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In This Issue

In this issue of *All Azimuth*, we present a selection of interesting articles on a variety of important theoretical and empirical questions analyzed from different perspectives.

The issue begins with a research article by Alev Yemenici, in which she argues that current international threats comprising multi-faceted conflicts and violence require new educational policies that are based on peace education. For this purpose, Yemenici elaborates on an educational model that cultivates a peace-oriented mindset by promoting skills of effective communication, creative problem-solving, conflict transformation, cooperation, and empathy. She highlights that aiming to eliminate the root causes of violence; this model operates at the cellular level through which a biological mutation that moves the cells away from the primitive urge for survival into an evolved state of consciousness of peace is foreseen by acquisition of knowledge about non-violent negotiation and reconciliation strategies. She concludes that national curricula should be redesigned on the basis of this model which in turn can serve as a neurobiological foundation that may lead to generations inclined to peaceful alternatives rather than violence.

In the second research article, Vanessa Tinker, critically analyzes the literature and reports on peace education programmes in post-conflict countries. The article contends that peace education programmes continue to be inspired by the worlds' religions that directly or indirectly affect their assumptions, theories and practices. Tinker first examines peace education's history and how it is conceptualized. In this connection, she highlights that the concept of peace education has come to represent a wide range of peace-based educational activities and that efforts to combine such diverse programmes under the label of peace education has been criticized mainly by peace educators working in the context of protracted conflicts. Nonetheless, the article points out that a variety of peace programmes has been introduced in countries emerging from ethnically/religiously linked conflicts. Examining four cases with relative success, Tinker concludes that there is a need for a deep philosophical analysis of what peace education comprises in terms of its implicit philosophical and possibly religious assumptions, in order to assess whether it can be adopted in other nations and contexts.

The third article, written by Abdellatif Hissouf, analyzes the political relationship between the Moroccan monarchy and the moderate Islam-oriented Justice and Development Party (PJD) which has led Morocco's coalition government since 2011. The article argues that the success or failure of PJD as an Islamic party which has come to power through elections and without violent uprisings remains significant for the region. In this context, the article further contends that a harmonious policy based on some form of Islamic secularism that takes into account Morocco's political realities may overcome divergences and lead to the development of Moroccan society. Analyzing the Moroccan political system along with the monarchy's control of the religious sphere, the article concludes that although PJD has established a common ground with the monarchy, it has not been able to address the issues of corruption and clientelism in the political elite. Thus, Hissouf suggests the PJD should promote a type of Islamic political secularism that would preserve the monarch as the Commander of the Faithful but at the same time lead the Moroccan society to change and modernism.

The fourth article by Şeniz Bilgi addresses the question of intelligence cooperation in the European Union (EU) with the assumption that the need for cooperation between

intelligence and security services has increased in the context of new security environment. The article discusses the extent to which current intelligence-sharing among the European countries has improved the EU's effectiveness in dealing with the new security threats. It specifically assesses the Al Qaeda attack on the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in Paris in terms of the shortcomings of intelligence cooperation in the EU. Bilgi concludes that none of the cooperation schemes established in the EU has come to operate as a central intelligence agency due to member states' political interests, which in turn inhibits the EU's effective actorness in the global security arena.

Following the research articles, Seán O Regan focuses on conflict resolution and explores the limitations of mediation in inter-state relations as a tool of peaceful conflict resolution. In his commentary, O Regan contends that international community should be prepared to intervene with armed force based on the Responsibility to Protect "just cause" threshold and precautionary principles when necessary. Arguing for a moral duty rather than a legal right, O Regan further maintains that international community has also an obligation to rebuild the post-conflict societies with a comprehensive programme that aims to tackle historical grievances as well as economic and political inequalities.

The final piece in this issue of *All Azimuth* is a review article by Engin Sune based on two books; one examining the question of why there is no non-Western approach generated within peripheral states, and the other representing such an effort for developing a non-Western IR approach on the basis of Ibn Khaldun's ideas. The review focuses on Ancharya and Buzan's five possible explanations for the absence of a non-Western IR theory and gives special attention to the discussion of relationship of Islamic worldview and IR theory. It then critically reviews Seyfi Say's book mainly with respect to its discussion of Ibn Khaldun's ideas on the issues influencing international relations. Sune concludes that to the extent that non-Western attempts to develop non-Western IR theories continue to adopt Western epistemological and ontological frameworks, they result in the reproduction of the very theoretical understandings that they aim to challenge. Thus, what is critical for the emergence of a non-Western IR theory, Sune argues, is serious questioning of the epistemological and ontological roots of Western centrism.

We believe this selection of articles offers a broad perspective for our readers and will stimulate much thought and some debate.

Peace Education: Training for an Evolved Consciousness of Non-violence

Alev Yemenici

Çankaya University

Abstract

This paper aims to present a preliminary, brain-based model of peace education. In addition to subjects that current peace education models emphasize such as human rights education, environmental education and conflict resolution education, this model aims to introduce another level, namely the cellular level, at which neurobiological causes of violence and its early prevention can be addressed. Specifically, the model advocates dissemination of information on neurobiological causes and prevention of violence, and the impact of early trauma on the developing brain during the pre-natal, birth, and post-natal periods. These early periods are when a foundation of love chemicals or chemicals of violence is established and the fundamental brain architecture is laid down. In other words, through the education of children, adolescents, and adults, the model opens up a cellular dimension where violence can be prevented.

Keywords: Peace education, birth trauma, non-violence, brain enrichment, empowerment

1. Introduction

The current threat of global terrorism, ongoing conflicts, multi-faceted violence, and the highly disempowering conditions in which refugees worldwide have been forced to live make it necessary on the international and transnational levels to design new educational policies that revolve around peace education. Peace education as defined by Susan Fountain, a UNICEF consultant, “refers to the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behavior changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national, or international level.”¹

Peace education² is an overarching approach that not only teaches about different approaches to protecting and sustaining peace but also builds a common framework in which these approaches and strategies can be taught and practiced in the safety of classrooms. It provides knowledge and practices for people from all walks of life and children of any age group to establish lasting peace. It creates awareness regarding the dangers of violence,

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¹ Susan Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF” (working paper, UNICEF, June 1999), 1.

² Ian M. Harris and Mary Lee Morrison, *Peace Education* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2003), 16.

warfare, and armed conflicts, terror, and misuse of power. It empowers learners to have a say in organizing national and international policies. It places human dignity and integrity at the core of educational policies.

To solve the current global conflicts and to build sustainable peace, acquisition and practice of cooperative/collaborative skills in negotiation and conflict management must begin at early stages of schooling. Skills, such as effective verbal/nonverbal communication, creative problem solving, critical thinking, self-awareness, and empathy in dealing with personal/relational and/or cultural conflicts can be effectively taught so that knowledge can be embodied through practice. Teaching how to identify and resolve/transform conflicts, how to recognize conflicting needs inherent in personal relations or in multicultural aspects of conflicts, and how to handle deep-seated cultural values in conflicts with an emphasis on negotiation strategies underlies the process of empowerment at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, social, national, and international levels.

Once this perspective finds its way into the formal and informal educational systems worldwide, a joint global movement regarding the quality and scope of education along the lines of peace education, the Joint Commission of World Education, can lay the foundation for global cooperation for conflict resolution and empowerment of the individual as a world citizen. Global cooperation with common goals has become a must if we desire to establish and sustain global peace by means of education.

The philosophy of peace education aims to teach “nonviolence, love, compassion and reverence for all life.”³ It brings to the forefront causes of violence and effective ways to deal with it. Peace education aims to examine issues related to peace and war, terrorism, dictatorial ideological oppression, military dominance, unethical political behavior as a way to preserve power, unjust systems, ethnic hatred, judicial system violation, vandalism, and different types of conflict. These factors, which have been regarded as the underlying causes of important global concerns, can be introduced within mainstream educational practices, with an emphasis on peace building. Peace building entails the study and practice of alternative non-violent conflict-resolution strategies, which center around core human values such as freedom of choice. Thus, when a common curriculum framework is jointly specified by the world’s countries then a worldwide systematic peace-oriented education can emerge. Culture-specific adaptations of the curriculum would fulfill the nations’ culture-specific needs, incorporating their unique socio-cultural characteristics and assets. In other words, a solid infrastructure to establish peace at a global level can be created as a result of joint effort.

Peace education provides for a curriculum in which students will learn and practice concepts, such as human rights, respect for rights, citizenship, democratic judicial systems, fairness, national and cross-cultural values and norms, constitution, multiculturalism, moral responsibility, diversity, freedom of choice, equality, and conflict management as integral parts of the curriculum. Students, depending on their grade level, learn to cherish the value of economic equity, understand the importance of equality of opportunity, internalize the essential nature of freedom, and virtually build and sustain international relations and democratic participation⁴ in an environment where appropriate strategies and practices are employed for different age groups.

