, \textit{The Turkish-American Relationship}, 170.
\textsuperscript{74} Bölükbaşı and Burkett, \textit{The Superpowers and the Third World}, 72.
\textsuperscript{75} Melek Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler,” in \textit{Türk Dış Politikası}, ed. Oran, 739.
\textsuperscript{76} Ellen B. Laipson, \textit{Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo} (Washington: USGPO, 1981), 1.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 331.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 334-335.
\textsuperscript{81} Laipson, \textit{Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo}, 26.
As a first reaction to the embargo, Turkey unilaterally declared the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on February 13, 1975. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit also overturned the prohibition on opium production. Next, on June 17, the Turkish administration announced that all US military and intelligence facilities in Turkey would be placed on “provisional status.”82 On July 26, Turkey cancelled the 1969 DECA and closed all US military facilities in Turkey except NATO bases.83

Jimmy Carter was elected president of the US in 1976. He argued that the uneasy relations with Turkey produced important problems for the Western defense system, and the embargo was lifted in October 1978. It is important to emphasize that this decision was made just as the US was about to lose Iran as an ally.84 On October 3, 1978, although the US and Turkey still did not agree over DECA, Turkey agreed to re-open its US military bases.85

The 1974 Cyprus crisis marked a new era in American-Turkish relations. With the impact of the détente between the two blocs and the strong anti-American feeling in Turkey, Turkey wanted to reduce its dependency on the US and improve its relations with the Soviet Union.86 The embargo most certainly damaged Turkey’s economy and defense capacity and created doubts about the reliability of the US. It also weakened NATO’s southern flank, negatively affecting US security interests. And finally, the embargo failed to help resolve the Cyprus issue. Since the end of World War II, US administrations had assumed they had Turkey’s unconditional support regarding US geopolitical interests in the region, regardless of Turkey’s domestic interests. However, on the Cyprus issue, US policies failed primarily because they used Turkey to realize their objectives in the region at the expense of Turkish national interests; many in the US administration also failed to understand that Cyprus was more important to both Turkey and Greece than NATO was.87

During the Cyprus crises, Turkey also learned several lessons about its alliance with the US. The Cyprus intervention highlighted the importance of public opinion in Turkey’s foreign policy, even when it was shaped primarily by external factors, and even in light of US opposition. The Cyprus issue heralded an era in which domestic concerns took on a more prominent position in shaping Turkish foreign policy.88 It became clear that Turkey’s unconditional loyalty to the West could be costly to its own security. NATO support was conditional and political, and Turkey learned it could not necessarily rely on NATO in a time of crisis.89

Critical geopolitics stresses the importance of geopolitical language in foreign policymaking. Geopolitical discourses shape minds and justify policy actions. Turkish-American relations during the Cold War were shaped by US administrations’ geopolitical concerns, such as preventing the expansion of communism, and Turkey largely adapted itself to this discourse. However, the Cyprus issue and its related developments, such as the Johnson letter and the arms embargo, created deep mistrust and suspicion between the US and Turkey. These crises revealed the limits of US geopolitical discourse in Turkish-American relations.

83 Laipson, Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo, 25.
85 Stern, The Wrong Horse, 155.
5. Conclusions
This article argues that ‘geopolitical imaginations’ are closely linked to practice, in that they are used to justify states’ decisions. Indeed, the geopolitical narrative of the Cold War created a world in which two superpowers tried to establish their own spheres of influence.

After World War II, Turkey, with its proximity to the Soviet Union, found itself in a geography in which the two superpowers strategized about how to dominate the oil-rich Middle East. Soviet territorial demands on Turkey in 1939 caught the attention of the US administration and obliged Washington to cooperate with Turkey to prevent Soviet expansionism. It can be argued that the Turkish-American relationship during the Cold War was a product of these deeply ideological conditions.

Turkey’s primary value in the eyes of US during the Cold War was its geographical location; the country was seen as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Turkey became a part of the US containment policy with the Truman Doctrine and received a huge amount of military and economic aid through the Marshall Plan. President Truman used the falling-dominoes metaphor with respect to Turkey and Greece to justify US military actions in the region. As a part of the containment policy, numerous military bases and US facilities were opened on Turkish territory, which have been central to understanding the strategic nature of the alliance during and after the Cold War. In Cold War language, Turkey was regarded as a barrier, a military base, and/or a NATO ally, whose purpose was to contain and prevent Soviet expansionism, especially in the Middle East.

Turkey’s participation in the Korean War and its inclusion in NATO showed that security and geopolitics were key terms in US state discourse regarding Turkey. Accordingly, during this period, Turkey was accepted as a Western ally and as part of the ‘West.’ It was the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that eradicated the East-West division and challenged Turkey’s position in the West.90

The Cyprus issue was the most important conflict of the Turkey-US relationship. Turkey perceived this issue as a national cause because it felt that ethnic conflicts would threaten the existence of the Turkish community on the island. Despite vigorous opposition by the US, the Turkish military intervened on Cyprus on July 20, 1974 in accordance with the rights given by Article 4 of the Guarantor Agreement. The Cyprus crisis revealed the costs associated with being so dependent on the US, and forced Turkey to reduce this dependence. For its part, the US realized that it had not taken into account the strength of Turkey’s national feeling, and that Turkey’s domestic interests ultimately took precedence over a US alliance.

After the Cold War, new geopolitical imaginations and practices changed the significance of Turkey’s geography for the US. That redefinition has mostly been accepted but occasionally resisted by subsequent Turkish administrations. It is important to analyze this new geopolitical understanding in light of current world events, but those are saved for a future study.

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Buying Trouble? The Impact of Foreign Assistance on Conflict in Direct and Indirect Rivalry Situations

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Abstract
States provide foreign assistance for many reasons, including their achievement of strategic goals. Previous research suggests that rivalries exert a meaningful impact on foreign aid allocations, not only in direct rivalry situations (i.e., rivals are less likely to receive aid), but also in indirect rivalry situations (i.e., potential recipients located near rivals or with rivalries in common with the donor are more likely to receive aid). What happens as a consequence of such strategic aid allocations? In this paper, we examine the effect of foreign aid on conflict within direct and indirect rivalry situations. Specifically, we identify and develop two contending arguments about the likely consequences of foreign aid and conflict in indirect rivalry situations. To test these arguments, we examine foreign assistance by the United States and the conflict history of recipient states from 1962 to 2000. Our results indicate that when foreign aid recipients and donors are rivals with a third state, increased foreign aid to the recipient leads to increased conflict between the recipient and the third-party rival.

Keywords: foreign aid, rivalry, conflict

1. Introduction
Strategic calculations play important roles in foreign aid allocations, as donors attempt to use aid to achieve a variety of policy goals. Aid allocations are thus complex decisions involving a variety of factors, among which are donors’ strategic rivalries.2 Not surprisingly, direct rivalry situations – long-term, persistent confrontations between pairs of states involving relatively frequent uses of force – are powerful determinants of assistance (i.e., rivals are less likely to receive aid).3 However, ‘indirect rivalry’ situations also play a role. As a recent analysis indicates, donors appear to allocate greater amounts of aid to recipients located near their rivals (neighbors of rivals) and to those with rivalries in common with the donor (shared rivals).4

What happens after major powers such as the United States (US) extend foreign aid?
assistance to countries with strategic rivalries involving the donor state? Does the provision of assistance ward off attacks on the aid recipient, or does it invite such attacks? Might such aid lead the recipient to initiate its own use of force? In short, do donors provide and improve security and defense, or do they actually buy trouble for those they aid and, perhaps, for themselves as well? The implications of these questions are significant, given that foreign aid can be distributed for many different purposes. Donors may distribute aid to achieve a foreign policy goal, only to discover that the assistance also encourages militarized behavior that runs counter to their initial purposes.

In this analysis, we examine the effects of foreign aid on conflict within direct and indirect rivalry situations. After situating our analysis in the relevant literatures, we identify and develop two contending arguments about the likely consequences of foreign aid and conflict in indirect rivalry situations. To test these contending arguments, we examine foreign assistance by the US and the conflict history of recipient states from 1962 to 2000. Our results lend support to the conclusion that when foreign aid recipients and donors are rivals with a third state, increased foreign aid to the recipient leads to increased conflict between the recipient and the third-party rival.

2. Foreign Aid, Rivalries, and Conflict

How does foreign aid affect the likelihood of conflict among aid recipients who share a rivalry with the donor or who are geographically close to donor rivals? A great deal of literature addresses the consequences of foreign aid. However, relatively few scholars focus on how foreign aid affects violence or conflict behavior, and these studies typically seek to explain conflict within states. Some studies examine whether aid affects conflict between states, but they vary significantly in their conclusions: some scholars find that aid contributes to security and peace, and others conclude that it contributes to conflict, arms races, and other confrontational behavior. However, there is nothing inherent in foreign aid that suggests the

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conflict consequences of aid will be limited to the recipients’ domestic politics (e.g., civil war).10

Foreign aid is an important foreign policy strategy for donors.11 While there are also domestic political factors at work,12 much research indicates that donors are substantially driven by strategic calculations in their aid allocation decisions and expect to derive political benefits from providing assistance. Indeed, security and strategic factors such as alliance concerns, ideological alignments, military deployments, and bases have all been found to influence aid decisions.13 Consequently, aid decisions are affected by the donor’s economic, political, and security interests and by the recipient’s economic and humanitarian needs.14

States rely on foreign aid in part because of its fungible nature and its potential contributions to a wide variety of purposes.15 Among other things, foreign aid may establish dependencies between the recipient and donor and may influence outcomes such as development, reform and observance of human rights, and internal conflict.16 The fungibility of aid, however, means that while the assistance may produce results in line with the donor’s intentions and interests, it may also lead to a number of “unintended consequences,” as recipients may divert resources and/or shift purposes.17

In fact, scholars are divided over whether the provision of foreign aid ‘buys’ influence for the donor. Some conclude that recipient behavior (in United Nations’ voting, for example) converges with donor preferences and others argue that assistance has limited (or even opposite) effects.18 According to Mott, for example, rather than buying influence, US military aid has instead contributed to stronger, more assertive recipients who ignore US interests and pursue their own purposes.19 Similarly, Sullivan, Tessman, and Li conclude that greater US military aid mostly reduces recipient cooperation with the US.20

Foreign aid may be used by donors to further their security interests. Indeed, security concerns such as rivalries affect which states receive aid: a state rarely allocates aid to its

Notes:

10 E.g., Collier and Hoeffer, “Unintended Consequences.”
16 Hook, Foreign Aid; Lancaster, Foreign Aid; Nielsen et al., “Foreign Aid Shocks.”
17 Collier and Hoeffer, “Unintended Consequences.”
19 Mott, United States Military Assistance.
20 Sullivan et al., “US Military Aid.”
rivals, and often directs its assistance to states geographically near a rival and/or sharing a common rival with the donor.\textsuperscript{21} This is unsurprising given the consequences of rivalry for a wide variety of foreign policy behaviors.\textsuperscript{22} In particular, the importance of rivalry in explaining the occurrence of conflict between states\textsuperscript{23} suggests that foreign aid may interact with rivalry in important ways to either increase or decrease the likelihood of military conflict involvement among recipients and their rivals.\textsuperscript{24}

While foreign aid may help to achieve a variety of foreign policy goals,\textsuperscript{25} it may also lead to conflict, either as a consequence of a donor’s intent, or as an above-mentioned unintended consequence,\textsuperscript{26} based instead on the goals of the recipient country and its increased ability to pursue them.\textsuperscript{27} In fact, there is little reason to believe that the impact of aid on conflict behavior will be consistent, given the wide variety of interests for both donors and recipients. This thinking is especially true in the context of rivalries and the provision of foreign aid shaped by such long-term confrontations.

As noted, donors are highly unlikely to provide foreign aid to their direct rivals.\textsuperscript{28} However, ‘indirect rivalry factors’ also impact aid allocations and thus also affect subsequent conflict behavior. According to Rudloff, Scott, and Blew, indirect rivalry factors involve the rivalries of donor states, which may lead to increased aid to states that either share the rivalry, or are located near the donor’s rival. Three indirect rivalry factors are central: a) \textit{rivalries in common} (‘rivals of my rivals’), or situations in which third-party states are engaged in their own rivalries with a rival of a major power; b) \textit{neighbors of rivals}, or situations in which third-party states are located in geographic proximity to the rival of a major power; and c) \textit{neighbor and rival} situations, or situations in which the first two conditions are simultaneously combined – that is, when a third party state is geographically near a direct rival of a major power and shares a rivalry in common with the major power.\textsuperscript{29}

In the context of these indirect rivalry factors, at least two contending logics may be in effect. As Rudloff, Scott, and Blew argue, there are many different motivations for a donor’s decision to give aid to states near, or in a rivalry with, its own rivals.\textsuperscript{30} First, aid could be intended to deter other states from attacking the recipient, similar to the notion of “extended deterrence.”\textsuperscript{31} In this case, the intent of the donor is to prevent conflict from occurring.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{mckinlay2011} McKinlay and Little, “A foreign policy model”; Rudloff, Scott and Blew, “Countering Adversaries.”
\bibitem{mckinlay2011} McKinlay and Little, “A foreign policy model”; Rudloff, Scott and Blew, “Countering Adversaries.”
\bibitem{mott2009} Mott, \textit{United States Military Assistance}; Sullivan et al., “US Military Aid.”
\end{thebibliography}
Second, donor states may be more interested in increasing conflict between a recipient and its rival, in an attempt to decrease the security of its rival state. Although these two logics may lead to opposite consequences in terms of conflict behavior, Rudloff, Scott, and Blew only address the influence of rivalry on foreign aid decisions and do not examine whether increases or decreases in aid lead to more or less conflict. These potential consequences of inserting aid into indirect rivalry situations are the focus of this analysis. In the following section we build on and extend these theoretical ideas, developing hypotheses regarding the link between foreign aid given as a result of indirect rivalry, and conflict between rivals and recipients.

3. Contending Arguments: the Consequences of Foreign Aid in Rivalry Situations

How does foreign aid affect the conflict behavior of either the recipients or the rivals who were ultimately the cause of the donor’s decisions to give aid? Previous work and its implications present two contending arguments on the effects of this foreign aid. On the one hand, as we discuss below, foreign aid might increase conflict, because if the donor or recipient share a common goal of weakening a rival state through conflict, aid is one means to strengthen the recipient’s capability to do so. On the other hand, aid might decrease conflict, particularly if both the aid donor and recipient wish to deter the rival state. Which of these arguments is best supported by the empirical evidence? We develop the foundations for each argument and then test them against each other and the relevant empirical record from 1962 to 2000 to determine which is more accurate and to provide insights into the intentions of donors and recipients in these situations. To develop these contending arguments, we must first consider the intent of the foreign aid donor and recipient, and how the ‘principal-agent problem’ creates the possibility that aid may increase conflict, despite the best intentions of donors to use aid to promote stability.

3.1. Principal-agent problems and foreign aid

Donors and recipients of foreign aid may be motivated by two very different purposes. Foreign aid donors such as the US may be motivated by a desire to protect other states from the aggression of its rivals. Conversely, aid donors may not be benevolently motivated, and may use aid as an instrument of aggression – encouraging states through aid to target its rivals. Moreover, recipients of foreign aid may have an interest in promoting their foreign policy goals by attacking or otherwise acting aggressively towards a donor’s rival. Or, a recipient may wish to avoid or deter conflict with the donor’s rival. At the intersection of these motivations are a number of interesting possibilities in terms of the role of aid in

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32 Rudloff et al., “Countering Adversaries.”
33 See ibid.
34 Ibid.
36 Rudloff et al., “Countering Adversaries.”
influencing conflict.

