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The main purpose of the Center is to help develop agendas and promote policies that contribute to the peaceful resolution of international and inter-communal conflicts taking place particularly in the regions surrounding Turkey. It also aims to analyze and interpret contemporary policies from a critical, comparative but, at the same time, constructive and peace-oriented perspective.

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In This Issue

In this issue of *All Azimuth*, we present a selection of articles combining research and policy-based works, offering a broad perspective for our readers.

The volume begins with a research article by Peter Gill in which he discusses major problems about state governance of intelligence. He examines intelligence as it works within and between different ‘sectors’, including state intelligence, non-state intelligence entities, and corporate actors, and their implications for democratization. Drawing upon a discussion about cooperative and competitive interaction among these sectors, Gill argues that only states can secure effective security policies. In this respect, the article suggests the development of state capacity in developing intelligence itself, the regulation of private companies, and the suppression of uncivil sovereignties, are necessary steps for democratizing intelligence.

In the second article, Zeynep Arkan, adopting a critical constructivist approach to European Union’s identity, analyses how the identity of the European Union was constructed in its foreign policy discourse based on a particular conception of ‘Europe’. The article provides an overview of the discursive processes through which identity is constructed within the framework of the EU’s common foreign and security policy and explores the ways how the core concept of ‘Europe’ has evolved in the last two decades.

Mine Kara, in the third research article, examines the economic turmoil in Europe which was evoked by the Global Crisis of 2007-2008. This article explains the recent European crisis with an emphasis on the counter movements between liberal and protectionist economic policies. Kara initially highlights three explicit economic policy eras characterized by these movements. Then, she focuses on the relations between European crises and political formations. She argues the current economic turmoil is the result of a liberal swing of the 1970s.

In the commentaries section, Musa Tüzüner deals with the problem of non-sharing intelligence behavior within the Turkish intelligence community. Based on the views of insiders from the Turkish intelligence community, this article first reveals the reasons behind the non-sharing behavior and then presents policy solutions towards more effective intelligence sharing behavior. In this line, the article suggests that a policy change should take place gradually starting from the agency level towards the international level.

This issue of *All Azimuth* concludes with a review article by Rana Nelson. Reviewed books are *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict* by Ara Norenzayan, and *God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*, by Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah. Nelson focuses on the correlation between religion and conflict resolution. This review compares and contrasts these two books, presenting a discussion of their main points as well as what we should know about religion when formulating conflict resolution strategies and developing international policy.
Thinking about Intelligence Within, Without, and Beyond the State*

Peter Gill

*University of Liverpool, UK

1. Introduction

The reform or ‘democratization’ of intelligence has been studied in many countries essentially as a process of transition from authoritarian or ‘counterintelligence’ states to liberal democratic regimes in which security and intelligence agencies are subject to (more or less) democratic control and oversight.1 These studies have contributed to the growth in comparative studies of intelligence but have often ignored some key issues, including the conditions for the very existence of ‘state’ intelligence, the continuing significance of parallel non-state intelligence entities and the involvement of an increasing number of corporate actors in intelligence activities. This chapter examines intelligence as it works within and between different ‘sectors’ and the implications for democratization.

Intelligence is a sub-set of ‘surveillance’, a ubiquitous social activity, and can be defined as: ‘mainly secret activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action – intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities.’2 A central element of this definition – as with surveillance more generally - is the link between information/knowledge and action/power (or, ‘intelligence’ and ‘policy’),3 where the objective of the process is security and it will be subject to resistance. Intelligence is exercised at various social ‘levels’ from the transnational to the personal: even individuals deploy information gathering in the face of uncertainty in order to assess threats etc.

2. Sectors of Intelligence

All the major contributing disciplines within intelligence studies have focused on the state. The study of war and the role of military intelligence have focused, until recently, on interstate violence and the archives providing the source for much of this study are themselves maintained and then released by states. Students of internal security intelligence have been concerned with the impact of political police on the rights and liberties of citizens and the study of criminal intelligence has focused similarly on the activities of public police forces. The examination of democratization has very naturally followed these paths in emphasizing

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1 E.g. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz, Reforming Intelligence: obstacles to democratic control and effectiveness (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007); Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian and Shlomo Shpiro, PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, National Approaches (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008).

2 Peter Gill, “Theories of Intelligence: where are we, where should we go and how might we proceed?” in Intelligence Theory: key questions and debates, ed. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian (London: Routledge, 2009), 208-26.

the legal and institutional aspects of intelligence. While this work has achieved much in clarifying the conditions under which intelligence may move from a repressive to a progressive political instrument, we must acknowledge the significance of two other intelligence sectors: corporate and ‘sovereignties’.

There are a number of perspectives on the significance of the corporate sector. There is a long history of ‘competitive’ or ‘business’ intelligence in which firms gather information in relation to potential markets, activities of competitors and so on. Most of this is concerned with nothing more than the profitability of the firm’s own products or services, is normally gathered from open sources and, as such, is quite different from the central concern of state’s and their security intelligence. However, it would be better to see business intelligence on a continuum with state intelligence rather than as qualitatively different. At times these will shade into one another, for example, where the transnational activities of corporations have implications not only for their health but also for state policy in terms of alliances and trade. This is especially the case with defense industries where states are the only (legal) market that exists.

Second, there are those companies for whom security intelligence is central to their own operations and profitability. These are often discussed as either private military or private security companies (PMCs, PSCs). A number of factors have accounted for their significant growth in the last twenty years since the end of the Cold War. This led to a ‘downsizing’ of western security and intelligence agencies and thus a potential supply of experienced and skilled intelligence personnel while many smaller states lost the support of their former Cold War sponsors. Therefore, lacking their own state personnel, when they required expertise they turned to the corporate sector. Even the United States found itself, in the wake of 9/11, dependent on many former personnel, some recalled from retirement, some now employed in the private sector who became contractors. This process reached its height in Iraq and Afghanistan. Security contracting covers a multitude of roles from the purely logistical to involvement in fighting and requires intelligence support. Some have become highly controversial, however, none more than the involvement of contractors in interrogation at Abu Ghraib and actions of Blackwater (now Xe) operatives. In the context of continuing restrictions on state budgets, ever-increasing corporate competition for trade and resources and continuing security concerns in so many places, a significant corporate role is clearly going to continue.

But there is a third sector of intelligence; indeed, one that existed prior to the modern state and continues to be highly significant in many areas. This is manifested in numerous ways with varying degrees of organizational formality: national liberation movements, paramilitary groups, clan, tribal or religious militias, criminal organizations. What these ‘para-states’, or non-state ‘sovereignties’, have in common is their willingness to use violence to control people, resources, or territory or, as the UN Guidelines on Humanitarian

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5 Larry Kahaner, Competitive Intelligence: how to gather, analyze, and use information to move your business to the top (New York: Touchstone, 1996); Seena Sharp, Competitive Intelligence Advantage: how to minimize risk, avoid surprises and grow your business in a changing world (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2009).
7 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: the rise of the world’s most powerful mercenary army (London: Serpent’s tail, 2007).
Negotiations describe them, non-state armed groups whose motives may be political, ideological or economic. Their activities are very similar to those of states although their legality may be highly contested. In some cases they will be clearly ‘illegal’ but there are some social organizations whose ‘intelligence’ activities will be conducted, as it were, on ‘license’ by states. ‘Neighborhood watch’ schemes, for example, are encouraged by police as complementary to community policing but if their members use violence – vigilantism – that will be officially discouraged even if sometimes a ‘blind eye’ is turned by state officials when the violence is compatible with state objectives.

But beyond the simple existence of these intelligence sectors, the relationships between them may be highly significant. In some cases there will be overlaps where actors within different sectors share tasks such as protective security but these will not always be obvious, for example, the same people may, at different times, act on behalf (or in the interests) of a state, a company or sovereignty. An especially lethal example of this would be ‘death squads’ made up of security or police personnel when ‘off duty’.10

In other cases, the relationship will be more of a network governed by a series of more of less formal contractual relationships. Such co-operation has a long history; the best known formal agreement was the UKUSA treaty between US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to share SIGINT at the start of the Cold War.11 However, since 9/11 much effort has been put into improving the reach and intensity of intelligence networks – the basis for effective information sharing - not only in the United States, where the failure of agencies to share information was one finding of the 9/11 Commission, but between agencies in different states, including some whose historical relations had been competitive rather than cooperative.

Generally, the relationship between agencies or sectors will be one of conflict rather than cooperation where state, corporation or para-state target each other as perceived threats. Over time, any particular relationship may shift between these types. Documentation in relation to the state sector is far more extensive than for the other sectors so we can quickly identify examples of various state/corporate and state/para-state connections. The former includes most technological issues in current intelligence since state procurement is now primarily from the private sector where most hardware and software innovation takes place. In this and other high technology and defense areas, ‘protective security’ advice and its link with counterintelligence is another key connection and, for the US intelligence community, there has been much outsourcing of core intelligence work since 9/11, discussed further below. The interchange of personnel is also significant: those trained in intelligence and with specialist expertise will almost certainly be able to command greater salaries in the private sector, while those retiring from the public sector may seek to augment their pension with a corporate position. Often, just as significant as the acquisition of expertise is the ability to make use of former contacts in developing informal networks – the lifeblood of any ‘intelligence’ system. However, there may be more tension in these relations: formally the government of Nigeria cooperates with Shell Oil’s extraction in the Niger Delta but, in the face of political support in the area for the ethnic militias opposing Shell, the company has employed various techniques,

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including penetrating the government with people seconded to relevant ministries (or so it claimed according to a US embassy cable from 2009 recently released by Wikileaks and bribery.\textsuperscript{12}

While there are plenty of opportunities for profiteering and improper influence in legal state/corporate relations, cooperation between states and para-states is even more prone to corruption. In practice, even if lawful, these relations will be ‘plausibly denied’. Prominent examples would include the CIA’s Operation Mongoose to recruit the Mafia to assassinate Fidel Castro after the Bay of Pigs invasion failed to overthrow his government.\textsuperscript{13} Several plans, from exploding cigars to diving suits impregnated with poison failed, as is evident from Castro’s longevity. In Northern Ireland there is strong evidence of ‘collusion’ between UK security forces (army, police and Security Service) that resulted in the killing of a number of alleged Republicans by the Loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Volunteer Force.\textsuperscript{14}

More recently, in Iraq, the apparent success of the US surge in reducing the levels of violence in Iraq in 2007 was widely accredited to the mobilization of the Sons of Iraq to fight against al-Qaeda instead of supporting their insurgency.\textsuperscript{15} UK forces in Basra sought to maintain peace similarly by co-operating with the Mahdi army. In Turkey, voluntary village guards have been deployed since the mid-1980s; they are unpaid but armed by the state in response to a local request for self-protection but their role has been highly controversial including involvement in murder, kidnapping, burning villages and torture. Recruited on the pretext of countering the PKK, they have been involved in arms and drugs trafficking may amount to little more than a security force for local clan chiefs.\textsuperscript{16}

On the other hand, state contacts with non-state groups may involve the sharing of information as part of conflict-resolution and peace-keeping.\textsuperscript{17} During the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, there were systematic contacts between members of the SIS and PIRA through intermediaries which, eventually, contributed to the start of the formal ‘peace process’ in 1994. Similarly, the CIA has been a central player in Middle East peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{18} The efforts may or may not be successful but, from the point of view of governments who refuse to be seen ‘talking to terrorists’, intelligence services provide what is often the only possibility for backchannel negotiations. Success in these negotiations or some form of regime change may then give rise to the intriguing prospect of incorporating intelligence operatives from an insurgent group into a reformed state service. South Africa provides an excellent example of this from 1992 onwards\textsuperscript{19} and a similar conundrum faces the construction of a new intelligence service in Kosovo. The other side of this issue is that if intelligence agents

\textsuperscript{17} E.g. Ben de Jong, Wies Platte and Robert Steele, Peacekeeping Intelligence: emerging concepts for the future (Oakton, VA: OSS International, 2003)
\textsuperscript{18} Shlomo Shpiro, “Intelligence, peacekeeping and Peacemaking in the Middle East,” in Peacekeeping Intelligence: emerging concepts for the future, ed. de Jong et al. (Oakton, VA: OSS International, 2003), 101-14.
are removed from office by some process of lustration and feel themselves aggrieved or without an adequate pension, then they may rapidly find employment with either a corporate or illegal organization where they are able to deploy their skills and contacts.

Least documented are the links between para-states and the corporate sector. These are most likely to be significant in areas where the state itself lacks capacity, so, if a corporation contemplates activities there it may have to rely for information and some measure of security on a locally-based group.

3. An Intelligence Monopoly?

How to conceptualize intelligence as it operates in all sectors so as to deepen our understanding of democratization? It is suggested that the starting point will be the definition of intelligence, as given at the start of the article, which relates knowledge to power and sees intelligence as a sub-set of surveillance. We start with this functional view of intelligence but if we are to examine democratic forms then we need to be able to see where ‘institutions’ may fit. In the classic Weberian definition, what distinguishes states from other groups deploying violence is their ‘monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory.’

In terms of considering what does constitute democratic intelligence, this is a key element but it is not the only one because violence is not the only form of power deployed as the outcome of some intelligence process. As a shorthand, we might add Etzioni’s other two categories: utilitarian (material) and normative (symbolic). Obviously states use a variety of forms of power – in democratic states, coercion is seen as a last resort – but it is the capacity for deploying legitimate force that is the defining characteristic. Equally, however, Warner defines ‘sovereignties’ by ‘their competitive willingness to use violence to hold or gain control over people, resources, and territory.’ But they cannot be defined solely in terms of the use of coercion; what is of empirical interest to students of intelligence is the way in which both states and non-states deploy intelligence in order to exercise power in all its forms, not just coercion.

When it comes to the more normative question of what constitutes democratic intelligence, can we develop anything as useful as the Weberian definition of ‘state’ based on the monopoly of legitimate coercion? Clearly not: while states seek to maintain their monopoly of legitimate violence by suppressing other users of violence (except in some cases where individuals or corporations may be licensed to use violence, for example in self-defense), there is no way in which they would either choose to suppress the non-state use of intelligence nor, in the unlikely event that they did (as, perhaps in a totalitarian regime), could they be entirely successful. Even if states have higher capacity, they will not seek to suppress non-state intelligence that deploys symbolic or material power. For example, corporations’ interests are central to the health of liberal capitalism, its fiscal base and national wealth and therefore companies need no license to ‘do’ intelligence; indeed, governments assist by providing them with (mainly open source) information that pertains equally to state and corporate interests. There is a separate normative question as to what extent states should regulate corporate intelligence, to which we shall return.

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22 Warner, Intelligence as Risk Shifting, 20.
The lack of any intelligence monopoly may seem obvious but must be examined in order to understand the possibility for a democratic intelligence. First, the state in many places ‘is not the most decisive working unit in intelligence studies.’ Though written a quarter century ago, this is probably even more the case now. In the post Cold War world of multiple asymmetric conflicts and questionable state capacities, the role of ‘sovereignties’ has become ever greater. Even in the conflicts involving major states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as we have seen, the intelligence role of corporations and ethnic, tribal or clan militias has been significant. It is precisely the fact of para-state control in certain conflict areas that is the cause and/or symptomatic of low state capacity. This is most especially so in border areas defined in terms of territory and/or ‘marginal’ populations, by reason of social exclusion or drug use.

4. Democratic Intelligence

Looking historically at the development of intelligence capacities in the three sectors, it is clear that pre-state ‘sovereignties’ came first. Writers such as Sun Tzu in about the fourth century BC and Kautilya, possibly in the same era or several hundred years later, identified the significance of surveillance and intelligence to rule in ancient kingdoms. Both identified the importance of secret agents, the use of covert action, the dangers of subversion and the role of counter intelligence. Corporations in the modern rather than medieval sense arrived with industrialization and the rise in capitalism while recognizable state structures followed in the mid- to late nineteenth century.

Deploying Charles Tilly’s work, we can identify two conditions for democratic intelligence: state capacity and the ‘...the extent to which the regime features broad, equal, protected, binding consultation of citizens with respect to state actions.’ For some writers, capacity and the legitimacy derived from respecting rights are seen as inseparable, for example,

‘democracies are political systems comprising institutions that translate citizens’ preferences into policy, have effective states that act to protect and deepen democratic rights, and count on a strong participatory and critical civil society.’

Fukuyama similarly doubts that legitimacy can be separated from capacity but, for the purposes of the present argument, it is preferable to examine capacity and legitimacy as independent variables. Tilly argues that the democratization process is enhanced by three main changes in public politics: the integration of interpersonal trust networks; the insulation of ‘categorical inequality’; and a reduction in the significance of autonomous power centers. Equally, the reverse of these processes may induce de-democratization.

‘Trust networks are ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others.’

24 E.g. Ed Vulliamy, America: war along the borderline (London: The Bodley Head, 2010).
26 Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 34.
29 Tilly, Democracy, 74-77.
30 Ibid., 74.
Examples such as trading diasporas, religious groups, clans and criminal organizations tend to shield themselves from involvement in political regimes but if they remain segregated it is an obstacle to democratization. If they integrate with regimes and motivate members to engage in mutually binding consultation with the state then democratization is possible. With respect to intelligence in particular, this can be seen by the extent to which members of trust networks come to rely on the state rather than their own resources to provide for security and, indeed, show willingness to volunteer relevant information to state agents. The significance of this can be easily illustrated by pointing to times/places where the condition was absent: ‘no-go’ areas to police in parts of Belfast and Londonderry in Northern Ireland during the ‘Troubles’, Native American ‘reservations’ – especially those crossing US borders with Canada or Mexico, and members of criminal organizations such as Mafia in which an ‘oath of silence’ is a key element.

‘Categorical inequality’ refers to the

organization of social life around boundaries separating whole sets of people who differ collectively in their life chances, as is commonly the case with categories of gender, race, caste, ethnicity, nationality, and religion and is sometimes the case with categories of social class. To the extent that such inequalities translate directly into categorical differences in political rights and obligations, democracy remains impossible.31

Intelligence may become very significant in such a situation since the ruling group will require reassurance as to its position; indeed, the regime might come to resemble a counterintelligence state32 in which the sole purpose of intelligence is to protect the regime against internal opposition. BOSS and its successor National Intelligence Service in South Africa under apartheid was a prime example. Even where efforts have been made to insulate public politics from these categorical inequalities, for example, by adopting devices such as secret ballots, security officials may play a key role in dissuading voters from attending voting places.

Third, ‘(a)utonomous power centers operate outside the control of public politics and outside of regular citizen-state interactions.’33 This includes all those interpersonal connections providing citizens with the means to alter or defend existing distributions of resources in their interest. Especially significant are those that may exist within the state, for example, armed forces or intelligence agencies, and inhibiting their autonomy to act in their sectional interest is a crucial aspect of democratization. Mechanisms by which this might come about include coalition formation between ruling classes and those previously excluded or co-optation of previously autonomous actors such as regional ‘strongmen’.