³ Harris and Morrison, *Peace Education*, 9.

⁴ Betty Reardon, *Educating for Human Dignity: Learning About Rights and Responsibilities* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 5.

Current peace education curricula consider the concept of non-violent communication, providing peace training to prevent violence and achieve sustainable peace by means of a variety of educational practices. These practices develop emotional intelligence along with cognitive intelligences, and create self-awareness with a focus on the role of human life and responsibility for all life forms on the planet. This paper aims to present an educational model⁵ that fosters a peace-oriented mind set, which needs for its establishment and sustenance an educational environment that enriches the brain, fully furnishing the individual with knowledge, skills, strategies, attitudes, and rewarding experiences to create internal, national, and international peace. Therefore, the present model proposes that peace education curricula should incorporate issues of brain development and the process of neurological imprinting. The model specifically focuses on the neurobiological aspect of peace and violence and takes into consideration the onset of human life: neurological imprints left in the brain of a fetus/baby during gestation and/or after birth due to any kind of trauma.

This paper suggests that elimination of violence can be ensured if we incorporate into educational practices the knowledge of the fragility of the human brain in critical periods of its development, that is, the pre-natal, birth, and post-natal stages. Such knowledge and practices can empower people to a level where they can make informed choices in the face of high emotional valence. The proposed peace education model also claims that it is only when we assist the individual in the process of self-evaluation to willfully change his or her inner climate that the survival-oriented or primitive misuse of power can be eliminated. In this endeavour, the power of epigenetics will assist us in changing primitive survival programs. Such peace-oriented training needs to begin from the early stages of brain development, and should continue with lifelong training, which, for some, may require a professional coaching component that assists the individual during willful and conscious biological change at the cellular level from survival consciousness to an evolved consciousness of non-violence. At the core of this level of consciousness lies the deep understanding of the human dilemma, empathy for human suffering, desire for compassionate action, and reverence for all life. Only then can humanity enter the long-sought-for Age of Peace.

2. Peace Education for the Whole Community

To create such awareness and genuine desire for peace, the peace education model depicted here has targeted three major groups: children, adolescents, and adults (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Specialized Target Group Training

⁵ This model in its preliminary stages was presented in a three-day workshop at Beit Berl College, Israel, February 2008, and at the WCCI, 13th World Conference in Education on "Creating a Global Culture of Peace: Strategies for Curriculum Development and Implementation" in Antalya, September 2008. The model presented at the WCCI was published in the proceedings for WCCI.

From childhood onwards, human rights, human dignity, and integrity,⁶ along with core values of non-violent peace education, should be introduced into the overall school curriculum. Children benefit most when their brain is enriched with peaceful ideas and practices, when they are raised away from images and practices of domestic and structural violence. When children at early stages learn, understand, and internalize the meaning of rights violations in a safe school environment where there is no immediate threat to their well-being, they will be able to “develop empathy and solidarity with those whose rights have been denied.”⁷ During early childhood education, the development of social, emotional, and intellectual skills can be fostered through play, drama, art, and social games. Social games enable children to express their emotions in safely structured contexts during play instead of inhibiting them. In this way, children can embody their experience at the visceral level. When the basic concepts of human rights education, such as children’s basic rights, are incorporated into the organized structure of dramatic play and social games, children begin to internalize the rules that regulate their social environment, accompanied by communication skills and constructive attitudes. They learn through experience what it feels like to take responsibility in society, to respect others’ rights, to actively listen to friends and the teacher to be able to behave appropriately, observing rules and regulations. Thus, making non-violent peace education core curricula, with tasks and play that are accompanied by explicit instructions and re-emphasized at home, may eventually result in absence of all forms of violence and rights violations. Children will develop communication and negotiation skills to express their respect for rights and be able to assume responsible roles as sophisticated civilians who promote human rights. Then they will have the necessary scope and creative repertoire for non-violent alternatives that are greatly valued in a society of empowered individuals.

Education for peace provides for principles whose implementation empowers people to change the dysfunctional structures of societies by providing basic conflict transformation skills, such as attentive listening, peace-oriented communicative competence, reflection, self-assessment, creative problem solving, and mediation. Empowerment comes when people gain these essential “skills, attitudes and knowledge to create a safe world, maintain healthy bodies and build a sustainable environment.”⁸ Doing so will enable children and adolescents to effectively put this knowledge into practical use to manage conflicts non-violently; to automatically choose peaceful ways in the face of conflict.

However, the philosophy of peace education advocates much more than teaching non-violence. The concept of peace “implies human beings working together to resolve conflicts, respect standards of justice, satisfy basic needs, and honor human rights. Peace involves a respect for life and for the dignity of each human being without discrimination or prejudice.”⁹ According to Reardon, peace education aims to transform the present human condition by “changing social structure[s] and patterns of thought that have created it.”¹⁰ Children need to be enriched and sensitized with these core values at early stages of their development. When they gain a real understanding of the needs and desires that lie at the core of human experience, such as the need to be respected and loved, and the desire to experience achievement and acceptance, they may have all the resources they need to deal with conflicts

⁶ Betty Reardon, *Educating for Human Dignity*.

⁷ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 7.

⁸ Harris and Morrison, *Peace Education*, 9.

⁹ Harris and Morrison, *Peace Education*, 12.

¹⁰ Reardon, *Educating for Human Dignity*, 4.

when they become adults, automatically tending towards peaceful solutions that benefit all sides. Although lifelong peace education is still key, such education in schools will help young people skillfully manage the higher needs in Maslow's hierarchy so that in the future our global village may benefit from the peaceful endeavors of political figures and leaders who have attained self-actualization.

Peace-oriented mind-sets help people transcend focusing on basic needs, which, in essence, prevent people from managing higher-order needs, such as emotional needs and self-actualization. Once people get used to fulfilling desires and deriving pleasure out of this fulfillment only, the mere act of satisfaction begins to captivate people. They may be obsessed with pursuing trivia, turning them into objects of attachment with an alluring quality. With higher goals come creativity and new paradigms. However, achieving this requires life-long learning and life-time commitment.

Adult training is also built into the instructional design of peace education. First and foremost, before people become parents they should be trained and sensitized towards the significant consequences of brain development during gestation. Whether the brain is enriched or deprived determines the quality of the individual's future life. Moreover, parents need to master non-violent ways to solve conflicts, and assist, support, and be role models for their children during their brain, behavior, and identity development throughout childhood and adolescence so that their children can choose peace in the face of life's challenges. Core values in the family or the larger society "can either contribute to or hinder behavior that promotes peace. The effectiveness of peace education is increased when strategies are used that address the value of the entire community."¹¹ Thus, not only school children but also adults need life-long non-violent peace education training to master fundamental peace concepts. Instructors who provide training and guidance with a peace-oriented frame of reference will lay the groundwork for citizens who respect cultural diversity and humanistic unity, who can establish harmonious relations between different religious and ethnic groups, who value freedom of expression and solidarity rather than competition, and who choose empowering attitudes rather than retaliation, cherishing harmony with nature.

If supported by healthy brain architecture and granted their human rights, peace education will give children, adolescents, and adults the skills and inner resources to choose a life of peace. And this infrastructure is laid down during pregnancy, and even before.¹²

3. The Model

The proposed model incorporates concepts from a variety of different areas to create a peace education model (See Fig. 2). First, the diverse areas that constitute the current model are briefly discussed. Then the model's four core issues of brain-based learning, life management skills, eliminating violence, and well-being in the pre-natal, birth, and post-natal periods are examined in detail. These issues are of crucial importance, as they mean life-long insurance for peace at the cellular level. Developing life skills to cope with stress, with a major focus on resilience training, contributes to an individual's cognitive and affective well-being. Eliminating violence towards women, especially during pregnancy and as mothers, is

¹¹ Fountain, "Peace Education in UNICEF," 5.

¹² Bruce Lipton, "Nature, Nurture, and the Power of Love: The Biology of Conscious Parenting," Youtube video, accessed September 6, 2015, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScEN6ScMtZ8>.

essential when we consider the healthy development of a fetus’ brain. Once enriched with empathy, loving care and kindness, the human brain is capable of emotionally intelligent coping when conflicts and threats arise. And finally, life-long brain-compatible education takes into consideration humans’ holistic nature, with our multi-faceted cognitive, emotional, and self-actualizing needs and aspirations. In these ways, the individual is empowered to become autonomous and assume full responsibility for his or her actions in society, putting integrity above personal gains.