One might conclude that the important theoretical argument rests entirely on the interests of donor and recipient, and whether these interests converge. However, the nature of the foreign aid relationship complicates the role interests play in the link between aid and conflict. Once donors give aid, recipient states exercise a great deal of latitude in their actions as a result of the aid, independent of the interests of the donor.\(^{37}\) This is not to argue that the interests of the donor are inconsequential in such a relationship. The transfer of aid can signal the intentions of the donor; acting counter to these intentions may lead to reductions in future assistance for the recipient.\(^{38}\) Donors will also carefully consider how aid is likely to be used prior to committing to a transfer of aid, and so will seek to avoid aid that is likely to lead to outcomes that run counter to their own goals.

Despite these possibilities, however, the fundamental reality is that donor states exercise little control over aid recipients once aid is given. This leads to a serious principal-agent issue in the aid relationship. The agent – in this case, the foreign aid recipient – can act relatively independently from the donor, and may choose to utilize aid in ways with which the donor disagrees. This principal-agent problem is key to understanding how foreign aid affects the conflict behavior of recipient states.

### 3.2 Argument One: aid as a stabilizing factor

Foreign aid may decrease the likelihood of conflict by deterring other states from acting against a recipient. Donors may give aid to states to increase the security of these states.\(^ {39}\) Foreign aid may be thought of as a promise of future support if conflict increases between the recipient and the rival states. If the foreign aid recipient also has an interest in avoiding conflict, this aid may significantly decrease the likelihood of conflict, as the foreign assistance serves as a form of “extended deterrence.”\(^ {40}\) The donor’s rival should be less likely to initiate conflict against the recipient state for fear that the donor would involve itself on the side of the recipient in the event of military conflict. Aid can therefore serve as an important signal to other states that donors are committed to protecting recipient states, particularly when both donor and recipient clearly prefer to avoid conflict.

Even in cases where a donor is indifferent to or prefers conflict between recipient and rival, foreign aid may decrease conflict by increasing the ability of defensive-minded recipients to further their goals. Aid may increase the capability of the target state, increasing the likelihood that the donor would prevail in a military conflict with the donor’s rival, regardless of whether the foreign aid donor chose to intervene. This situation further compounds the rival’s incentive to avoid conflict with the recipient. When donors and recipients both wish to avoid conflict, foreign aid can serve to promote these goals. Thus, according to Argument One:

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H1a: \text{Increased aid to neighbors/rivals in common decreases the use of force against the recipient by the donor's rival.}
\]

If aid recipients wish to avoid conflict, the second obvious result is that aid will be associated with less conflict initiated by the recipient. What if the recipient of foreign aid is not so pacifically inclined? Any aid given to the recipient (even if the donor intends for aid to

\(^{37}\) e.g., Mott, *United States Military Assistance*; Sullivan et al., “US Military Aid.”

\(^{38}\) e.g., Crawford, “Foreign Aid.”

\(^{39}\) Rudloff et al., “Countering Adversaries.”

\(^{40}\) Huth, “Extended Deterrence.”
be used for defensive or deterrence purposes) could be used to engage in conflict with another state. There may be ways to avoid this principal-agent problem. For example, foreign aid donors can use the promise of future aid and good relations with the donor to constrain the provocative behavior of the recipient towards the donor’s rival. For example, by maintaining significant aid ties with Israel, the US may have an increased ability to constrain Israel from attacking states such as Iran, which Israel views as a direct threat to its security. The key is the relative value that the foreign aid recipient places on future gains from this relationship versus the possible benefits from conflict in the short term. Additionally, because donors know that foreign aid could be used for purposes that do not align with its preferences, they should specifically target its aid to states that are likely to be swayed by this relationship. If a recipient values this relationship highly, we would expect conflict to be suppressed, as aid promotes more peaceful policies among recipients. Unlike hypothesis H1a, however, the primary effect is on the recipient’s likelihood of initiating conflict against the donor’s rival. Thus, Argument One also suggests:

**H1b: Increased aid to neighbors/rivals in common decreases the use of force by the recipient against the donor’s rival.**

3.3 Argument Two: aid as an aggravating factor

In contrast to the first argument, contending logic suggests that foreign aid may increase the likelihood of conflict between the recipient and other states. In the previous two hypotheses, we assume that the donor state wishes to decrease conflict between its rival and the foreign aid recipient. However, it may be the case that the foreign aid donor wishes to increase conflict. Even if a recipient wishes to avoid conflict, accepting aid may work counter to its preferences, as the donor’s rivals may view such aid as a potential attempt to alter regional power relationships in ways that damage the rival. By increasing conflict, the donor may be able to punish its rival without directly involving itself in military conflict.41

Increased foreign aid to the recipient may create a threat to the donor’s rival that it finds untenable. With the potential of increasingly strengthened ties between donor and recipient, and the added possibility of the donor increasing its military capability over time as a direct result of the aid, the donor’s rival may choose to strike militarily before the recipient becomes an even greater threat to its security. Such an act may decrease the relative military strength of the donor’s rival and divert its attention away from the donor. In both cases, this may be of benefit to the recipient, which manages to counter its rival without directly placing itself at risk, or bearing the direct military costs of the conflict.

On the other hand, the aid recipient may find itself in a form of security dilemma, in which the actions it takes to gain security instead result in increased threats. In the context of aid, its desire to accept aid for peaceful purposes may not be perceived in the same way by the donor’s rival, whose reactions may therefore result in the direct opposite of the recipient’s intentions. If this contending theoretical argument is at work, we might expect increasing levels of aid to the recipient to provoke the donor’s rival to attack the recipient. Thus:

**H2a: Increased aid to neighbors/rivals in common increases the use of force against the recipient by the donor’s rival.**

41 Rudloff et al., “Countering Adversaries.”
Alternatively, a foreign aid recipient may not possess peaceful intentions, and aid that it receives may be used to promote its desire to act aggressively against other states. Although we argue that the intention of the donor is important in explaining states’ conflict behavior, particularly in determining whether the donor’s rival or the foreign aid recipient is the initiator of conflict, the intent of the donor may simply be ignored by the foreign aid recipient. In these cases, a donor may hope to decrease conflict through foreign aid, only to find that an unintended consequence of the aid is to increase conflict.

Foreign aid may increase the confidence of the recipient that it will be able to prevail in a conflict against the donor’s rival, thus increasing the likelihood that it will attack. Even if the foreign aid does not increase the likelihood that the recipient will prevail in a conflict, it does allow the donor to fund conflict, making conflict more attractive as a foreign policy choice. Consider cases where the recipients of foreign aid engaged in provocative acts against a donor’s rival, even when there were significant military or diplomatic costs. Examples include Israel’s decision in 1981 to attack Iran’s nuclear facility at Osirak, or Georgia’s confident defiance of Russia prior to the 2008 conflict between the two states. In such cases, recipients may increase conflict-oriented behavior against other states, either at the behest of the donor state, or on its own initiative. Thus, Argument Two also suggests:

\[ H2b: \text{Increased aid to neighbors/rivals in common increases the use of force by the recipient against the donor’s rival.} \]

The provision of aid motivated by these indirect rivalry factors produces many possible effects in terms of increased conflict behavior. The key to understanding these effects is to consider the underlying motivations of aid donors and recipients, and how aid can be used to further the goals of both states, or potentially (in troubling cases from the view of the donor) be used in ways that run counter to the goals of the donor. In the logic of Argument One, (Hypotheses 1a and 1b), foreign aid works to decrease conflict. Conversely, according to the logic of Argument Two (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), the aid recipient can either be the target or the perpetrator of the use of force. Whatever the intention of the donor, increased conflict can result from an increase in aid from the donor. These cases of mixed motivation are perhaps the more interesting cases, as a recipient looking to promote economic growth through aid may find that this aid induces other states to act aggressively toward it, while donors looking to promote deterrence may find that aid recipients have their own plans for using the aid.

Although aid may lead to many different effects, and individual cases of each of these four hypothesized relationships may exist, we seek to examine whether any one of these relationships is more important than the others. We ask: Which of these contending arguments does the evidence best support? What does this evidence tell us about the role of foreign aid in conflict? The following section outlines our strategy for answering these questions using data on rivalry, conflict, and foreign aid.

4. Research Design

The hypotheses in the previous section emphasize the effects of aid on a subset of states,
Buying Trouble? The...

rather than all states. Specifically, we focus on those states that share a rival with a potential donor, as well as states that are proximate to a donor’s rival. These states may be more likely to receive foreign aid as a result of indirect rivalry effects, and are therefore the subject of our theoretical arguments. Due to the limited availability of reliable and complete aid data, in this test of our argument, we limit our analysis to cases in which the US is the potential donor. Our unit of analysis is the state-year, and the time period of our study is 1962 to 2000. These years include data from the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, increasing the generalizability of the results by including cases from different international contexts.

To determine shared rivalry, we use the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl data on rivalry, which indicates that the US was involved in a number of rivalries between 1962 and 2000 (see Table 1). We utilize this data set because our interest is in cases that are more likely to be prone to international conflict as a result of rivalry, and unlike alternative rivalry measures, Klein, Goertz, and Diehl base their rivalry measure directly on states’ conflict behavior. These rivals span a number of regions, and their interactions are not limited to before or after the end of the Cold War. After determining US rivals, we use the same rivalry data to find which states are in a rivalry with the US rivals, limiting their inclusion in the data set to years when each of these states is a rival of the US in a particular year.

We use Gleditsch and Ward’s data to determine whether a state is a neighbor of a US rival. Per their specification, we include states that are within 950 kilometers of each of the US rivals identified in Table 1. A state year is only included if the state is a neighbor of a US rival in the same year that it is both geographically near that state and the state is a US rival. Although we run subsequent analyses on the shared rivalry and the neighbors of rival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rival</th>
<th>Years of Rivalry (1962 - 2000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1974 – 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1962 – 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1982 – 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1962 – 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1962 – 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1992 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1962 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1973 – 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1979 – 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1987 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1962 – 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1970 – 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1998 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1962 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1962 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1962 – 1973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, “The New Rivalry Dataset”.

We use Gleditsch and Ward’s data to determine whether a state is a neighbor of a US rival. Per their specification, we include states that are within 950 kilometers of each of the US rivals identified in Table 1. A state year is only included if the state is a neighbor of a US rival in the same year that it is both geographically near that state and the state is a US rival. Although we run subsequent analyses on the shared rivalry and the neighbors of rival

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43 Rudloff et al., “Countering Adversaries.”
46 Klein, Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The New Rivalry Dataset.”
data separately as a check against the application of our arguments across multiple contexts, it is important to note that there is overlap in these two sets of cases. There are a number of states that are located near US rivals that are also in a rivalry with the US rival. Therefore, the rivalry and neighbor data sets should not be treated as mutually exclusive.

Our dependent variable is conflict between states. To measure this concept, we utilize the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset.\(^{48}\) Using EUGene, we generate conflict data, and then use this data to collect four different variables to measure the conflict between potential foreign aid recipients and US rivals.\(^{49}\) Our hypotheses indicate that we must distinguish between whether a state is an initiator of a dispute or a target of a dispute, so we construct multiple dependent variables to be utilized in our analysis.

The first variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether there was a militarized interstate dispute in a year where the aid recipient initiated a conflict with a rival of the US in the given year.\(^{50}\) The second variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether there was a militarized interstate dispute where the aid recipient was a target of a militarized interstate dispute initiated by a US rival in the given year.\(^{51}\) Both variables include all types of conflicts in the data, which range from war between states to threats between states.\(^{52}\) We also code a variable that includes only military conflicts that led to a death,\(^{53}\) to account for the possibility that the severity of the conflict may partly determine the decision-making logic of the states involved.\(^{54}\) For each of these conflict variables, we construct a separate variable for each category of potential aid recipient: neighbors of US rivals, and rivals of US rivals.

The foreign aid data for our study is from Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s foreign aid data set, which itself is derived from the USAID’s Greenbook.\(^{55}\) Due to the availability of US foreign aid data, we focus on the US as the foreign aid donor in this study. Furthermore, although USAID differentiates between military and economic aid, for our purposes, we use total US aid to recipient states per year, because we do not make any theoretical arguments regarding the differences in aid type on conflict between states. Aid data is potentially problematic because a number of states receive no foreign aid in a given year. Moreover, the distribution of aid among recipients leads some to log aid variables in their analyses.\(^{56}\) Logging the aid variable, however, means that those states that do not receive aid will be dropped from the analysis, even though these states are an important segment of cases. We therefore present the analysis without logging the aid variable, but we note any differences that result from substituting the logged aid variable in the results section.

We include a series of control variables that might explain a state’s conflict behavior. First, to control for the effect of regime type, we include a democracy variable from the Polity IV data set that varies between -10 and 10, with higher numbers representing greater levels of


\(^{50}\) For each of the four conflict variables, we utilize the default definition of “initiator” included in EUGene. See Bennett and Stam, “EUGene.” See Ghosn and Palmer, “Militarized Interstate Dispute Data” for how the Correlates of War Project codes its conflict variables.


\(^{52}\) Ghosn and Palmer, “Militarized Interstate Dispute Data.”

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Although we do not include tables with results for these alternative conflict variables (in order to aid comprehension of the results), we do discuss the findings using these variables in the text.


\(^{56}\) Mesquita and Smith, “Foreign Aid.”
Second, we include a dichotomous variable indicating whether a potential aid recipient is itself a rival of the US, which we derive from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s rivalry data. This is necessary because a number of US rivals are geographically proximate to one another (see Table 1), and may themselves be rivals with one another. By indicating which potential recipients are also rivals of the US, we control for the possibility that these potential recipients are much less likely to receive aid, despite their shared rivalry or proximity to a US rival. Third, to gauge the effect of common political interests, we include Signorino and Ritter’s “S-score” between each potential recipient and the US, which was drawn from EUGene. Fourth, we include a count variable of the number of US rivals the recipient state shares a rivalry with (in the shared-rivalry analysis) or is a neighbor to (in the neighbor-of-rival analysis) in a particular year. This inclusion helps control for the possibility that states associated (either through rivalry or proximity) with greater numbers of rivals may be more likely to engage in conflict with at least one of these rivals, and are also more likely to receive greater amounts of aid given their association with more US rivals. Finally, to control for the economic development of the potential recipient state, we include the gross domestic product (hereafter GDP) per capita variable from Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, which was originally drawn from World Bank economic data. The GDP per capita variable is adjusted for inflation, and is measured in constant US dollars. In the statistical analysis, the aid, GDP per capita, democracy, and S-score variables are lagged by one year.

Each of the four dependent variables in our analysis is dichotomous, therefore all subsequent analysis is conducted using logistic regression. A number of issues arise from our data, however, that must be accounted for to ensure the quality of the statistical results. First, the unit of analysis is state-year, and each state may be in the data set for a number of years. Given that a state’s foreign policy behavior in consecutive years is related, we must control for the lack of independence between observations. To do this, we calculate a new variable representing the number of years since at least one conflict occurred involving the potential aid recipient. This variable, denoted as “Peace Years” in subsequent analyses, also helps control for the clustering of conflict across time, as there may be periods in a state’s history when it is more likely to engage in conflict due to short-term disputes with other states. Using this variable as a baseline, we then include a squared and a cubed version of this variable, as suggested by Carter and Signorino. Finally, we include robust standard errors, clustered by state.