Therefore, in order to assess to what extent states have capacity in the intelligence field, we need to identify the process by which state intelligence is established independently of non-state ‘sovereignty’ capacities. Or, to what extent and how does state intelligence replace pre-existing ‘trust networks’ and ‘autonomous power centers’? This is an interesting historical question which has, as yet, received little if any attention. State intelligence services came into existence for three main reasons – to detect foreign threats and inform foreign policy, to support military operations and to detect threats to internal security. In other words, to carry out tasks quite distinct from those already being carried out by corporations and self-

31 Tilly, Democracy, 75.
33 Tilly, Democracy, 76.
protecting sovereignties. In some cases, state intelligence will have rendered these redundant, for example, the British army and government slowly taking over intelligence in India from the East India Company. A general increase in state capacity and penetration throughout its territory will reduce the need for local sovereignties to act in their self-defense. However, this is a process that will never be complete: we have already pointed to the impossibility of a state monopoly of intelligence, therefore, the question becomes not whether the state can displace or incorporate them (à la Tilly) but whether the state can work out a non-competitive modus vivendi with them. This might occur through contracting, advice, consultation, division of labor, networking and so on. However, tracing the precise process by which state intelligence becomes an alternative or complementary to varieties of non-state intelligence is beyond the scope of this article which, instead, concentrates on the issue of democratization in the three sectors.

5. Democratizing State Intelligence

Many of the national ‘democratizations’ of intelligence in the past quarter century have been far less dramatic than envisaged by conquest or revolution but some have certainly involved domestic confrontation in the context of regime change. In Eastern Europe the offices of the Stasi in Leipzig were ransacked as the Berlin Wall fell and the Ceacescus were shot in Bucharest, signaling change in Romania. In the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia escaped the war and reformed peacefully, in Serbia and Croatia intelligence reform proceeded but unevenly after the end of the war in 1995. In Bosnia, reform of the intelligence architecture was embroiled in the overall political stagnation but a new national agency started work in 2004. Similarly, there were different patterns in Latin America as military regimes were replaced through the 1980s and 1990s but in all cases the process was less violent than their coming to power.

The issues of trust networks and autonomous power centers clearly underlie the legislative attempts to reform intelligence in the wake of authoritarian regimes. Nobody trusts security or intelligence agencies in single-party or military regimes; even the leaders fear them and the proliferation of agencies often found under authoritarianism is the result of ‘divide and rule’ and the hope that agencies will spy on each other. Apart from leading to general paranoia, this is also hopelessly inefficient and wasteful. The reform process does not necessarily succeed in cutting the number of agencies – the ‘securocrats’ can be very persuasive as to the new regime’s need for their specialist skills and information – but a minimal requirement is that the conditions for the development of trust are established. This requires legislation so that the structure of agencies and their mandate are established in law (rather than simply as a matter of executive decree). Intelligence agencies are distinguished from other government departments by the fact that they may gather information covertly in addition to open sources

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37 Priscila Antunes, “Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Argentina,” in Reforming Intelligence: obstacles to democratic control and effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 195-218; Marco Cepik, “Structural Change and Democratic Control of intelligence in Brazil,” in Reforming Intelligence: obstacles to democratic control and effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 149-69.
Thinking about Intelligence...

and the process, by which these special powers can be authorized, for example, by a judge or minister, must be spelt out.

The precise relationship between agencies and the political regime is normally shrouded in secrecy within authoritarian regimes, for example, are security officials simply the servants of the Party or the Generals or do they constitute a ‘state within the state’? Within a democratic structure the object is to avoid either extreme of agencies being a rule unto themselves (an ‘autonomous power centre’) or simply the handmaiden of the party in power. It was common in the 1990s democratization in Eastern Europe for opposition politicians to assume that the agencies were still being used against them at election times, and sometimes they were right! Therefore, the relationship between ministers and agencies must be made clear so that, on the one hand, the agencies are working to the agreed security priorities of the government, not their own, while, on the other, there are procedures to enable a Director to blow the whistle on any attempts to use her agency for improper or partisan purposes.

After the fact of legislation itself, the single most significant measure required in order to generate a new trust network is the oversight role of Parliaments and other external bodies who might challenge the intelligence agencies on behalf of citizens. Apart from passing the legislation itself, parliaments have a crucial role in budgetary control: one of the main enablers of security and intelligence abuse is the existence of ‘off-the-books’ budgeting and the deployment of secret state funding. In some cases, this problem is reinforced by the agencies supplementing their funds – and autonomy - by running their own businesses, for example the Indonesian National Intelligence Agency (BIN) runs its own newspaper. It has become the norm now for parliament also to establish some committee for the oversight of security and intelligence agencies; often this is a joint committee of a bicameral legislature. The details of the mandate and powers to access information are crucial in determining the potential influence of such a committee but whether or not it has a real rather than purely symbolic impact will depend on the political will of the membership to do a good job and whether they can actually develop a relationship of trust with the agencies.\footnote{Born and Leigh, 2005, provide a detailed overview of ‘best practice’. Born and Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable.}

6. The Corporate Sector

First, we must note that very little has been written about the privatization of intelligence compared with military and security services more generally. Here I am not addressing corporate use of business or competitive intelligence but the involvement of corporate actors in direct security issues. What we do know concerns mainly the U.S. where the rise of the corporate intelligence sector has been mapped by Tim Shorrock: by 2006, about 70% of the estimated $60 billion the government spent on foreign and domestic intelligence was outsourced to contractors.\footnote{Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire: the secret world of intelligence outsourcing (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 6.} He identifies four main periods of development: the privatization revolution that started during the Reagan administration but which reached fruition under Clinton; the leap in defense outsourcing in the late 1990s; the surge in intelligence spending negotiated by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet at the turn of the century after a decade of cuts; and the post-9/11 expansion. Technological innovation was a key element in this as commercial developments in encryption; IT etc. outpaced government innovations and coincided with the downsizing post 1991. Thus, by the turn of the century, Shorrock argues, the institutional memory of the U.S. Intelligence Community resided in the
private sector. Contracting soared in the aftermath of 9/11 and it was only in 2005-06 that USG started concerted hiring at agencies themselves.\(^{40}\)

The main structural reason for the significance of the corporate sector since 9/11 and the new emphasis on ‘homeland security’ was the simple fact that 90% of communications, energy and transportation networks is in the private sector and required public-private partnerships. Just after 9/11 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence called for a ‘symbiotic relationship between the Intelligence Community and the private sector,’\(^{41}\) and this ideology of the Intelligence-Industrial Complex was born from a blend of patriotism, national chauvinism, fear of the unknown and old-fashioned war-profiteering.\(^{42}\)

A key figure was Kenneth Minihan, former director of NSA and DIA, who, together with Jim Woolsey, former CIA director, created the Paladin Capital Group in 2002 as the first private equity fund to invest exclusively in companies making products for the homeland security and intelligence markets. Minihan argued that economic globalization and the communications revolution meant CIA/NSA etc. could no longer act in a vacuum; industry and government must join forces to defeat the nation’s adversaries so that contractors were now inextricably tied to the success of operations, presenting opportunities to create technologies that government can use ‘with all the complexities that exist in merging the interests of the private and public sector in the intelligence apparatus.’\(^{43}\) What is striking about this is, of course, that public-private contracting and partnership are facts of any liberal capitalist economy, but the merging or symbiosis of interests in security and intelligence apparatus takes us into the realms of a corporatist state in which government takes place through private corporations. This raises profound issues about the nature of intelligence governance in the U.S.; bearing in mind the ‘neglected stepchild’ of congressional oversight,\(^{44}\) de-democratization is apparently underway.

Beyond oversight of the state sector, almost nowhere has there been any effort to examine the corporate sector. Chesterman identifies three main challenges to oversight of corporate intelligence: secrecy, the different incentives for private compared with public employees and the uncertainty as to what functions should be regarded as ‘inherently governmental’ and thus unsuitable for outsourcing. It was only in the U.S. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 that, for the first time, the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI, successor to DCI) would be required to provide the intelligence committees with detailed reports on the use of contractors and the accountability mechanisms governing their performance but the legislation was vetoed by President Bush. However, even these congressional efforts were led by just a few members of Congress; for others the intelligence budget was just another chance for ‘pork barrel’ politics in the face of massive lobbying from contractors.\(^{45}\) So far there remains a good deal of ambiguity around the attempt to determine which intelligence functions are ‘inherently governmental’, especially when even those that are can still be outsourced if it amounts to the ‘implementation’ rather than ‘control’ of policy.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{40}\) Shorrock, Spies for Hire, 81-114.  
\(^{41}\) Simon Chesterman, “‘We Can’t Spy...If We Can’t Buy!’: the privatization of intelligence and the limits of outsourcing ‘inherently governmental functions’,” European Journal of International Law 19, no.5 (2008): 1056.  
\(^{42}\) Shorrock, Spies for Hire, 357.  
\(^{43}\) Ibid., 363.  
\(^{45}\) Chesterman, “We Can’t Spy!”, 1066-1067; Shorrock, Spies for Hire, 366-372.  
\(^{46}\) Chesterman, “We Can’t Spy!”, 1069-1073.
Thinking about Intelligence...

Beyond the political sphere, there are a number of other mechanisms with potential for overseeing the corporate sphere such as the law, contract conditions, auditing, and public reputations. For example, there is some potential for the development of ‘corporate social responsibility’ in private security and military companies. The idea of increasing competition between public and private providers of military goods and services and publishing relevant data so citizens can make informed choices is at the heart of neoliberal security governance. Examples include free trade in military goods and services among NATO and EU members through privatization of national defense companies and harmonization of standards, and mutual recognition of national licenses for private security and policing services. There is also a role for private standard-setting and self-regulation, with a role for industry associations and reinforced by market pressures. The state’s role is to establish conditions to support private industry standards and to be a responsible consumer, buying from the best suppliers.

But there are a number of reasons as to why these market and reputation-driven checks may falter in practice. First, considerations of commercial confidentiality combined with national security mean that citizens just will not know just what is being contracted and at what cost. Second, however strong the identification of contractors with government policy, the fact remains that their firms exist to make profit, not serve the public interest. Given the growing symbiosis noted above, there is a clear danger of public policy being subordinated to profitability. Third, market disciplines are much reduced when, as in security contracting, there may be only a few firms with the relevant capacity. Even where there are trade associations, their impact may be to raise barriers to entry to new firms and thus retain oligopolistic relations with government. Thus, if security contracting is characterized more accurately as ‘corporatism’ than a marketplace, more profound questions of governance are raised: the more autonomous the power of the Intelligence Industrial complex, the more democracy is reduced.

We simply do not know the extent to which other countries have followed the same route as the U.S. On the face of it, the UK would be favorite since it has followed a similar path of post Cold War downsizing in the context of the information revolution and a neo-liberal governing ideology. The UK intelligence community will have a similar dependence on the corporate sector for hardware and software but there is less evidence of the wholesale involvement of the corporate sector in tasks such as collection, analysis and, more controversially, interrogation, as happened in the U.S. However, the continued significance of technological change in the context of states facing the budgetary implications of the financial crisis that started in 2008 does not suggest any likely diminution in the corporate role in security intelligence.

7. Democratizing ‘Sovereignties’ – a Contradiction in Terms?

Alongside its directory of state intelligence agencies, the American Federation of Scientists Intelligence Resources Program lists over 300 ‘para-states’ including national liberation movements, drug cartels, ethnic militias and terrorist groups. As such, it might appear

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slightly absurd to ponder the potential for democratization among such groups. Most of the
time, states will be concerned to try to contain if not suppress and obliterate these groups
and some are quite short-lived. Yet we need to think about why some of them have a longer
history. This may be because, as a criminal organization, they are supplying products in
a market where demand is very strong. If this is coupled by supply being concentrated in
areas where states hardly penetrate, then it may well be that the organization constitutes the
main employer and supplier of ‘security’ and social services in that area. In other words,
the longevity of such an organization will be accounted for to some extent by support from
local populations which, while not confirmed by elections or any such device, will be strong
enough to resist information gathering attempts by state agents. This may not constitute
‘legitimacy’ in the Weiberian sense of the term but popular acquiescence is a factor that must
be taken into account.

In other cases, the situation will be complicated by the fact that the state, though opposing
the organization in rhetoric, will actually seek an accommodation based on a realization that,
realistically, it cannot suppress it and, in the meantime, is better off negotiating a relatively
peaceful, albeit possibly temporary situation in return for a cessation of attacks on state
officials. In general terms, the coca-growing areas of Colombia and poppy-growing areas of
Afghanistan have ‘enjoyed’ such a situation from time to time.

National liberation movements, especially where they dominate some part of a state’s
territory, provide an even better example of the competitive nature of legitimacy; indeed, the
contest over legitimacy is the very essence of nationalist insurgencies. If they are successful,
then the interesting situation arises of the insurgents’ intelligence operatives becoming the
official state agents or, in the case of peaceful regime change, being integrated into the state
agencies who were previously their opponents. This was the situation in South Africa where
the government’s National Intelligence Service and the Department of Intelligence and
Security of the ANC’s armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), having fought each other for
years, were then crucial to the negotiations in the early 1990s and both provided personnel to
the new National Intelligence Agency in 1995.50

We must beware that the further notions of ‘democratization’ travel from their European
and North American origins, the less likely it is that they will take root in the ways originally
envisioned. There is too often a tendency in the West to equate (more or less) fair elections
with democracy when, in fact, it is at best a procedural or ‘pseudo democracy’.51 Where
states, for whatever reason, lack the capacity to provide protection to citizens, and even more
where the state itself is perceived as predatory, then the existence of security and intelligence
groups based on locality, ethnicity, or clan may actually enjoy a legitimacy that cannot simply
be dismissed. For example, a recent study of Indonesia concludes:

‘...the nature of state and society in Indonesia is such that conventional notions of
democratization in terms of the democratic control of state agencies is inadequate to deal
with the complexities of Indonesia in which the legitimacy or otherwise of many corporate
and ‘community’ organisations performing intelligence functions and security roles must
also be considered.’52

50 O’Brien, “South Africa”.
8. Intelligence Networks and Accountability

Structures designed for single sectors such as state hierarchies will be inadequate for multisectoral governing networks. Although this issue has been addressed in various policy fields, we are only now starting to think through the implications for intelligence. All we can confidently predict is that the task will be extremely challenging! This final section of the article seeks to identify some areas of possible development in order to develop much needed oversight of intelligence networks that have developed both within and between nations, levels and sectors.

For example, national oversight within the state sector should be functional, not institutional. Failing that, parliamentary or other overseers must develop their own networks – if there is more than one oversight body within the state, then they should use ‘statutory gateways’ enabling them to cooperate on investigations, such as suggested in the report of the inquiry into the Maher Arar case in Canada. Between states, some limited mechanisms for discussion are already in existence, for example, the biennial International Intelligence Review Agency Conferences. Currently, these are largely closed events during which participants share ideas of best practice; that should be continued but it would be useful if additional time could be spent in discussion with other interested parties, including specialist journalists, academics and representatives of civil society. Within Europe there are some existing transnational bodies, e.g. European Parliament (EP) and Council of Europe (CoE) which both examined extraordinary rendition. The advantage of these bodies is that they transcend the national but they have no authority over national governments to compel disclosure. For example, carrying out the CoE study into rendition, Marty said:

We must condemn the attitude of the many countries that did not deem it necessary to reply to the questionnaire we sent them through their national delegations. Similarly, NATO has never replied to our correspondence.

There are some supra national European bodies with intelligence functions – Europol, Sitcen, Frontex – and the European Parliament seeks to increase its oversight of them but almost all significant intelligence sharing and cooperation occurs bi-laterally and beyond the gaze of even supra national bodies.

The law has a greater role now in governing intelligence than 25 years ago, but it ‘empowers’ as well as ‘limits’ agencies. Yet the development of rules by national and supranational bodies, their application and judicial oversight by, for example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) can make a contribution to the task of overseeing intelligence, especially regarding its propriety. It is also noteworthy that courts are now less deferential on security matters than even ten years ago – 23 Americans, mainly CIA officials, have been convicted in Italy for their part in the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar in 2003 and face arrest if they travel to Europe. However, the courts in Germany have upheld the Government’s decision not to seek the extradition of CIA agents allegedly involved in the rendition of Khaled el-Masri, despite the issue of an arrest warrant. Although the informality of networks that is prized by

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54 “Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,” in A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP’s National Security Activities (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2006).
practitioners reduces the impact of law, Richard Aldrich argues that the law has still had more impact in terms of intelligence oversight since 9/11 than ‘toothless’ political mechanisms.\(^57\) However, while the law might occasionally have impact through cases brought before the courts, the vast majority of intelligence operations never do come to court. The law is little use for regular auditing and monitoring.

Since a common feature of covert action is that intelligence agencies use ‘grey’ financial channels, agencies should be required to inform their oversight committees of financial incomings and outgoings with other agencies and the corporate sector in connection with operations, training, equipment etc. Much intelligence sharing takes place electronically and there is potential for built-in auditing that can be accessed by overseers. For the foreseeable future, however, institutional forms of oversight of intelligence networks will remain largely undeveloped and, as we saw in the case of rendition, it is most likely to occur as a result of informal coalitions of parliamentarians, lawyers, researchers, journalists and those working in civil society organizations. All of these can contribute to ‘regulation through revelation’.\(^58\) Indeed, in an age of Wikileaks, Cryptome et al, we should make a virtue of necessity and encourage all the various forms of oversight as they emerge in both official and unofficial contexts.

9. Conclusion

There are major problems with state governance of intelligence: the context of secrecy may provide the cover for authoritarianism and corruption while fragmentation between agencies may compound a lack of effectiveness in informing security policies. But, compared with the other sectors, only the state can secure adequate resources, provide for reasoned debate and protect the general public interest in matters of security intelligence.\(^59\) Therefore, the process of democratizing intelligence requires the development of state capacity not only in developing intelligence itself but also for the regulation of private companies and suppression of uncivil sovereignties. As we have seen, the cooperative and competitive interaction between these sectors can be very complex and challenges any simple notion of state governance of intelligence but the search for democratic accountability within what sometimes appear to be neo medieval corporatist structures is crucial to the task of establishing intelligence that is more progressive than repressive.\(^60\)

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Abstract

The European Union’s international identity is a theme that has attracted great scholarly interest in the last two decades, parallel to the increasing role of the Union as a global actor. This period has also witnessed the rise of constructivism as an approach in International Relations with a specific focus on the social nature of and ideational factors in international affairs. Many of the works published in this time frame have approached the topic of European Union identity from a constructivist perspective that focused on the outcomes of the identity construction process within the Union, drawing parallels between the processes of identity construction and dissemination in nation states and at the European level. This study, by differentiating between the critical and conventional constructivist accounts of identity, offers a discursive analysis of the European Union’s identity that concentrates instead on the building blocks and evolution of the identity construction process within the Union. To this aim, it explores the ways in which the identity of the European Union has been represented in the foreign policy discourse originating from the Union’s various institutions and leaders, based on a particular conception of ‘Europe.’

Keywords: Identity, constructivism, critical constructivism, Europe, European Union

1. Introduction

Yosef Lapid noted in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* that “[c]ulture and identity are staging a dramatic comeback in social theory and practice.” Focusing on the reflections of this comeback in the discipline of International Relations (IR), he explained that it was the outcome of two interconnected developments: the transformation of the global order that took place and a critical scrutiny in the discipline of IR that this transformation brought about. Leaving aside the argument that this might be culture and identity’s first true appearance in IR theory, it can be said that the resulting “moment of robust intellectual openness” provided scholars with an opportunity to rethink the existing categories of analysis and presented the possibility of an intellectual transformation in the discipline.

In this period, it was a number of alternative approaches, or “critical margins of the IR discipline” that derived their explanatory power from the significance they attributed to factors that were previously disregarded. The critique that many of these approaches brought

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2 Lapid, “Culture’s Ship,” 3.
forward was not about what mainstream scholars did or said but instead what they ignored, namely, “the content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics.” Accordingly, these alternative approaches aimed to demonstrate that the conception of IR as portrayed and theorised by mainstream approaches failed to reveal certain aspects of international politics.