Figure 2: Components of the Model

3.1. The outer components

The outer circle of the model includes essential peace-education components, such as philosophy and practice of peace education, conflict management, human rights education, environmental education, all of which are commonly proposed by contemporary peace education specialists. The outer components also incorporate subjects common in general curricula, such as arts, science, (preventive) health education, as well as humanities and social sciences. All of these subjects should be dealt within a peace-oriented framework that advocates non-violence and human dignity. The infrastructure of such non-violence can only be laid when all subjects training is infused with the basic principle of “resolv[ing] disagreements without resorting to warfare or physical force, and for justice where human beings are treated with the dignity afforded them by their human rights.”¹³ To do so, each subject should be tied to the main goals of peace education.

Education for peace distinguishes levels of peace, namely peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding along with accompanying policies. These different definitions and perspectives on peace enable us to formulate concepts which would help us develop different

¹³ Harris and Morrison, *Peace Education*, 13.

practices of conflict management and devise a variety of ways to deal with different types of violence.

With conflict management education more specific, non-violent strategies to deal with conflicts are introduced. Successful management of conflicts requires the skills of conflict resolution and conflict transformation at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national, and international levels. Conflict management education includes informing students about the psychological processes involved in personal/cultural conflicts, teaching them the social and psychological theories of conflict, as well as helping them to develop effective conflict resolution and social-emotional skills. Conflict management techniques assist learners in dealing with conflict situations effectively, which requires close investigation and understanding of factors causing misunderstandings, intolerance, and violence. Mastering constructive responses to conflict, however, necessitates development of non-violent communication/negotiation skills, mindful listening, compassionate communication,¹⁴ respect for individual differences, and empathy, as these skills inspire “understanding, sharing, helping, and cooperation.”¹⁵

Human rights education promotes the understanding and upholding of human rights and responsibilities regarding core values that revolve around resolving conflicts, i.e. social equity, cultural diversity, a commitment to democracy, justice for the whole community, and freedom. It familiarizes learners with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the role of the UN and the EU, the nongovernmental organizations and the contribution of these organizations to the human rights practices worldwide. It introduces concepts and language suitable to the learners’ levels so that they understand how to exercise rights with accompanying social responsibilities. Such education sensitizes learners to human suffering due to injustice, political repression, and rights violations by incorporating arts, literature, drama, films and music. Learners become more adept at recognizing structural dominance and oppression, torture and persecution, by analyzing the conditions and reasons that bring about human suffering, the conditions that produce totalitarian systems, and the consequences of misuse of power.

Human rights education can be enriched through incorporating training that focuses on intercultural communicative competence since developing a healthy social identity to establish harmonious relationships is dependent on effective communication skills. Learning a variety of languages and cross-cultural communication skills along with rules that regulate cultural contexts sensitizes learners towards cultural and linguistic identities, cultural heritage, and diversity.

Health and environment education, on the other hand, raises awareness on general well-being of humans and other species. Health literacy provides information on addiction, stress, stress-related diseases, the relationship between stress and depression, preventive health care practices, introducing coping strategies for mental and physical health. Maintaining mind-body balance with such techniques enhances one’s resilience, sense of grounding, and connectivity so that they can cope with difficulties, struggles, and challenges in life without losing overall quality of life and resorting to violence. Environmental education in schools

¹⁴ The author is in the process of developing a mindful communication approach that aims to develop an assertive, empowering, and mutually respectful communication strategy in personal and professional areas of interaction.

¹⁵ Sandra V. Sandy, “The Development of Conflict Resolution Skills,” in *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, ed. Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman, Eric C. Marcus. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Imprint, 2006), 366.

aims at creating awareness regarding pollution, environmental damage, deterioration of ecosystems, and the interrelationship between human health and the environment. While dealing with major issues, such as global warming, climate change, species extinction, and environmental destruction on an intellectual level, learners also need to develop a naturalist intelligence while working on projects that require innovative ways to protect and preserve the quality of the environment

The peace education curricula should also include art, science, and humanities courses designed to promote non-violence and peace in the classroom. For example, the study of evolution can be instrumental in appreciating the bonds between humans and other species by revealing how life has changed through time. History of civilizations can help us understand the formation of cultures, religious doctrines, inventions, and cultural values. Understanding how these cultures evolved, the political systems and religions they adopted, and the ideas and inventions they cherished allow us to identify their influences on different cultures. The study of ancient myths sheds light on their role in the formation of the cultural values and belief systems of the past. Such a longitudinal perspective on life and culture can furnish learners with a desire to research and understand more, developing critical thinking skills in the process to decide which ideas to form, which perspective to take, and which path to follow with a non-violent frame of mind. Thus, studying religious doctrines and spiritual schools which influenced the formation, maintenance, and destruction of societies and cultures could prevent fanaticism, fundamentalism, fear, xenophobia, and terror, which are increasingly associated with religion. With such education, learners may develop an understanding as to the need to form belief systems and the underlying mechanisms of the human propensity to believe in the supernatural. Scientific analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of ideas and beliefs are necessary if we want to understand the diversity of cultural values and the psychology of belongingness.

With science and math education learners acquire the skills of reasoning, logic, hypothesizing, and forming theories with the ability to test them. They can monitor their own thought processes and witness those of others. Knowledge brings freedom of choice and empowerment. Thus, science training can take learners beyond the neurobiological survival program, helping them reconstruct the self and transcend the limits established by fear, ignorance, and hatred, which divide cultures and countries.

Arts education can be used as a healthy outlet for emotions and enable better communication. Art education creates a safe context in which authentic literature accompanied by visual and musical arts can be used for cultural enrichment, linguistic sophistication, and cognitive development. Art education activates the brain's often underused right hemisphere, which is responsible for intuition, emotional involvement, and creativity, balancing the logical and analytical left hemisphere's dominance. Thus, art education enhances creativity and prepares the individual for more artistic and holistic information processing. Art appreciation, on the other hand, brings the understanding of universal qualities that immortalize artwork, enhancing learners' creative perception and evaluation skills.

3.2. The core of the model

According to latest research, traumatic imprints at the early stages of life may result in a tendency towards violence. The mother's stressful or traumatic experiences, her mood, and

whether she is undernourished during pregnancy have irreversible impacts on the brain of her baby. In other words, the fetus'/baby's experience of its mother's psychology in the womb or any repetitive experience of neglect or violence in early childhood has the power to shape the brain in such a way that the deprivation experienced may manifest itself as severe dissociation, leading to future acts of violence and/or a need to search for uncontrollable power.¹⁶ Thus, the individual may lose the capacity to emote and empathize with others, becoming self-centered and seeking instant gratification.

Violence that may dramatically change the architecture of the brain can be in many forms: verbal, emotional, physical, sexual, and military. Violence in the case of war, abuse of power in state affairs to subdue people, and exertion of control over personal/social freedom have detrimental effects on a larger scale. Once exposed to personal or social violence, the brain may choose to retaliate. The brain that is a product of early exposure to violence may be the cause of later institutional violence, which subdues civilians under oppressive economic conditions from the fear of losing institutional power. Such misuse of power leads to social or structural violence, which may create "circumstances that limit life, civil rights, health, personal freedom, and self-fulfilment."¹⁷ Brains motivated by power and ruled by fear create miserable health conditions, poor education, or high-quality education for only a select few, and deprive people of the freedom to live in humane conditions. It also manifests itself in the form of ecological violence. These different forms of violence may result from the fact that the neural connections in the brain of the individuals involved in feats of power and violent acts have been compromised. Those who fall short of devising peaceful and empowering governance policies and practices, and those who opt for destructive methods at national/international levels, may not have had the chance to develop healthy neural connections under optimal non-violent conditions. Due to early trauma, their brains may not have evolved enough to control violent impulses and fear responses. Such self-centric survival-oriented impulses and behaviors arise from the terror center of the brain, due to imprints of traumatic and fearful experiences and/or deprivation, especially the early deprivation of love.

Thus, acquiring skills of non-violent communication gains momentum as the dissemination of knowledge strengthens and empowers the civic voice to balance power distribution in society when peace concepts start with early childhood education, when peace education continues during adolescence, and exists as an integral part of life-long education. This infrastructure requires pre-service and in-service peace education training for instructors and readily available materials for all age groups.

In peace education, knowing the causes of violence is crucial, creating awareness so that new prevention strategies can be developed. Asking the following questions may shed light on the very complex nature of violence: What are the internal and external causes that bring about violence? What is the role of the environment and the social structure in causing violence? How does the psychology of parents contribute to psychosocial risks, such as violence and harassment?

The peace education model proposed here, advocates that understanding the neurobiology of violence and love is crucial to answering the above questions. The answers to the following

¹⁶ Arthur Janov, *Imprints: The Lifelong Effects of the Birth Experience* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1983); *The Biology of Love* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2000); *The New Primal Scream* (London: Abacus, 2003); *Primal Healing* (Franklin Lakes, N. J.: New Page Books, 2007).