Subsequent analysis lends itself to isolating the expected relationship between foreign aid and the potential for conflict in these indirect rivalry situations. For example, a simple
correlation between aid and conflict may indicate evidence for our earlier arguments (that aid either increases or decreases the likelihood of a state engaging in conflict). However, it may also indicate something about US decision making in regard to aid. A positive correlation between aid and conflict may indicate that the US is more likely to give aid proactively to those states that are willing to engage in conflict with its rival(s), and this possibility is largely indistinguishable from the alternative that we are interested in – that recipient states use the benefits of this aid to engage in conflict with their rivals.

Although this possibility is problematic, our analysis mitigates it in a number of ways. First, we distinguish between those states that are rivals of US rivals, and those that are simply neighbors of US rivals. If the US anticipates conflict, we are likely to see a statistically significant effect in the former case, but not the latter. If the recipient state is engaged in a rivalry with the US rival, it has already demonstrated a history of conflict with the US rival. These rivals are much more likely to engage in conflict than neighbors. In addition, the Peace Years variable used to account for temporal dependence has the beneficial side effect of controlling for recent conflict history, as potential aid recipients that have recently engaged in conflict may be more likely to engage in conflict in the near future (regardless of whether or not they receive aid from the US). If this is the case, we expect the Peace Years variable to be negatively associated with conflict in a given year, as longer periods of peace will make a new conflict less likely.

5. Analysis

Our analysis focuses on two types of potential recipients: rivals of US rivals, and neighbors of US rivals. Our hypotheses suggest that there may also be differences between the conflict behavior of aid recipients and US rivals, so for each of the analyses, we present a separate analysis for cases when the aid recipient initiated conflict, and cases where the aid recipient was targeted by a US rival.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2- Neighbors of Rivals (Conflict Initiation versus Targeting)</th>
<th>Recipient Initiates</th>
<th>Recipient Targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Aid</strong></td>
<td>0.0003*** (0.00007)</td>
<td>0.00009 (0.00008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log of GDP per capita</strong></td>
<td>-0.038 (0.229)</td>
<td>0.445** (0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>0.029 (0.023)</td>
<td>0.031 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S-score</strong></td>
<td>0.170 (0.868)</td>
<td>-1.514* (0.755)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Rival</strong></td>
<td>1.280*** (0.362)</td>
<td>0.766* (0.330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Rival Neighbors</strong></td>
<td>0.427** (0.145)</td>
<td>0.371*** (0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace Years</strong></td>
<td>-0.195* (0.095)</td>
<td>-0.218** (0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace Years$^2$</strong></td>
<td>0.006 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace Years$^3$</strong></td>
<td>-0.0006 (0.0001)</td>
<td>0.00005 (0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-3.148** (1.097)</td>
<td>-3.118*** (0.710)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n = 1915</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>n = 1915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.)

* = $p < 0.05$, ** = $p < 0.01$, *** = $p < 0.001$
Table 2 summarizes the results for potential recipients that are neighbors of US rivals. The preliminary results indicate that foreign aid to neighbors of rivals increases the likelihood that these recipients will initiate conflict with US rivals, but there is little evidence to suggest that aid increases the likelihood that these states will be targeted by US rivals. The aid variable in the first model, which measures aid recipient initiations against US rivals, is positive and statistically significant, but the aid variable measuring rival conflict initiations against the aid recipient is not statistically significant. This is consistent with the expectations in Hypothesis 2b.

For example, Albania was a neighbor of a US rival (i.e., Serbia) from 1992 to 2000. Aid from the US decreased from 1992 to 1995 (after the end of the Cold War), but began to increase sharply again in 1996, and continued to increase until 2000. It is during this period of increase that Albania was more likely to initiate conflict with Serbia: once in 1998 and again in 2000. This case may illustrate Albania’s willingness to increase its aggressiveness towards US rivals when it receives more aid from the US.

Furthermore, foreign aid seems to be associated with a significant increase in conflict between recipients and US rivals (See Table 3 for a summary of the predicted probabilities). For all of the predicted probability analyses, all variables other than foreign aid are set either at their mean or median, except for US rivals, which is set at 0. Given these values, when a neighbor of a US rival receives no aid from the US, the predicted probability that it initiates a conflict in a given year is only 1.5%. However, when foreign aid is increased to the aid variable’s mean plus two standard deviations, this probability increases to 2.2%, an increase of over 45%. There are two notes of caution about these predicted probabilities, however. First, the 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probability of conflict at this minimum and maximum overlap. Second, there is great deal of skew in the total aid variable, as there are clear outliers in terms of states that receive a great deal of aid from the US compared to other states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 - Predicted Probabilities of Conflict*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aid (minimum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor of Rival Initiates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival of Rival Initiates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Variables “Rival of Rival Targeted” and “Neighbor of Rival Targeted” are statistically insignificant and thus not included.

Note: Confidence intervals for predicted probabilities of conflict for minimum and maximum levels of total aid overlap.

65 Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, “The New Rivalry Dataset.”
66 Mesquita and Smith, “Foreign Aid.”
67 Ghosn, Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, “The MID3 Data Set.”
68 To calculate the predicted probabilities throughout this paper, we utilized the SPOST package (Long, J. Scott and Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata. Second edition (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2006), http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/spost.html).
69 Table 3 also reports the predicted probability of conflict when the aid variable is set at its maximum. Although this change significantly increases the apparent impact of the aid variable, it is not necessarily an appropriate comparison, given that there are significant positive outliers in terms of the amount of foreign aid received by the US. We therefore present the comparison between the minimum and the mean plus two standard deviations throughout the text, because this encapsulates a much more appropriate range of the aid variable.
70 We run additional models replacing the total aid with the log of total aid. These models are problematic due to the number of states that did not receive any aid from the US during the time period of our analysis. When taking the log, these states drop from the analysis. In the case of the models in Table 2, over 500 observations drop from the analysis. Despite this drop, the logged aid variable is significant with a $p$-value of 0.059, which is remarkable given that almost a third of the cases drop from the analysis. We argue that the total aid variable is more appropriate, because it allows us to measure the full range of US aid observed, and it allows for easier interpretation of the variable. Although they are outliers, cases where the US presented states with a disproportionately large amount of aid should be considered along with the much larger number of cases where the US chose not to give any aid.
Returning to Table 2, there are relatively few control variables that are statistically significant. For example, the variable indicating whether a potential recipient is itself a US rival is positive and statistically significant in the model that measures recipient conflict initiation, indicating that these states are much more likely to initiate conflict. Furthermore, the variable indicating the number of US rivals with whom a potential recipient shares rivalries is also significant, which is unsurprising given that states with a greater number of shared rivals have a greater likelihood of initiating conflict with at least one of these rivals. Although the control variables are not statistically significant, this result may be due to the relatively small sample size of \( n < 2000 \). This small size, however, makes the significance of the total aid variable even more striking.

In general, there is no evidence in this analysis that suggests that foreign aid leads to less conflict, as the first contending argument (Hypotheses 1a and 1b) suggests. It would seem that foreign aid has a significant inflammatory effect in these situations. Furthermore, if we only include conflicts that led to at least one death in the dependent variable, both of the total aid variables in these models remain statistically significant and positive. Given the evidence, it would seem that while US rivals are no more likely to initiate conflicts in general with neighbors that receive aid from the US, those rivals are more likely to initiate conflicts against the aid recipient when we consider only the most severe cases (Hypothesis 2a). Again, the weight of evidence suggests that aid to states in indirect rivalry conditions increases the likelihood that these states will attack US rivals. There is also evidence that US rivals are likely to initiate conflicts against aid recipients when we isolate the most severe cases of conflict.

Table 4 illustrates the results for potential recipients that are the rivals of US rivals. In this case, the number of observations is much smaller (660 observations, instead of 1915 when one includes neighbors of US rivals), as states are much more likely to be near a rival than to be in a rivalry with a US rival. In this case only one of the aid variables – for the recipient initiation model – is both positive and statistically significant, at the 0.05 level. Once again, there is some evidence that recipients of US aid are more likely to initiate conflict with US rivals as the amount of aid increases, and is further support for Hypothesis 2b. The statistical significance of the aid variables disappears in the case of recipient initiation with the substitution of logged foreign aid for total foreign aid. However, the sample size in the case of logged aid is only 375 compared to 660 due to dropped cases. On the other hand, if one excludes conflicts that did not lead to at least one death, both of the total aid variables summarized in Table 4 are statistically significant and positive, which indicates that total aid is associated positively with the most-violent conflict initiations. Again, the weight of evidence supports Hypothesis 2b, both for all conflicts and for the more severe conflicts. Hypothesis 2a receives only some support, and this is limited to the more-severe cases, where at least one death was recorded in the conflict. Hence, the second contending argument is better supported by the empirical evidence of our test.
Given these results, is it possible that it is not the aid that is causing greater levels of conflict, but the fact that the US directs more aid to states that are most likely to be involved in conflict in the future? That is, it is not US aid that is causing conflict, but some other factors that are also causing the US to give aid to these states. To mitigate this possibility, we have taken several steps. First, we control for a number of economic and political factors that may also be associated with conflict, which would help isolate the effects of aid on conflict. Second, we believe that one of the best predictors of future conflict in these cases is past conflict, which is inherent in the rivalry data that we are using.71 If this is the case, then we are also likely to control for the possibility of future conflict through the variable measuring the number of peace years since the previous conflict. Note that in each of the models presented, the Peace Years variable is negative (although not always statistically significant), indicating that as the number of years since the previous conflict increases, the likelihood of conflict occurring in a given year decreases. Finally, the main finding in support of the first contending argument – that increased levels of aid lead to greater levels of recipient conflict initiation – is robust, regardless of whether one considers only rivals (Table 4), or adds the neighbors of the recipient state to the sample (Table 2). Ultimately, by considering two different samples, and controlling for factors that may also predict the level of conflict between the relevant pairs of states (based on both rivalry and proximity), we better isolate the influence of aid on conflict involvement in recipient states.

Returning to Table 3, which contains the predicted probabilities for all the models, there is a significant increase in the predicted probability of conflict when one increases total aid from its minimum to the variable’s mean plus two standard deviations. In the case of aid

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71 Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, “The New Rivalry Dataset.”
to states that share a rival with the US, the predicted probability of a recipient initiating conflict against a US rival increases from 6.6% to 10.2%, for a 55% increase in the predicted probability of an aid recipient initiating conflict with a US rival.

An example of a state that is more likely to initiate conflict against a US rival when receiving more US aid is Saudi Arabia, which was involved in two distinct periods of rivalry with US rivals during our period of study: from 1962 to 1967 and then from 1984 until 2000.\(^\text{72}\) Saudi Arabia received virtually no aid from the US in the latter period,\(^\text{73}\) nor did it initiate a conflict with a US rival from the mid-1980s onward.\(^\text{74}\) On the other hand, Saudi Arabia did receive aid from the US between 1962 and 1967,\(^\text{75}\) and in this short period of time it initiated two conflicts with Egypt, a US rival.\(^\text{76}\) In 1962 Saudi Arabia initiated a conflict against Egypt and the Yemen Arab Republic, and in 1964 initiated a conflict against Egypt alone.\(^\text{77}\) Although the motivations of Saudi Arabia and the US may be different in the region, it is important to note that the US still receives the benefit of another state targeting its rival with conflict.

Given that there is a statistically significant relationship between aid and conflict in Table 2 and in Table 4, we have less reason to be concerned that this is an artifact of US aid decision making. If the US were simply giving more aid to states that were predisposed to fight its rivals, we would expect there to be a positive and statistically significant relationship in Table 4, but not necessarily in Table 2. Instead, we find that this positive relationship exists in both sets of data. Although it is impossible to completely eliminate the possibility that we are misinterpreting the direction of causality, current evidence suggests this is not the case.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

In general, our statistical results demonstrate that there is little evidence that aid to neighbors of US rivals or to rivals of US rivals decreases the likelihood of conflict between these recipients and the US rivals. To the contrary, the evidence robustly indicates that aid in indirect rivalry situations greatly exacerbates conflict within these contexts. We find little evidence that aid leads to “extended deterrence.”\(^\text{78}\) Rather, foreign aid seems to increase the likelihood of a recipient initiating conflict against a rival, and to a lesser degree appears to increase the chances of the recipient being targeted by a US rival. Furthermore, the significance of the aid variable is most consistent across models when we consider only conflicts that lead to at least one death. This indicates that not only does foreign aid lead to more conflict in these cases, but it leads to more-violent conflict as well.

Interestingly, the results are a bit more consistent in the sample of neighbors of US rivals, rather than rivals of US rivals (due to the fact that the logged aid variable at least approaches statistical significance at the 0.05 level, despite the large number of dropped cases). On the one hand, this result is surprising, given that one might expect that conflict is more likely to be prompted in cases where foreign aid recipients already have a ready enemy. However, rivalry also means that conflict is already occurring between states, so it may be the case that while foreign aid may spark conflict between states, it is less likely to escalate conflict.

\(^{72}\) Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, “The New Rivalry Dataset.”
\(^{73}\) Mesquita and Smith, “Foreign Aid.”
\(^{74}\) Ghosn, Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, “The MID3 Data Set.”
\(^{75}\) Mesquita and Smith, “Foreign Aid.”
\(^{76}\) Ghosn, Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, “The MID3 Data Set.”
\(^{77}\) Ibid.
\(^{78}\) Huth, “Extended Deterrence.”
between states already engaged in persistent conflict with one another. It is possible that foreign aid may help lead to the creation of rivalries among neighbors, but this is an empirical question that would need to be addressed in a subsequent analysis.

As we stated at the outset, foreign aid is an important foreign policy tool for major powers, and existing research demonstrates the diversity of goals that can be achieved through the use of aid. However, the arguments and evidence in this paper demonstrate the need for caution in the provision of foreign aid. Donors appear to respond to indirect rivalry situations by providing greater amounts of assistance in many cases. In these situations, states may wish only to support states against rivals in a manner than makes conflict less likely. Nevertheless, our statistical analysis demonstrates that aid does not appear to decrease conflict between states. To the contrary, aid appears, at least in some cases, to increase the probability of conflict between recipients and the rivals of donors. This is yet another potential “unintended consequence” of aid. Foreign aid meant to support the security of states may ultimately undermine that security, either by prompting the state to engage in conflict, or by inviting attack from US rivals.

Although this analysis provides an initial examination of the potential conflict-increasing effects of aid, much more work is needed to determine whether there is consistent evidence that aid increases conflict in these indirect rivalry situations. For example, we examine only a single donor, the US, and, although that country is an important foreign aid donor, this limits the generalizability of the results. By extending the number of potential donors considered, the results will not only become more generalizable, but more consistent with larger sample sizes. Furthermore, future analyses should disaggregate foreign aid into economic and military components to evaluate whether different forms of assistance are associated with different consequences for conflict. Although the argument presented in this paper does not theoretically distinguish between types of aid, such a distinction may help identify more specific contingencies in which aid is more likely to lead to conflict or peace. Despite the findings of this study suggesting that aid to states that share a rival will be associated with conflict initiation against the rival from the aid recipient, it is possible that there are specific conditions under which aid may be bring less conflict. Finally, a future study can also make a substantive contribution by examining conflict behaviors other than initiation. For example, states may be more likely to escalate to higher levels of conflict when given aid, or may be more likely to engage in conflict with a larger number of states. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that, while donors may provide aid in the context of rivalry situations for a variety of strategic purposes, they may in fact be ‘buying trouble’ when they do so.