Within the framework of these alternative approaches, “one topic that seems to be flashing in neon is ‘identity’.” Identity has usually been treated as a factor that deserves little attention, since mainstream approaches assumed “that all units in global politics have only one meaningful identity, that of self-interested states.” The underlying neorealist and neoliberal assumption regarding the similarities between states and their motives for action in the international arena forced them to treat identity and interests of states as exogenous and given. Building on their rationalist foundations, both theories focused on changes in state behaviour rather than changes in the interests and identities of states, and assumed that states were, and remained, alike. Those critical of these mainstream approaches, however, argued that the analysis of identity as an intervening factor would contribute to a better understanding of international politics by improving the discipline’s “proverbial toolbox.”

The period that witnessed a growing interest in the theme of identity in IR also saw the rise of a unique case study: the European Union (EU) as a world power in the making. The growing influence of the EU as one of the key players in international politics, and its increasing visibility and relevance within and outside the borders of the Union have put the topics of the EU’s nature, qualities, and actorness in the spotlight since the 1990s. This has resulted in a growing interest in the identity of the Union regarding its essence and impact at the European and global levels, not only in the framework of European Integration Studies, but also in IR. The EU was usually portrayed as an unprecedented political entity that had, or was attempting to construct, its own transnational identity above those of the individual Member States. It was assumed that this transnational identity affected not only European citizens as a new form of collective identification, but also the Member States and the Union itself in their relations with the wider world.

This article aims to analyse the representations through which the EU, as a distinctive international actor, constructed its identity in its foreign policy discourse within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) from a critical constructivist perspective. It will be argued that, instead of a conventional constructivist framework, a critical constructivist approach would not only help uncover the building blocks and key themes of this identity, but also demonstrate how representations of this identity evolved over the years. To this aim, the article will first briefly introduce the core assumptions of

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constructivism and explore how different variants within constructivism approached the topic of identity. It will then present a review of the constructivist literature on EU identity, highlighting the ways in which the critical constructivist approach could contribute to the existing debate. The final part of the article offers a critical constructivist analysis of EU identity that focuses particularly on the core concept of ‘Europe’ that dominated the Union’s foreign policy discourse, and illustrates its evolution since the early days of the process of political integration in Europe.

2. Constructivism and its Rise in the late 1990s

Among the alternative approaches that came to the fore in the 1990s, constructivism occupies a central place in terms of its focus on previously disregarded aspects of IR, namely the importance of ideational factors and the social nature of international affairs. Constructivism is also one of the main approaches that offered a comprehensive account of the formation and impact of identity in international relations, as well as its linkages to interests and actions.

As an approach in social theory, constructivism is a way of studying social relations based on “a social ontology which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings.”

Building on this, constructivism as an IR approach also embraces a social ontology, yet deals with larger social collectivities, usually in the form of states. Constructivists argue that as social beings, agents shape and are in turn shaped by the social structures in which they are situated. In this respect, constructivism challenges the assumption that the formation of states’ identities, interests, and preferences is prior and exogenous to social interaction.

For constructivists, though the international system includes both material and ideational factors, the former acquire meaning only through the latter. Thus, in contrast to mainstream scholars’ ‘desocialised’ understanding of material factors, it is argued that “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.”

Constructivists assume that the social structures in which material and ideational factors are embedded are defined by shared meanings and intersubjective understandings. If a certain social structure exists, it is because agents make it real and act in accordance with it. This implies that social structures exist “not in actors’ heads nor in material capabilities, but in practices.” Parallel to this, for constructivists, key concepts in the discipline of IR that shape theoretical and empirical debates are not fixed givens. These concepts, not only in the form of agents’ interests and identities, but also those that define the international system, such as anarchy, “are reified structures that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness.”

In the constructivist framework, identity proved to be a topic that was discussed extensively from a number of different perspectives. While these perspectives adhered to the same underlying assumptions, they differed from each other in terms of how they approached the process of social construction and the methods they used in their analyses.

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13 Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” 74.
2.1. Constructivism(s) and identity

In the 1990s, the rise of alternative approaches to world politics led to a reconceptualisation of the founding principles and existing categories in the discipline of IR. This contributed to an intensified debate between two rival camps – rationalism and reflectivism – regarding the foundations of the study of world politics. Approaches that were built on rationalist foundations sought to explain behavioural regularities and causal mechanisms at work by examining the nature of the international system.15 These approaches presupposed the existence of an international political reality and neutral facts regarding this reality waiting to be discovered through the systematic use of scientific methods. On the other hand, reflectivists used interpretative and non-positivist methods to study what they regarded as intersubjective or intertextual structures, institutions, and understandings in international politics. They assumed that facts and actions, as well as political reality, do not speak for themselves; instead, “they have to be narrated and interpreted in meaningful ways within a particular social, cultural and historical context.”16 This understanding implied that the focus of reflectivist approaches was not so much on determining the ‘real causes’ of events by establishing causal relationships between various factors and the resulting behaviour, but studying how specific interpretations of these events were made possible and came to dominate all others.

Following its introduction to the discipline of IR from social theory, constructivism was often described as occupying a middle ground between rationalist and reflectivist approaches. In fact, in an attempt to distinguish themselves from reflectivists, a number of leading constructivists such as Adler and Wendt argued that constructivism, through its emphasis on the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge and its rationalist epistemological and methodological foundations, should be assigned the role of facilitating a conversation between the two sides.17 They argued that constructivism formed a ‘via media’ between rationalist and reflectivist positions based on the premise that “while the ideational aspect of human social life has important implications for international politics, these do not include a rejection of ‘science’.”18

Yet, the adherence of these leading constructivists to rationalist and positivist principles in their attempt to find a middle way proved to be a point of disagreement in the overall constructivist camp. The problem with the via media version of constructivism was that it disregarded a number of different positions within the constructivist camp, including those that were much closer to reflectivism. Zehfuss noted that only those who adopted the ‘thinner’ via media version that was in debate with rationalism were regarded as “proper constructivists.”19 Those who preferred ‘thicker’ versions of constructivism, on the other hand, were generally overlooked.20

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While there is no commonly accepted categorisation of these different strands of constructivism, it is possible to analyse the constructivist programme as roughly divided into two: conventional and critical. While these two accounts agree on the fundamentals such as the need to ‘denaturalise’ the social world to reveal the human agency behind it, the key role played by shared understandings and meanings in the construction of social reality, and the mutual constitution of agency and structure, they differ from each other mainly in terms of their methodology and epistemology.

What can be classified as conventional constructivism occupies the middle ground between rationalism and reflectivism, has an intersubjective ontology, and a positivist epistemology and methodology based on hypothesis testing and causality. Conventional constructivists adhere to the assumption that an objective reality exists out there, which can be understood and explained through scientific methods. Conventional constructivists believe “in the possibility of attaining empirical knowledge without the mediation of language” and assume that objects exist independently of the meanings attached to them.

Conventional constructivists have a similar research agenda to that of mainstream IR theory, which focuses on explaining state behaviour. They differ from mainstream scholars, however, in terms of the importance they attach to ideational factors in shaping state behaviour. In fact, constructivists such as Ruggie, Adler, Katzenstein, Risse-Kappen, and Wendt aim to prove that ideational factors such as norms, rules, values, and identity, which are overlooked by mainstream approaches, have causal or semi-causal effects on state behaviour. Through its emphasis on “how ideational or normative structures constitute agents and their interests,” this version of constructivism differs from mainstream theories only in terms of its ontology, but not its epistemology or methodology.

While agreeing with conventional constructivists on the matter of ontology, critical constructivists distinguish themselves through their focus on discourse, as well as their criticism of the former’s reification of the state as the main object of analysis. The critical constructivist agenda that emerged in the late 1990s is founded upon the assumption that key

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22 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism,” 182. Recent manifestations of the ‘practice turn’ in IR aim to bridge the divide between these various different constructivism and other approaches, including poststructuralism and realism, by developing an ‘interparadigmatic research programme’. By focusing on what is broadly termed as practices (linguistic or otherwise), and thereby going beyond traditional levels of analysis, IR scholars of this persuasion study world politics as structured by international practices. This, however, does not surmount the key points of diversion that exist between various constructivisms in IR. For various reflections of the ‘practice turn’ in IR, see Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, International Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Chris Brown, “The Practice Turn”, Phronesis and Classical Realism: Towards a Prerotic International Political Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40, no.3 (2012): 439-456; Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31, no.3 (2002): 627-651.


objects of and concepts in the discipline of IR, such as ‘national interest,’ are not neutral, but are discursively constructed “through representations (of countries, peoples, etc.) and linguistic elements (nouns, adjectives, metaphors and analogies).” To explore how these concepts are constructed, critical constructivists engage in detailed studies of texts to understand the systems of meaning and representation in discourse.

In their analyses, critical constructivists are more pluralistic than their conventional counterparts in terms of methodology, which includes post-positivist methods such as discourse analysis. They are also “deeply skeptical of the possibility of formulating general covering laws.” Critical constructivists do not, however, deny the existence of a material world and assume, by differentiating between ontological objectivity and subjectivity, that it is only social reality that is constructed, not the natural one, and that discourse is essentially constitutive of the former. The key distinction between conventional and critical constructivism lies not in their assumptions regarding the existence of an objective world, but in the latter’s emphasis on language as an intermediary between the signifier and the signified, the word and the thing. Material reality exists, yet its meaning is established through discourse. Parallel to this, issues in world politics as well as subjects and their actions are dependent on discourse, as outside it they do not acquire meaning. For critical constructivists, meaning is created through the interactions between agents on an intersubjective basis. In this vein, meaning is not an individual or collective but a social phenomenon: “it is not that everyone has the same ‘ideas’ inside their heads, but rather that meaning inheres in the practices and categories through which people engage with each other and with the natural world.”

The differences between conventional and critical constructivism have a considerable impact on their respective accounts of identity. The conventional constructivist account of identity focuses on the social practices that produce particular identities and assumes that it is possible to identify a specific “set of conditions under which one can expect to see one identity or another.” Conventional constructivists also argue that particular identities imply certain actions and interests. To explore how specific identities shape agents’ actions and interests, they approach identity as an end product of the social practices of agents, as somewhat finalised and stable.

As opposed to this view, critical constructivists have a discursive approach to identity. Instead of linking identities to specific behavioural patterns, they are more concerned with how people come to identify with a certain identity and its associated narratives. They also focus on how agents draw on these identities to justify certain (foreign) policies instead of identifying the effects of these identities. Critical constructivism therefore “aims at exploding the myths associated with identity formation, whereas conventional constructivists wish to treat those identities as possible causes of action.”

Another key difference between these two accounts of identity relate to the dynamics

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29 Fierke, “Constructivism,” 185.
32 Ibid., 183-184.
of the process of identity construction. Conventional constructivists deal with how states acquire specific identities in the process of “interaction with other states; they come to see themselves and each other in terms of the subject positions that are constituted by the social structure of international politics.” Critical constructivists, on the other hand, focus on the role played by practices of ‘othering’ in the process of identity construction. Accordingly, the critical constructivist identity requires the existence of an Other, as it is regarded incomplete without it. As opposed to this thinking, the conventional constructivist account is based on the construction of identity in social relations and does not require the existence of an Other. In fact, conventional constructivists assume that positive identification with the Other would eventually lead to the construction of collective identities on a larger scale. Weldes argued that, by assuming state identities are formed only through inter-state interaction, Wendt (and other conventional constructivists) treated the state “as a black box whose internal workings are irrelevant to the construction of state identities and interests.” She explained that

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\text{[the meanings that objects, events, and actions have for states are necessarily the meanings they have for those individuals who act in the name of the state. And these state officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate onto which meanings are only written as a result of interactions among states.]
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Instead, these officials act on the basis of their interpretations of these objects, events and actions, which are based on cultural raw materials and extant resources provided by the security imaginary of a state. In line with the critical constructivists’ assumption that objects and events do not present themselves directly to the observer and that they need to be interpreted, it is argued that the linguistic as well as cultural resources that form an actor’s security imaginary also define its identity as well as its interests, preferences, and actions.

In terms of its key assumptions, the critical constructivist account of identity is in some ways similar to the poststructuralist one, particularly regarding the role of discursive practices in the constitution of identity. Both approaches highlight the inherent link between identity and foreign policy: “Foreign policy problems, and especially acute problems, or ‘crises,’ are political acts, not facts; they are social constructions forged by state officials in the course of producing and reproducing state identity.” Every subject ‘performs’ its identity in its relations with its external realm through its foreign policy. By focusing on the performative production of identity through foreign policy, critical constructivist scholars thereby distinguish themselves from conventional constructivists who presuppose the existence of an already formed state identity that precedes and shapes foreign policy. Another key resemblance between the critical constructivist and poststructuralist approaches regards the dynamics of identity construction. Like poststructuralists, critical constructivists attach great importance to practices of othering in the construction of identity, as “[a]lterity and difference are central to the processes by which individuals, groups or states build a sense of identity in the contrast between themselves and others.”

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33 Rumelili, “Constructing identity and relating to difference,” 31.
34 See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Wendt argued that through co-operation and interaction, states can form a collective identity and collective interests “which will in turn help them overcome the collective action problems that beset egoists.” Ibid., 337.
35 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 9.
36 Weldes, Constructing National Interests.
37 Ibid., 219.
Consequently, though the two different versions of constructivism are based on similar foundations, the accounts they offer, particularly in relation to construction and reproduction of identity, differ from each other in terms of the role attributed to discourse and the dynamics of identity construction. It can be concluded that critical constructivists offer a much more nuanced understanding that aims to explain how specific identities are produced, reproduced, or altered through the discursive practices of the agents, while conventional constructivists focus on the causal or semi-causal impact of identity on state behaviour.

3. The Construction of EU Identity in Foreign Policy

3.1. Constructivism(s) and EU identity: The state of the art

The ideas of conventional constructivists, particularly in terms of the gradual formation of collective identities, served as a source of inspiration for many studies on EU identity. Building on these ideas, scholars explored how the identity of the EU is constructed “in the course of social interaction; through encounters with other actors and in the context of the external environment of institutions and events which enable and constrain EU action” and acquired through internalisation or socialisation by the citizens of the Union. By establishing linkages between how identities at the national and European levels are constructed, studies drew parallels between the processes of nation formation and the creation of a ‘European demos’ within the EU, and assumed that a collective identity was imperative for the Union to function and survive. In line with this, they focused on the different methods through which this identity is constructed in the various policy areas and initiatives of the EU, and the effects of the process of integration and EU identity on the identities, policies, and domestic structures of Member and Candidate States under the heading of Europeanisation.

A number of constructivist studies also suggested that the EU, as a value-based polity, is a new type of international actor with an identity that is not based on exclusion, providing non-members with the possibility of drawing closer to it by adopting its values and norms. In one of the most cited examples of this view, Manners, focusing on the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity, categorised the Union as a normative power whose identity is based on the core norms of peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In later works, Manners, Whitman and a number of other scholars focused on the co-constitution of role representations of the EU and polity perspectives, and explored how the identity of the EU is constructed at the international level and influences its external relations.

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As opposed to conventional constructivism, the critical constructivist perspective has not had a considerable impact on studies on EU identity. While a limited number of scholars focused on the role of discourse in the EU’s governance and political order, with respect to EU identity, analyses from this perspective were few. In one of the rare self-proclaimed critical constructivist works on identity, Rumelili dealt with the EU’s different modes of differentiation in the constitution of its identity. She argued that, by emphasising the significance of difference in the constitution of identity and meaning, and the performative constitution of identity, critical constructivism offered a valuable alternative to what she labelled as liberal constructivism, as put forward by Wendt, Checkel, Finnemore, and Sikkink. In a similar tone, Diez argued that in the process of differentiating itself from its Others, the EU used various forms of othering. He maintained that in articulations of the EU as a normative power, the Union used various strategies from approaching the Other as an existential threat to viewing the Other as merely different from the Self.

Consequently, the conventional constructivist framework proved to be the most commonly used perspective to study the gradual construction of collective identity at the European level. This monopoly was maintained despite the rise of alternative perspectives that focused on the role discourse plays in the constitution and maintenance of identities. The dominance of conventional constructivism eventually led to a ‘conceptual overstretch,’ within the framework of which identity became a gap-filler in the academic and public discourse, often leading to “a myriad of options for interpretation and misinterpretation,” particularly in the absence of a clear research agenda and methodological guidelines on the part of conventional constructivism. This study argues that the critical constructivist approach would contribute to the existing debate not only in terms of demonstrating the evolution of the process of identity construction, but also by revealing the key building blocks upon which the EU’s identity project is founded. To this aim, it offers an analysis of the EU’s foreign policy discourse with a particular focus on the core concept of ‘Europe’ and the way it is represented in relation to the EU.

3.2. A critical constructivist analysis of EU identity

An actor’s foreign policy is the key sphere in which that actor defines itself in relation to its various Others and performs its identity, thereby reproducing a specific narrative of this identity. As a unique type of international actor, the EU has a wide array of policy areas whose aims and impact can be classified under external relations, including trade and aid. Yet, the EU’s political relations with its external realm (or in a narrower sense of the term, its foreign policy) are best encapsulated in the CFSP and its predecessor, the European Political Co-operation (EPC). It was through this policy area that various discursive agents within the EU, such as representatives of the Union’s institutions, the High Representative, and leaders of Member States, defined the EU as a key global player in international politics and carved it a distinctive role to play. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the only direct reference to the identity of the Union in its Founding Treaties is in relation to the CFSP, the main battleground of the EU’s identity.


44 Rumelili, “Constructing identity and relating to difference.”


The following paragraphs analyse the EU’s identity representations in its foreign policy discourse (originating from various EU institutions and representatives) as the key discursive agents in the process of identity construction. The texts analysed include policy documents, commissioned reports, speeches, and declarations, and are assessed through a Foucauldian discourse analysis that focuses on the key representations that together form the many facets of the EU’s identity. The assumption here is that the EU’s identity project is a fluid and multi-faceted one that builds on various representations of what the EU stands for in the world, and the roles and qualities attributed to it. Accordingly, the analysis of the foreign policy texts focuses on how the discursive agents within the EU constructed the identity of the Union in relation to a specific conception of ‘Europe’ as the core concept and the symbolic reference on which this identity is built. In line with the argument that foreign policy debates, though composed of a number of individual texts, share and converge around a smaller number of core themes, it is concluded that the core concept of ‘Europe,’ which was often used interchangeably with the EU and identified through a systematic reading of the policy texts, serves as the main foundation upon which EU identity is built. Through its focus on the core concept of ‘Europe’ as simultaneously a geographical, cultural, and historic entity, this study not only aims to explore the key building blocks of the EU’s identity, but also explain the evolution of the concept of ‘Europe’ as a formative theme in the Union’s identity.

3.2.1. The EU and the changing conception of ‘Europe’

As a concept, ‘Europe’ has been ascribed a vital role as a ‘vehicle of identity production’ for the EU. It was the concept that was deemed to best symbolise what the EU stood for and represented in the international arena, and define how it was to behave in its foreign policy. The analysis of the EU’s foreign policy texts demonstrated that the meaning of the term ‘Europe’ fluctuated in the EU discourse over time. In most cases, it was used almost synonymously with the EU (for example, in the form of ‘European unification,’ ‘European unity,’ ‘construction of Europe,’ or the ‘idea of Europe’), which implied that the Union’s identity also assumed different meanings parallel to the way in which the concept of ‘Europe’ was defined. Spatially, the dominant conception of ‘Europe’ was by and large limited to the Member States of the European Community (EC)/EU. At the same time, its borders were flexible in the sense that they were open to other states that might, in the future, join the EC/EU. Parallel to this understanding, it was argued that whilst the EC “remain[ed] the original nucleus from which European unity has been developed and intensified,” its enlargement to include “other countries of this continent…would undoubtedly help the Communities to grow.”