¹⁷ Harris and Morrison, *Peace Education*, 12.

questions may create an awareness of major sources of violence in social structures so that aspects of society can reorganize themselves to control and eliminate the detrimental impacts of violence on children and adults. What brain chemicals are connected with violence? What is the relationship between the neurochemical imbalance that leads to violence and the pre-natal, birth, and post-natal periods? Under which circumstances does neurochemical imbalance occur? How does the brain develop under stress and trauma to cause violence? What is the role of deprivation and the impact of deprived environments in causing violence? What is the nature-nurture relationship in the formation of violent tendencies? What is the role of genetic pre-disposition? With a more holistic view on how the brain works, a more effective means for overcoming violence at the individual and even cellular level can be designed.

Using a brain-based approach to learning requires educators to explore, question, and interpret brain science that comes from many sources: brain imaging, animal research, brain diseases, brain trauma, and experiments on cognition and affect. This approach centers around constructing brain-enriching environments, investigating how the brain learns and opening up new territories for instructors to experience novelty while designing materials, devising methodologies, and evaluating performance. Brain-based learning brings to the forefront the devastating effects of stress, violence, and trauma on the brain and its relationship to identity development, helping teach others, such as educators and families, how to relieve and remove stress in schools and homes. Brain-based learning aims at enriching the brain with intrinsically motivating cognitive and affective learning, supported by transformational learning experiences.

When brain-friendly curricula are designed and implemented, multiple intelligences to enhance creativity and creative problem solution need to be taken into consideration. Emotional intelligence gains prominence when learners are trained to recognize both their own and others' emotions as they are required to appropriately respond in emotionally-laden situations. Students learn how to manage their emotions constructively and express themselves with effective communication strategies in challenging situations. Emotional intelligence incorporates non-violent brain-based pedagogy, fully equipping learners with non-violent communication strategies. Moreover, it focuses on personal learning styles and teaches a variety of study skills to enable learners to successfully complete tasks and assessments and to create a desire for life-long learning practices. It also aims to invoke curiosity and provides tools so that learners can acquire knowledge and skills on their own. Such autonomy emerges as learners conduct extensive research and experiments by drawing on resources with the guidance of the instructor, when they organize their thoughts effectively, express themselves well in writing, and defend their views and arguments skillfully when challenged.

The ever-accelerating speed of daily life, with its private and professional overload of duties and responsibilities, makes it essential to create balance so that the situation will not lead to debilitating stress and burnout. Developing resilience is tightly linked to effective stress-management and self-management skills, which can relieve anxiety, exhaustion, and aggression. When an individual is resilient enough to overcome obstacles to happiness, then the natural intrinsic reward system will become active, along with the neurochemical substrate that guides one's whole sense of well-being.

Brain-based learning prepares learners for a demanding world in which individual level conflicts may frequently turn into social conflicts and end up in violence. The present model

advocates an individual level, brain-based intervention to address the root causes of such violence and either prevent individuals from harmful exposures or enhance their ability to overcome their fight or flight (survival) responses in highly stressful situations. One's levels of technology literacy, scientific thinking, field-related skills and qualifications, autonomy, self-discipline, awareness, emotional management, creative self-expression, team skills, stress management, communication skills and problem-solving abilities determine one's prospects in living, promoting a peaceful life. Brain-based learning aims to assist the learner in the construction of this peaceful self and develops many assets that contribute to a peaceful society.

In order to illustrate how peace and non-violence at the individual level can be achieved by introducing brain-based learning, the following sections focus on critical stages of brain development, the effect of trauma, the neurochemistry of violence and love, and how this knowledge should be utilized at the core of peace education.

3.2.1. Critical stages of brain development

The brain of the fetus develops at an amazing speed during gestation. Hundreds of millions of brain cells, dendrites, and synaptic connections are formed every minute. During these precious moments, the emotional mood of the mother, her attitude towards life and the baby have a powerful effect on the brain. If, on the other hand, the mother experiences major challenges, is exposed to violence of any form, or if the fetus is undernourished, natural brain development may be impeded.

When a newborn is loved and when its needs are fulfilled, its internal serotonin- and oxytocin-based inhibitory system¹⁸ becomes well-established. The baby will thus feel at ease and relaxed. The frontal cortex, which is responsible for thinking, reflecting, and inhibiting sensations and impulses driven by the lower brain systems, such as the brain stem structures and the limbic system, will be enhanced. This enhancement will provide control in the later stages of life. In a healthy person, all the brain layers and hemispheres work in harmony.

When a traumatic experience occurs, however, this enhancement will not take place. In response to trauma, the brain protects itself by disconnecting some areas so that the input will not overwhelm the brain and information will not travel to and be interpreted by the left frontal cortex. An individual who has a weak frontal cortex due to early trauma will lack control and the individual will be hyperactive or prone to violence.

The strength of survival reactions to stress are caused by pre-natal threats in the womb, birth complications, after-birth experiences, lack of fulfillment of early needs, and emotional or life-threatening experiences later on in life.¹⁹ Lack of fulfillment of pre-natal or early needs results in a high concentration of stress hormones and leads to massive pain. Such pain requires an equally massive effort to hold it down.²⁰ Combined with parental indifference or lack of love after birth, the pain will be compounded and not only impede the development of the frontal cortex and the limbic system but also damage the existing connections. Such treatment results in a variety of trauma-induced behaviors and thought patterns in the future, including obsessive-compulsive behavior patterns, paranoia, phobias, attention and concentration problems, and even health problems, as the impulse control mechanisms of the

¹⁸ Janov, *Biology of Love*.

¹⁹ Janov, *Imprints; Biology of Love; Primal Scream; Primal Healing*.

²⁰ Janov, *Biology of Love*.

neocortex may not develop well. This damage, i.e. traumatic-imprints, will result in chronic suffering throughout life.

According to Janov, there is a timetable of needs and critical periods for healthy brain development, and only when these needs are fulfilled can the brain develop to its potential.²¹ For instance, in the womb if the mother takes care of the baby by choosing a healthy lifestyle and a balanced diet without smoking, taking drugs or becoming unduly stressed, then the baby will develop the necessary neurochemicals to prepare it for high life performance and good health. The mother's love for the baby chemically transmitted in this way will well equip the baby for future life challenges. After the baby is born, its basic need for love is fulfilled if he or she is touched and cuddled. Touching is essential at the first stages of after-birth development, especially when the baby is immediately brought to the mother for breast-feeding.²²

Imprinting has three distinct stages, and each stage has a counterpart in brain development.²³ Janov emphasizes that the first needs of a baby are the physical needs, such as nourishment and safety. In the second stage are emotional needs for love, understanding, and respect for feelings. The third stage includes intellectual needs, that is, needs of knowing and understanding. During these three stages, the most important ingredients are love and love-related needs. All traumas are processed, coded, and stored at certain levels of consciousness, each of which has distinct memory systems and communication mechanisms.²⁴ Baby's personality is determined in the womb from the third month onwards, as the primitive brain and nervous system register memories and imprints.²⁵ During gestation and after birth, genuine love and interest in the baby and fulfilling its needs will determine how healthy the baby will be. Unless there is love and loving physical contact, the deprivation imprinted will be neurobiologically registered as trauma, with significant future consequences regarding the brain's natural development.

Janov states that early trauma creates great pain, which is repressed by the brain. The brain uses various feel-good neurochemicals, such as serotonin and endorphins to deal with trauma. Serotonin is an inhibitory neurotransmitter that mediates comfort, keeping imprinted impulses under control. However, if the trauma is too great and compounded, if there is great deprivation before, during, and/or just after birth, or if repression goes a long time without treatment, then the serotonin system may be damaged, resulting in hyperactive, fear-ridden, and impulsive children who have trouble learning.²⁶

Another neurochemical agent of great importance is dopamine, which is an excitatory chemical that coordinates bodily movements and alerts the individual. Pre-natal stress changes the dopamine levels of the fetus. Early lack of love and touch depletes dopamine resources.²⁷ A poor uterine environment and deprived family background or repression in the family also alters dopamine levels and may result in depression later.²⁸

Extremely high dopamine levels can weaken the individual's gating system, while extremely low levels affect the integration capacity of the brain, resulting in a sense of

²¹ Janov, *Biology of Love; Primal Scream*.

²² Janov, *Primal Scream*.

²³ Janov, *Primal Scream*.

²⁴ Janov, *Biology of Love; Primal Healing*.

²⁵ Janov, *Biology of Love; Primal Scream*.

²⁶ Janov, *Biology of Love*.

²⁷ Janov, *Biology of Love*.