80 Rudloff et al., “Countering Adversaries.”
81 Mott, United States Military Assistance; Collier and Hoeffler, “Unintended Consequences”; Sullivan et al., “US Military Aid.”
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Babies, Parks, and Citizen Dissatisfaction
Social Protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey and their Long-term Effects

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**Abstract**

2013 was a year of social unrest in the regions of the Mediterranean and southeastern Europe. From Bulgaria to Slovenia, and from Egypt to Syria, there were new waves of citizen unrest, violent clashes, and civil-war-like escalations. This paper looks at the social protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey. The protests in the two countries started because of concrete examples of public mismanagement: In the case of Bosnia because of the failure to pass a new law on identity numbers, which resulted in the inability of a baby to receive medical support abroad, and in the case of Turkey because of the decision to replace Gezi Park with a new shopping centre in Istanbul. However, both protests are also symbolic of deeper sentiments of citizen dissatisfaction. What started out as protests to save a park in Turkey, and change the law on identity numbers in Bosnia, became a wider movement to demand substantial reforms and changes to the current style of politics in both countries. This paper will look at the long-term effects of these protests. While in the short-term they have resulted in relatively few changes, it will be demonstrated that there might be long-term effects that will significantly impact the social contract in Bosnia and Turkey.

**Keywords:** Bosnia, Turkey, citizen dissatisfaction, social protest

1. Introduction

The summer of 2013 saw civil unrest in most countries of southeastern Europe. From Slovenia to Greece, from Croatia to Bulgaria, a pattern of protest emerged in which citizens publically demonstrated against their governments, economic mismanagement, and wider societal inequality. Protests also took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina\(^1\) and Turkey. In both countries, the underlying issue is discontent with the system, and the struggle for basic public and common goods for all is the transparent progressive content of the protests. While various catalysts motivated people from different backgrounds to take to the streets against their government, the consequences levied by security forces saw those citizens joining forces to protest government actions. The long-term effects of these movements are yet to be determined, but whether the protests are ongoing, as in Turkey, or have faded (with questionable effect), as in Bosnia, a legacy will undoubtedly remain that solidarity, passion, and a common cause can create a movement willing to challenge existing political systems.

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\(^{1}\) Henceforth, the short form ‘Bosnia’ will be used to indicate the country’s full name.
It is these long-term consequences that we are interested in and will discuss in this paper. In doing so, we first outline the history of the recent protests and their original motivation and then explore the wider background of the social unrest in these countries. In the last section, we discuss the long-term effects on the nations' political systems.

2. The Start of Protests in Bosnia and Turkey

In Turkey, protests began in May 2013 out of peaceful demonstrations against a government-backed plan to demolish Gezi Park (a section of Taksim Square in central Istanbul) to build a shopping mall. At the time of this writing, there have been six deaths attributed to the protests, and the Turkish Medical Association has reported that more than 8,000 people have been injured at demonstrations, while thousands of civilians, lawyers, and journalists have been imprisoned. The strong police crackdown on those demonstrations spawned widespread anger in Turkey, with hundreds of thousands of people taking to the streets on May 31. Although triggered by the Gezi Park incidents, the unrest developed into a broader protest against Prime Minister Erdoğan’s autocratic authoritarianism and didactic conservatism. Turkey’s constitution states that it is a secular democratic country, but Erdoğan’s critics warn of his lack of concern over democracy in favour of an Islamist agenda, moving Turkey away from the West and closer to the Middle East.

Over time, the nature of the protests in Turkey has changed, with mass demonstrations being supplemented by acts of public defiance and civil disobedience. The most recent protests began following the death of Ahmet Atakan, a 22-year-old man who died at a rally opposing the construction of a road that would cause environmental damage to the grounds of Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara. The official statement claims that Atakan fell from a building, but opposition sources say he died when he was struck by a police gas canister. This event sparked a fresh wave of protests nationally, lasting for days and resulting in further clashes with security forces.

In Bosnia, citizens from both entities came together to demonstrate their discontent with the political system. The country’s baby revolution (Bebolucija) is so named because the consequence of the latest political stalemate affects babies born after February 12, 2013. These children are not being allocated their official identity number (known by its acronym, JMBG), without which, among other things, they are unable to obtain a passport. Bosnian Serb representatives demanded that the new ID numbers reflect the country’s two entities: the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb Republika Srpska. Bosniak and Croat representatives, however, did not agree, and both sides refused to compromise. Protests began on June 5, 2013, when the plight of a three-month-old girl who was restricted from travelling to Germany for medical treatment spread on social media.

Reacting to the story of baby Belmina, a group of citizens gathered in front of the parliament building to protest. They decided not to move until politicians found a solution

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4 Bosnia is a federal country consisting of two entities (The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS)) and the District of Brčko. On Bosnian federalism see: S. Keil, Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2013).
to the problem. Within days, 3,000 protesters had formed a human chain around Parliament, refusing to allow parliamentarians, politicians, or foreign dignitaries from leaving until a new law had been adopted, or until, as they said, politicians finally did the job they were paid to do. The protests intensified upon the news of the death of a baby who needed treatment in Serbia but was unable to cross the border to receive it. Again, it took only days for citizens to react, and protests erupted in all major cities in Bosnia. Students protested in Sarajevo and in the Republika Srpska’s administrative centre (Banja Luka) against an inefficient university system and the difficult conditions of student life. Citizens also gathered in Banja Luka in support of a man who had been evicted from his property and beaten by police in an incident related to plans to destroy a public park to build a shopping mall – much like the Gezi Park situation in Turkey.

The reaction to the failure to resolve the JMBG issue has been said to reflect the ongoing frustrations of Bosnian citizens with the political elites. The lack of cooperation in parliament leads to political deadlock around most legislative issues; the Bosnian political and administrative system costs the country around two-thirds of its budget and consistently fails to deliver results. To replace the ethnic divisions set out in the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (which ended nearly four years of war in the country) opposition parties have called for a new constitution that would reflect the rights of all citizens as equals.

The protests in Turkey and Bosnia developed through spontaneous action, without being led by one main group or organiser. Social media played a vital role in the organisation of these protests, and the coordination of the protestors. Different opposition parties and groups tried to utilize the protests to push their own agenda, but failed to do so effectively in both countries.

3. The Wider Picture of Social Unrest in Bosnia and Turkey

In Turkey, the 2013 protests have been loosely coordinated through Twitter hashtags and Facebook pages, and there has been no evidence that the movement has resulted in an increase in electoral support for certain opposition parties, who tried to use the protests for their own political agendas. Indeed, it appears that the lack of faith in any political party is one of the main reasons protesters took to the streets in the first place, along with general dissatisfaction within some elements of Turkish society (such as the secular elite who have become more and more estranged from the AKP government (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party; JDP) and Prime Minister Erdoğan’s increasingly arbitrary and autocratic style. This strong public opposition to the government has been provoked by the following factors: Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conflict – which has led to terrorist attacks in Turkey; legislative attempts to restrict freedom of behaviour – such as recent restrictions on the sale of alcohol; and liberal economic and investment policies that ignore social and environmental matters – despite a strong tradition in Turkey of leftist and ‘green’ movements.

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In Bosnia, the demonstrations also evolved through citizen movements, and were not organised by a political party. At the beginning of the protests in June 2013, there was real potential for a social movement to emerge that could have counterbalanced the ethnic divides preserved by the institutions adopted in the Dayton Peace Agreement. Most protesters were Bosniak residents of Sarajevo, but demonstrators were not using national slogans, and groups from the Republika Srpska and Zagreb also joined the protest in Sarajevo. The possible threat to the country’s nationalist parties saw the political elites adopt the familiar ‘divide-and-rule’ tactic – Croat and Serb MPs attempted to portray the protests as hostile actions waged by Bosniaks against their fellow citizens (Serbs and Croats), which proves the need to preserve the autonomy of the constituent peoples in the country’s political system. Serbian politicians declared that the protests were “anti-Serb” in nature and manipulated by Bosniak parties, and the president of that entity talked about “the biggest hostage crisis” while the Bosniak member of the tripartite presidency called upon protesters to show their discontent at the next elections. While there was a momentum to create a stronger social movement, this has now faded, and is unlikely to happen. In November 2013 the Bosnian Parliament adopted a new law on identity numbers, which will not only contribute to further ethnic divisions, but also ignored the demands of the protestors for identity numbers that are neutral and do not identify a person’s place of birth or ethnicity.

The nationalist rhetoric used by politicians to retain support was being openly questioned and opposed by citizens willing to gather across divisions and protest against the system as a whole. The Beboluciya movement suffered because of its determination to remain independent from any party, according to Dennis Gratz (president of the multi-ethnic party Naša Stranka), who believes the protesters were playing a “dangerous game” by compounding all parties into one target, leaving their group detached, isolated, and powerless. However, by preventing citizens from gaining access to the basic citizenship right of a registration number, ethno-nationalists provoked an unexpected reaction: they provided citizens with a common enemy by giving political meaning to what they strived to destroy – namely the common citizenship of all Bosnians and Herzegovinians. The chances of success for this civic movement to influence the political system, however, was always questioned by those who see the institutional system designed by the Dayton Agreement as effectively paralysing political life on ethnic grounds.

The international community, which was instrumental in designing the Dayton Agreement, also played an important role in the 2013 protests. Two days after the protest began, High Representative (HR) Valentin Inzko demanded that protesters remove the blockade on the parliament building, promising that the issue would be discussed at an urgently convened meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an international body that oversees the country’s peace process. Meanwhile, concerns about the current structure in Bosnia have been raised in the European Union (EU). The inefficient political system and resulting

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12. The High Representative is the highest civilian authority in Bosnia. The position is legitimized by the Dayton Peace Accords and has received extensive imposition and removal powers by the PIC. The PIC and the HR also regularly report to the UN.
administrative inertia, especially at the central level, has given rise to public dissatisfaction and widespread criticism. The division of the country based on ethnic criteria affects the voting system and discriminates against citizens of other ethnic backgrounds. Due to this, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Füle stated that the EU will only recognise the results of the parliamentary elections scheduled for Spring 2014 on the condition that the constitution be amended to address a vital judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in 2009.13

The international community has not been impressed with Erdoğan’s reaction towards Turkey’s protesters: the United Nations (UN), the United States (US), and other Western partners have voiced concern about the heavy-handed police action. A report published by Amnesty International accused Turkish authorities of committing human rights abuses “on a massive scale” while trying to quell the uprisings.14 The report stated that Turkish riot squads fired enormous amounts of tear gas, often at close range in confined spaces, and used other types of disproportionate force in their tactics to crush protests in Istanbul, Ankara, and other cities. The rights group cited the evidence compiled by the Turkish Medical Association regarding the more than 8,000 injuries, attributed to tear gas, rubber bullets, water cannons, beatings, and live ammunition. Erdoğan’s government defended what it called the right of police to use tear gas and water cannons against protests by groups that undermine public order.15

Although Erdoğan is unlikely to sever Turkey’s ties with its traditional allies in Europe or with the US, those relationships are likely to come under considerable strain. An increase in the already-rocky relations between Turkey and the EU could prove particularly problematic at a time when the negotiating process for Turkish accession has been postponed until the progress report on Turkey’s EU reform credentials has been assessed. This situation could also affect Turkish-US relations regarding Syria, where NATO-member Turkey is a key regional ally for the US and has, thus far, backed it in opposing President Bashar al-Assad.

4. The Long-Term Effects of the Protests

It has become clear in recent weeks that the protests in Bosnia and Turkey have had very little short-term effect on politics in those countries. While a new law on ID numbers was passed in Bosnia, it did not take into account any of the protesters’ concerns. In Turkey, the destruction of Gezi Park has begun and Prime Minister Erdoğan remains in power. Neither the short-term demands for a new, ethnically-neutral law on ID numbers in Bosnia nor the protection of Gezi Park in Istanbul has been successfully achieved, and the long-term issues of a more authoritarian conservative Erdoğan and a divided political system in Bosnia have also not been addressed.

Yet these protests, and those in neighbouring nations, have demonstrated that there is general dissatisfaction with the current state of democracy and economic organisation in these countries. The well-known Slovene Philosopher Slavoj Žižek and others have pointed to a global crisis characterised by a general apathy towards some of the side effects of free-market

capitalism. In this context, it is important to note that the protests in Bosnia and Turkey crossed important societal divides. While the first demonstrators in Bosnia were Bosniaks in Sarajevo, they were soon joined by Croats and Serbs from other parts of the country. In Turkey, young and leftist protesters first went to the streets to voice their opposition to the destruction of Gezi Park. They were soon joined by older protestors from all social classes, and also by those that would otherwise support the ruling AKP. These two issues – a baby and a park – were able to bridge important divides that have been key markers of these respective societies in the last decades. They managed to unite people from different class, political, and geographical backgrounds, and provide a platform on which to discuss not only the questions of ID cards and Istanbul’s green space, but also the political systems in Bosnia and Turkey. Moreover, the protests were able to cross party lines, and while opposition parties tried to participate and instrumentalise the protests in both countries, they largely failed to do so because the protestors refused to join them. While this is a remarkable development in political systems where parties dominate parliamentary representation and government selection, in the long term it remains to be seen whether the protestors’ demands will be addressed and their voiced concerns will find political representation in systems based on parties and their representatives.

In Turkey, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s response to the protests may have damaged his long-term plans. His support may have been affected by his comments that branded the hundreds of thousands who took to the streets in cities across the country as an “extremist fringe” and “a bunch of looters.” In stark contrast, Turkish President Abdullah Gül called for a calm reaction by government and defended protesters’ rights to hold peaceful demonstrations. Erdoğan has been seeking to push through controversial constitutional reforms that would increase the power of the presidency, a position he is seeking in the 2014 election, and which, after winning three landslide elections as prime minister, he had seemed well placed to win. However, Erdoğan’s harsh comments, the heavy response of Turkish security forces to the demonstrators, and Erdoğan’s decision to leave the country for foreign visits during the unrest, thus absolving himself of responsibility for resolving it, has seen Gül’s popularity rise. Gül will be running for president again in 2014, and what will happen in that election is anyone’s guess; even the possibility of an AKP split cannot be excluded.

Erdoğan’s recent announcement in Istanbul of his much-anticipated “democratization package” was met with a cool reception domestically and at the EU level. Many minority groups feel continued frustration at the lack of equal rights and representation, and Amnesty International says the package fails to address the authorities’ violations during the 2013 protests and lacks any assurances that similar incidents will not occur in the future. Although many EU leaders have been critical of the overuse of force by police against protesters, the most recent progress report of the European Commission views the democratization package and some of the reforms Turkey implemented by after the height of the protests in June 2013 as positive signs of internal democratization. The EU has agreed to open another chapter

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with Turkey, but the country’s prospects are worse than ever. While German and French conservatives have focused on Turkey’s Islamic tradition to veto its membership in the EU, they can now also point towards its lack of democratic credentials and a stronger push towards authoritarianism. In fact, it could be argued that the lack of EU engagement in and with Turkey in recent years has been partially to blame for the undoing of some important reforms that were implemented in the early 2000s, when Erdoğan first came to power. Turkish relations with the US are also at issue. While Erdoğan will not risk a break, his re-orientation and authoritarian style has alienated many in Washington. It has become clear that Turkish foreign policy is being reshaped, and the recent low in Turkey-Egypt relations\textsuperscript{20} is an example of the failure of the country’s zero-problems-with-neighbours policy that aimed at establishing Turkey as a regional power.