50 In other cases, ‘Europe’ ostensibly referred to a geographical entity, a continent or region, whose specific borders remained vague.
51 A few references to a broader and seemingly geographical conception of ‘Europe’ often seemed straightforward and neutral. A clear example of this was the geographical precondition for membership to the EC: Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome stipulated that “(a)ny European State may apply to become a member of the Community.” However, keeping in mind that that there is no commonly accepted geographical definition of ‘Europe’ in the Founding Treaties or elsewhere, it can be concluded that the ‘Europeanness’ of a state was in fact open to interpretation and was by no means neutral.
In this respect, the EC/EU was usually assigned the role of a leader in its region, and the ultimate protector of the heritage, values, and norms that ‘Europe’ was based on. It was also represented as the greatest contributor to the current state of good relations and peace in the region, as it was assumed that the continent “has changed, partly because of the Union’s successes” and its “contribution to an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity.”

The commonalities that formed the basis of ‘Europe’ were defined on the basis of its continuous existence throughout history—a shared past, present and future—and defined the parameters of ‘Europe’s relations with the outside world. In terms of the historical dimension of these commonalities, there were various references to the common cultural heritage and responsibilities of the ‘European’ states in addition to a number of references to a common ‘European’ civilisation in the early texts. The Dooge Report, for example, argued that the promotion of common values of civilisation was one of the priorities on the path to establishing a Union, taking into account that “[t]he contemplated European Union will not rest on an economic community alone.” The Report further stated that “European culture is one of the strongest links between the States and peoples of Europe. It is part of the European identity.”

In terms of the responsibilities that accompanied such a historical legacy, particular attention was paid to the role ‘Europe’ could play in the improvement of the relations between the East and the West, possibly in the form of a mediator and facilitator, and the historical links that existed between a number of Member States and their former colonies. It was also argued that a more united ‘Europe’ should be “capable of assuming the responsibilities incumbent on it by virtue of its political role, its economic potential and its manifold links with other peoples.”

In these early texts, frequent references were also made to the common values, norms, and principles that formed the basis of ‘Europe’, which were often linked to the shared heritage of the Member States. As an example, in the statement issued following their meeting in Bonn, Member State leaders justified the motive to form the union of ‘Europe’ based on “the spiritual values and political traditions which form their common heritage” and “the awareness of the great tasks which Europe is called upon to fulfil within the community of free peoples in order to safeguard liberty and peace in the world.” In the same vein, the 1970 Luxembourg Report on the future of foreign policy co-operation stated that “[a] united Europe should be based on a common heritage of respect for the liberty and rights of man and bring together democratic States with freely elected parliaments.” These ‘European’ norms and values in the form of democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and respect for human rights laid the foundations of the present political reality of ‘Europe’ and brought the Member States together as a community.

In the period that followed the establishment of the CFSP in 1992, references to the ‘civilisational’ commonalities that brought the peoples and states of ‘Europe’ together became less frequent. Only a limited number of texts, mostly originating from individual
representatives of the EU, mentioned the Member States’ underlying cultural and spiritual commonalities and highlighted the need to take further action to defend and promote them in the Union’s external sphere. Some of these commonalities were derived from a shared ‘European’ history, as in the case of “a civilisation deeply rooted in religious and civic values.” Others originated from ‘Europe’s shared history and informed the current form, goals, and relations of the EU, as well as its future. These remarks were accompanied by increasingly frequent references to the norms, values, and principles that the EU is considered to be built upon, in the form of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms. The Union was thus represented as a ‘community of values,’ membership to which was open only to those who shared a commitment to them.

In this period, references to a broader and almost hierarchical conception of ‘Europe’ also became somewhat more frequent, which corresponded to the changes taking place in the region following the end of the Cold War. Now ‘Europe’ included Central and Eastern European countries as well as the Baltic States in the form of prospective Member States. Yet, these countries were sometimes referred to as the ‘other Europe,’ different from what was possibly perceived as the ‘real Europe,’ i.e., the existing and mainly Western Member States. The relationship between the existing Member States and this ‘other Europe’ was not clearly defined. A number of texts referred to the countries of the ‘other Europe’ as part of the larger ‘European family’ despite their different experiences and histories, while other texts talked about the responsibility of the EU to unite, or reunite, ‘Europe,’ implying that there was no real separation between its constituent parts. A number of documents even mentioned “overcoming the divisions of Europe and restoring the unity of the continent whose peoples share a common heritage and culture,” highlighting a deeper level of historical unity between the different parts of ‘Europe.’

In the last decade of the CFSP, references to the ‘European’ norms, values, and principles (respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, the rule of law and equality) were present in almost all of the texts. These notions were also seen as forming the core of the EU’s foreign policy, and in parallel, the Union was given the responsibility to uphold and promote them in its relations with the wider world:

The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which its seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

In this period, references to the common cultural and civilisational foundations of ‘Europe’ were almost non-existent, as agents chose instead to define the building blocks of the EU’s identity in the form of its shared ‘European’ values, norms, and principles, possibly as a response to the increasingly heterogeneous composition of the Union and its changing international context.

It can be concluded that in the EU’s foreign policy discourse, the meaning of ‘Europe,’ as the core concept on which the EU’s identity is built, has varied. In many of the texts

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61 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1/24, 23.
analysed, the term ‘Europe’ was used almost interchangeably with the EC/EU. Therefore, the borders of ‘Europe’ roughly corresponded to those of the EC/EU. This ‘Europe’, however, was not a geographical unit. Instead, it was represented as a historic entity based on a set of commonalities, which formed the building blocks of the EU’s identity. These commonalities, as well as the temporal dimension of this conception of ‘Europe,’ were portrayed in a continuous manner, linking the shared past of ‘Europe,’ its present reality, and its common future. Similarly, in the early texts that originated from the European Council, EU representatives, and experts’ committees, ‘Europe’ was represented as built on a common civilisation, culture, history, and heritage, features of which were reflected in the present reality of the Union. The commonalities that brought together the states and peoples of ‘Europe’ also included shared objectives, interests, ideals, values, and principles. These commonalities were then linked to the future of ‘Europe’ in the form of a common destiny for its states and peoples.

This view of ‘Europe’ as a historic entity united by a cultural and civilisational heritage, however, did not survive the 1990s; the focus turned to the normative foundations of ‘Europe’ in the form of the values, norms, and principles its identity was based upon, and the standards it aimed to uphold in its relations with the wider world. This in turn was reflected in the way in which the EU was defined as a global actor, whose identity and foreign policy behaviour were themselves defined by the EU’s commitment to democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and solidarity. This normative facet of the identity of ‘Europe’ today best describes what the EU stands for in the world and shapes its relations with its external realm despite its limitations as a foreign policy actor.

4. Conclusion

As an approach in IR, constructivism offers a comprehensive account of the social nature of world politics. By approaching identity as a social construct produced and reproduced through the interactions of agents, constructivism puts forward a set of means through which identity can be conceptualised and analysed in international affairs. Yet it would be wrong to treat constructivism as a cohesive and unitary approach in IR. Instead, it can roughly be divided into two quite distinct perspectives – conventional and critical constructivism – that share a core number of assumptions, but, at the same time, diverge from each other in terms of methodology and epistemology. It is argued in this study that while the conventional account is helpful in understanding the impact of identity in international affairs, it fails to provide a satisfactory account of how the dynamics of the process of identity construction operate. The critical constructivist account, on the other hand, focuses on the discursive processes through which identity is constructed and adopts a more pluralistic methodology to study the dynamics of construction and reproduction.

By adopting a critical constructivist approach to identity, this article aimed to illustrate how the identity of the EU was constructed in its foreign policy discourse in relation to the concept of ‘Europe.’ It was argued that representations of this core concept illustrated the foundations upon which the EU’s identity was built. The term ‘Europe’ was often used synonymously with the EC/EU in foreign policy discourse. This ‘Europe’ was initially portrayed an entity founded upon a shared history in the form of a unique civilisation with a shared cultural and humanistic heritage. These common historical features of ‘Europe’ were
then linked to its present through the values, norms, and principles derived from its history in the form of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equality, and social justice, as well as the common interests and responsibilities of its states and peoples. The EU was also projected into the future in the form of the common destiny of these states and peoples. This conception of ‘Europe’ was represented in a temporally continuous manner, as an entity that has existed throughout history in an almost uninterrupted form and, as such, symbolising the foundations upon which the EU is built.

Changes in the EU’s composition and structure, as well in its international context, implied that such an exclusive, cultural, and civilisational view of ‘Europe’ was no longer feasible. Therefore, the last two decades have witnessed a shift in the way in which ‘Europe’ was conceptualised. In this period, ‘Europe’ came to be characterised as founded upon a core set of values, norms, and principles derived from its history and reflected in its present political reality. These concepts, commitment to which is identified as one of the preconditions for membership into the Union, today form the basis of the EU’s identity and make the EU a defender of these values and norms in not only its neighborhood but also the wider world.

**Bibliography**


Causes and Consequences of the Recent European Crisis: Can Polanyi help us understand problems of the Eurozone?

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Abstract

By evoking economic turmoil in Europe, the global crisis of 2007-2008 had important impacts on the economic and political integration of the European Union (EU), leading to a reassessment of the relationship between the core–periphery countries and the model of the ‘democratic European welfare state.’ Most studies that address this problem in the EU focus on the fiscal mismanagement and welfare policies of the non-core or periphery countries (i.e. Greece) as the main culprit. Unlike the mainstream ideas, this paper explains the recent European crisis as a result of the liberalization and deregulation process that started with the second globalization wave in the 1970s. This paper also questions whether the recent radical nationalist trend in the EU countries can be explained as a byproduct of the crisis, using Polanyi’s notion of “double movement”.

Keywords: European crisis, Eurozone, Polanyi, double movement, swings of the pendulum

1. Introduction

When we look at the ‘grand theories’ to explain social and economic crises, such as those postulated by Marx, Schumpeter, Polanyi, and to some extent Keynes, all, even if they have different world views, agree on the ‘self-destructive’ power of capitalism that surfaces during these crises. The common ground among these theories is the institutional problems and imbalances that are created by unharnessed and expansionist capitalism. According to Marx and Schumpeter, this feature of capitalism will result in capitalism terminating itself endogenously. While Keynes advocates government intervention to eliminate these imbalances,1 Polanyi asserts that protectionist movements and regulatory policies must emerge endogenously to protect capitalism from destroying itself and from deteriorating society, a concept he calls double movement.2

According to Polanyi, double movement is the end result of self-regulating markets,3 whose functioning requires commodification of labor, land, and money.4 Polanyi explains

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1 Keynesian reasons for imbalances can be categorized under two main intertwined issues: uncertainty (S.E. Phelps,”Capitalism and Keynes: From the Treatise on Probability to the General Theory” (paper presented at the Conference Commemorating Keynes 1883-1943, Palazzo Mundell, Santa Colomba (Siena), 4-6 July 2006, 2-4) and sticky prices and wages, both of which create inefficient results and coordination failures between aggregate demand and aggregate supply in capitalist economies (F.J.C. De Carvalho, ”Keynes and the Reform of Capitalist Social Order,”Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 33, no.2 (Winter 2008-2009): 191-196). Contrary to liberal ideas, these problems, according to Keynes, are internal to capitalism and there is not endogenous remedy for them. Thus, Keynes advocates government intervention to solve such problems.


3 Self-regulation implies that all production is for sale in the market and that all income derives from such sales (Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 69).

4 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 68-76.
this process as an unnatural and inhumane procedure. For example, in the course of labor commodification, human beings become agents who sell their labor, which is only possible through the separation of economic life from social life. Economic life necessitates rational, self-interested, atomized hermits isolated from their social lives, for example, as fathers and mothers, friends, and citizens. This division results in constant struggle between these two roles, which leads to rising social problems and to fundamental changes in the economic and social structure as a counter movement. Similarly, the environment is being destroyed as a result of this commodification process. Although at first glance, protectionism, and for this purpose, regulating capitalism, looks like a remedy for such problems, intervention creates many problems of its own and much tension in self-regulating markets. Interference contradicts with the workings of capitalist institutions, creates new crises, and leads to catastrophe, such as occurred with the rise of fascism in the 1930s.\(^5\)

To summarize, the continuous tendency to expand self-regulating markets, and reaction to that expansion to then protect human beings and society from its effects, creates ongoing counter movements between liberalism and protectionism. Indeed, when global economic policies are examined as swings of a pendulum between protectionism and liberalism, three eras since the Industrial Revolution can be identified, both at the domestic and at the international level:

1. First Globalization: 1870-1914 and the Interwar Years: 1914-1944;

The paper continues as follows: First, the periods are explained from the perspective of the double movement notion, with an emphasis on swings of the pendulum between liberal and protectionist economic policies. For this purpose, Section II explains the swings by categorizing the above-noted eras as liberal between 1870 and 1914, protectionist between 1944 and 1973, and liberal from the early 1970s until today. The second part of the paper shows that the recent European crisis and political formations are not independent events. On the contrary, they are just a continuation of the latest liberal swing, in accord with Polanyi’s double movement notion. To elucidate this point, Section III questions the EU economic imbalances by focusing on the relationship between the periphery and core countries, which started with the introduction of liberalization procedures to become a single, big, homogenous market. The main aim of this section is to study the reasons for the imbalances that triggered the European crisis by examining the flaws of the Maastricht Treaty as a design for the region’s monetary union. The last part of the article connects Polanyi’s ideas to the consequences of the Euro crisis.

2. Swings of the Pendulum

Polanyi himself explains the first era (between 1870 and 1930) as the struggle between liberal and protectionist ideologies. He starts with the industrial revolution and the enormous welfare and growth increase that also resulted in major social problems over the following 60 years.

\(^5\) This point is especially underlined by Özgür and Özel. According to the authors, double movement is usually understood in a narrower sense as a protective counter movement at the level of class struggle or government intervention. However, it should be understood not only as a counter movement but also as the reason for strains on the market system as a by-product of protectionist counter movements (Gökçer Özgür and Hüseyin Özel, "Double Movement, Globalization and The Crisis," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 72, no.4 (October, 2013): 898; Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 133-134).
The four main institutions of nineteenth-century Western civilization – the so-called four pillars, which helped encourage capitalism until the 1930s – began to collapse under capitalist expansion. The first pillar was the balance-of-power system, which prevented the occurrence of long and devastating wars among the Great Powers. The second was the international gold standard, which symbolized a unique organization of world economy. Financial and capital liberalization across nations was guaranteed mainly by this system. The third was the liberal state, which ensured the workings of self-regulating markets, themselves the fourth pillar.6

2.1. The first globalization and the interwar years: A liberal era

During the first pendulum swing, the domestic and international institutions noted above worked well in the service of self-regulating market economies.7 Core European countries were growing steadily and avoiding big wars. This stability lasted for 100 years, until the beginning of the twentieth century, when the four pillars began crumbling. The balance of power was changing because of colonial rivalries among strong nations.8 Within nations, liberal ideologies were losing ground due to a counter movement in the form of socialism, and the international gold standard system was creating instabilities. Still, the gold standard would wait until the 1930s to collapse, which would bring down the unharnessed, free markets. Under these conditions, the First World War was inescapable.

After the war, big changes occurred in the world order. Countries had suspended the gold standard system to finance the war, and after the war, they wanted to return to that system, despite economic obstacles. Because of excessive war spending, inflation rates had increased in many countries. Thus, returning to the gold standard at pre-war prices required deflation, which meant unemployment. While citizens, and therefore government, had accepted deflation and unemployment before the war, the spread of democracy, socialism, and powerful trade unions meant that governments could no longer ignore such issues.9 These institutional changes were the result of the counter movement to liberal markets at the class struggle level as part of the double movement notion, which occurred gradually during the liberal era. Under the new circumstances, deflation was creating adverse effects on the economy because wage cuts were not viable in labor markets but prices were decreasing. Consequently, labor was becoming expensive and output was declining. The changing and developing institutions, i.e. labor unions and minimum wage regulations, built up as a counter movement to self-regulating markets and were hampering the latter’s smooth functioning. After great efforts to resurrect the gold standard in the 1920s, by the dawn of the 1930s, beginning with the UK, countries began to discard it.

In 1929, the Great Depression further shocked the world economy, lasting until the mid-1940s. Polanyi explains the Depression as one of the consequences of the hopeless efforts of the world’s main economies to save the gold standard: The US was trying to back up the British pound by decreasing its interest rate to avoid capital flow from the UK. However, this triggered a credit expansion and boom that led to the bust of 1929.10 All global economies were badly affected by this crisis and trust in liberalism was losing ground, which led to the rise of totalitarian regimes in 1930s’ Europe, such as in Germany and Italy. At this point,

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we can turn to Polanyi’s important idea that the “rise of fascism was the result of the liberal utopia of self regulating markets.” These events prepared the ground for the Second World War, which ended the liberal era: the pendulum began to swing toward protectionism.

2.2. The postwar period: The rise of the state

After World War I, Keynesian economics, which advised harnessing capitalism, gained popularity around the world. Thus, in the second swing of the pendulum, the liberal focus was replaced by a protectionist movement and the welfare state idea. This wave continued until the late 1970s in Europe. The Keynesian idea pinpointed government engagement and regulations in economic management, and this advice was followed in many economies. A new international monetary system, Bretton Woods, was established during this time.

Bretton Woods was another fixed exchange rate system, yet quite different than the international gold standard. The open economy trilemma asserts that fixed exchange rate regimes can only be combined with monetary autonomy at the expense of unrestricted capital mobility. It follows, therefore, that unrestricted capital mobility can only be combined with monetary autonomy at the expense of a fixed exchange rate regime. To put it another way, the international gold standard regime was a fixed exchange rate regime, and it was combined with unrestricted capital mobility and no monetary autonomy. Thus, there was no monetary policy application among the rules of the game. During the heyday of this system, liberal ideas prevailed, which did not advocate economic policy applications anyway. After the 1940s, however, together with protectionism and regulations, monetary policy implementations began to gain importance. Keynes himself, as the British representative at the Bretton Woods, New Hampshire conference that developed (and was a namesake for) the new system, wanted a much more flexible system than the gold standard, in which monetary policies would be an important tool. Because Bretton Woods was a fixed exchange rate system combined with monetary autonomy, consequently, according to the trilemma, capital controls must be restricted. In these respects, – flexibility and capital controls – Bretton Woods was different than the international gold standard system. However, these properties were also the causes of its instability. Although capital mobility was restricted, speculators found ways around this by borrowing from abroad, by delaying payment for goods, or by lending by forwarding money in advance.

Nevertheless, the main problem for Bretton Woods came from the US. In Bretton Woods, the US dollar was the only currency fixed against the price of gold: 1 ounce of gold was $35. All other currencies in this system were fixed in value against the dollar. Although the US committed to preserve the dollar price of gold, it could not uphold that promise. Its involvement in the Vietnam War doubled inflation in the country, which meant overvaluation of the dollar. Eventually, the US devalued the dollar to preserve the system but it could not stop inflation, and gold convertibility was finally abandoned in 1973. This was the end of the Bretton Woods international monetary system. This event, along with other problems that we touch upon briefly in the next section, created a loss of confidence in Keynesian ideas and directed the pendulum toward liberal policies again.