²⁸ Janov, *Biology of Love*.

overwhelm and confusion even at low levels of stimuli.²⁹ Increased dopamine in the right hemisphere lessens the ability to regulate emotions. Lower levels in the right hemisphere results in passivity; therefore, these individuals tend to give up on things easily.³⁰ When dopamine levels are low in the left hemisphere, the person is prone to ideation, developing odd ideas to repress brain stem impulses.³¹

Research done by Teicher and colleagues reveals a strong link between children's physical, sexual, and emotional mistreatment and the development of psychiatric problems.³² This is because of the susceptibility of the brain during the critical formative years when it is being physically rewired by experience. The trauma experienced during these years reorganizes the nervous system. As the child lacks the resources necessary to process the experience, the impact of severe stress or abuse can leave an almost permanent imprint on its structure, modifying its functions. Abuse induces a cascade of neurobiological effects that irreversibly alter neural development.³³ The psychobiological and neuroendocrinological effects of the trauma may result in a variety of abnormalities.³⁴ Because of abnormalities developed in the brain, the individual continues to experience the trauma at the visceral level as if it were still going on. In later years, the child may be diagnosed with depression, anxiety, suicidal thoughts, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), aggression, impulsiveness, delinquency, hyperactivity, and substance abuse.³⁵

According to Teicher et al.,³⁶ childhood abuse disrupts the healthy maturation of the limbic structures and stimulates the amygdala into a state of heightened electrical irritability. Early abuse damages the hippocampus through exposure to stress hormones in its critical developmental phases. The reduction of the left amygdala correlates with feelings of depression and irritability or hostility.³⁷ In addition, early stress reconfigures the molecular organization of the limbic regions: it alters the GABA receptors in the amygdala. Furthermore, middle parts of the corpus callosum, the neural bridge that connects the two hemispheres of the brain, were found significantly smaller in boys and girls exposed to abuse.

According to other studies, the left hippocampus of abused patients with PTSD was 12% smaller than those of the healthy controls.³⁸ Bremner et al. found a significant correlation between short-term verbal memory deficits and smaller right hippocampal volume in patients with PTSD.³⁹ According to the researchers, the impact of trauma on hippocampal regions may be dependent on the time when the trauma was experienced. Early trauma appears to cause cell shrinkage. Neuronal plasticity in the young brain means that short-term memory functions normally mediated by the hippocampus may be partially taken over by other brain regions; however, since the brain loses plasticity with age, trauma experienced later in life may lead to the loss of memory functions.

²⁹ Janov, *Imprints*.

³⁰ Janov, *Biology of Love*.

³¹ Janov, *Biology of Love*.

³² Martin H. Teicher, "Scars That Won't Heal: The Neurobiology of Child Abuse," *Scientific American* (March 2002): 68-75.

³³ Teicher, "Scars That Won't Heal," 75.

³⁴ Bessel A. van der Kolk, "The Body Keeps the Score: Memory and the Evolving Psychobiology of Posttraumatic Stress," *Harvard Review of Psychology* 1 (1994).

³⁵ Ronald Kotulak, *Inside the Brain: Revolutionary Discoveries of How the Mind Works* (Kansas City: Andrews McMeel Publishing, 1996); Teicher, "Scars That Won't Heal."

³⁶ Teicher, "Scars That Won't Heal."

³⁷ Teicher, "Scars That Won't Heal."

³⁸ Bremner et al., "Magnetic Resonance Imaging-based Measurement of Hippocampal Volume in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder related to Childhood Physical and Sexual Abuse-A Preliminary Report," *Biological Psychiatry* 41 (January 1997): 29.

³⁹ Bremner et al., "Magnetic Resonance Imaging-based Measurement of Hippocampal Volume", 30.

Teicher et al.⁴⁰ found clinically significant brain-wave abnormalities and EEG anomalies in patients who had experienced serious physical and sexual abuse; the EEG anomalies apparently indicate limbic irritability.

In strong support of the previous research,⁴¹ Teicher et al. reiterate the importance of the absence of stress in human development:

We hypothesize that adequate nurturing and the absence of intense early stress permits our brains to develop in a manner that is less aggressive and more emotionally stable, social, empathic, and hemispherically integrated. We believe that this process enhances the ability of social animals to build more complex interpersonal structures and enables humans to better realize their creative potential.⁴²

3.2.2. Violence and its causes

Having emphasized the significance of early love for the fetus/baby, we will now focus on the detrimental consequences of deprivation of love and how it leads to violence. As noted above, sensory deprivation, deprivation of love, and exposure to violence are detrimental early experiences that permanently change the physical structure of the brain.⁴³ These changes may result in physical and mental diseases and/or emotional and psychological imbalances, establishing impulsive thought processes that make an individual view violence as an acceptable way of dealing with problems.⁴⁴

If there are extreme levels of stress hormones present during pregnancy, the fetus brain adapts itself to the stressful conditions that convey survival and threat messages to the fetus through the mother's perception of the world.⁴⁵ Thus, "exposure to early stress generates molecular and neurobiological effects that alter neural development in an adaptive way that prepares the adult brain to survive and reproduce in a dangerous world."⁴⁶

Early stress generally means domestic violence. Once the brain realizes that it is under threat at home, serotonin and noradrenaline imbalances may occur. Especially when the child is genetically vulnerable to stress, the wiring of the brain and the distribution of neurohormones lay the groundwork for violence for the rest of the individual's lifetime. Deprivation of love in the family, domestic violence, poverty, shattered families, and drug abuse can rewire the brain in such a way that neurohormones prepare the body for aggression.⁴⁷ According to Kotulak, the most susceptible children to violence "have low IQs, poor school attainment, high impulsivity, and lack of concentration. They tend to come from big families, low-income families, and have parents who were convicted of a crime; they grow up with harsh discipline, poor supervision, and separation from parents."⁴⁸

Aggression, when balanced, is a universal positive force that enables humans to stand up for their rights to live, seeking and cherishing food and shelter. "Normal aggression has a set point, like body temperature, which is regulated by brain chemicals. Most people are born with a balance of these neurochemicals."⁴⁹ Depending on the amount and distribution of

⁴⁰ Teicher, "Scars That Won't Heal," 71.

⁴¹ Janov, *Imprints: Biology of Love; Primal Scream*.

⁴² Teicher, "Scars That Won't Heal," 75.

⁴³ Janov, *Imprints: Biology of Love; Primal Scream*.

⁴⁴ Kotulak, *Inside the Brain*.

⁴⁵ Lipton, "Conscious Parenting".

⁴⁶ Teicher, "Scars That Won't Heal," 75.

⁴⁷ Kotulak, *Inside the Brain*.

⁴⁸ Kotulak, *Inside the Brain*, 69.

⁴⁹ Kotulak, *Inside the Brain*, 67.

these chemicals, however, aggression may increase or decrease. Similarly, fear, in essence, helps animals and humans avoid danger. Thus, it has a survival value. However, an extremely fearful experience such as a trauma can imprint an emotional memory, causing physical changes in the brain architecture and resulting in permanent behavioral changes. Thus, “fear plays an important role in psychopathology. While fear is an adaptive component of [the] response to potentially threatening stimuli, too much or inappropriate fear accounts for many common psychiatric problems.”⁵⁰

Fear is processed and memorized by a set of circuits that detect and respond to danger. The link between a scary stimulus and the reaction is laid down as a special, primal kind of memory, which is distinct from the explicit or rational memory that forms after the experience.⁵¹ Emotional content of the memory is formed in the amygdala.⁵² Usually, the memories encoded here last a lifetime because the plasticity in the lateral amygdala may serve to permanently store the fear-based association.⁵³ Since the brain tends to store high-valence memories permanently, fear memories short-circuit rational thought, block normal behavior, and disturb normal thought patterns. In some people with anxiety disorders, emotional memory seems to override logic. When activated by a similar stimulus, primal memory tends to override rational memory so that the fear response escalates into paralyzing anxiety.⁵⁴ For instance, in people afraid of snakes, the sight of a stick or a rope can trigger a paralyzing terror.

A healthy amygdala can filter out unthreatening stimuli. Without this filtering, we would respond to all kinds of inappropriate fear cues. However, if the amygdala lets too much information in, even mildly scary stimuli can be terrifying and override rational thought. Once primed by one or more frightening experiences, a person with a ‘leaky’ amygdala may become hypervigilant.

When our neurochemicals are balanced, we are able to rationally react to the events in our external reality. Serotonin, as a mood regulator, controls primitive drives and emotions, such as the drive for sex and appetite at normal levels. It also controls aggression, sleep, suicidal tendencies, arousal, and pain. According to Dr. Michael Raleigh, normal serotonin levels are associated with clear thinking and social success.⁵⁵ With the right amounts, the brain masters all of its resources to make use of the opportunities in its environment, balancing the risks against the benefits. In such individuals, enough aggression is allowed to surface so that they can be assertive and get things done.⁵⁶

An imbalance of serotonin seems to change the brain’s perception of fear, especially if the imbalance happens in infancy. One study⁵⁷ found that depriving infant mice of some of their serotonin made them anxious as adults. There is evidence that serotonin must be available to the brain in adequate amounts in early childhood to protect it from anxiety.⁵⁸

When serotonin declines in the brain, as is often the case with abused children or with

⁵⁰ Marie A. Pezze and Joram Feldon, “Mesolimbic Dopaminergic Pathways in Fear Conditioning,” *Progress in Neurobiology* 74 (December 2004): 1.