When, during the height of the protests, Erdoğan organised a counter-protest outside Istanbul in which tens of thousands of AKP and Erdoğan supporters participated, he demonstrated that he is not afraid of further conflict. This evidence has further deepened the divisions between those who support traditional Atatürk-style secularism and those who favour a more-conservative public sphere, where Islam plays a more-prominent role. And while Erdoğan is not trying to turn Turkey into a second Iran, he is attacking some of the fundamental pillars of Turkish society. He does so with the support of a large part of the population, mainly (but not exclusively) from Anatolia, the lower and middle classes, and rural areas. Those who have supported (and profited from) the long tradition of Kemalism, that is, the higher classes, societal elites, the judiciary, and most notably, the army, find themselves in a new position, and it remains to be seen whether Turkish democracy and civil society are strong enough to address these deep cleavages within a democratic framework.

In Bosnia, the domestic political scene remains dominated by ethnically exclusive parties. Their leaders focus more on their own interests than on what is best for the country. Little change can be expected in the 2014 general elections, as a system along ethnic lines favours those who radically promote the benefits of their own group. While the unrest must have scared some of these elites, its quick cool-down after June 2013 will have calmed those who saw their positions in danger. With ongoing discussions on constitutional reform, which allow for a focus on particular interests and ethnic divisions, it is unlikely that any long-term change will emerge out of the summer unrest. Yet these protests were by no means in vain. For the first time, there has been a movement of people crossing ethnic, party, and societal lines, and who voiced their opposition to their current elites and their political practices of vetoes and blockades. Public outrage about a system that favours a small minority and discriminates against the rest has become vocal; people have stopped suffering in silence. Other issues, such as a lack of progress in EU integration, further economic downturn due to Croatia’s membership in the EU, or other important unresolved political issues (for example, a return to visas as a result of the incapability of Bosnian elites to establish efficient anti-corruption bodies) may spark further unrest because citizens’ general consensus is that the Bosnian system has broken down (more so than in Turkey). People want change, but it remains to be seen how they will next articulate their desire for reform.

The international community, in particular the EU, would do well to support non-governmental organizations and citizen associations in Bosnia in their quest for a more-

efficient and more-open political system. However, as long as the EU keeps supporting those parties that have been opposed and blamed by the protesters for their lack of decision-making, little can be expected in terms of public support for the EU in Bosnia, and in terms of progress for the country’s EU integration, which has substantially slowed down since Bosnia signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2008. Bosnia needs a fundamental reform, and one in which citizens play a major role.

From the situations in Bosnia, Turkey, and other countries in recent years, it has become apparent that citizens are willing to take their dissatisfaction to the streets. The political systems of Turkey and Bosnia, although formally democracies, have shown themselves unable to cope with public unrest except by declaring it illegitimate. This situation demonstrates how the elites of these countries have not internalized some of the most important elements of a civic culture and an established democracy; they apparently believe that democracy happens once every few years through the election ballot. Yet citizens and their acceptance of the political system are fundamental in a democratic system. The basic definition of democracy as “rule by the people” remains of key importance. Bosnia, Turkey, and many other countries in the region (including those affected by the ‘Arab Spring’) demonstrate that when institutional mechanisms to voice citizen dissatisfaction fail (for example, because there are no free and fair elections, or because a government is becoming more authoritarian and less willing to compromise and find consensus), then people will take their dissatisfaction to the streets. In democratic political systems, the right to protest, as well as the right to strike and the right to free expression are fundamental values and often enshrined within wider human rights provisions. Ignoring them can lead to long-term dissatisfaction not just with certain elites or parties, but with complete systems. If there is anything that we can learn from the breakdown of communism in the 1990s and from the Arab Spring, it is that citizen dissatisfaction can lead to massive changes in the long run.21 Political elites in Bosnia and Turkey would do well to recognise the value of a dialogue with citizens and the value of addressing their demands. Otherwise, although the unrest may have been quelled for a time, it will likely rise again, and perhaps transform in nature, possibly including more-violent clashes, and more-widespread unrest in both countries in the near future.

21 A good example of such reform is the Solidarity movement in Poland, which became a driving force of change in the early 1980s, and persisted for nearly 10 years, until Communism fell and free elections occurred.
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Revisiting the Theory and Practice Debate in International Relations and Foreign Policy and an Idea for a Joint Venture

Yönet C. Tezel*

Abstract

The relationship between theory and practice in international relations and foreign policy has been addressed by many on both sides. Despite helpful observations, the exploration has not produced much in the way of conclusive outcomes. This result is not surprising given the fact the theory-practice debate in foreign affairs is inevitably associated with the broader debate about how to properly study organized political/social life when focusing on the role of culture, structure, and choice in international relations. Although juxtaposing the theoretical study of international relations and foreign policy against the practice of foreign/international policy has its discipline-specific traits, it cannot be divorced from the larger ontological and epistemological debates. This essay reminds the reader of several facets of the narrower debate as it relates to the broader one and offers a perspective and ensuing observations from a ‘part taker’ in foreign policy. The essay also includes an idea for a research project that could be used to help overcome some of the putative shortcomings of the field.

Keywords: theory and practice, international relations, foreign policy making

1. Introduction

When studying political science and international relations as an undergraduate aspiring to become a diplomat, I had developed in my mind an image of a book that I looked forward to gaining access to once I joined the foreign service. This book would comprise, as realist theory had inspired me to believe, a list of “dos and don’ts” in foreign policy according to clearly defined elements of national interest, and would guide me in my professional life. After more than two decades in the service, I joke to young colleagues that I am still in search of that book. No such book exists, nor could it, at least in today’s world. I have been privy to confidential documents that aimed to provide general courses of action on key foreign policy areas, but the world is always changing, and the scope and context of the decisions that needed to be made proliferated continuously. Those secret documents were too general and quickly became obsolete, losing their relevance for everyday policy making. (Things might have been somewhat different in the strait-jacketed years of the Cold War.)

While still new in the service I also vowed to remember the theory courses I took at university, hoping that knowledge would be another useful guide in the world of practice. This proved to be a difficult promise to keep. Still, later in my occasional returns to theory,

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I realized that theory too is in flux, and hence hardly a referential guide for everyday use, despite the breath of intellectual fresh air it offers. The diplomatic/bureaucratic routine, usually more hectic than dull, which is formed around the everyday life of practice in the ministry and diplomatic missions abroad de-mistifies the object of theory in the eyes of the practitioner. Still, the possibility of testing the relevance and validity of theory against one’s practical experience presents a challenge, hopefully perceived worthy of pursuit for the interested practitioner. After years of occasional contemplation, at times part of academic endeavours, I still have many unanswered questions about, and some disappointments in, the toolbox of theory we use to make sense of international relations (IR) and of how foreign policy decisions are made.

This inconclusiveness might also be observed from academia, reflected in the ongoing intra-discipline debates and the continuing search for better theory, and may be why some aspiring scholars take up the challenge of choosing IR as their preferred discipline. If the above is true, now may be a good time for a joint venture: a research program involving practitioners and theoreticians to harness the interest on both sides for a better understanding of the world and our ways of dealing with it. As my rationale for such a research project, I will devote much of this essay to remembering the theory-practice debate in its various manifestations.

2. Reintroducing the Debate: Theory versus/and Practice

Although I, like many others, believe the theory and practice debate relates very much to the meta-theoretical debates in the social sciences, including the discipline of IR, this association was not obvious for many (at least in the analyses that scholars in mainstream IR and foreign policy analysis (FPA) produced), especially until the mid-1990s. In comparing the “two cultures of academia and policy-making,” Alexander L. George provides valuable insight for both the theoretician and the practitioner, albeit in the US context. George’s distinction between the two cultures is straightforward:

The development of theory about international relations by academic scholars and the use of this knowledge by practitioners in the conduct of foreign policy has been handicapped by the different cultures in which they have traditionally resided. Members of these two communities have been socialized in quite different professional and intellectual worlds. They generally define their interest in the subject of international relations differently and have pursued different objectives; and, not surprisingly, for all these reasons they have difficulty communicating with each other.¹

George, like others, observes how members of the two cultures view one another. Practitioners have a certain discomfort with, and not much trust in, theory. They complain about academics’ lack of understanding about the worldly dynamics affecting the process of making decisions. Academics are believed to “overintellectualize”² policy making with academic jargon. In fact, the very effort to make science out of foreign policy is questioned; after all, policy making and diplomacy are seen by practitioners as an art, not a science. Most critically, sound academic products, even when appreciated, are underutilized in the daily reality of decision making under time pressure and other exigencies.

For academics, on the other hand, practitioners “are too aconceptual and atheoretical, even anticonceptual and antitheoretical.”3 Too much reliance on their intuitive judgment and experience leads practitioners to cognitive biases, depriving them of the self-critical faculties needed for testing the validity of their approaches to issues – in this case, foreign policy. Yet, practitioners seldom, if ever, realize that for all their aversion to theory, they are in fact using it in their everyday decisions. (Arguably, tenets of the realist theory, with its emphasis on national interest and balance of power, are the most influential among many practitioners.) Moreover, they are deprived of the methodological advantages of an academic discipline for testing the generalizations and assumptions involved when dealing with problems. Nor do they have enough empirical information, including historical cases across different settings, to systematically develop a knowledge base and methodology. Add to this the all-too-well-known curse of groupthink, and one sees a practice much in need of improvement.

A theme very similar to George’s two cultures is used in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff’s co-edited Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas, which focuses on Britain as well as other contexts.4 Academics and policy makers alike contribute to this volume, and offer analyses, observations, and anecdotes that largely overlap with George’s account of the US context. However, whereas George advocates for, and offers ways of, bridging the gap between two cultures, the volume on “two worlds,” while recognizing the advantages that may come from cross-fertilization, leans towards a cautionary analysis, pointing to the risk of over-intermingling and its negative consequences for academia. In his introduction, Hill prefaces the cautionary view:

> It is difficult indeed to free oneself from the pressures and conventional wisdoms of one’s own time. That is precisely what is supposed to characterise a good academic; the ability to pursue an independent line of thought. And if academics are not well enough chained to the mast to resist the siren song of policy relevance, who else is there?5 …The irreducible starting point is that academic IR is half in love with policy and its milieu….6

The attraction of foreign affairs is by no means limited to British academia. In a country like Turkey, which has been experiencing domestic socio-political transformation since the early/mid-1980s, and which has found itself, externally, in the middle of a regional geopolitical commotion with broad international implications, not to mention the more recent developments in the Middle East, foreign affairs does stand out as an ever-current and attractive subject of commentary for laymen and experts alike. In 2005, Turkish academics attending the Workshop on International Relations Studies and Education in Turkey,7 organized by Ankara University’s faculty of political science, complained about the wide range of professional associations in Turkey – from doctors to miners – commenting on foreign policy. More disturbing for the scholars was the inflation of self-acclaimed experts lured into televised debates, offering analyses on different subjects each time. Foreign policy was just too sexy, one academic commented.

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3 George, “The Two Cultures,” 151.
4 Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, eds., Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners, and the Trade in Ideas (London: Routledge, 1994).
7 Uluslararası İlişkiler [International Relations, Special Issue on International Relations and Education in Turkey] 2 (2005).
The impact of meta-theoretical debates in IR (inspired by the broader debate within social sciences) on the theory and practice debate became evident especially in the second half of the 1990s. One of the most significant intellectual exchanges directly relevant to this perspective took place between William Wallace on one side, and Steve Smith and Ken Booth on the other.\(^8\) The responses given to Wallace by Smith and Booth show that the debate transcended the issue of the relationship between academics and policy makers to discuss different ontological and epistemological assumptions held by positivist scholars on the one hand and post-modernist challengers on the other. Wallace argued that (British) academia was too distanced from policy circles, having lost touch with the real world of politics and policy, and that academia should not shy away from ‘speaking truth to power.’ Wallace maintained that too much theorizing comes at the cost of empirical studies; doing theory for theory’s sake amounts to a self-righteous attitude. Recognizing the dangers of too close a relationship between scholars and government, however, Wallace argued for ‘semi-detachment,’ wherein one can give advice without being pulled in fully.

Booth and Smith delivered a strong post-positivist response, not least because Wallace, while arguing for closer engagement with policy, was highly critical of the ivory tower effects of entering meta-theoretical debates as a result of being too fond of theory. Smith, in good post-positivist fashion, challenged Wallace’s foundationalist assumptions and argued that “there is no view from nowhere,”\(^9\) that is, that there is no foundational basis from which pure truth can be deduced. According to Smith, policy and theory are inexorably intertwined and scholars cannot pretend to have access to ‘truth,’ which they can then confidently convey to policy. Yet, he made clear that giving policy advice was not the problem: “the problem is if those who give it are unaware of the extent to which they are standing on the policy conveyor-belt of the state … it means taking the ‘givens’ of policy-makers as the starting point of analysis.”\(^10\) Smith believed that Wallace was wrong to assume value-neutrality on the part of academics. According to Booth, Wallace was attacking a “straw man from an ethnocentric liberal top-down perspective.”\(^11\)

The theory-practice debate between the three men was essentially an intra-academy debate rather than a debate between members of the worlds of theory and policy. (Admittedly, Wallace has links to politics, namely through his association with the Britain’s Liberal Party.) And it is not unwarranted that with the exchange between Wallace and Smith/Booth the debate shifted its focus to a much larger issue than the typical theory-practice dichotomy (or non-dichotomy according to the latter scholars). Bernstein et al. argue that, due to a desire to build a science of IR, scholars in this discipline have put some distance between themselves and policy making circles, but that in the 50 years since this practice began, no theoretical IR work has emerged that produces sufficiently useful and confident results.\(^12\) However, this distance does not mean that scholars ceased to cater to the needs of policy makers, especially in the US context, where the disciplines of political science and IR have most flourished.

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\(^12\) Steven Bernstein et al., “Social Science as Case-Based Diagnostics,” in *Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics and International Relations*, eds. Richard Ned Lebow and Mark Irving Lichbach (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 229.
In fact, Timothy Mitchell alludes to a problematic relationship between the two groups as a result of the “imperial ambition of postwar American politics,” where “[p]olitical science had to expand its boundaries to match the growth of postwar U.S. power, whose ambition it would offer to serve.”

Parallel to the putative distancing from the ‘real world,’ one is also reminded by Helen Milner’s argument that the voluntary separation IR attained in its search for disciplinary autonomy from ‘political science’ in the 1950s and 1960s was a mistake. She asks that ‘comparative politics’ be brought back into IR. The need to reconcile these two disciplines is also echoed by comparativists such as Karen Remmer, who points to the global political developments of the last decades of the twentieth century, including democratic transitions in various parts of the world, and finds prevalent theoretical explanations to be unsatisfactory because of the divide between IR and comparative politics. In short, the turn taken by IR, both for the sake of academic disciplinary autonomy and scientific credibility, has caused as many questions marks as it has offered new possibilities. Inevitably, views about the theory-practice equation have also been affected.