13 Ibid., 172-174,
2.3. The swing toward the second globalization and liberalization: 1973 to today

Although the Bretton Woods system was prone to destabilizing properties, with the help of some convenient recovery conditions after World War II, such as high profits and investments and technology transfers, Keynesian policies delivered almost 25 years of growth around the world, between 1950 and 1973. This period was called the Golden Age. However, the political economy of demand management tended to make politicians more willing to increase spending in difficult times than to raise taxes in good times, and as a consequence, most Western economies built up considerable debt in the 1970s, which increased their inflation rates. Another problem in this period was the supply shock due to the increasing price of petrol, and for the first time, stagnation and inflation were seen together. The name of this crisis was *stagflation*. Liberals agreed that it was the consequence of too much government regulation, which resulted in increasing inefficiencies, i.e., increasing production costs, because of constant intervention in markets. According to this thinking, another counter movement was necessary to allow self-regulating markets to function smoothly again. These ideas began the most recent swing to liberalization, but this era has also witnessed important crises: the global crisis of 2007 and 2008 and the Eurozone crisis. These crises shared some similar sources, such as monetary expansion after the 1990s. The general glut of savings in developing Asian countries, which provided ‘cheap money’ for the world, especially affected both crises. This point was underlined by economist Ben Bernanke in a speech about financing the US current account deficit.\(^\text{14}\) From this standpoint, we cannot think of the Eurozone crisis as an independent event from the global crisis. On the contrary, it is a continuation of the events that started with financial deregulations and affected the US and other countries in the world in terms of easy access to other countries’ savings. Nevertheless, the Euro crisis also had its own and different stimuli. It can be said that even if the global crisis had not played a catalyzing role, the Eurozone would still have been prone to crisis.

Some studies of the Eurozone crisis focus on the fiscal debt created by the periphery countries.\(^\text{15}\) However, other studies show that, except for Greece and Italy, governmental fiscal debt was not endemic to the periphery in the Eurozone.\(^\text{16}\) If we look only at the GIPSI countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy) their average debt/GDP ratio had declined from 88% to 75% between 1999 and 2007, before the Eurozone crisis.\(^\text{17}\) In addition, increasing indebtedness of many of the European periphery countries since the early 2000s stemmed not from government debt but from private debt.\(^\text{18}\) These findings suggest looking for alternative views to the Eurozone crisis rather than focusing only on the fiscal debts of some countries as the sole reason for it.

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\(^{17}\) Krugman, "Eurozone Problems."

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
3. Euro Zone Deregulation and Imbalances

3.1. Liberalization in the EU toward a single market

After the collapse of Bretton Woods and with liberalization beginning in the second globalization era, around the world nominal\(^9\) deregulations were accelerating in Europe as well. During the 1980s and 1990s most countries in the EU lifted capital controls and deregulated interest rates to achieve a ‘single market’ in the financial system (Table 1).\(^{20}\) These regulations were the antecedent of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), before the introduction of the Euro in 1999. The Maastricht Treaty focused on the economic convergence necessary before the EU countries could undertake a common currency.\(^{21}\) The idea of the convergence criteria adopted in the EU and the EMU (European Monetary Union) was followed by postulates of the “theory of optimum currency area.” Optimum currency area requires both real and nominal convergences among regions that form the Union. Yet, in the Maastricht Treaty, mostly only nominal convergence criteria were laid down, such as convergence in inflation, exchange rate, and interest rate. Budget deficit-to-GDP ratio and government debt-to-GDP ratio were confined to three percent and 40% respectively among the member countries.

Convergence in real terms, such as productivity rates, were overlooked and probably left to the workings of the market forces.\(^{22}\) Or perhaps, if convergence in real terms was considered, examining it was postponed, given the difficult and long-term nature of the issues, such as fiscal convergence.

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<tr>
<td>Other Euro Countries</td>
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<td>Non-Euro Countries</td>
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</table>

Source: E.P. Caldentey and M. Vernengo “The Euro Imbalances”.

According to the Chinn-Ito index, a value of 100 means complete liberalization.

Core countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

Non-core countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

Other Euro countries: Estonia, Malta, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

Non-Euro countries: Sweden and the United Kingdom.

3.2. Intra-area imbalances

The adverse economic effects of the Maastricht Treaty and other issues in attaining a single market stemmed from two intertwined channels. One problem was fixing exchange rates among member countries to eliminate competitive exchange rate devaluations. However, devaluating exchange rates is not the only way of becoming competitive. If a country’s wages are lower than its productivity, wage deflation is created, and decreasing production

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19. Here, the term “nominal” is used as a broader concept, almost in a philosophical context, which accentuates the opposite of “real.” From this perspective it mainly covers the financial and monetary variables.
Causes and Consequences... costs increases a country’s competitiveness. Bibow convincingly explains how this strategy has been applied by Germany since the 2000s to boost its exports and consequently create current account imbalances in the EU.\footnote{J. Bibow, “The Euro Debt Crisis and Germany's Euro Trilemma,” Levy Economic Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No: 721 (2012).} Importantly, the decline in labor cost was not due to any acceleration in productivity growth, but in wage restraint, which gave an extra push to German exports. Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands were other countries with relatively low labor costs and thus current account surpluses. Bibow adds that these countries used the surpluses to consolidate their own public finances to match the Maastricht Treaty regulations.\footnote{Bibow, “The Euro Debt Crisis.”} However, labor costs were higher in periphery countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. With the regulations after Maastricht, these countries lost the ability to devaluate their exchange rates to compete with core countries. This situation directly decreased their exports and increased imports within the union, and they started to run current account deficits, in contrast to the core countries that had current account surpluses (Graph 1).\footnote{For the detailed numbers used in the graph, see Table 2 in the Appendix.} The labor market convergence thus did not occur as it was supposed to.

The second problem was credit expansion. Together with interest rate convergence, which lowered interest rates,\footnote{The average secondary market yields of 10-year government bonds for core and periphery countries stood at 6% and 10% respectively, and reached 5% for both country groups in 2002, when the Euro was implemented (Caldentey and Vernengo, “The Euro Imbalances”).} and deregulation of capital movements in European countries, borrowing became easy (Graph 2).\footnote{For the detailed numbers that are used in the graph, see Table 2 in the Appendix.} Consequently, core countries’ surpluses were flowing to periphery countries to fund their deficits. Capital inflow to the periphery was decreasing interest rates even further and hence increasing the likelihood of bubbles, as had happened in the US.\footnote{Paul Krugman, “Currency Regimes.”} The reckless global adventures of European banks were also increasing the possibility of crisis. Indeed, housing bubbles were created in Ireland, Spain, and Italy. Between 1996 and 2006, house prices increased as much as 182% in Ireland, 115% in Spain, and 51% in Italy.\footnote{Suzanne Kapner, “Study Finds Endemic European Housing Bubble,” Financial Times, February 14, 2011.} The private indebtedness of these countries increased till the bubble burst and gave way to the European crisis following the global crisis. Not all countries were subject to bubbles, but they were still put in a fragile position because of their current account deficits. Especially for countries such as Greece, that also had problems such as high public debts, the global crisis created detrimental effects. Worst of all, countries’ abilities to use countercyclical policies were hampered by the Maastricht Treaty and there was no supranational institution to instill proper fiscal policies when the system failed.
Graph 1: Current Account Balance in Selected Eurozone Countries.
*Source:* Eurostat yearbook 2012.

Graph 2: Interest Rate Convergence in Selected Countries.
*Source:* Eurostat yearbook 2012.
4. Final Thoughts

The 2007 crisis exacerbated the economic conditions of the Eurozone. Increasing sovereign debt due to bailouts reached an all-time high of 92.2% of the zone’s GDP in 2013. Production decreased by 1.8% in 2009. Increasing unemployment rates (Graph 3), austerity measures, and decreasing wages and social benefits also ensued. As Feldstein mentions, some of the countries would clearly have had lower unemployment, a smaller national debt, a more-competitive international position, and better prospects for the future had they had never been part of the EMU. Also, political relations within Europe would be less confrontational.30 Indeed, the recent picture reflects disintegration, rather than integration, especially for the periphery. However, negative economic effects are not the only outcomes; other important implications for the future of Europe and the world also must be noted. The recent European Parliament Elections showed that far-right movements with similarities to 1930s fascism received a significant number of votes: The Front National in France (25%), Golden Dawn in Greece (10%), the Danish People’s Party in Denmark (27%), Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (12%), the Freedom Party in Austria (20%), and Jobbik in Hungary (15%). Members of Jobbik have called for Jews to sign a special register on the grounds that they might pose a “national security risk.”31

Since the Second World War, Europe has been the citadel of individual freedom, multiculturalism, tolerance, social progress, and welfare.32 So what is happening in Europe now? Seeking an answer to that question leads to Polanyi: When liberal ideas start to lose ground because of economic problems, fascism resurfaces. Indeed, the last crisis did just that. The center right has been discredited while the left has either colluded with austerity or lost its proletarian soul, which paves the way for the far right.

How did Europe reach this point? Polanyi’s double movement mechanism can be traced quite explicitly in the history of the Eurozone crisis. With the last swing, after the liberalization of the 1970s, the Eurozone began to regulate for deregulation to be a competitor in the globalizing world. There was great faith and trust in free markets. If Europe could become one big market excessive advantages such as increasing trade, demand, and growth would be realized. However, deregulation with the purpose of establishing a monetary union, but without taking into account countries’ heterogeneity, was a grave error. By leaving the real convergence to the workings of the free markets, the EU implemented the same currency with a common Central Bank, but did not establish fiscal centralization. Free markets did not work as predicted, as we saw in the labor markets and current account situations. On the contrary, imbalances occurred and led to the crisis. We can think of this procedure from the point of view of Polanyi’s double movement mechanism. According to Polanyi, free markets do not have a solution for this type of crisis; government institutions must do the work, but in the Eurozone situation, government hands were tied because of EU regulations. Consequently, corrective fiscal and monetary policies could not be implemented, which exacerbated the problems. Thus, the consequences of the Eurozone crisis were political as much as economic.

31 Tim Stanley, "European Fascism Has Returned?," The Telegraph, June 30, 2014.
32 Stanley, “European Fascism.”
Do people learn from their mistakes? As Caldentey and Vernengo state,

Imbalances in a Monetary or Currency Union are bound to occur when its state members are economically heterogeneous and different. Recognition of this fact requires that the establishing Union must create, as part of its constituent, charter mechanisms to solve and clear the imbalances—rather than making them cumulative over time.\(^\text{33}\)

This kind of approach may soften the pressures that are created by difficult economic conditions that generate crisis, which is also implied by Polanyi. For each country, instead of only pursuing their self-interests and becoming rival atoms at the national level, pursuing solidarity and interlocking with each other would be much more beneficial in the long run.

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\[^{33}\text{Caldentey and Vernengo, “The Euro Imbalances,” 30.}\]
Bibliography


### Appendix of Tables

#### Table 1- Current Account Balance in Selected Eurozone Countries

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Country</th>
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*Source: Eurostat yearbook 2012*

#### Table 2- Interest Rate Convergence and Decrease before and during the Crisis for Selected Countries

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*Source: Eurostat yearbook 2012*
### Table 3- Eurozone Annual Unemployment Rates (in percentages)

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*Source: Caldentey and Vernengo, “The Euro Imbalances.”*
Insights of Intelligence Insiders on (Non-) Sharing Intelligence Behaviors

Musa Tüzüner
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research

Abstract
This study surveys the Turkish intelligence community’s (non-) sharing intelligence behavior. The factors affecting failures to share intelligence and how to increase intelligence sharing practices are examined based on the views of Turkish intelligence insiders. These insiders’ views reveal that the complexity of bureaucratic structures, lack of trust, compartmentalization, power, egoism, fear, informal groupings, lack of reciprocity and lack of feedback are the causes for non-sharing of intelligence. Policy solutions for shifting from non-sharing towards intelligence sharing behaviors is discussed in a new framework including respective government willingness, enhancing capacity of intelligence collection, building intelligence aquariums, creating rules for establishing new intelligence sharing, opening up new communication channels, training, and support for sharing culture. This framework argues that policy change should start first at the agency level, then at the community level and finally at the international level.

Keywords: Turkish intelligence community, intelligence sharing, intelligence reform

1. Introduction
While becoming an insider scholar¹ in the field of Intelligence Studies, I have had the opportunity to meet with many practitioners and leading scholars studying intelligence². During these interactions, we have often discussed how intelligence sharing is (not) working in different countries. It was from these discussions that I first got the idea to write a paper presenting insiders’ perspectives on Turkish intelligence sharing behaviors. From that moment on, I began taking notes from my interactions with current and former Turkish intelligence officials about the intelligence sharing behavior of Turkish intelligence community members both within and among the main intelligence agencies of Turkey—the Turkish National
Intelligence Agency (MIT), the Turkish National Police Intelligence Agency, and the Military Intelligence Agencies.

Although intelligence officials are hesitant to give details and specific examples on (non-) sharing intelligence behaviors, I have been able to gather enough insights from my interactions to now present a preliminary look at insiders’ views on how intelligence sharing should, and could, work. First, I will lay out the causes for non-sharing of intelligence and then present recommendations for increasing the level of intelligence sharing within the Turkish intelligence community.

2. The Need for Intelligence Sharing

There is a common belief in scientific inquiry that it is impossible to capture the whole reality about any particular phenomenon at any one time and place. Each scientific paradigm looks at the same phenomena differently, and thus the scientific community needs rival schools of thoughts. According to the pluralistic view of Paul Feyerabend, multiple research methods and paradigms are fundamental to going beyond partial truths to the whole truth. Moreover, since no single scientific discipline can ever capture the full, big picture of any phenomenon, multiple disciplines should share their knowledge, scientific tools and methodologies. In the social sciences, borrowing from different scientific disciplines can help scholars understand and solve societal problems, increase the quality of democracy, and enhance “human dignity” by providing the intelligence to aid policy decision makers.

Similar to scientific disciplines, intelligence agencies also use their own tools and methodologies to make inquiries in order to understand societal threats, and submit the resulting intelligence products along with alternative policy options for politicians and policy makers to consider. Often, policy options against various threats may fail because they include only partial truths about the ensuing dangers. It can be assumed that the more intelligence is produced but not shared, the more likely it is for intelligence failures to occur. As one former head of an intelligence agency states:

We were collecting daily intelligence in high volumes about a significant terrorist attack on our premises in the Eastern part of Turkey. As usual we were confident about the collected intelligence and did not get in touch with the other community members to make a plan in order to prevent the oncoming attack. Normally, based on the confirmed intelligence and its analysis, we were sure to successfully eliminate this attack without any losses. The terrorist attack started as we had expected, however, we were not able to stop them and had many losses. The reason for this failure was that the terrorist group had used a different strategy and tactic in its attack than we had expected. After this attack, we learned that the leader of that terrorist group was someone with whom I was very familiar and whose tactics and methods I knew well. Based on our intelligence, he was supposed to be in a terrorist camp in another country. If I had known that he was actually back in that region where the terrorist attack occurred, our strategy to prevent this terrorist group would have been very different. At that time, I wished that the other agencies in the intelligence community had shared with us their intelligence about that terrorist leader and his location.

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5 Musa Tuzuner and Halil Baltacı are working to expand this preliminary view on Turkish intelligence sharing behavior in a comprehensive survey study.


5 Ibid.


7 Lichbach, *Is Rational Choice Theory All of Social Science?*

This example clearly shows the need for sharing among intelligence agencies, but of course there can be barriers to such cooperation. For example, in the 1990s, in order to eliminate the same kind of intelligence failure as was seen in the above case, I built up an intelligence aquarium, in which I included the bibliographic intelligence data of all terrorist group members within my jurisdiction. I periodically up-dated the intelligence aquarium not only with verified intelligence but also with raw and unverified intelligence, and shared these data with the unit members in my region as well as with other intelligence agencies’ units in the intelligence community. As a result, intelligence community members working together against terrorist threats were able to carry out many successful operations. Ironically, after I had left that jurisdiction for a new post, my former subordinates accused me of having sold the bibliographic intelligence dataset to other intelligence agencies in the Turkish intelligence community and then proceeded to erase the database. For me, such accusations were the price of sharing intelligence. Fears of such outcomes along with a variety of other factors all may play a role in deterring intelligence officials from sharing intelligence.

3. Non-Sharing Intelligence Behavior In The World

My interactions with intelligence scholars and former intelligence officers first confirmed a general agreement that no intelligence agency is fully aware of the intelligence that other agencies have, and that each agency has vast amounts of unused intelligence waiting around to be connected to other bits of intelligence in other agencies. Since this sharing does not occur, the consensus was that intelligence failures seem inevitable. What are the causes for this failure to share intelligence? Based on my discussions, 22 factors can be considered as key in explaining hesitant attitudes towards sharing intelligence (see Table 1).

Obviously, the availability of intelligence in the hands of an agency is a must for intelligence sharing. However, even if intelligence is available within an agency, the agency might not want to share it. One reason for this is that intelligence is a very costly item. In the process of producing intelligence, a significant amount of an agency’s budget is used, and equally often, a large amount of funding goes to developing intelligence which is of minimal or no use at all. Aside from the financial costs there may be other costs as well, since dangerous and difficult methods might have been used during the data collection process. With respect to international sharing, Intelligence officials also argue that once intelligence is produced, it takes on a kind of national identity, and because of this, some agencies and their members may not wish to share it. In short, all these factors make intelligence sharing less likely.

It is also necessary to consider that intelligence is produced by agencies based on an agency’s own goals, interests, threats, and the ways in which that agency and its personnel understand these threats. If there is no commonality among the agencies, it is pointless to expect them to share intelligence. In other words, differences in intelligence agencies’ goals, interests, threats and understandings of threats make sharing intelligence less likely.

It may also happen that heads of agencies may simply not want to share intelligence. One of the reasons for this is that intelligence is seen as a source of power for maximizing self-interests. Another is that intelligence is used as a tool for gaining benefits and credits. It is believed that when intelligence is shared, the power and credits may be passed to competing counterparts. It is not unusual then that rational intelligence actors may not be in favor of sharing intelligence that may result in losing the powers and credits attached to
that intelligence. If the sharing of intelligence is to be done with an agency seen as a rival intelligence actor, the probability of non-sharing intelligence behaviors will increase.