⁵¹ Janov, *Imprints*.

⁵² Joseph LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998).

⁵³ Teicher, “Scars That Won’t Heal.”

⁵⁴ Janov, *Imprints; Biology of Love*.

⁵⁵ Kotulak, *Inside the Brain*.

⁵⁶ Kotulak, *Inside the Brain*.

⁵⁷ Cornelius Gross, et al., “Serotonin 1A Receptor Acts During Development to Establish Normal Anxiety-like Behavior in the Adult,” *Nature* 416 (2002): 396-400.

⁵⁸ Gross et al., “Serotonin 1A Receptor.”

alcohol and drug abuse, impulsive aggression is unleashed. With serotonin depletion a person may also start to lose interest in life and signs of happiness decrease; depression and a tendency to suicide steps in. With depletion comes a lack of control, irritability, loss of temper, and explosive rage.

Other neurochemicals also play an important role in aggression. Dopamine is another neurotransmitter which most potently modulates humans' motivational and pleasure-related behaviors as well as the mechanisms underlying states of fear and anxiety. There is strong evidence for the important role of the stress-responsive mesolimbic dopaminergic system in controlling mood.⁵⁹ When dopamine levels drop substantially, a person may use violence or hallucinogenic drugs to activate the pleasure pathways in the brain.⁶⁰

Noradrenaline is a neurochemical that notifies the body when it is under stress or threat. It alerts the brain's survival mechanism to take immediate action in response to danger, reorganizing the distribution and amount of neurohormones, such as adrenaline and other chemicals. Noradrenaline may be instrumental in both hot-blooded and cold-blooded violence; when noradrenaline is high, impulsive violence becomes more likely,⁶¹ and as low levels cause under-arousal, the cold-blooded violence of a serial killer may be more likely.⁶² Thus, behind aggression, violence, or criminal activity, a combination of serotonin and noradrenaline may be at work. When high noradrenaline was superimposed on low serotonin, impulsive aggression was aimed at others. When low noradrenaline was combined with low serotonin, aggression was aimed inward.⁶³ According to research,⁶⁴ impulsive aggression may also be caused by dysfunctional serotonin-dopamine interactions. Different combinations of these neurochemicals as triggered by conditions and experiences may produce different violent consequences.

Genetic heritage may also make people susceptible to low serotonin. If a child is exposed to violence at home, such experience appears to determine how that gene will be expressed. Research has just begun to unveil the power of the outer environment in gene expression: epigenetics. According to Lipton,⁶⁵ the environment's signals are received by cell membranes, which activate effector proteins within the cell. As a result, new genes are formed: "Integral membrane receptor-effector proteins are the fundamental physical subunits of the cellular brain's 'intelligence' mechanism. By functional definition, these protein complexes are 'perception switches' that link reception of environmental stimuli to response-generating protein pathways."⁶⁶

This piece of information has many valuable implications. First and foremost, if an expectant mother has a stressful life, then the way she perceives the world will trigger the expression of genes that will prepare the baby for a stressful life. In other words, the baby will be equipped with more stress chemicals to be able to survive in an insecure world. Second, the

⁵⁹ Christiane M. Thiel and Rainer K. W. Schwarting, "Dopaminergic Lateralization in the Forebrain: Relations to Behavior Asymmetries and Anxiety in Male Wistar Rats," *Neuropsychobiology* 43 (2001): 192-99.

⁶⁰ Michael A. Bozarth, "Pleasure Systems in the Brain," in *Pleasure: The Politics and the Reality*, ed. David M. Warburton (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994).

⁶¹ Kotulak, *Inside the Brain*.

⁶² Kotulak, *Inside the Brain*.

⁶³ Kotulak, *Inside the Brain*.

⁶⁴ Dongju Seo, Christopher J. Patrick, and Patrick J. Kennealy, "Role of Serotonin and Dopamine System Interactions in the Neurobiology of Impulsive Aggression and its Comorbidity with other Clinical Disorders," *Aggressive Violent Behaviour* 13 (2008): 383-95.

⁶⁵ Lipton, "Conscious Parenting"; *The Biology of Belief* (Santa Rosa: Mountain of Love/Elite Books, 2005).

⁶⁶ Lipton, *Biology of Belief*, 128.

brain will shape itself in such a way that the neurochemicals and the structures that evolve for survival will rise to prominence. This is exemplified in Keverne's⁶⁷ research, which reveals a genetic mechanism through which regulatory genes inherited from the mother promote the expansion of the neocortex, which is a more-evolved part of the brain. Genes inherited from the father support the brain stem, which promote a bigger body and survival skills. In other words, the organism decides which gene to silence and which part of the brain to develop based on the parents' perceptions and experiences.

Thus, based on these research studies, it would not be wrong to claim that stress and threat in the environment will trigger mechanisms that affect the DNA so that the brain can adapt itself to its environment. When we consider the fact that the human organism is genetically pre-programmed for survival, if children at early stages are exposed to fear-inducing violent events and circumstances, their brain will change to accommodate future behavior that will orient them towards destruction and violence. They will have limited ability to empathize with others; because empathy is a function of the prefrontal regions that need experiences of love and compassion to develop. If there is threat in the environment, brain structures and neurochemistry will tend towards developing for survival; if there is a loving and caring environment, then brain structures and neurochemistry will tend towards developing for cognitive sophistication and creative, non-violent self expression.

3.2.3. Love and elimination of violence

Having covered the multi-faceted causes of violence and the effects of violence on the brain, we will now look at the neurobiological aspects of love, which can counteract its effects. If we really want to establish global societies based on peace and raise new generations that look into peaceful solutions to conflicts, we need to eliminate stress, resolve uncontrollable violent impulses that are closely connected to the experience of threat and violence in the family, and lay the groundwork for a more peaceful brain and more peaceful societies. For this reason, we need to encourage the secretion of love chemicals and support the development of brain structures that mediate the experience of love through loving, caring and empowering environments beginning from pregnancy onwards.

Love (both romantic and maternal) occupies a unique area in the brain's specific regions, each of which may overlap or differentiate. These regions⁶⁸ belong to the brain's reward system, which contains a high density of receptors for oxytocin and vasopressin. When these regions are activated, regions that process negative emotions, mentalizing, social judgment, and critical social assessment are deactivated.

Activation of the brain's reward systems can be considered a normal component of behavior. These regions govern an organism's approach to goals that are normally beneficial and promote survival⁶⁹ by using neurochemicals such as dopamine, which gives us the feeling of satisfaction, and oxytocin, which produces feelings of love.

Oxytocin (and vasopressin) is also involved in maternal attachment and adult pair-bonding; they may even play a role in memory and learning. During breastfeeding or sucking, maternal oxytocin levels increase. Oxytocin may also be released by touch and warmth, thus

⁶⁷ E. Barry Keverne, "Genomic Imprinting, Maternal Care, and Brain Evolution," *Hormones and Behavior* 40 (2001): 146-55.

⁶⁸ Andreas Bartels and Semir Zeki, "The Neural Basis of Romantic Love," *NeuroReport* 11 (2000): 3829-34; Andreas Bartels and Semir Zeki, "The Neural Correlates of Maternal and Romantic Love," *NeuroImage* 21 (2004): 1155-66.

⁶⁹ Bozarth, "Pleasure Systems."

it may play a role in positive social interactions and emotions. Oxytocin specifically has an anti-stress effect.⁷⁰

According to Uvnas-Moberg, “oxytocin coordinates both the causes and effects of social interactions. During social interactions, oxytocin can be released by sensory stimuli perceived as positive, including touch, warmth and odors.”⁷¹ Oxytocin is also associated with a decrease in heart rate, blood pressure, and cortisol levels, thus reducing the deleterious effects of chronic stress. In other words, loving and supportive interactions support the body’s natural tendency towards repair, growth, and bonding.

When the significance of the pre-natal environment and/or the first months of life are taken into consideration, the power of love chemicals in shaping the brain is evident. According to Janov, if the brain of the fetus/baby does not fully develop due to pre-natal experiences, imprints such as “I’m not loved” and/or “I’m not worthy” will be laid down almost permanently.⁷² To compound the problem, because lack of love hinders connections between the three levels of the brain and because the lack of fully-formed connections prevents the individual from becoming consciously aware of his or her feelings,⁷³ people usually need intense professional assistance to change them.