3. A Perspective: From Theory down to Practice and Back up

The above section is a partial snapshot of the theory-practice debate, reflecting selective observations on what some scholars have discussed. How I view the field, especially regarding the broader debate, is in order at this point.

I believe, as a growing number of observers do, that positivist approaches in IR do not offer fully reliable accounts of how and why things happen in international politics and foreign policy. Similarly, positivist approaches that aim to explain socio-political phenomena in comparative politics, where meta-theoretical discussions do not define the discipline as much as they do in IR, also fall short of helping us fully understand organized human existence. Strands of constructivism in IR (as well as culturalist and structuralist approaches in comparative politics), and the more ambitious theoretical positions such as post-structuralism, offer helpful insights. Recognizing the overbearing importance of context, one ought to be cautious about drawing generalizations across societies.

Generations of scholars and thoughtful social scientists like Max Weber have in different ways argued that the dynamics of social existence, including in the international setting, are qualitatively different from the conditions that prevail in the physical world. Even a classical realist like E.H. Carr argued in 1939 that whereas the analyst in the natural sciences could study facts objectively, for political/international sciences there were no facts independent of the analyst. Following Karl Popper’s metaphor of clouds and clocks, Almond and Genco point to the inappropriateness of clock-like assumptions in dealing with political (social)
phenomena that are more like unpredictable clouds.\textsuperscript{19} Although soft regularities do exist, they argue, attempts at creating a hard science of politics is nothing but “historical deviation, [and] flirtation with mistaken metaphors.”\textsuperscript{20}

Using a more direct reference to international relations, Bernstein et al. reiterate that humans have a knowledge of structure and process that leads to conscious attempts to influence social phenomena.\textsuperscript{21} This outlook is reminiscent of Weber’s understanding of the social cosmos: that humans, including politicians, statesmen and stateswomen, diplomats, NGO members, guerrilla leaders, etc., are all purposive and self-conscious actors. Human consciousness, individual and collective, empowers us to change our fates in ways that complicate efforts towards a ‘scientific’ explanation and prediction of human action. The spacio-temporal contingency of human behaviour is regnant to such a degree that it renders most parsimonious attempts at discovering social scientific laws unsatisfactory at best and often misleading.

With the hindsight provided by the interpretivist turn in social sciences, the more an observer recognizes the socially constitutive, hence the contextually bounded, properties within his or her ontological assumptions, the more likely he or she will find it hard to rely on universal claims. The pertinence of contingency, however, does not mean vindication of pure relativism or that accumulation of knowledge is impossible or undesirable. Post-positivism should not be seen as anti-science.\textsuperscript{22} The complexity of, and the intentionality that exists within, the collective human experience render social ‘reality’ a combined outcome of chance and choice. For any given actor in a specific situation there will often be several choices available to be considered with limited knowledge of the circumstances and approximated understandings of how competing actors think. Therefore, trying to understand the context and the social interplays within any situation is the more apt endeavour for investigating the social cosmos than is seeking measurable, repeated patterns across social domains. As Nicholas Onuf puts it, the world is of our making,\textsuperscript{23} and we should aim to understand it accordingly.

International relations and foreign policy are directly implicated by the above view of what kind of a ‘reality’ is out there to find and how much one can rely on our ways of studying it. After all, the most commonly observed unit of analysis, that is, the foreign-policy-generating state (the nation-state), is a weak starting point for building grand theory. There are too few units and too short a time span of their existence to form a universe that may generate recognizable patterns that can be ‘scientifically’ measured and predicted. The units are highly dissimilar in capacity, size, and longevity, not to mention divergence of factors affecting their functioning, such as institutions and culture. Such diversity – unsurprising in a social universe – produces a resistance to patterns across time and space. The consequent spacio-temporal contingency lends support to Colin Wight’s argument that “[t]he attempt to construct a parsimonious theory of IR is not only flawed and doomed to failure, but also politically and ethically dangerous.”\textsuperscript{24} Admittedly, FPA (as a sub-discipline of IR), with its

\textsuperscript{20} Almond and Genco, “Clouds, Clocks,” 522.
\textsuperscript{21} Bernstein et al., “Social Science,” 233-234.
\textsuperscript{22} Lebow, “What Can We Know?” 7.
\textsuperscript{24} Colin Wight, \textit{Agents, Structures and International Relations} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8.
actor-specific focus, is much more aware of contingency. Yet, it too constitutes an effort of approximation; not all factors affecting policy can be taken into account when offering explanations of policy choices. That is why “[p]arsonimacy for its own sake is not revered in FPA.” Indeed, foreign policy is rarely, if at all, only about foreign policy. Yet, academic analyses, including FPA, need to impart a sense of certainty to have credibility. One then becomes concerned across the board “about a search for a false certainty and about the relatively trivial nature, and lack of policy relevance, of many ‘big’ generalizations.”

4. A Research Project: A Joint Venture

How can this false certainty be avoided, or at least minimized? How can our academic conceptualizations be brought more in touch with the real world? And how can practitioners assist this process and also benefit from the improved analytical capacity it promises? What should the approach of both sides be? One possible answer is: Greater epistemic humility on the part of academics, and a parallel recognition on the part of practitioners, of the need to conceptualize and contextualize more systematically what is it they are engaged in as makers/implementers of policy. Whether one focuses on the analogy of two different cultures, or two worlds, or the post-positivist critique that calls for a thicker description of the theory-practice dynamic, we need more-satisfactory accounts of this inter-relationship so as to improve the functions of both. For the occasional academic who takes on an advisory role or who is involved in research programs that put him/her in close and extended contact with policy circles, the everyday hands-on experience in the world of practice may have a theory-shattering effect. In other words, my hunch is that academics who venture into the world of policy, especially if they are allowed into central decision-making circles, may start losing faith in some of their favoured grand theoretical explanations of how things work in international relations and foreign policy making.

Paradoxically, practitioners – the group known to dislike theory – are potentially the most inclined to concur, on some fundamental points, with scholars belonging to the non-mainstream theoretical approaches – the group criticized for over-theorizing. A practitioner would be aware of the many variables that go into making a decision and of the power-related implications. He or she would be witnesses to the ‘governmentality’ dynamics criticized by post-structuralists, even if he or she might not conceptualize the situation as such or critique it, let alone work to change it. The systemic forces of the international system make little sense when accounting for decisions of foreign policy that in reality, practitioners observe, reflect a compromise between a multitude of mundane factors, ranging from the simple need to respond to press reports, to personal rivalries, character differences between leaders, path-dependency, political culture, bureaucratic culture, and pure coincidence. Game theory is likely to appear to them as an approximation of extreme proportions.

In view of these factors, I offer an idea for a specific research project: a joint endeavor between the theory people and the policy people. To bring added value to the field, this project would employ a reflexive approach by including practitioner participants who are familiar with theory.

25 Bernstein et al., “Social Science,” 256
26 The (too) few academics to whom I have, in passing, directed the question as to how their experience with the world of practice affected their view of theory admit that they have come to question the validity of the assumptions at the core of the grand IR theories they normally work with.
From the point of view of conventional/positivist perspectives on social enquiry, close proximity to the object of research is a problem. However, as some feminists, constructivists, and other scholars now argue, participation and personal experience need not be seen as a source of debilitating ‘contamination.’ Focusing on feminist studies, Ann Tickner argues that acknowledging the inevitable subjectivity in analysis may, in fact, work to increase objectivity. In this sense, personal experience is viewed as an asset: “feminists believe one’s own personal position in the research process to be a corrective to ‘pseudo-objectivity.’” Although feminism’s bold move to embrace subjectivity is derived from its aims of the empowerment of women, the reflexive method it advocates has a larger applicability.

The research project I propose would use incumbent practitioners who have preferably received graduate academic training in theory and/or who would be given additional training/refresher courses in theory. They would contribute to the project through their participation in the foreign policy milieu they have agreed, and been officially blessed, to analyze. The project would not be a typical case of ‘practitioner-based enquiry/research,’ but one tailored to the environment of foreign policy making. Applied especially in fields such as medicine and education, practitioner-based research is about the practitioner being trained in research methodology and thereafter engaging in research in his or her usual professional setting while continuing his or her daily practice. More-direct ‘taking part’ would be required in the project I am proposing. Ralph Pettman, in explaining his ‘commonsense constructivism,’ emphasizes the importance of actually partaking in the process under study:

...going beyond the limits of rationalism sets means more than ascertaining what those who make or think about foreign policy say they are doing (an injunction rule-oriented constructivists are happy to observe). It also means participating ourselves in the foreign policy practices we want to understand and explain (an injunction only commonsense constructivists routinely observe). It means finding out what is involved experientially as well as analytically, not only from the ‘horse’s mouth,’ but from living with horses as one of the herd…

Why? Because so much of what we need to know is in the other people’s heads. It has to do with perceptions and intentions of an individual, communal, or collective kind, and getting knowledge of these things takes more than trying harder to listen. It requires participation as well. Pettman further clarifies that “taking part” is also more than the thick description associated with cultural studies; a form of such close participation can be developed and harnessed in the service of science and craft at the same time.

My project would be comprehensive and last long enough to produce satisfactory results, with the scholars and practitioners cooperating under an institutional arrangement, for example, between a university or several universities and a foreign ministry. Such a project would be based on an agreement rendering both institutions accountable to each other. On the policy side, confidentiality issues would have to be addressed. In addition to the advantage of employing researchers with security clearances, one way of controlling the
confidentiality problem could be to present the end results in general terms, despite the case-specificity that would be inevitable, and in fact desirable, at the research/observation stage. A sufficient number of practitioners would have to be found and (re)trained for the project. On the academic side, specific modalities of research ethics would have to be developed and enforced.

Practitioners of diplomacy are constantly expected, more so today than in the past, to analyze. For this they rely on a mixed capacity of intuition and careful deliberation (time allowing), as well as practical knowledge of the field, developed over the years within their specific professional cultures. However, their everyday practices and especially their methodology in forming those analyses are seldom, if ever, scrutinized as carefully as academic analyses are. In this sense, a research project conducted over a period of several years could also serve to detect possible cognitive biases and offer corrective methodology.

The academic benefits of such a research project and hence the enthusiasm of the university(ies) would be obvious. They would have recruited theory-cognizant observers in the center of policy making who would be institutionally instructed to help test some theoretical assumptions about how decisions are made, and what domestic and international factors impact the decision-making environment. As for the foreign ministry, it would need to see how some of the compromises it would have to accept by agreeing to such an undertaking would be outweighed by the potential benefits. One way of compensating for allocating key personnel, albeit part-time, for this project could be an arrangement whereby the ministry would rely on its academic partner institution(s) to provide, when requested, informative reports, case studies, analyses, historical studies, opinion polls, etc. on specific issues, countries, and/or regions. In return, academics would run the research project within the ministry, but ensure the ministry did not choose which theoretical approaches were to be tested. It might be prudent to have a consortium of academic institutions to reflect the different approaches within the discipline.

Given the emphasis on contingency and the caution against generalizations described above, I do not suggest that the results of such a research project involving one country would offer universally applicable truths. Notwithstanding case specificity, one does nevertheless find striking similarities between the workings of foreign ministries despite different political and bureaucratic cultures. Observations by James Cable, a former British ambassador and former Head of Planning Staff in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, would sound familiar to his Turkish and other counterparts: “[the] hectic routine of telegrams and telephoning and trotting to and from the offices of ministers and under-secretaries left little time for analysis, for the consideration of alternative policies, for the elaboration and submission of new initiatives.”

Others’ observations, for example, those of Iver B. Neumann about speech writing in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, would also ring true for some: “There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that the arguments made here [i.e., that speech writing is first and foremost a question of ministerial identity building and that the rigidity of such texts can only be broken through the interference of politicians] may be generalized to other Foreign Ministries and foreign policy-making institutions in late-modern states.”

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32 Iver B. Neumann, “‘A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand For,’ or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New,” *International Political Sociology* 1 (2007): 193. Having agreed to a job offer in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Neumann, considering himself a participant observer, used this opportunity as well as his contacts with the foreign policy world to make
comments – and unless similar projects have already been conducted that I am not aware of – the research project advocated in this essay might provide some original findings that could be tested in other settings as well.

One might then ask if such a research project could be conducted in Turkey, for example. On the academic side, one could find enough interest. Turkish IR academia has grown impressively over the last 25 years. In 1984, as I was taking my university entrance exams, there were only three IR university departments in Turkey (four, if one included the quasi-IR department of political science at Boğaziçi University). As the number of IR departments in Turkey has since multiplied exponentially, so too has the number of Turkish graduates with PhD degrees, mostly from European and North American universities, who have returned to teach at universities across Turkey. Theory, including the post-positivist strand, is not seen as an esoteric preoccupation. (And those willing to offer analysis for policy makers, especially through the media, are abundant, in fact, over-abundant.) On the policy side, however, the indicators are mixed. Turkey’s foreign ministry has been increasing the number of its political officers over the years, and the possibilities for graduate study offered to young recruits have expanded. The academically minded leadership may also look favourably on research projects. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of officers has not yet caught up with the growing workload of the foreign service at home and abroad. The geopolitical commotion around Turkey continues to stretch personnel resources. The series of crises around Turkey do not facilitate a mind-set that would give priority to pursuing academic studies that would engage, albeit part-time, officials in key departments close to policy making. Crises also affect academics, and especially the think-tank community, who find themselves all-too-readily categorized as pro-/anti-government when offering – arguably too often – their analyses to the ever-demanding media, in particular through televised debates. Perhaps in a calmer foreign policy environment in Turkey the idea of a novel joint research project would be embraced with greater enthusiasm, especially on the part of practitioners.

5. Concluding Remarks

The theory and versus practice debate in IR has several faces. One issue is about how those who belong to either of these two pseudo-camps view each other, that is, what their relative advantage and disadvantages are. It is also possible to debate how close academics should be to the policy environment and whether they could, in the first place, possess a scientifically derived ‘truth’ to be conveniently offered to policy makers. One must take seriously the critique brought against the search for theory that it imparts universal claims, as is often the case in positivistic accounts of IR.

Given the pertinence of these questions and the inconclusiveness of the meta-theoretical debates within the discipline, I offer an idea, to be further developed, for a research project aimed at bringing together the comparative advantages of theory and policy. The aim of this project would be to understand to what degree (if any) the main theoretical approaches – grand and micro – about international relations and foreign policy making are corroborated – individually or eclectically – by the daily practice of diplomacy. Using practitioners trained

poignant, philosophically minded observations. Although some of his points do not concur with my own experience in the Turkish setting, Neumann’s work offers a rare insight into ministry workings. See also Iver B. Neumann, “To be a Diplomat,” International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 72-93.
in theory and working in a foreign ministry – embedded researchers who are theoretically aware – would offer research advantages associated with the reflexive method. Given the power-knowledge *problematique*, such a project would need to be ideology-proofed as much as possible. And a ministry willing to devote personnel as well as unprecedented access in the name of science – and/or to increase its analytical capacity – would have to be found. Moreover, the proposed idea would have to be rigorously evaluated by academics from a variety of theoretical backgrounds to see if it also makes sense to them, and not only to the author of this article and like-minded practitioners. If the project does find support from both sides, the end result would be rewarding to the IR community and policy makers alike.