Table 1- Factors Behind Non-Sharing of Intelligence

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<td>Absence of intelligence in agencies</td>
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<td>Lack of reciprocity</td>
<td>Absence of true exchange of intelligence</td>
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<td>Cost</td>
<td>Intelligence is an expensive product</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Dangerous methods may be used in its production</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difficulty</td>
<td>Difficult and secret methods may be used in its production</td>
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<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Intelligence is a national product</td>
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<td>Lack of common goal</td>
<td>The condition of having different goals in the intelligence community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of common interest</td>
<td>Each agency or officer has different interests</td>
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<td>Lack of common threat</td>
<td>Absence of common threat</td>
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<td>Lack of common understanding</td>
<td>Absence of common understanding among agencies about the nature of the threats</td>
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<td>Lack of permission</td>
<td>Head of an agency is not in favor of intelligence sharing</td>
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<td>General tendency of getting rewards for intelligence</td>
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<td>Competition</td>
<td>Entering into rivalries with each other for getting the same intelligence</td>
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<td>Lack of standardization</td>
<td>Absence of rules, norms and standards for gathering intelligence</td>
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<td>Absence of mutual trust in each other and in the quality of the other’s intelligence</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern over the security of intelligence sources</td>
<td>Fear of exposing sources of intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leaks</td>
<td>Fear of unwanted parties gaining access to shared intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of feedback</td>
<td>Absence of feedback on earlier shared intelligence</td>
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Another must for intelligence sharing is having standards for how to do it. Some intelligence officers justify their unwillingness to share intelligence as stemming from the lack of standards for determining how this sharing should be accomplished. Nevertheless, even when there are rules, intelligence actors may still not want to share intelligence. One
reason may be an absence of trust. Intelligence actors are more likely not to share intelligence with an agency they consider as untrustworthy. Reluctance to share can also stem from egoism. If one agency acts as if it is the best among the various agencies, this behavior will surely irritate the others and may lead them to give up on sharing intelligence. Yet another reason that is often given is fear of exposing intelligence sources and of a possible leaking of intelligence to unwanted parties. Once intelligence is shared, there is little control over how it may be handled or used by the other agency, so feelings of unease and doubt are common. Yet another reason cited is the lack of feedback mechanisms. After an agency has shared intelligence, there is the general expectation that they will receive some kind of feedback about it. If an agency or intelligence actor has had experiences of not receiving such feedback in past cases, they will likely limit their sharing behaviors, at least to those agencies that they feel are more likely to provide feedback. Overall these factors, each of which is discussed in detail below, can be highlighted as negatively affecting intelligence sharing behaviors.

4. Intelligence Non-Sharing Behaviors in Turkey

Turkish intelligence practitioners with whom I’ve spoken over the years have pointed out certain specific factors behind their negative attitudes towards intelligence sharing—though they were not always comfortable with sharing details or providing specific examples. They did, however, reveal to me some overall factors that are frequently discussed not just among Turkish intelligence community members but also between the Turkish intelligence community and foreign intelligence agencies.

The complexity of bureaucratic structures is an often noted cause for limited intelligence sharing within an agency. Each individual intelligence agency has its own huge bureaucratic structure and yet there are no single units to coordinate intelligence sharing within an agency. Based on the principle of division of labor, each intelligence unit in an agency has different tasks. Each unit is supposed to concentrate on its job and not to interfere with the work of the other units. Because of this division of labor, each unit naturally has limited knowledge about each other’s tasks and is therefore not able even to know what might possibly be shared with the other units. Without regulations on how to share intelligence among an agency’s units and lacking any within-unit intelligence aquariums that could be connected to a larger scale agency-wide intelligence aquarium, responsibility for the sharing of intelligence is left on the shoulders of the individual units. In such an environment, unit chiefs generally devise informal—and often deterring—rules for sharing intelligence. For example, one former intelligence officer told me the following:

I was visiting an intelligence unit in the region. While walking in the hall I saw a big sign saying “DO NOT SHARE INTELLIGENCE WITHOUT ASKING THE BOSS”. When I asked my counterpart in that agency what the boss’s rules were for intelligence sharing, he told me simply that there were no rules.

Other former intelligence officers have noted that sometimes there are nonsensical rules within the agency that serve to prevent any kind of intelligence sharing. Though they were reluctant to give examples about such rules, there have been claims of such practices as unit chiefs setting rules based on their own self-interests, personal characteristics, egoism, and so on.
In Turkey there are clear overlaps in the organizational missions of the three intelligence agencies, and there are no clear boundaries delineating their responsibilities. With such structural characteristics, each agency is in a sense sharing the necessary resources to deal with the same threats, and the availability or lack of resources puts these organizations in a self-help position to prevent the threats. While all three agencies may at any given point be dealing with targeting the very same threats, they are in a competition to find human intelligence sources from the same target pool. As a result, it is not uncommon to have the same informant working for at least two of the agencies. All of this serves to actually reduce the likelihood for intelligence sharing within the intelligence community. Moreover, the lack of a clear division of labor in the Turkish intelligence community naturally results in not having any formal communication channels, regulations, or rules about what to share, how much to share, how to share and when to share. The unregulated realm of sharing intelligence is thus left to the discretion of the head of each agency. Most often, these agency heads prefer a centralized system for sharing intelligence among the agencies. According to such a system, each time intelligence sharing is about to occur, the approval of the head of the agency is required. In the end, such a system based on the discretion of the agency head is more likely to reduce the sharing of intelligence among intelligence agencies.

_Lack of trust_ is arguably the single most important factor for reducing intelligence sharing within or among agencies. Mutual trust in one’s counterparts and in the actual intelligence is a must for productive intelligence sharing, and any suspicions about individuals or the collected intelligence in an agency, will immediately put a halt to intelligence sharing. As one former intelligence officer told me:

I was working as an intelligence collector. One day, my boss told me that he had lost his trust in one of my intelligence sources because of the incomplete intelligence he was providing. I felt really bad because I had tried hard to convince my boss to let him work with us. So I stopped sharing the intelligence I got from that source with my boss. Some time later, a horrible terrorist attack occurred. I got some intelligence from that same informer about some suspects in the attacks. I didn’t share this intelligence with my boss, instead, I passed it through informal channels to the operation units, and they captured the suspects.

There are many other examples similar to the above, clearly showing that lack of trust is a primary factor for hindering intelligence sharing in an agency. In yet another example, a former senior intelligence officer reported the following to me:

One day, my informer told me that a terrorist wanted him to go a rural area where a military operation was going on in order to bring him a large sum of money (two million Deutsche Mark and one million US Dollars). I did not share this intelligence with my chief of intelligence unit because, for reasons I can’t speak about, I had lost my trust in him.

The lack of trust within and among the Turkish intelligence agencies seems to be so prevalent that it causes a significant reduction in intelligence sharing. For whatever reasons, intelligence officers claim that each agency sees the others as its rival. They also note that each intelligence agency has its own distinct institutional identity. In the constructing of these institutional identities, one feature has been the defining of the other agencies as competitors.
rather than partners. I have observed examples of this firsthand while teaching groups of intelligence community members. Even in the classroom or in interactions before and after class, unless absolutely necessary, different agency members are hesitant to communicate with each other.

Some intelligence officers claim that this lack of trust comes from the potential of loyalties to alternate informal groupings different from those in their own agencies. In addition to the lack of trust in individuals or institutions, there may also be a lack of trust in the actual intelligence collected by other agencies. Whatever the cause, if either part lacks trust in the other, it greatly reduces the likelihood of intelligence sharing among the domestic intelligence agencies.

Lack of trust is also the leading reason negatively impacting Turkish intelligence community members’ intelligence sharing with foreign intelligence agencies. It is claimed that the lack of trust stems from the conflict-ridden historical interactions with foreign countries, and the resulting reluctance to share intelligence with historical enemies. In addition to historical experiences however, current practices also reduce the level of trust in foreign intelligence agencies. For example, one intelligence officer stated that:

A team of intelligence officers went to a neighboring country with a folder of documents about one of the terrorist group activities in both our countries. We shared the intelligence about the threats and it seemed as if we had established a good cooperation against the threat. A couple of months later, we got intelligence from our sources that our neighbor intelligence agency had shared our intelligence with the terrorist groups. After receiving this intelligence, we stopped cooperating with them. They are still asking to enhance cooperation to include the other threats, but we keep our silence, pretending that we are still willing to do so.

As seen from this example, once trust is lost there is little hope for productive intelligence sharing.

Compartmentalization is also seen as an important factor preventing intelligence sharing within an agency. Ordinarily the logic is that each unit should collect intelligence directed to its own mission, but should share relevant intelligence with other units. In reality, this is sometimes understood as each unit should know only the intelligence relevant to its mission and should avoid revealing that intelligence to the other units of the agency. In the words of a former senior intelligence officer:

When I first entered the intelligence world, there was a word view of “don’t ask anything and just do whatever you’re asked.” Also, my boss told me not to share anything with anybody. I thought this compartmentalization was necessary for the sake of the intelligence job. After some time passed, one of my colleagues from another unit asked me to give him the newspaper. He added that there was news about their target in that newspaper. I said that I was not supposed to share that newspaper with him. I behaved like that because I was indoctrinated about compartmentalization in that way.

Another former intelligence officer reported the following:

When I was working at the intelligence agency, there was one thing that was really bothering me. Whenever I visited another bureau and had a cup of tea with my colleague, I realized that he would place all the documents on his desk upside-down. I hate this behavior within our agencies but I cannot do anything about it.

This type of understanding has gone even further with technological developments. In recent decades, there is a general tendency to install electronic systems that allow only members
of a particular unit to obtain access. This practice gives the image of “just do your business (collect your intelligence by yourself) and you do not need any help (intelligence) from other units”. Again, compartmentalization is seen as the source of the attitude behind the failure to share intelligence among or even within agencies. There is a further effect as well however, as isolating units from each other reduces the interaction among unit members and their familiarity with each other’s jobs. As a result, even if willing to share, intelligence officers end up in a position of not knowing what to share or with whom.

Power comes from the intelligence one has in hand. In other words, collected intelligence is power for an intelligence officer, who, in turn, may not want to lose that power by sharing it. Since power allows them to realize their self-interests, such as getting promotions, receiving money rewards, and being recognized in the agency as successful, some individuals may consider that any shared intelligence will increase their rivals’ power. As one former intelligence chief reported:

Our boss set up an intelligence flowing system that made it so that the incoming intelligence only flowed to him. He tried to keep all his subordinates separate from each other and never gave them a chance to come together and collaborate. Nobody knew what was going on in the unit except for him. The boss never wanted intelligence collectors to write reports on the collected intelligence, instead, he preferred to meet separately with the intelligence collectors and get the intelligence from them verbally. We were unhappy with the implications of this system because we really didn’t know what to do about the threats we were dealing with. He always told us what to look out for while we were out for intelligence collection. After some time passed, he became popular in the agency and was credited with all the achievements. We later realized that if the boss saw someone as a rival for his position, he would find a way to send him or her out of the unit. After he retired, a new boss came. The new boss had a meeting with us and asked how many human intelligence resources we had. We said we didn’t know anything about the informers. Our former boss had kept all the intelligence and when needed, acted as if he had just collected it by himself. Our new boss told us that the former boss had only told him about two or three human intelligence sources but we were aware of the fact that there were more than ten.

This case clearly shows an example of highly self-interested and power-seeking behavior, and how such behaviors are likely to reduce intelligence sharing practices within an agency.

Some reasons for such power-seeking and self-interested behaviors when it comes to agency heads may be to maximize the overall agency’s budget, to get closer to political figures, to increase the agency’s impact on national policy decision-making, or to increase the number of successfully conducted operations that their own agency makes over those of other agencies. It is claimed that when intelligence is shared, power could shift to a rival intelligence agency allowing that agency to become the ‘leader’ of the ongoing competition among them. In short, in the intelligence community, even at the institutional level, self-interests too often take precedence over national or common interests, thus reducing intelligence sharing among the various agencies.

Egoism is also commonly noted as negatively affecting intelligence sharing within Turkish intelligence agencies. It can be assumed that the more we see signs of egoism among supervisors, the less likely we are to see intelligence sharing. Sometimes these egoistic individuals are called as ‘gods’ in the agency, based on their attitudes of seeming to know everything best. They have extreme, perhaps over-stated, self-confidence in the reliability of their intelligence and their own ability to make well-analyzed intelligence products.
According to them, their intuition can effectively fill the intelligence gap. Because of this egoistic behavior, their subordinates may be reluctant or even intimidated to share the intelligence they gather with them. For example, a former intelligence officer stated that:

Our chief of unit always acted as if he was an expert in intelligence work and that we had a long way to go before we could reach his expertise. Whatever we told him, he said he already knew. He always gave us directions on how to collect intelligence. We were therefore hesitant to share all the intelligence we obtained with him. One day I collected intelligence from a source about a couple of terrorists who had come from the rural area and were staying at my informer’s neighbor’s house downtown. I did not want to share this intelligence with my chief because I thought he must have already gotten this kind of intelligence from his own sources. After some time passed, I found out that my chief had not gotten this intelligence from his sources and then I realized that he might have been bluffing in the past.

As seen from the example, subordinates may believe that such egoists somehow will gather the same intelligence they have obtained, and therefore there is no need to share all the intelligence with them. In other words, if there is a sign of egoism in an agency, subordinates are less likely to share their intelligence. The signs of egoism can also be seen at the level of regional units in an intelligence agency. In this case, the units which consider themselves more capable are more likely to unilaterally take the necessary measures against threats and not see a need for sharing intelligence with other regional units.

Finally, egoism is also a common factor negatively affecting intelligence sharing behavior among entire intelligence agencies. Most Turkish intelligence community members will assert that theirs is the most professional intelligence agency and that, in essence, “we are the best and all intelligence should be shared with us”. At the same time, most admit that the presence of this image in the intelligence community has a negative impact on intelligence sharing. For example, a senior intelligence officer said:

One of the intelligence agencies is trying to give the image as if it is the most important intelligence agency amongst all the others. One day, there was a high level formal meeting of intelligence community members. When I was sharing intelligence with the other agency officials, one of their units interrupted my presentation and stated that he was already aware of what I was informing them about. However, I am certain that his agency was not aware of anything I was talking about because the chair of the meeting told me that other agencies had not shared any information before the meeting. After that meeting, I only shared trivial pieces of intelligence with them.

As seen from the example, the sign of egoism does seem to affect sharing practices and ultimately to reduce the level of shared intelligence.

Fear is also an important factor reducing intelligence sharing within an agency. There is a common belief that the more intelligence that is shared, the more problems are likely to be encountered, thus making it seem preferable not to share at all. Intelligence officers generally have a fear of exposing the sources of intelligence, of violating the principle of secrecy of intelligence, and of experiencing problems after sharing the intelligence, particularly with respect to unconfirmed, “raw” intelligence.

The main principle of intelligence work is the security of one’s intelligence sources. While sharing intelligence therefore, the first priority is not to expose those sources. Even in cases of just minimal concern or unease, officers or units are still more likely not to share the intelligence with other officials or units of an agency. The fear of course is that if there is
any chance of a source being exposed, the possible result is not being able to gain any further intelligence from that source. Additionally, officers are highly reluctant to lose credibility in the eyes of their sources. Some intelligence officers also reported having witnessed human sources spreading rumors about intelligence agencies putting their sources’ lives in danger and therefore not being trustable. Such unwanted results might scare intelligence agency officers and may lead them not to share intelligence.

Fear of violating the secrecy of intelligence is also a cause for reducing the rate of intelligence sharing. It seems to be the case that when intelligence is shared with other units of an agency, the receiving units are less conscientious about the secrecy of that intelligence. Officers say that the more that intelligence is shared, the more it loses its secrecy. Some officers reported, for example, having witnessed many times that their bosses were talking about shared intelligence with other individuals who were not supposed to be informed about such kind of intelligence. In short, an officer’s or unit’s fear of being accused of violating intelligence secrecy principles may lead to an attitude of not sharing intelligence.

In some cases, the results of shared raw intelligence worries intelligence officers and pressures them not to share such intelligence until it is verified and completed. There have been various cases in Turkey that justify this concern. For example, in the case of Hrant Dink, a Turkish-Armenian journalist who was assassinated in 2007, unverified intelligence had been shared among the police intelligence agencies. After his death, all recipients of the shared intelligence were accused of not having done their job and were prosecuted. On the other hand, failure to share raw intelligence can also cause problems. In one example, intelligence officers received intelligence from a villager that terrorists were planning an attack. Because the villager had heard this from a terrorist passing by their village that day, there was no opportunity to get further detailed intelligence. In this case the officer opted not to share this unconfirmed intelligence with his units and one day later a terrorist attack occurred. This and numerous similar cases show that some officers and units tend to only share intelligence when it is fully verified, and to be hesitant to share raw intelligence.

Informal Groupings may also be a cause of reduced intelligence sharing. Such groups are likely to be seen in intelligence agencies, based on principles like different ideologies, religious sects, ethnic roots and so on. Occasionally, some of these groups may become more influential in an agency over different time periods. It is not uncommon for these informal groups to have claims that “we love our homeland better than other groups and; so, it is our duty to save the homeland from the threats”. Based on this philosophical foundation the group members see themselves above the bureaucratic structure, and seek to hold all-important and strategic intelligence in their own hands and use that intelligence to affect the strategic moves against the threats. As a general rule, members of these informal groupings do not want to share intelligence with non-members, fearing they will not use it effectively or that it will be wasted in the other group. In short, it is less likely to see different informal group members sharing intelligence with one another.

With respect to inter-agency sharing, since different informal groups might dominate within different intelligence agencies at any given time, intelligence sharing among the agencies is less likely as well. In recent decades, different informal groups have been emerging and increasing their influence in intelligence agencies. As a result, a decrease in sharing behaviors has come to be seen as the norm by these agencies.
Lack of reciprocity is a key factor blamed for reducing intelligence sharing between Turkish intelligence community members and foreign intelligence agencies. Sharing intelligence is of course not a one-way action, and includes the expectation of exchange. For this to occur, both sides should have some intelligence or at least a valid promise of some, in order to start sharing intelligence behaviors. This is not always the case, however, as reported by some former intelligence officers:

Most of our strategic partners generally ask us about some information concerning terrorist targets without showing us any willingness to exchange it with other intelligence that we wanted in the past. If we are not going to get anything out of this bargain, then why bargain in the first place? As a result of this, we refuse their demands.

In short, one-way intelligence sharing is bound to not last long.

Less common but also sometimes noted, lack of feedback may be a factor negatively impacting intelligence sharing among the intelligence agencies. Intelligence agencies have some expectation of getting feedback from agencies with whom they have shared intelligence. They would like to see how the shared intelligence has been used and how the shared intelligence contributed to the analytical or operational work of that agency. The absence of this feedback discourages an intelligence agency from further intelligence sharing.

Finally, intelligence officers have highlighted a variety of other common reasons that could explain why intelligence sharing is less likely to occur both within the Turkish intelligence community and between it and foreign intelligence agencies. These are respectively the lack of common goals, lack of common threats, and simple lack of interest. All these factors could be considered natural outcomes of a realist reality in which self-interested and self-help states are seeking self-security in an anarchic system.

5. Towards Turkish Intelligence Sharing Behavior

At a recent workshop, former senior intelligence officials and intelligence scholars from different parts of the world met to discuss what should be done to increase intelligence sharing at both the national and international levels\(^\text{16}\). They laid out some recommendations for increasing intelligence sharing based on their long experiences in the intelligence field. From those discussions, I have formed a framework explaining what should be done for increasing intelligence-sharing behavior (see Table-2). The common starting idea that emerged from these intelligence officials’ views, was that essential measures should first be taken at the national level and then at the international level.