Adequate love, compassion, and understanding, however, enable a baby to have a reward system that is naturally activated by daily life experiences. When a person encounters stress or compounded challenges in daily life, the brain connections and neurochemical distributions laid down by love experienced pre- and post-natally, will allow him or her utilize inner resources to resolve them. However, if rewards normally effective in influencing behavior lose their ability to motivate, or if natural rewards do not activate the reward system very strongly, the individual may turn towards drugs or delinquent behavior to get the same feelings.⁷⁴

4. Conclusion

As evident from the discussion of the mechanisms of violence and love, there is another level to peace education, namely, the cellular level. Enriched with the knowledge of the neurobiology of violence and love, peace education can develop effective ways to eliminate the root causes of violence. Understanding how the brain physically changes, how it loses its neural affluence when exposed to violence or how neural networks thrive when stimulated in enriched environments can aid the education specialists in designing new educational policies to prevent cognitive and affective impairment due to environmental deprivation and neglect. In this way, solutions to global concerns can be addressed at the most fundamental levels.

Specifically, the proposed model advocates disseminating information on the effects of violence, fear, stress, and trauma during the pre-natal, birth, and post-natal periods when the foundation of love chemicals or chemicals of violence are established and the brain architecture is formed. In other words, through educating parents, children, and teachers, including pre-parental development training, the model opens up a cellular dimension where violence can be prevented before its pre-natal foundation is established. This cellular

⁷⁰ Kerstin Uvnas-Moberg, “Oxytocin May Mediate the Benefits of Positive Social Interaction and Emotions,” *Psychoneuroendocrinology* 23 (1998): 819-35.

⁷¹ Uvnas-Moberg, “Oxytocin,” 820.

⁷² Janov, *Biology of Love*.

⁷³ Janov, *Biology of Love*.

⁷⁴ Janov, *Imprints; Biology of Love; Primal Scream*.

dimension may act as a neurobiological foundation on which a more loving and caring generation of human beings who can choose peaceful alternatives to violence and who can provide critical evaluation of alternative strategies can be raised. To ensure this result, national curricula should be redesigned based on the framework set by the peace education paradigm, incorporating courses from disciplines that cultivate creativity, peaceful solutions to global concerns, and critical mind-sets. However, betterment of education systems on a global scale is dependent upon cooperation in the form of a Joint Commission of World Education.

Since individuals who are raised in loving and empowering environments develop more evolved brains that grant them a compassionate outlook on life, peace education has the potential to transform today's world into one where peace consciousness resides. Peace consciousness is raised by acquiring knowledge about non-violent negotiation, reconciliation strategies that can be used during major conflicts and crises, and major causes of violence. When students cultivate means and strategies for non-violent struggle, realize the importance of absolute replacement of armed struggle and wars with non-violent peaceful negotiations by providing critical evaluation of alternative strategies, they will be able to appreciate non-violent resolution of national and international conflicts. They will perceive alternatives to violence, displaying reverence for all life forms, human rights, and our planet. Education to awaken the power to eliminate violence and terror from the world stage through non-violence is an evolved act of compassion that requires a high intellectual capacity. Taking compassionate action can transform the images of cultural violence engraved in the minds of today's youth by "the media, entertainment industry, politics, national and foreign policy, community and the family."⁷⁵ Active non-violence can be regarded as positive peace, which emphasizes the value of cooperation to resolve conflicts by respecting "standards of justice, satisfying basic needs, and honoring human rights" as "peace involves a respect for life and for the dignity of each human being without discrimination or prejudice."⁷⁶ Learning about non-violent solutions, children will become functional citizens who can solve conflicts peacefully and non-violently, and who can thus end intolerance, discrimination, and social injustice. However, to actualize this, one needs to achieve peace at the cellular level.

In our century, the world cannot take the risk of building leaders who have irritable, hostile, and overactive amygdala due to traumatic experiences or early deprivation. Such individuals are doomed to tyrannize their own countries and threaten the welfare of others especially if they have low levels of dopamine, serotonin, and unbalanced levels of noradrenaline.

Our DNA is pre-programmed to struggle for survival. As such, in the evolutionary process, the human race has become extremely skilled in survival. Once a physical struggle, survival is now a mental game of the highest quality, with technology and knowledge in the service of highly intelligent power sources that control the planet. This means that our genetic survival programming and control mechanisms have evolved into very sophisticated tools to ensure survival and control at all costs. This act of survival consciousness accompanied by the desire to exert power to control humanity with ingenious political or military strategies and moves may assume the role of relentless terror, wars, invasions, the use of the state of the art arms and technologies to control disempowered masses. If we genuinely desire to bring peace to our planet, we must induce our own biological mutation, taking our cells away from the primitive level of survival programming into an evolved state of consciousness: the

⁷⁵ Harris, *Peace Education*, 10.

⁷⁶ Harris, *Peace Education*, 12.

consciousness of love, compassion, and peace. In other words, we can start to change from the inside out by using the power of knowledge. Education, from this perspective, is the first step. Policy makers must drop armed survival strategies and display their genuine concern for the well-being of our species and our planet. Thus, education turns into a symbolic catalyst that can assist the individual and societies to consciously and willfully change their genetic encodings. This mutation is a must if we desire to become an empowered species with peace inside, peace outside, and peace in action with compassion.

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Peace Education as a Post-conflict Peacebuilding Tool¹

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Abstract

This article provides a critical analysis of the literature and reports on peace education programmes in countries emerging from violent conflicts. First, it begins with an overview of peace education's history. Next, it examines how peace education has been conceptualised, and highlights why it remains poorly defined. The article then proceeds by looking at the development of the international community's use of peace education as a tool to contribute to their peacebuilding efforts in countries emerging from protracted contexts. After that, it reviews the research and evaluation work that has been done on peace education programmes. The article concludes with a survey of peace education programmes in ethnically/religiously linked post-conflict environments that have made mainstreaming their goal, and identifies areas of future research.

Keywords: Peace, peace education, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, protracted conflicts

1. Introduction

The practice of peace education is as old as war itself. For generations, people have sought to find ways to prevent war and violence and educate on ways to be peaceful. Some of the oldest theories of peace education derive from the worlds' religions, following the teaching of such prophets as Buddha, Ballá'u'lláh, Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Moses, and Lao Tse.² This article maintains that many peace education programmes today, even those that present themselves in purely secular terms, continue to draw inspiration and insight from this religious heritage, directly and indirectly influencing the programmes' philosophical assumptions underpinning their theories and practices.

However, it was only after the end of the Second World War that peace education became consciously practiced in formal and informal educational settings, evolving and developing into the distinct field of research and practice that it is today. This article provides a critical analysis of the literature and reports on peace education programmes in countries emerging from violent conflicts. It begins with an overview of peace education's history. Then it examines how peace education has been conceptualised, and highlights why it remains

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² Ian Harris, "The Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education," in *Peace Education: The concept, principles and practices in the world*, ed. Gabriel Salomon and Baruch Neve (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002), 15-26.

poorly defined. The article then proceeds by looking at the development of the international community's use of peace education as a tool to contribute to their peacebuilding efforts in countries emerging from protracted contexts. It next reviews the research and evaluation work that has been done on peace education programmes. The article concludes with a survey of peace education programmes in ethnically/religiously linked post-conflict environments that have made mainstreaming their goal, and identifies areas of future research.

2. The Emergence of the Field of Peace Education

Following the First World War, education reformers and peace advocates from Europe and America, such as Maria Montessori and John Dewey, began promoting the idea of "education for international understanding." It was assumed that ignorance of different cultures and political systems had historically led to distrust, suspicion, and often to war. Therefore it was hypothesized that through education it was possible to prevent future wars by changing former attitudes and behaviours to those more conducive to the creation of peace. Schools likewise began incorporating international relations into their curricula.

The idea to provide education for international understanding gained further attention and support after the Second World War, when the international community, through the newly established United Nations (UN), acknowledged traditional diplomacy as inadequate to respond to international conflicts. Many world leaders within the UN, and through its interagency, UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), proposed developing some kind of intellectual and moral framework that would unite the hearts and minds of humankind towards the goal of achieving lasting peace. Education was likewise turned to as the primary tool to achieve this objective.

Education had been used during both world wars as a tool to promote extreme nationalism through the indoctrination of youth in formal schooling. To counteract this trend, UNESCO promoted the idea of "education for world citizenship." UNESCO asserted that "wars begin in the minds of men" and therefore "it was in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed" (UNESCO, 1945). Since then, UNESCO has sought through education to advance international peace and the common welfare of humankind by developing international documents and proposals on ways to improve curricula and teacher training.