As for the debate about how much an engagement is desirable and appropriate between academia and the world of policy; there is no universally applicable blueprint. Cultural and institutional traditions – hopefully taken into account by the broadly universal academic ethical considerations – will determine the right mix in each country. Until a better balance is found, the parallel existence of individuals and institutions (e.g., think tanks) who and which may be ready to engage and cooperate with policy makers on the one hand, and academic institutions that prefer to keep a distance from policy circles on the other, does not seem to be a terrible state of affairs. To end diplomatically, and on a cautiously optimistic note: Moderate amounts of cross-fertilization between academics and practitioners (rather than full mergers) designed to achieve mutual understanding and insight will be mutually rewarding, provided that dissenting views from either side are respected.

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Capitalism, Crisis, and Alternative System Seeking

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Review article of three books:

1. Adam Hanieh, *Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 266pp., USD 90, hardcover)


The current economic stagnation, which some have considered to be in existence since the 1970s and that peaked with the collapse of the financial markets in 2008 (Amin, 2011, p.3) has engendered discussions about the rise of new ideologies and regional-global powers as an alternative to the capitalist order led by the United States (US). Several questions arise regarding reshaping the capitalist system in the face of emerging powers such as China and those in the Persian Gulf and Latin America, and regarding assisting the recovery of the current system: Is the global capitalist system facing collapse? What do financialization and monopolization mean in the capitalist system? What kind of new formations does a crisis of capitalism lead to?

Three books aim at giving satisfying answers to these questions from different perspectives: Adam Hanieh’s *Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States*; John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney’s *The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly–Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China*; and Samir Amin’s *Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism*? All authors question the sustainability of the current global economic order in the face of a crisis triggered by the actions of current system actors that have the capacity to bring an end to the capitalist system through emerging powers, regions, and/or ideologies.

1. *Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States*, Adam Hanieh

From the Marxist perspective, Adam Hanieh’s book discusses the steps towards the
internationalization and financialization\(^4\) of capital in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the creation of a state-backed trading class in the region as an agent of capitalism. It also discusses competition among the superpowers and capitalist countries for the region, given that the Gulf’s huge amount of petrodollars essentially sustains the capitalist system. The first debate concerns the regional development of capitalism and the second concerns the progress of the world markets.

In brief, Hanieh focuses on the transformation of the Gulf powers, mainly Saudi Arabia, into a key player in the capitalist system following the end of World War II, as well the region’s future role in preserving or changing the course of capitalist functioning.

Prior to defining the Gulf countries’ roles in the capitalist order, the \textit{Capitalism and Class} first analyses how Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman politically and economically joined together to create the GCC, thus creating a capitalist actor in world affairs. The GCC’s large-scale integration and impressive development in the regional sphere have undergone various phases, such as the emergence of a state-backed class formation within the contemporary world market. Hanieh first defines this class, stressing that it is a “set of social relations that emerge[d] around capital accumulation” (p.27). The process began with importing non-citizen workers (migrant labor) from Asian countries and disallowing them rights to possessions, citizenship, and legal defense options. This method quelled labor movements against such conditions because the countries could expel these workers at will to halt emergence of proletariat groups that would threaten the accumulation of capital.

In the first chapter of his book, Hanieh examines the formation of a capitalist class and capital accumulation in the Gulf, and then examines how oil contributed to the development of this capitalist class. Hanieh also discusses the imperialistic history of the region, which was dominated first by Britain and then by the US. At that time, the region was not aware of its resource potential and the role it could seize in the capitalist system. As Hanieh notes, the beginning of the oil age in the 1920s motivated Britain to keep the Gulf states under its rule, triggered US interest in the Middle East, and was a turning point in the region’s class formation and internationalization. “Strong trading families and their cooperative relations with the imperialist powers were determining the course of the Gulf” (p.45). State and class formation in the region was an intertwined process, resulting in members of privileged families becoming part of the capitalist class.

“Limiting the explanation of the development of the Gulf region to oil-related relations would be insufficient in explaining the region’s path, which was also shaped by global capitalism” (p.54). The essence of this class consciousness is linked to the accumulation of capital, which also led to state formation. Another step in this process was the internationalization of capital, which led to the global penetration of Gulf capital, creating powerful competition among capitalists for more shares.

In the 1950s, the US was the dominant power in the international capitalist system, controlling 60\% of the industrial product market in the 1950s. The Gulf region was among the source of this wealth, through oil revenues that international consortiums controlled in US interests. Leadership in the US at that time became increasingly focused on the Gulf’s

\(^4\) The Monthly Review first “used the term ‘financialization’ of US capitalism, pointing out that employment in the financial sector, trading volumes in the speculative markets and the earnings of Wall Street firms were all rising sharply,”(Foster and McChesney, 2011, p.18).
inclusion into the global order so as to continue the accumulation of capital. “By the 1960s, the US controlled over 60% percent of oil resources in the Middle East and had markedly increased its oil-related production efforts” (p.78).

The 1970s heralded a new period in the global economy. A decline in US power caused by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system⁵ decreased American influence over the oil-rich Gulf. The financialization of capitalism in the Gulf meant the mobilization of multinational corporations there and more involvement of the Gulf in the capitalist system. Then, a rise in oil prices sharply increased the Gulf countries' oil revenues, which recycled petrodollars into the financial system, providing a flow of these funds to the US and European financial and debt markets, keeping the capital market vibrant. In a demonstration of the Gulf’s cooperation with the US-led capitalist economic order, Saudi Arabia especially used petrodollars to maintain the value of the US dollar (USD) via US Treasury purchases. Hanieh states that “the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) funneled 10% of its total reserves (107 billion USD) into the US and European markets between 1973 and 1977” (p.87). This situation thus enhanced relations between the US and GCC states, and maintained the power of the US.

Hanieh defines GCC capital as Khaliji (Arabic for ‘of the Gulf’) capital, formed mostly through economic deals among the Gulf states. This capital, along with US capital, helped finance the First Gulf War, playing a salient role in what had been designated the New World Order by then-US President George H. Bush. From the Marxist perspective, the enrichment of a Khaliji capitalist class and strong state control over oil production and distribution overlapped with the process of state and class formation in the Gulf states at that time. The circulation of capital and commodity, importation of industrial goods and other items, the establishment of shopping malls, the increased interdependency of the US and the GCC region, and the importation of military equipment created an alliance between the two powers during the 1980s and 1990s. In an attempt to enhance regional integration of the GCC, Saudi Arabia began a new banking system, decreasing the role of foreign shares and control and ensuring a high level of domestic control.

Discussing circulating capital’s effects on the formation of state and class in the Gulf, Hanieh also argues that “[o]il production allowed [the] GCC, as the main supplier of raw material and energy, to understand the importance of oil, contributing to US hegemony through dominating the Gulf” (p.133).

In the fourth chapter, Hanieh discusses the role of other global actors in the capitalist system, such as China, in the creation of “the sole global capitalist economy” (p.135). The basic characteristic of the emerging system was a salient development in the finance sector: building a world market based on global manufacturing and global distribution meant a new stage of internationalization. Emerging financial markets played an important role in this internationalization, which was determined by the flow of private capital throughout the world. Hanieh especially emphasizes that the emergence of new economic powers

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⁵“The Bretton Woods system of monetary management established the rules for commercial and financial relations among the world's major industrial states” in 1944. This “system was the first example of a fully negotiated monetary order intended to govern monetary relations among independent nation-states…. The chief features of the Bretton Woods system were an obligation for each country to adopt a monetary policy that maintained the exchange rate by tying its currency to the US dollar and the ability of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] to bridge temporary imbalances of payments.” In 1971, the system collapsed. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system)
challenged US dominance by creating competition in the GCC region, threatening the supply of hydrocarbon products at the core of the capitalist development that the US had shaped and directed in accordance with its interests. In an attempt to compete with the US and the Western powers, China focused on substantial economic development, resulting in increased demand for oil. At the same time, the US pushed for free-trade agreements and free-trade regions with the GCC states for easier access to their resources. Despite the competition, GCC countries still directed a significant amount of their petrodollars to US treasuries, real estate, and bonds, setting the stage for financial bubbles and finally, an economic crisis.

Internationalizing the regional Khaliji capital developed strong ties among the GCC states through single-currency and common-rate policy goals via ongoing negotiations scheduled to be concluded by 2015. So far, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar have reached a settlement to form a common central bank with a unified currency. Combined with increasing oil prices, these developments have meant increased capital and more investment in Western media and telecommunication sectors. Hanieh explains, however, that this regular flow of capital has been interrupted by and partly caused the 2008 economic crisis. The burst of the mortgage bubble in the US resulted in huge losses for the GCC region because of its many financial assets there. However, the GCC has managed to overcome these setbacks through regional cooperation and by regularly increasing oil prices as well as giving state funds and credits to private banks and corporations, and even public corporations. Saudi Arabia, the leading GCC country, provided financial support to less-resistant economies such as Kuwait and Qatar. “Abu Dhabi gave $10 billion to Dubai in 2009 in an effort to help its neighbor to overcome the negative effects of [the] crisis” (p.243). Another way of coping involved internationalizing the Gulf’s construction corporations. These measures led to the development of a pan-GCC unification scheme to connect the Gulf via common policies.

Hanieh’s arguments regarding the overlapping and interacting structure of regional GCC capitalism and global capitalism allows readers to understand how a capitalist system functions, proving the insufficiency of solely national or regional evaluations in understanding the global capitalist order. It offers a detailed analysis of the capitalist system at the regional and international levels.

2. The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China, John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney

John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney offer a clear explanation of the current global economy, which, since the 2008 crisis, has been called the “Great Financial Crisis” (p.8), and is an extension of the slowdown in the world economy that has been occurring since the 1970s. The authors agree with Hanieh that the current crisis is related to the internationalization of monopoly capital, which has been felt deeply since 2008. “The main consequences of the internationalization of monopoly capital for accumulation are the intensification of world exploitation and a deepening tendency to stagnation” (p.128), meaning that a very small percentage of groups control most of the world’s assets.

The authors focus on the changing nature of economic activity after the 1980s, moving from production to financialization and monopolization. For them, the US financial crisis
began in 2000, with the “bursting of the New Economy stock market bubble” (p.13). Defined as a budgetary and private sector crisis, and incorporating a decline in wages and an increase in unemployment, this stagnation has been accompanied by social and political unrest. China is also suffering from this crisis despite its relative development towards stability. Capitalism requires consistent growth and employment, and thus the current situation is a symbol of an “endless crisis” because the system is functioning on the basis of monopoly-finance capital, meaning that it is controlled by monopolistic corporations. This situation can only lead to stagnation, through “price markups of these corporations, giving rise to a growing problem of surplus capital absorption” (p.31). Bellamy and McChesney discuss the current economic crisis, which occurred under the US-led capitalist system, and describe it as the “failure of neoliberal economic policy, including Europe and Japan” (p.8), arguing that economic slowdown extends back to the 1970s, especially in the US. Despite huge military spending, a dollar-centered economy allowed the country to establish a hegemonic order, observed during the housing crisis in the 2000s. The two scholars point out that financialization created the conditions for an economic crisis, arguing that the term ‘capitalism’ was replaced with the term ‘market economy’ in an effort to hide the crisis. “The problem was not that no one saw the Great Financial Crisis coming, rather the difficulty was that the financial world, driven by their endless desire for more, and orthodox economists, prey to the worship of their increasingly irrelevant models, were simply oblivious to the warnings of heterodox economic observers all around them” (p.18). For a better understanding of the financialization of US capitalism, one must understand its features: “Employment in the financial sector, trading volumes in the speculative markets and the earnings of Wall Street firms were all rising sharply. Between 1980 and 2000, financial industry profits rose from $32.4 billion to $195.9 billion” (p.19). Along with financial speculations, more spending and more economic growth occurred. Because monopolistic corporations controlled surplus capital and could not find fields for investment, the economy became dependent on state spending as well financial expansion. Investments in foreign countries were also not enough to overcome the crisis that US economic hegemony suffered. Overaccumulation thus led to a slowdown in growth, one of the reasons for stagnation. The book emphasizes a point that many observers also note, which is that the US economy began its slowdown in 1970 due to the Vietnam War, excessive use of oil, and massive military build-up because of the Cold War. Attempts at mending that crisis included growing debt and credit as a symbol of a financialized economy. The Triad (the US, Europe, and Japan) was thus in a “stagnation-financialization trap” (p.25) and tried to get out of it by exploiting developing countries for more profit, which only worsened the world economy. The 1980s and 1990s were defined by economic booms due to financial speculation led by rising debt, especially in the private sector. Production-based economic activity was replaced with speculative finance, leading to luxury consumption. According to the authors, decline in production resulted in unemployment in the Triad, and resulting in economies dependent on financial activities. Thus, the main reason for the stagnation was a price increase led by monopolistic corporations preventing surplus capital absorption. Foster and McChesney argue that a monopoly in power, profits in great economies, and centralization of global capital are symbols of monopolization, adding that “total annual revenue of the five hundred largest corporations in the world was equal in 2004-08 to around 40 percent of world income, with sharp increases since the 1990s” (p.32). Additionally, price
warfare and harsh competition among these oligopolistic corporations excluded small firms, in what is called “the monopoly stage of capitalism” (p.34).

The tendency towards firm monopolization and labor exploitation to increase income shifted the US’ economic course towards more deficits, shaking all balances in all economic activities, turning the country into the world’s largest borrower, and undermining its economic hegemony.

The book discusses the three phases of the global accumulation of capital: the mercantilist era, the industrial revolution, and monopoly capitalism, the last meaning the concentration of capital in parallel with emergence of the rich-North/poor-South division. The rise of China and India can be explained via exploitation of the working class, ultimately restricting the movements of capital, and putting the countries of the southern hemisphere under pressure.

In discussing the decline in US economic power, the book focuses on “the decline of the sociological foundations of entrepreneurial capitalism with the rise of the modern corporation and state” (p.50). After the 1970s, the situation in the global economy, especially in developed countries, signified a full-scale crisis. A salient shrinkage in the real growth rate of the US economy until 2008 caused the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. The financialization character of economies bred stagnation. While capital was trying to find a way out of the growing surplus, financial institutions were mobilized across the world by a system that caused more debt.

This system opened the way for state intervention to bail out monopolistic corporations, promoting financial bubbles such as what occurred on Wall Street during the development of communication technology. But this ‘solution’ further undermined economic systems and created more stagnation. The book notes how quickly financial institutions became significant in the US economy: “As recently as 1990, the ten largest US financial institutions held only 10 percent of total financial assets; today they own 50 percent” (p.53).

Transitioning from monopoly capital to “monopoly-finance capital” based on exploitation and limiting rights such as insurance and wages meant a “debt burden” (p.55) on developing countries. This situation also burdened the US economy because it forced state-run institutions to spend trillions of dollars to bail out financial firms. Printing money contributes to more deficits, harming a currency’s value. According to *The Endless Crisis*, a new hegemonic structure is rising in China because of capitalist growth, but it is not resolving the stagnation of the core countries because that structure is also based on sweeping financialization. “Accumulation – real capital formation in the realm of goods and services – has become increasingly subordinate to finance. Financialization can be defined as the long-run shift in the center of gravity of the capitalist economy from production to finance” (p.59). Marx foresaw the concentration of products that occurred in the nineteenth century, and the main factor in the shift away from that model was the modern credit system. This change resulted in a more visible division between real and monetary economics.