According to this framework, in order to increase sharing intelligence at the national and international levels, the willingness of high governmental figures is seen as necessary. Without their support, it seems very difficult to bring about changes in intelligence sharing behavior. Moreover, if an agency has nothing in its hands, then sharing seems impossible. So, each agency should clearly define its own intelligence needs and then determine which parts of this intelligence can be collected independently and which parts can be gathered through sharing with other agencies. In order to collect intelligence independently, an agency’s capacity for collecting should be upgraded and all sorts of intelligence should be kept flowing into the agency. Once the different types of necessary intelligence are gathered, they should be accumulated in an intelligence aquarium. The next step is to set

\(^{16}\) Tuzuner, ed. *Intelligence Cooperation Practices*. 
up rules for intelligence sharing practices. Sharing rules and standards—both national and international—must be defined by formal regulations and agreements. Based on these rules, new communication channels among the agencies can be created. These channels might be in the form of liaison officers, regional groupings, formal meetings and feedback mechanisms. Once an intelligence sharing system has been set up, trainings should be started to change old mindsets of intelligence sharing into new ones that believe to be more in the usefulness of sharing for each counterpart. The final step is to create a supportive environment for the new culture of intelligence sharing.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 2- Factors for Global Intelligence Sharing</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Government willingness</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Enhancing Capacity in Intelligence Collection</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Building an Intelligence Aquarium</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Setting up rules for new intelligence sharing</strong></td>
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</table>
| **Opening up New Communication Channels** | New communication channels among intelligence agencies should be created, including:  
- Liaison officers (Individual relationships)  
- Establishing regional groupings for intelligence sharing  
- Formal arrangement of meetings among agencies  
- Setting up feedback mechanisms for shared intelligence |
| **Training** | Out-dated mindsets towards sharing intelligence should be changed into new ones |
| **Support for Sharing Culture** | A culture of sharing should be encouraged |

Similar to their international counterparts, the Turkish former intelligence officers explicitly recommended that in order to increase intelligence sharing, the necessary measures should first be taken within domestic agencies, then in the Turkish (or other national) intelligence communities overall, and finally at the international level.

**Governmental Willingness:** The common view of the intelligence officials shows us that Turkish high-level governmental officials’ willingness is definitely required for any kind of change at both the national and international levels of intelligence sharing. Without such commitment, all initiated actions will quickly fade. For example, in 2010 I set up an Intelligence Studies Master (MA) Program that would help develop students from the intelligence, security, and civilian sectors. One of our goals is to contribute indirectly to increasing intelligence coordination and cooperation within the Turkish intelligence community. Heads of intelligence agencies have shown us their willingness and desire to have their intelligence officials apply to the program. One of my students told me:

> Since our boss showed his consent for us joining the master program, it was easy to apply to the program and to ignore the pressures from mid-level supervisors, who would rather have us not attend these courses.
As seen from this example, if the heads of the intelligence agencies did not show their eagerness in favor of their employees attending the intelligence master program, we would not have been able to realize our goal of indirectly increasing coordination among Turkish intelligence members in the future.

**Enhancing the Capacity of Intelligence Collection:** Turkish Intelligence officials seem satisfied with the current capacity of their agencies for collecting intelligence. However, some policy changes appear necessary to enhance the overall capacity of these agencies. The first recommended policy change is to select and promote those people who have the skills and abilities to do the job effectively. The second needed policy change is to give up strict compartmentalization. This problem could be addressed by creating some common working areas where officers who are doing similar jobs could work alongside each other. Also, teamwork should be encouraged as the common working style throughout the agencies. The third policy change is about informal groupings. It is stated that in the process of intelligence production, the dominance of one informal group over others should not be allowed. Each informal group’s members should be included in the production of intelligence. It is believed that such new policy options would change the overall quality of the intelligence, and would allow the holders of intelligence to share it without doubts, so that this intelligence, as a form of power, would work to the benefit of more common and national interests.

To increase the overall capacity of the Turkish intelligence community, it is also recommended that a joint task force for each threat be established, and that joint projects be conducted. For example, Turkish intelligence agencies generally deal with the same threats. In some cases, a joint working group can be formed and can start collecting intelligence. Such a practice would increase mutual trust within the intelligence community, save the resources of each intelligence agency, and help to eliminate the mindset of seeing each other as rivals. The idea of joint intelligence task forces at the international level could also increase mutual trust and common understandings of threats.

**Building Intelligence Aquariums:** The expert intelligence officers also found common agreement on the idea of having an intelligence aquarium for each agency and for the community. These aquariums should include all types of intelligence collected. Even if the intelligence is small, incomplete and unverified, it should still be in the aquarium. Such intelligence aquariums would make it easier and faster for agencies to reach the intelligence. In these aquariums, pieces of intelligence would find their way to couple up and fill in intelligence gaps. If these aquariums were accompanied by a new set of intelligence sharing rules, intelligence gaps would grow ever smaller.

**Setting up rules for new intelligence sharing:** Once we have intelligence in an aquarium, it is ready to be shared. Sharing within agencies, among agencies in a community and with foreign agencies should be done according to the laws, regulations, and rules. These rules should clearly define what to share, whom to share with, how to share, when to share, how much to share, and what not to share. They should also regulate not only centralized intelligence sharing but also field level intelligence sharing, the security of the human intelligence sources, the standards of sharing intelligence among units and agencies, and secrecy of shared intelligence. This policy option is believed to be able to reduce the concerns of the intelligence officers on the secrecy of intelligence and take the burden off intelligence units and agency chiefs by generating rules for intelligence sharing.
Opening up New Communication Channels: After setting up the rules, new communication and coordinating channels are necessary at the national and international levels. Within the intelligence community, the advised channels include periodical official meetings among the heads of each intelligence agency, representatives of each intelligence agency and representatives of agency units that are dealing with common threats. These meetings would help to familiarize all sides both personally and professionally, and to increase their previously limited knowledge of each other’s jobs. At the international level, the possible communication channel could be in the form of liaison officers. Whatever the nature of the communication channel, they should have the characteristics of mutual intelligence sharing and of serving as a feedback mechanism.

Training: Once there are new rules and new sharing channels in place, the desired intelligence sharing behaviors can be given to intelligence officials via training. Naturally, the intelligence officials should master the new rules, procedures, standards, and communication channels and their function. With these trainings, efforts should be made to change current, resisting mindsets on intelligence sharing. Some of the suggested trainings within the agency should be specifically designed to make clear national interests and the common goals of the whole intelligence community; to show how shared intelligence might increase the success of individuals, units and the agency; to present how egoistic behavior might conflict with an agency’s national interests and jeopardize the overall success; and to increase intelligence officers’ skills, leading to a closing of the intelligence gap in the various units and agencies.

In addition to agency level trainings, it is advised to have community level joint trainings serving to personnel from the different intelligence agencies. The goals of these trainings should be to increase the intelligence community members’ capability of conducting joint tasks such as intelligence collection and operation on common threats; to show how one agency’s self-interests might result in disturbing other intelligence agencies’ missions oriented to national interests; to build up mutual trust among intelligence community members; to change self-interested mindsets to national interested mindsets; and to conduct activities that can raise awareness of the importance of sharing intelligence in the intelligence community.

At the international level, joint trainings would be useful for changing the mindsets for joint intelligence task forces against common threats. They should be designed to increase the ability to conduct joint intelligence tasks, and as a result, these trainings should increase mutual trust among international intelligence partners.

Support for a Sharing Culture: One final recommendation is to organize some social activities within the agencies and in the intelligence community as a whole to increase the informal social ties among intelligence officials. This social capital building process will contribute to building a positive atmosphere that can keep a newly emerging intelligence sharing culture alive in the agencies and intelligence community.

6. Conclusion

In democratic countries, intelligence officials, like scientists, are working to enhance democratic life by producing intelligence for the policy makers who are responsible for making good policies for the society. In order to be most effective, intelligence agencies must share the intelligence they have collected. However, intelligence sharing behavior does
not always operate as needed. Political scientist Terry Moe has argued that bureaucratic structures are intentionally created to fail\(^\text{11}\). We hope that this is not the case in Turkey.

To understand the specific factors behind non-sharing intelligence behaviors and how things could be improved towards sharing at both the national and the international levels, the data for this article were taken from interactions with Turkish intelligence officials and from informal discussions with international intelligence practitioners and scholars. These insiders’ insights show us how key factors such as the complexity of bureaucratic structures, the lack of trust, compartmentalization, power, egotism, fear, informal groupings, lack of reciprocity and lack of feedback are the main causes of non-sharing intelligence behavior. According to the common view of intelligence insiders, policy chances on intelligence sharing behavior should start first at the agency level, then proceed to the community/national level and finally to the international level. These changes should include respectively government willingness, enhancing capacities for intelligence collection, building intelligence aquariums, setting up rules for new intelligence sharing, opening up new communication channels, training, and providing support for a sharing culture.

This study is intended to open up a discussion on how to reform intelligence sharing behavior in Turkey. It is hoped that future studies will ultimately contribute to even broader reform of the intelligence sector worldwide.

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Bibliography


Global Religious Forces and Conflict Resolution: A Book Review

Rana M. Nelson

Review article of two books:

Abstract

In Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict, author Ara Norenzayan tracks the rise of religion in human communities, from the small deities of hunter-gatherer tribes to the big gods of more-modern societies. He argues that while the development of moral supernatural agents was a large contributor to our cooperative, mainly anonymous way of living, their influence is now waning in the face of secular institutions. In God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics, authors Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah maintain that religion is alive and well, especially in politics, where it has enjoyed a resurgence in the last 40 years. This review compares and contrasts these two books, presenting a discussion of their main points as well as what we should know about religion when formulating conflict resolution strategies and developing international policy.

Keywords: Big Gods; God’s Century; cooperation; religious resurgence; conflict resolution

1. Introduction

Religion has become a much-debated topic in recent years. Some argue that religion is resurging,¹ some argue it is declining,² and certainly, there has been an obvious and documented increase in religion-related conflict in at least the last decade.³

Ara Norenzayan, author of Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict, notes that although “most people in most societies in the world still are, and always have been, deeply religious,”⁴ religiosity has decreased in certain regions, namely,

² For example, Nigel Barber, columnist for Psychology Today and Huffington Post, in Why Atheism will Replace Religion: The Triumph of Earthly Pleasures over Pie in the Sky (Kindle edition, 2012).
in democratic, modern, Western societies. Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, authors of God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics, claim that religiosity is increasing, and state that as of 2000, 64 percent of the world adhered to Catholic and Protestant Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism (an increase of 14 percent from 1900), and that about 80 percent of the world believes in [a] God. Interestingly, they suggest that the factors Norenzayan lists as contributing to religion’s decline are the very same that are facilitating its resurgence.

Believing in God, however, and behaving in ways that show God matters to you are not the same. Ronald Inglehart (chair of the World Values Survey, which compiles social data from 80 countries) concurs: How important God is in someone’s life “makes a lot of difference, not just on immediate attitudes on abortion, divorce, etc., but on national pride, child rearing, attitudes toward authority and many other things that are not obviously linked, but empirically are very strongly linked.” For example, many people who would say they believe in God still might not attend worship services, or they might choose to get married by a state official rather than by a religious official. For strong believers, however, their faith informs everything they do.

Exploring faith’s global effects and how it can be such a powerful force for change provided part of the motivation for this review, as did an interest in conflict resolution. Due to the concerns of space and time, however, this review provides only a general overview of some of the concepts in God’s Century and Big Gods; interested readers are urged to follow up with readings and research of their own.

Regardless of whether religion is declining or resurging, one cannot ignore its extreme ability for positive and negative change in the world. The authors of both books assume, as do I, that democracy (despite some flaws) and equal rights for all are general conditions to aspire to, and both Big Gods and God’s Century document religion’s role in working toward (and against) these goals.

Ara Norenzayan, author of Big Gods, states that as countries become more modern, democratic, and industrialized, society changes from needing religion for encouraging cooperation among large groups (prosociality) to depending on trustworthy secular institutions like the justice system to achieve this purpose. “These societies with atheist majorities – some of the most cooperative, peaceful, and prosperous in the world – climbed religion’s ladder, then kicked it away.” Others before Norenzayan have supported the ‘secularization thesis’ (which, developed in the 1960s, maintains that modernity and secularization go hand in hand) – notably Peter Berger (who later renounced it) and Steve Bruce (who still upholds it), but Norenzayan is not arguing for or against that theory. Instead, he posits and convincingly shows that large-scale religion, through its moral supernatural “watchers,” contributed to the emergence of large cooperative groups, which ultimately developed into modern society.

Recently, however, democracy, modernization, and globalization (DMG henceforth)
have contributed to religion’s waning influence in public life in some regions of the world, especially Scandinavia. In regions where people cannot trust their institutions, citizens tend to retain their religious beliefs. One exception to this pattern that both books note is the United States, where separation of church and state is written into its constitution, yet where religion still heavily influences politics. They explain that this situation exists because the separation between rich and poor (that is, those who are struggling to survive and those who are not) in the US is wide compared to that separation in Northern European countries.

Duffy Toft, Philpott, and Shah also hold that the DMG factors are exactly what have strengthened religion, especially in the last four decades. Using data from Freedom House (and other sources), a global organization that promotes democracy and human rights and rates countries on a scale of 1 to 7 as Free, Partly Free, and Not Free, the authors of *God’s Century* conclude that as countries become more democratic and religion becomes less (consensually or conflictually) entwined with the state, religion can develop a more independent voice to win people to its teachings, do good works, and participate in public life, including politics. And when religion is more able to express its views publically and politically, it can do so in ways that do not lead to the violence born of repression. “When religious actors are given substantial independence from the state, they are given the capacity to perform a range of positive functions in society.”

Both books present excellent accounts of religious history, *Big Gods* tracing its cultural development and *God’s Century* its political development. The former chronicles the emergence of (mainly) monotheistic religions, which usurped the small deities of hunter-gatherer tribes as a way to encourage collaboration and trust among larger and more-agrarian societies. The latter chronicles the enmeshment of church and state until about the 1700s, then a three-century decline in religious influence on state and society, and now a religio-political resurgence in the last 40 years, sparked mainly by the Iranian Revolution.

Duffy Toft et al. argue that this resurgence shows no sign of abating because the DMG factors that stimulated it continue to spread across the world. They offer four themes of religious resurgence:

1. Religious people and communities have transitioned from private devotion to public engagement.
2. The crises brought on by secular ideologies (repression, food and goods shortages, dictatorships, civil war, poverty) have led people to return to religion.
3. Religious communities were/are seeking more freedom through a separation of church and state.
4. Religious communities have embraced/are embracing DMG forces.

Another concept central to *God’s Century* is the level of independence of religious authority and political authority, which is key to how religion comports itself vis-à-vis the state (these days, interactions usually follow that dynamic, compared to centuries ago, when the state often had to be concerned with how to comport itself vis-à-vis religion).

Norenzayan summarizes his arguments into eight principles, and *Big Gods*’ chapters are generally presented in that order:

1. Watched people are nice people.
2. Religion is more in the situation than in the person.

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10 Duffy Toft et al., *God’s Century*, 217.

3. Hell is stronger than heaven.
4. Trust people who trust in God.
5. Religious actions speak louder than words.
6. Unworshipped Gods are impotent Gods.
7. Big Gods for Big Groups.
8. Religious groups cooperate in order to compete.

He then includes a chapter on religious cooperation and religious conflict, and one on cooperation without God.

Each book approaches its research and arguments differently. In addition to historical data, Big Gods makes substantial use of data from experimental data, such as game theory, much of it conducted by Norenzayan with others, to determine how people respond to religious issues, often without knowing the experiment is studying religion. God’s Century relies more on historical data, such as the increase in suicide bombings or accounts of church-state interaction in the Middle Ages, and the authors often use this data to present their arguments and conclusions in tables and diagrams. Each book also discusses why some religions are active in pro-democracy and human rights movements, why some are not, and why some even actively work to oppose such efforts.

While I am cognizant of and concerned about strife in other parts of the world, this review focuses mainly on discussion of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region whose struggles seem more urgent, and lately, certainly more deadly. Similarly, although both books explain the history of many religions in most parts of the world, this review focuses on their discussions of Islam and Christianity, as interaction within the MENA region, and between MENA and Western countries, is of great concern today. The hope is that international policymakers and those working in conflict resolution will consider the books’ suggestions on how to resolve, or at least mitigate, religious conflict. Big Gods and God’s Century are rich with examples of countries and societies that have followed religious and non-religious trajectories, all of which give compelling evidence that regardless of whether one believes religion is waning or winning, it has been, is now, and shall be – for the foreseeable future at least – a major force in human culture.

2. Discussion

2.1. Religion’s ascendance, à la Big Gods

Norenzayan of Big Gods posits (although he cautions that the research is preliminary) that belief in big gods gained ascendancy because of the following five factors:

1. belief in moral supernatural monitoring,
2. credible displays of sincere faith,
3. synchrony in ritual dance and music,
4. cultivation of self-control, and
5. fictive kinship.

These factors helped create strong, prosocial communities of believers whom others gained trust in, and who in many cases joined that faith. Norenzayan also discusses the cognitive aspects of belief, but in this review I focus on the cultural ones, because understanding those aspects will help us better understand and thus hopefully reduce religious conflict.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} Norenzayan, Big Gods, 114-115.
The first two factors are the most important in how big-god religions grew, claims Norenzayan. Our original societal groups (small hunter-gatherer tribes) developed deities that were essentially unconcerned about people’s moral behavior because people monitored each other within their small circles, and would hold each other accountable for transgressions. About 12,000 years ago, communities became more agricultural and thus larger because they had a dependable supply of food. Around the same time, the concept of supernatural watchers emerged, and Norenzayan posits that this was to keep people in line in these larger societies, where contact with human watchers (that is, people who knew each other) might occur less frequently.

Norenzayan suggests that more and more people came to believe in these big gods partly because of what his colleague Joseph Henrich calls “credibility-enhancing displays,” including acts of devotion involving self-torture, elaborate rituals, and adhering to restrictions on behavior. This line of thinking essentially follows the notion that ‘actions speak louder than words,’ and that religious actions like the ones above are potent signals that people who participate in such displays are sincere believers. This sincere belief also signals that 1) such people can be trusted and 2) perhaps there is merit in their beliefs.

While it may be difficult to fathom that practices involving painful rituals such as multiple piercings would be willingly followed, Norenzayan (and others he cites) hypothesizes that such sincere displays of faith — especially by group leaders — helped spread the religion. While not all believers of all religions participate in such extreme rituals, virtually all religious adherents follow various guidelines on sexual behavior, food, dress, and/or appearance — guidelines that can also be viewed as socio-cultural influences that may be unexamined assumptions about how one lives in society.

Regarding Norenzayan’s third factor, synchrony in ritual dance and music, other data backs up his claims about their cohesive attributes. Evidence shows that music reduces signs of stress, and most people have likely had experience with music engendering strong emotions. Combine such effects in a shared-belief setting, and it is not surprising that people join in solidarity whether for religion, a social cause, or war. Norenzayan cites research that links synchrony to greater self-regulation, the fourth factor. “[S]elf-control processes are an important element of social cohesion,” and religion is a social phenomenon. If the people in your religious community are (or are not) doing something, you likely will (or will not) either—partly because your faith instructs you so, but also because you are experiencing social pressure to follow the same norms. This factor also links back to factor two (credible displays of sincere faith), and thus the factors of pro-social belief seem to be mutually reinforcing.

Social cohesion also relates to Big Gods’ last aspect of successful prosocial religion, fictive kinship. This concept essentially means that we consider non-related people that we have intense prolonged contact with as sisters and brothers. Fictive kinship could apply to close friends (one often hears the term “She [or he] is like a sister [or brother] to me.”) or to religious associates (in many languages and religions, the word for members of the

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13 Norenzayan, Big Gods, 98.
14 Norenzayan, Big Gods, 99.
15 I thank Erin Wilson for her insight on this issue.
16 For example, Christine Carter, Raising Happiness:10 Simple Steps for More Joyful Kids and Happier Parents (New York: Ballantine Books, 2010), 98.
17 Norenzayan, Big Gods, 116.
same religious group is ‘brother’ or ‘sister’). Norenzayan posits that fictive kinship “reminds believers of the proper social norms to follow when [interacting with] others.”

Since those first permanent agricultural settlements of hundreds or thousands, human communities have grown to millions strong. “Total strangers regularly depend on each other for livelihood, economic exchange, shelter, and defense,” states Norenzayan. But strangers in continual contact can eventually become friends (or enemies; more on this later). People have always sought connections with each other; in fact, we suffer without it. Numerous studies have documented that even if babies’ physical needs are met, they do not thrive without social contact, and studies on adult humans in isolation also show negative brain effects. Thus, although many of us likely only know a handful, if any, of the thousands of people who serve in our militaries, we are likely familiar with the staff at our local market. It is because of such desire for connection that Norenzayan cites customers’ increasing trust in travelling Muslim merchants as one reason for the spread of Islam. Continual interaction with the same people can often result in one party internalizing or adopting the other’s beliefs. As those beliefs spread, a prosocial community can emerge. Continual interaction can also generate conflict, however, as has been shown time and again over history.

2.2. Religio-political interaction, according to God’s Century

When a religion becomes powerful enough, it can challenge or be challenged by the state that houses it, and God’s Century documents that religion-state conflict has existed since the emergence of each as a separate entity. The progression of the relationship between religion and state around the world has been well studied, thus I do not elaborate on it here. Central to this review, however, is Duffy Toft et al.’s argument that how a religion participates (or not) in promoting democracy and equal rights depends on its level of independence from the state. The authors present four types of religio-political interaction: high and consensual, high and conflictual, low and consensual, and low and conflictual, all of which incorporate varying levels of independence and all of which are subject to change as political, religious, and social dynamics change.

The first type of relationship, high and consensual, is characterized by most modern states in the Americas and Europe, as well by New Zealand and Australia, where “a liberal democratic constitution [exists] that institutionalizes freedom of religion and disestablishment.” The authors also include in this category some mid-twentieth-century Latin American states where Catholic churches were allowed consensual independence but not Protestant churches. As an example of the second type, high and conflictual, the authors cite Muslim-majority Turkey, which became officially secular with the formation of the Republic in 1923, and implements restrictions on all religions, although it has loosened these to some extent in the face of potential EU accession. Duffy Toft et al. also place in this category Indonesia under former president Suharto.

Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are examples of low and consensual religious and

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18 Norenzayan, Big Gods, 117-118.
19 Norenzayan, Big Gods, 4.
20 http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/capsules/histoire_bleu06.html
22 Norenzayan, Big Gods, 58.
23 Duffy Toft et al., God’s Century, 39.
Global Religious Forces...

political independence, where “the dominant religious community [benefits from] extensive legal prerogatives, while the religious body legitimates the authority of the state.”24 Note the word “dominant”; other religions also exist in these countries, but they do not enjoy the same privileges, and in fact may be actively suppressed. In Sri Lanka, the Buddhist sangha is the favored son. The last type of church-state independence in Duffy Toft et al.’s analysis is low and conflictual, such as between most Arab governments today and conservative Muslim groups, as well as between Communist states and Orthodox Christian sects. In these cases, “states have dominated and altogether subordinated religious actors, depriving them of any meaningful autonomy.”25

In explaining religious and political separation, *God’s Century* stresses that “the independence of religious and political authority should not be confused with the influence of religion on politics or with contact between religion and state.” For example, the US “is simultaneously the state where religious authority is arguably the most independent in the world and the state whose religious actors are some of the most politically influential.”26 According to US legislation, a “church” (and its leaders) cannot engage in “substantial lobbying” or donate money to political campaigns, but a “religious organization” can. But because the legislation is vague, the US Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF) reports that it receives continual complaints of churches engaging in political activity.27 Interestingly, the US government had not been pursuing violations of this sort, and was engaged in a court case with the FFRF to resume doing so. In early August 2014, the FFRF won its case, and the Internal Revenue Service, responsible for tax collection and tax law enforcement in the US, will once again be investigating “tax-exempt churches that engage in illegal electioneering.”28

2.3. Who supports democracy, à la God’s Century

The forces of democracy have been greatly assisted in many cases by religious leaders and their congregations. Duffy Toft et al. explain that religions in a high and conflictual situation are most likely and best able to work for positive change; indeed, the autonomy they enjoy has often been achieved “only through [their] firm resistance to a state that is determined to suppress [them].”29 In a high and consensual situation, high levels of democracy and human rights already exist, and in a low and consensual or low and conflictual situation, religions are either too repressed or too entwined with the state to offer (or want to offer) much resistance to anti-democratic actions.) Note also that a religion that is supported in some countries may be suppressed in others, which is why religious activism varies greatly within and among regions and religions. As an example of this situation, Duffy Toft et al. highlight South America, where some Anglican and Catholic churches supported democratic movements and some did not.

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24 Duffy Toft et al., *God’s Century*, 41
25 Duffy Toft et al., *God’s Century*, 42
26 Duffy Toft et al., *God’s Century*, 38.
27 See the FFRF’s “State/Church FAQ”, at http://ffrf.org/faq/state-church/item/14005-churches-and-political-lobbying-activities. The FFRF is a self-described “nontheist” organization that works to protect “the constitutional principle of the separation of state and church,” (yet displays various atheist slogans and promotions on its website). For succinct definitions of the terms in this paragraph, see Joanne Fritz, “What’s the Difference Between a Church and a Religious Organization?” http://nonprofit.about.com/od/faqthebasics/a/The-Difference-Between-A-Church-And-A-Religious-Organization.htm, which also provides a link to the relevant legislation. Both webpages accessed on August 7, 2014.
29 Duffy Toft et al., *God’s Century*, 39.
Level of independence is not the only reason religious actors do or do not support pro-democracy movements; political theology is another. *God’s Century* devotes much of its discussion to explaining how religion has resurged because religious actors are reinterpreting what it means to be a believer. Religious people the world over are engaging in more-politically and -civically involved practices, as instructed by their leaders or religious texts. As one of a number of examples, the authors discuss the Second Vatican Council, convened between 1962 and 1965 (during secularization’s ascendance, interestingly), when Pope John XXIII gathered his bishops from around the world to discuss the Catholic Church’s relationship to modern society. As a result, the Church “proclaim[ed] human rights, peace, and economic development [and religious freedom] with an authority, force, and philosophical and theological foundation that [it] had not previously applied to these concepts.”30 Three things led to this sea change: the Catholic Church’s experiences of religious freedom in the US, European countries easing up on their religious suppression after World War II, and new thinking about religious freedom among Catholic scholars — previous to 1962, the Catholic Church still officially held its (literally) medieval philosophy that Catholicism was the only legitimate religion.31 Then, because the Church wielded a global influence through its bishops, these new beliefs were transmitted internationally relatively quickly, although with varying levels of success, depending on the level of religio-political interaction and leaders’ own level of agreement with the new goals. These days, technology also plays a large role in mobilizing a populace. By now, it is well known how Twitter and Facebook contributed to the Arab Spring uprisings, and recently, there has been discussion of how terrorist groups are using social media to attract new followers.32

After Vatican II, pursuit of the new goals was aided considerably by Pope John Paul II, which brings us to a third, less-discussed factor in how religions (or any group) mobilize around an idea: a leader’s charisma. While acknowledging the numerous religious actors who have challenged established regimes in fighting for democracy and human rights (e.g., Ghandi, Nelson Mandela, the Dalai Lama, El Salvadoran archbishop Oscar Romero), Duffy Toft et al. give only passing credit to the leaders themselves, focusing more on the effects of their respective theologies. But ideas (good or bad) need engaging leaders to carry them out, and both *God’s Century* and *Big Gods* lack discussion on the characteristics of an enigmatic leader. A political situation also contributes to how and whether people will mobilize around a leader, and more discussion of the interplay between a religious actor, an ideology, and social circumstances would have been enlightening.

### 2.4. Who Agitates for Change, à la God’s Century

Partly because of Catholicism’s revised theology, but also because of its sheer numbers and spread around the globe, Catholics have been the most active of all religious actors in fighting for democracy and human rights. Duffy Toft et al. compare the faiths of leading religious actors who worked for positive global change between 1972 and 2009, and Catholics come out on top by far: 36 Catholic actors played a leading or supporting role in countries undergoing democratization, compared to 19 Protestant, 12 Muslim, four Orthodox, and one Hindu actor(s).33

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30 Duffy Toft et al., *God’s Century*, 111.
31 Duffy Toft et al., *God’s Century*, 112.
33 Duffy Toft et al., *God’s Century*, 101.
Compared to Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism, there is not much discussion of Judaism in either book, especially in *God’s Century*, and its authors explain why. Israel is the world’s only Jewish-majority state, and regardless of its other issues, has been a democracy since its inception in 1948, and categorized by Freedom House as “Free” since then. Jews in the rest of the world reside mostly in France and the US – stable, democratic countries. Therefore, simply because of where they live, Jews have generally not been part of groups agitating for social justice.

Although *Big Gods* and *God’s Century* authors do discuss atheism (with Norenzayan citing research noting that if one “considered [atheists] a ‘religious’ group, they would be the fourth-largest one in the world”[^35]), there is no discussion in either book about what could be called ‘spirituality’ or a general ‘search for meaning.’ There is anecdotal evidence in non-religious circles of increasing interest in such things as meditation, energy work, or chakras, a surge that Ronald Inglehart also notes: “So, where we find, in the World Values Survey, declining emphasis in the rich countries on traditional religious beliefs, we find growing concern for the meaning and purpose of life.”[^36] Peter Berger notes this too, calling such inquiries “part of the phenomenon of religion, of what is clearly religious but outside the doors of the church.”[^37] Although such ‘New Age’ seekers may not be agitating for democratic change as an organized group, a mention of these types of beliefs would not be remiss in books documenting the history and discussing the currency of religious forces and beliefs.

### 2.5. Religious Conflict, à la Big Gods and God’s Century

*Big Gods* and *God’s Century* authors stress the fact that religion and its actors can both promote peace and cause conflict. Norenzayan gives three ways the latter can occur:

1. Varying levels of distrust of people who do not share one’s belief system.
2. The social cohesion of one religious group excluding/being intolerant of other groups.
3. Ignoring or being unaware of a religion’s sacred values.^

4. In today’s conflicts in MENA and in this region’s conflicts with the West, all three paths seem well trodden, and all three also reflect Duffy Toft et al.’s view that suppressing religion can result in violence. Despite (or perhaps because of) the coverage of events in MENA of late, I think that many people in the West do not understand how repressive many of the governments in the MENA region actually are of religion, including Islam. Anecdotally, a group of university-educated, engaged Canadian citizens showed that a high percentage believe that most or all governments in MENA are strongly supportive of Islam – in a way that could be categorized as consensually integrated. This thinking, however, ignores the political reality:

> “Before the Arab Spring, government restrictions on religion and social hostilities involving religion were higher in the Middle East and North Africa than in any other region of the world. Government restrictions in the region remained high in 2011 [and 2012, the latest year studied], while social hostilities markedly increased.”[^39]

[^34]: Duffy Toft et al., *God’s Century*, p. 104.
[^35]: Norenzayan, *Big Gods*, 70.
[^39]: “Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion,” Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project, accessed August 6,
In exploring what facets of religion may lead to violence, Norenzayan’s studies in the Middle East show that increased religious attendance results in more – and more support for – suicide bombing, while increased prayer (alone or with others) does not\textsuperscript{40}—support for his second way that religion can lead to conflict. Duffy Toft et al. explain that religions with a political theology of reconciliation are more likely to peacefully work towards change than those with a more-violent theology. While religious terrorists have emerged from all faiths, Islamic actors disproportionately use religion to justify violence.\textsuperscript{41} The authors attribute this prevalence to “the dominance of…Salafi-jihadism, [a violent theology] described as ‘the guiding ideology of Al Qaeda’,”\textsuperscript{42} as well as to low and conflictual and low and consensual levels of independence between Islamic actors and the state.

2.6. Conflict Resolution, à la Big Gods and God’s Century

Importantly for our time, \textit{God’s Century} and \textit{Big Gods} both counsel the necessity of understanding, acknowledging, and factoring in the applicable religious belief(s) when formulating foreign policy and engaging in conflict resolution strategies. For example, Sufism is a contrasting interpretation of Islam to Salafi-jihadism noted above, and can be defined as “the intention to go towards the Truth, by means of love and devotion” and “a way of being that is the actualization of the attributes of God.”\textsuperscript{43} The \textit{God’s Century} authors view Sufi practitioners as “natural allies of moderate regimes,” and suggest that connections could be made and fostered with Sufi groups to enlist their aid in decreasing conflict.\textsuperscript{44}

In discussing conflict resolution in a religious arena, Norenzayan urges us to consider the source of most of the research, research subjects, and theories about human behavior in Western countries: WEIRD people – that is, Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic. “Much of WEIRD public policy [(national and international)] is grounded in the idea that material or instrumental values are the key drivers of human actions,” which is the rational actor model.\textsuperscript{45} However, in the non-Western—that is, more-religious world—he maintains that many people operate from sacred values, which

“involve strong moral convictions that are better seen in the framework of a devoted actor model…. A wide range of apparently irrational aspects of human behavior, such as falling in love, emotional attachments…to objects and places, and why it is so easy for terror groups to recruit young men for suicide missions…make much more sense in a devoted actor framework.”\textsuperscript{46}

He then discusses findings by Jeremy Ginges and a team who studied how considering sacred values (or not) affected hypothetical peace negotiations between real Israelis and Palestinians. The researchers discovered that having one’s core values acknowledged, even if (and I would say especially if) they are not shared, makes people more open to compromise.\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, policymakers and negotiators should take note that discounting or ignoring others’ sacred values, as Western leaders often do, usually intensifies conflict.

\textsuperscript{40} Norenzayan, \textit{Big Gods}, 164-165.
\textsuperscript{41} Duffy Toft et al., \textit{God’s Century}, 128.
\textsuperscript{42} Duffy Toft et al., \textit{God’s Century}, 128.
\textsuperscript{43} This definition is taken from the website of the Nimatullahi Sufi Order, accessed on August 10, 2014, http://www.nimatullahi.org/what-is-sufism/.
\textsuperscript{44} Duffy Toft et al., \textit{God’s Century}, 173.
\textsuperscript{45} Norenzayan, \textit{Big Gods}, 166.
\textsuperscript{46} Norenzayan, \textit{Big Gods}, 167.

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There may be some problems, however, with such a simplistic division between West and non-West, and scholars and policymakers must take care not to push examples of “devoted” behavior into a convenient category without fully exploring the myriad factors behind such behaviors. Many Western actors also exhibit devoted behaviour, and the afore-noted strong presence of religiosity in US politics arguably informs much of that country’s foreign policy. Note that a “sacred value” is not necessarily a religious value; it simply means something that is deeply important. For example, democracy is likely a sacred value for most Canadians. Also note that the opposite of “rational” in this case is not “irrational.”

Because of the political focus of their book, Duffy Toft et al. go into much more detail on conflict resolution, giving “Ten Rules for Surviving God’s Century”:

1. Acknowledge that religious actors are here to stay.
2. Do not assume that the activism of religious actors can or should be confined to a “private sphere.”
3. Learn to live with the fact that the issue is not whether, but when and how, religious actors will enter public life and shape political outcomes.
4. Do not exaggerate the power of religious actors in public life, thereby replacing secularization with sacralization…
5. …but expect religious actors to play a larger and more pervasive role than conventional wisdom anticipates.
6. Accept that the more governments try to repress or exclude religion from public life, the more such efforts will be self-defeating.
7. Acknowledge that the more governments permit religious actors to be autonomous social actors in a system of consensual independence, the more religion will serve as a “force multiplier” for important social and political goods, including democratization, peacemaking, and reconciliation.
8. Take the religious beliefs and political theologies of religious actors seriously because they interact with political structure and context to explain much of the political behavior of religious actors.
9. Accept that if governments fail to respect the institutional independence of religious actors, especially through systematic repression, the more these governments will encourage pathological forms of religious politics, including religion-based terrorism and religion-related civil wars.
10. Appreciate that there is strategic value in pursuing religious freedom in the conduct of foreign policy.
11. Duffy Toft et al. stress that “states that fail to address the grievances and expectations of religious actors within their borders contribute to the globalization of terrorism.”

3. Conclusion

Despite Norenzayan’s assertion that as countries experience the forces of modernization, secular institutions replace big gods, he does not predict that religion will die out. In fact, he states that religion may triumph simply because of a demographic fact: religious people have more children.

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48 I thank Zeki Sarigil for noting that such a view may be problematic.
49 Duffy Toft et al., God’s Century, 207-222.
50 Duffy Toft et al., God’s Century, 123.
“For example, data from 82 countries reveals a linear relationship between the frequency of religious worship and number of children, with those who worship more than once a week averaging 2.5 children compared to 1.7 (below replacement!) for those who never worship.”

Inglehart also explains that secularization leads to cultural changes that bring a huge decrease in fertility rates. Duffy Toft et al. make similar statements, citing high fertility rates as one of the reasons for religion’s tenacity. Peter Berger himself cites “the weight of evidence” as why he changed his mind about modernity leading to secularization, saying that “it may – and it does in certain parts of the world among certain groups of people – but not necessarily. On the other hand, I would argue that modernity very likely, but not inevitably, leads to pluralism, to a pluralization of worldviews, values, etc., including religion, [which… changes] the character of how religion is both maintained institutionally and in human consciousness.”

The above quote seems to highlight why there has been increased conflict in and with the MENA region: the forces of modernization, government, and religion are clashing – in a struggle for superiority, yes, but more importantly, in a struggle of how to define and redefine themselves and each other in a changing world.

Before reading Big Gods and God’s Century, I wondered whether there might be a political resurgence of religion but not a private one—if there was indeed a resurgence at all. I might now be convinced that privacy and politics can not be separated for long; the issues that fuel national and international debate and conflict are often the same issues that spark arguments at home. “The personal is political,” a phrase popularized in the 1970s, refers to the US women’s liberation movement; however, it could just as easily refer to religious movements in the world today. Author Carol Hanisch explains that the theory behind that phrase “came out of struggle…against those who were either trying to stop the movement or to push it in directions they found less threatening.” This comment reflects Duffy Toft et al.’s argument that countries that repress religion will likely end up fueling violence; it also echoes Norenzayan’s contention that policymakers who ignore sacred values do so at their peril.

Ronald Inglehart’s view of religious forces in the world today combines Norenzayan’s and Duffy Toft et al.’s main arguments (and mine) with some points of his own:

“The world is changing in a way that is clearly not going back to the old-time religion in which a priest tells you how to live your life. But it is a world in which spiritual concerns are becoming more important…. In this broader sense, spiritual concerns are growing, not shrinking, and a different kind of religion may be playing a bigger role. A simplified view would be that religion is resurfing all over the world. It’s simply not true. But the politics, even of advanced industrial societies, is shifting to one in which religions [sic] issues are more relevant and value questions are much more central.”

Throughout history, societies have responded in various (often violent) forms to other ways of seeing and doing things. Berger defines his above-noted pluralism as “the coexistence

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Norenzayan, Big Gods, 152.


in the society of different worldviews and value systems under conditions of civic peace and under conditions where people interact with each other.”56 If civic peace is the goal (even if we do not all yet accept different worldviews), many countries have a long way to go. But *Big Gods* and *God’s Century* give us some direction on how to proceed.

**Bibliography**


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Manuscript Submission:

Manuscripts submitted for consideration must follow the style on the journal’s web page (http://www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org/doc/authors-guideline.doc). The manuscripts should not be submitted simultaneously to any other publication, nor may they have been previously published elsewhere in English. However, articles that are published previously in another language but updated or improved can be submitted. For such articles, the author(s) will be responsible in seeking the required permission for copyright.

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