Financialization also brings a ‘speculative economy,’ where a crisis causes a contradiction because the finance sector experiences huge profits but economic growth suffers due to a decline in production. While finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) increased wealth among the upper class and spending among the middle class, debt as a cure to economic stagnation means a crisis in the long term.

Foster and McChesney explain the situation as follows: “Hence, financialization, while boosting capital accumulation through a process of speculative expansion, ultimately
contributes to the corrosion of the entire economic and social order, hastening its decline” (p.70). The authors stress that the “extreme free-market” (p.79) is the reason for today's economic crisis, and they call this era the “new phase of financial imperialism” (p.71). Large-scale social and economic disparity has resulted from this crisis, leading to a war-prone and environmentally damaged world.

Monopolies control most sectors, with huge corporations operating in most industries. Two hundred US firms have a monopoly over the total business profits in the US economy, and data reveals that these corporations’ profits increased from 13% to 30% between 1950 and 2007, contributing to the mobilization of monopolies across the globe (p.81). The US auto industry is a good example of this trend. Technology also made its accession into world markets. In an important finding, the authors argue that an “increased degree of monopoly/oligopoly would not only be to concentrate economic surplus in monopolistic firms but would also increase the rate of surplus value at the expense of wages” (p.94), leading to overaccumulation and stagnation. In the monopolistic world economy, competition has not totally disappeared but its nature has changed. After World War II, as a result of an increasing labor force, competition concentrated on labor costs instead of on low-cost policies. When monopolies reached their peak in the 1980s, huge layoffs occurred, defined as ‘increasing efficiency’ to deflect criticism against the functioning of capitalist system. Harsh competition among the giant corporations weakened some sectors in the US by breaking their “oligopolistic characteristics”(p.106).

Regarding the internationalization of monopoly capital, the book argues that this phenomenon really only emerged during the 2008 economic crisis. Although the neo-liberal perspective claims that the era of monopoly is over, monopolists avoid using the term ‘defeat’ and talk about a new era defined by “global monopoly-finance capital in production” (p.120). In the service sector, for example, many airlines have merged, and even Microsoft has made alliances with several corporations. It is not easy to understand the process leading to oligopoly rivalry because the issue is usually only considered from a national point of view; the concepts should be reviewed from an international perspective. It is also wrong to assume that market competition has weakened the power of monopolies/oligopolies. Foster and McChesney argue that the giant firms followed the divide-and-rule strategy, especially in the global South, which gave them advantages over smaller corporations.

The Endless Crisis considers the tendency towards monopoly as an attack on democracy, barring people from creating alternative power structures. Wealthy states act as supporters of monopoly capital while neo-liberalism proponents aim to remove all limits such as the political and economic barriers set by these states. Poorer states open to international interventions and directives from the IMF and the World Bank are exploited by giant corporations.

The Endless Crisis also focuses on the changing features of the “capitalist labor force” (p.135) after capitalism’s production center was moved to developing countries (especially China and Eastern Europe) to take advantage of cheap labor, lower production costs, and easy access to domestic materials. “The South’s share of industrial employment has risen dramatically from 51 percent in 1980 to 73 percent in 2008” (p.133). Thus, exploitation of labor by monopolistic firms paying low wages has allowed corporations to make huge profits. Paradoxically, the work force was “redundant” (p.141) during crisis periods, and people were forced to work more for less money. For more accumulation, more mobilization of labor was necessary. This form of reshaping world production and repositioning labor began in
1970 with globalization, which emerged after World War II via the expanding activities of international corporations and gained momentum with the collapse of the Soviet Union. For instance, some US firms have more workers in developing countries than they do in the US, which is why capital accumulation was at its highest level while labor wages remained low. This situation made China and other Asian countries vulnerable to big corporations’ cheap labor politics and increased migration from rural areas to cities, as people sought work. Cheap labor also contributes to protecting the value of money, allowing the capitalist class to retain their financial assets. Capitalist accumulation also increased through temporary workers who migrated (legally and illegally) to core countries in exchange for (low) wages.

Foster and McChesney consider the age of the internationalization of monopoly capital and the movement of world production to the South a “new imperialism” (p.75). This shift has resulted in emerging economies with high growth rates, such as China. But the process has different characteristics than what occurred in developed countries because of the millions of people who work as cheap labor. Still, China is expected to achieve the next level of capitalism based on its “capital-intensive” (p.158) manufacturing rather than its labor army. Although these emerging economies are also open to the crises that Western capitalism is experiencing (for example, China’s export markets are struggling), there is speculation that the Chinese economy will be the world’s largest by 2020 (p.149), something “[v]iewed with unease in the old centers of world power” (p.162). Considering these predictions, the authors note that China may offer temporary relief from the current economic impasse, as the US did for 30 years with the financialization trend, but nothing permanent. The path that the Chinese economy is on is based on human exploitation, land grabbing, and creating rich strata. Despite this early stage of capitalist transformation, today China is the world’s “final production platform” (p.175), alluding to the fact that many countries no longer use goods as their main sources of revenue, but rely on financial mechanisms. The Endless Crisis defines China as “more the world assembly hub than the world factory” (p.175), and considers great growth in the Chinese economy as the “product of a global system of exploitation and accumulation” (p.179). There are varied predictions regarding whether China will provide a solution to the current crisis; at this point, it is logical to assume that the futures of China and the West are tied together in many respects.

3. Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism?, Samir Amin

Samir Amin considers that while accumulation is the core element in the continuity of capitalism, it also provides the means for struggling against it. “Atlantic capitalism” (p.1) has been built on the ground of violating the rights of the majority to benefit the privileged rich strata. Although globalization declared triumph with the unipolar world, “liberation struggles” (p.59) in Asia, Africa, and Latin America symbolize the first challenges against the capitalist order, as capitalism aims to maintain its dominance through exploiting people and resources in periphery countries via oligopolies.

Amin argues that the energy crisis that the world is suffering is not because of a lack of oil but because of oligopolies’ policies to assume control over oil resources by excluding other actors. Despite attempts by oligopolies to access resources, resistance, especially from the South, will rise against them. Rather than being financial, Amin states that the current crisis is a “crisis of the imperialist capitalism of oligopolies whose exclusive and supreme power risks being questioned by the struggles of the entire popular classes and the nations of the
peripheries” (p.3). It is also about the decline of US hegemony.

Amin, like the other authors, maintains that the current economic crisis dates back to the 1970s, with the collapse of dollar-based system. Capitalism, then, is facing a systemic crisis rather than a financial crisis. Financialization, with oligopolies assuming control over markets, also damages democracy because of the concentration of power among these oligarchs. Instead of competing with each other, the US, EU, and Japan have created a collective imperialism directed against the rest of the world.

Amin argues that the in-crisis US hegemony aims to resolve its crisis by using the war machine against the poor South in an effort to reach more resources, as it has continually done throughout capitalism’s history. If this strategy fails, the author asks the following question: Who will replace the current hegemon? China is not the right answer because its “strategy is confined to promoting a new globalization without hegemony” (p.12). The only satisfying alternative, then, is a collaboration of the countries of the South.

Ending the Crisis also discusses how the military apparatus of capitalism conceals itself in organizations such as NATO and under pretexts such as the war on terror to bypass the United Nations. For this reason, there is need for “[e]mancipatory struggles, a questioning of the system exclusively by some of its peripheries” (p.16). Another kind of struggle against the capitalist order is to use all gains to defeat the system’s military tool. This approach, Amin maintains, should be an international collective act; nationalization can overcome oligopolies in developing countries.

Amin considers the current financial collapse as the end of the capacity of capitalism to evolve, which has led to a systemic crisis. The positive atmosphere that the post-World War II era created for the accumulation of capital has now disappeared. A system based on bipolarity, such as existed with the US and the Soviet Union, represented two separate ideologies and economy models for the world and has lost its viability. Prior to this development, monopolies’ delocalized feature allowed them to create low real-wage policies and privatization, an important step for accumulation and expansion across the globe. Today, the crisis of accumulation, energy-linked problems, food crises (which may be the most important in all of these), and the impossible continuation of the order that capitalism has created, clearly reveal that a systemic crisis exists. In an effort to cope with this awakening in the South, the hegemonic order may use more force, creating “apartheid at the world level” (p.161). Today’s capitalism is defined by financialization abandoning the supply-and-demand reality and acting through economic agents so as not to be affected from market ups and downs. The author argues that the inner problems of the accumulation system and the pressure that it created in society over the direction of change brought stagnation. The question now is whether society can develop an alternative to the current order. Unless the oligopolistic characteristics of the system are changed, total recovery of the financial markets will be impossible.

Amin, tracking capitalism’s development, distinguishes between the European and Chinese paths, arguing that access to land determined how capitalism advanced. European capitalism, also known as historical capitalism, banned the rural population from accessing land. On the other hand, Chinese capitalism allowed for access to land as a main state principle. The former path encompasses the often-violent methods used in imperialist capitalism. China closed itself to the capitalist world for some time, and this relatively slower path offered advantages in terms of cheap labor and a large workforce. For Amin, individual interests
mixed with competition underlie capitalism. At the same time, “[a]ccumulation through dispossession is a permanent feature in the history of capitalism” (p.51). Through conquest of the world, Europe dispossessed natural resources as a way of historical capitalism, leading to accumulation.

Amin also points out capitalism’s characteristic that does not allow the periphery to be at the centre, and posits that societies on the periphery should cut ties with capitalism to create an “alternative globalization.” In this regard, the twentieth century marked “the first wave of socialist revolutions and the awakening of the South” (p.59). Capitalism through the cooperation of the Triad has a complex structure and many mechanisms operate against the periphery through organizations such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, etc. The US hegemony exerts military control in an organized “collective imperialism” (p.109).

Ending the Crisis states that continuing North/South conflict is inevitable, but unless a major change such anti-capitalist revolutions occur in the capitalist world, a socialist formation is not possible. Today, some societies of the South are developing alternatives to monopolies and product technology in an effort to overcome dependency. The Chinese revolution in 1949 struggled to create an alternative to imperialist capitalism, then gradually evolved towards capitalism. Societies of the South, such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan fought for freedom from capitalist exploitation, despite their limited military resources and fragility due to the lack of a powerful central authority. During such struggles, democracy should be internationalized because, due to its changing structure, it means more than “a static and definitive” formula…. Democracy is about all aspects of social life and not exclusively the management of the political life of a country” (p.90). However, defining democracy with a free market, as capitalism has done, reduces it to the US-style democracy that socialism is against.

In the fifth chapter, Amin focuses on capitalism’s practices of agriculture and emphasizes the necessity of land tenure reform in the South. By means of the division of labor between producers and companies, agricultural production is very high in the North compared to the South: “modern family agriculture constitutes an inseparable part of the capitalist economy” (p.101). The South has failed at attempts to develop similar agricultural practices due to the lack of that division of labor and a lack of democracy, among other reasons. Nations reacting to monopolization should work towards a regulation between the markets and “peasant agriculture” (p.141) and protecting national production should be foremost so that the price monopoly is removed. This method is termed ‘food sovereignty,’ which has become a calamity in Africa. Amin discusses the Triad’s awareness of the issue via systematic policies. Because industrialization and food security are vitally linked, the South must also address this issue. With the 2008 financial crisis, the food deficit arises as a critical problem for all states. “China and Vietnam provide a unique example of a system for managing access to the land which is neither based on private ownership, nor on custom, but on a new revolutionary right, which is that of all the peasants having equal access to land” (p.115).

In the sixth chapter of Ending the Crisis, Amin explores two paths of development: humanitarianism and internationalism. He first criticizes the North’s oversimplification of the reasons for underdevelopment and how it deals with the problem from the perspective of the economy and ignores the social dimensions. For Amin, “[d]evelopment is an overall process that involves the definition of political objectives and how they are articulated: democratization of society and emancipation of individuals” (p.131).
In essence, the nature of a socialist revolution is internationalist, but a tendency towards humanitarianism is clearly seen. A rhetoric used by the dominant discourse tries to explain underdevelopment through the division of good and bad governance by eliminating some of the main discussion points such as the role of civil society, social justice, and the fight against poverty. For instance, to neutralize civil society and social forces, foreign aid is used to corrupt the leading strata, especially in Africa. Therefore, aid from rich states should be allocated via the UN, making the main struggle tool solidarity not humanitarianism. Amin calls this method the “alternative aid” (p.140) process because it excludes all capitalist formations, such as the OECD and the World Bank, leading to the creation of alternative developments “giving priority to internal markets (national and regional)” (p.143). Alternative cooperation models can be developed, such as a South-South cooperation that could replace the North-South pattern of using technology to assume control over natural resources.

The last chapter of Ending the Crisis more addresses the philosophical discussion around the topic, explaining the ideology of socialism and Marx’s contributions to the field by focusing on the change and transformation of societies towards a better system. Putting the idea of emancipation at the centre, a transition period can result in either revolution or chaos (which outcome is not clear). Amin defines the current system as a “liberal virus” (p.14) with “[w]ork and exploitation, commercial alienation and expansion, the fetishism of money, the state at the service of capital” (p.159) as its main features. The ongoing tension between the North and South has recently increased in the race to control the natural resources of periphery countries. This section focuses on discussion around creating a socialist alternative to the current capitalist system and on the methods for such a process by defining today’s state as an apparatus of capitalist oligopolies. The question arises whether the current financial crisis could be a transition into an alternative to the current system. At this point, “[c]areful analysis of the strategies of the oligarchy in the Triad, the economic interests at stake and the geopolitics and geostrategy of states that are systematically on the defensive” (p.171) is a must.

Amin concludes that the current path of capitalism will move the world towards chaos unless a socialist revolution is realized. Here the importance of an ideological battle emerges; lacking awareness, the South’s fate is to subordinate to the North.

4. Conclusion
The three books agree on one point: the capitalist world economy faces a serious downfall, allowing for the probability of the rise of new powers/systems in different parts of the world. Regardless of who these emerging powers are or which ideologies struggle against the US-led capitalist world order, this situation also means the decline of US hegemonic power, which not only dominates the global economic system, but also the dynamics of capital markets. John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney’s The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China puts forward that China is the emerging power, while Adam Hanieh’s Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States discusses the rise of the Gulf region as an alternative to American economic domination. Hanieh emphasizes a rising Chinese effect in the region and a decline in US hegemony as it loses control over Gulf capital, and Foster and McChesney note a relative setback in US power due to China’s rising economic power. It might be said that historical capitalism (to use Amin’s phrase in Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism?)
will lose ground against new capitalist powers. However, it is not clear whether China’s rise will provide for a recovery of the global economy. Amin’s take on the crisis of neoliberal politics and capitalism calls the issue a systemic crisis. Like Foster and McChesney, Amin points out that the monopolistic/oligopolistic tendencies in the world economy have led the system to the deepest crisis it has ever experienced. Like all the other authors, Amin argues that the US, Europe, and Japan are at the center of this crisis and that they will be the countries most affected by this economic setback. While Hanieh maintains that Gulf capital has a determinative role in the capitalist rivalry regardless of whether it cooperates or conflicts with US power, Amin focuses on the developing or periphery countries as producers of alternative political and economic structures through concrete movements towards global emancipation.

**Bibliography**


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