Peace education's formative years began as a study on the causes of war and other forms of direct violence and strategies to reduce or eliminate them. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, peace educators such as Johan Galtung elaborated and expanded on this conceptualization to include structural and cultural violence. Peace educators from around the world have since then adopted and adapted peace education programmes to address violence according to their specific social and political contexts. To illustrate a few examples, Japan introduced "a-bomb education" in the 1950s to counter fears following the aftermath of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.³ South America in the 1960s began initiating "development education" in response to the increase of violence caused by power and underdevelopment.⁴ In the late 1980s, Ireland initiated a peace education programme called "education for mutual understanding" to reintegrate divided Catholic and Protestant communities.⁵ Also in the

³ Harris, "The Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education," 16.

⁴ Harris, "The Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education," 16.

⁵ Terrence Duffy, "Peace Education in a Divided Society: Creating a Culture of Peace in Northern Ireland," *Prospects* XXX, no. 1 (2000): 15-29.

1980s, the United States and Great Britain offered “nuclear education” to prevent a “nuclear holocaust” from occurring.⁶ Peace education programmes have since then gone by a number of other names, including anti-nuclearism, international understanding, citizenship, global education, environmental responsibility, communication skills, conflict resolution, critical pedagogy, life skills, democracy, coexistence and gender equality, human rights awareness, peacebuilding, and tolerance of diversity.⁷ Each approach offers a different perception on how peace can be ‘mainstreamed’ in basic education.⁸

One of the newest developments in the field of peace education is its use by international actors as a peacebuilding tool in countries emerging from violent conflicts following the end of the Cold War. It is hoped that through peace education, succeeding generations will learn how to deal with conflicts non-violently and to eventually sustain a culture of peace.⁹ The remainder of this article will focus only on peace education programmes in this post-Cold War context, a phenomenon that remains poorly defined and understudied.

3. The Conceptual Framework of Peace Education

The concept of peace education has been used to refer to a wide range of approaches and diverse social contexts. It represents a variety of different but inter-related peace-based educational activities. UNICEF defines peace education as “the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level.”¹⁰ This definition is intended to be both specific and general, to address the many social and political contexts around the world.¹¹ The definition is thought to represent a combination of practical experiences gained by peace education practitioners in developing as well as industrialized countries, in addition to ideas that have emerged from scholarly work and research in peace and conflict studies.¹²

However, efforts to pool such a diverse range of programmes and place them under one single label has been criticized, questioned, and found self-defeating by a number of peace educators in the field, especially those working in the context of protracted conflicts. By defining and interpreting the field of peace education so broadly, Salomon argues that it “glosses over profoundly different kinds of peace education” and “implicitly assumes that

⁶ Harris, “The Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education,” 17.

⁷ Lisa Ardizzone, “Towards Global Understanding: The Transformative Role of Peace Education,” *Current Issues in Comparative Education* 4, no. 2 (2002): 16-25; Daniel Bar-Tal, “The Elusive Nature of Peace Education,” in Salomon and Neve, *Peace Education*, 27-36; Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict* (New York: UNICEF, 2000); Sara Clarke-Habibi, “Transforming Worldviews: The Case of Education for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Journal of Transformative Education* 3, no. 1 (2005): 33-56; H. B. Danesh, “Towards an Integrative Theory of Peace Education,” *Journal of Peace Education* 3, no. 1 (2006): 55-78; Maria Fitzduff and Isabella Jean, *Peace Education: State of the Field and Lessons Learned From USIP Grantmaking* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2011).

⁸ Susan Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF” (working paper, Programme Division, Education Section, UNICEF, New York, 1999).

⁹ UN states that, “The culture of peace is based on the principles established in the Charter of the United Nations and on the respect for human rights, democracy and tolerance, the promotion of development, education for peace, the free flow of information and the wider participation of women as an integral approach to preventing violence and conflicts, and efforts aimed at the creation of conditions for peace and its consolidation (A/Res/52/13, 15 January 1998, para.2).

¹⁰ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 1.

¹¹ Gabriel Salomon, “Peace Education: Its Nature, Nurture, and the Challenges it Faces,” in *Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace*, ed. Joseph de Rivera (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2009), 107-21.

¹² Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF.”

education for human dignity and human rights, democracy, and nonviolence translates into situational-specific, context-appropriate behaviors and actions.”¹³ Porath adds “that authors disagree on the description of the problem they wish to address and correspondingly on the proper solution, as well as on the site in which peace education is to take place.”¹⁴ According to scholars in the field, this semantic broadness has inhibited the field’s scholarly advance in terms of theorizing, research, and programme evaluation.

To address some of these shortcomings and academically develop the field of peace education, Salomon suggests analysing and distinguishing programmes according to the socio-political context they take place in, of which he identifies three: 1) regions that are in or emerging from [protracted]¹⁵ conflicts (e.g. Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Israel, Cyprus, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)), 2) areas where there exist nonviolent inter-ethnic tensions based on ethnocentrism (e.g. immigrants in Belgium and African-American, Hispanic, and Indigenous people in the US), and 3) relatively peaceful areas (e.g. Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland). These distinctions derive from the challenges programmes face, their goals, and the approach regarding different sub-groups of participants.¹⁶

4. Peace Education in the Context of Protracted Conflicts

Nevertheless, as research has demonstrated, peace education programmes in the context of protracted conflicts continue to represent a range of practices (e.g. conflict resolution, multiculturalism, with cross-cultural training, and the encouragement of a peaceful disposition); a number of different challenges (e.g. conflicting collective narratives, mutually exclusive historical memories, deeply rooted beliefs about the conflict and the adversary, grave inequalities, and a belligerent social climate); pursue a variety of goals (e.g. the cultivation of understanding between adversaries, the development of mutual tolerance, empathy and positive disposition towards other groups and a peaceful outlook in general; seek societal changes at different levels – intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, and international and encompass a wide range of activities (e.g. curriculum development and reform, retraining of teachers, address structural and policy changes required to mainstream peace education, promoting initiatives at the community level, and engaging in public awareness campaigns). These programmes reflect a wide range of conceptual frameworks originating from different religions or ideologies, which in turn envision different routes to peace. Therefore, peace education remains an elusive concept because there is no agreed-upon definition of peace or the means to achieve it. Consequently, Bar-Tal argues each programme projects its “own particular vision of a desirable society, the means to achieve it, and the school’s role in this mission,” and he concludes that “the consequence is the very multifaceted state of peace education we see at the present time.”¹⁷

¹³ Salomon, “Peace Education,” 107.

¹⁴ Sigal Ben-Porath, “War and Peace Education,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 37, no. 3 (2003): 525.

¹⁵ Within the field of peace and conflict studies and peace education, practitioners have used the term “intractable” conflicts instead of “protracted” conflicts; some use other terms such as deep-rooted, ethnic, or identity-based conflicts. Given the absence of an agreed-upon term to describe contemporary conflicts, this article uses the term “protracted conflict.”

¹⁶ Gabriel Salomon, “The Nature of Peace Education: Not All Programs Are Created Equal,” in Salomon and Neve, *Peace Education*, 5.

¹⁷ Bar-Tal, “The Elusive Nature of Peace Education,” 27-8.

4.1. Defining violence and peace in peace education

As formally discussed in this article, Johan Galtung, considered to be the father of peace studies, has sought to distinguish between different types of violence to include *direct* (e.g. verbal, physical, and violence harming the body, mind, or spirit), *structural* (e.g. political, repressive, economic, exploitative; supported by structural penetration, segmentation, fragmentation and marginalization), and *cultural* violence (e.g. religion, law, ideology, language, art, empirical/formal science, cosmology, and by carriers such as schools, universities, and media).¹⁸ Likewise, he has elaborated on the concept of peace, making the distinction between *negative peace* (e.g. the absence of war, gang attacks, sexual assault, random killing, and all other forms of physical harm) and *positive peace* (e.g. the existence of social and cultural structures that contribute to the well-being of all citizens).¹⁹

For many peace scholars however, the definition of peace does not go far enough. Peace educators such as Clarke-Habibi²⁰ argue that the moral and spiritual dimensions of peace need to be included, as some of the greatest peace-builders of the last century did (e.g. Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Ghandi, Maria Montessori). Peace scholar Gur-Ze'ev has gone further by suggesting that concept of peace itself derives from a theological origin, even in its secular form.²¹

While most peace educators and practitioners today agree that peace is more than the absence of direct violence (negative peace), the deeper meaning of peace (positive peace) remains undetermined. Peace educators such as Betty Reardon²² maintain that a holistic approach to peace education is needed, one that leads to inclusive education practices that incorporate global, social, political, moral, and personal dimensions of peace. Such an approach also complements and assists UN efforts to promote a “culture of peace.”

Peace educators working from negative interpretations of peace, however, criticize attempts to elaborate on the meaning of peace, suggesting that doing so is responsible for much of the conceptual confusion and incoherence within the field. Critics also maintain that peace education programmes working from positive conceptualizations have become too ambitious, with their goals of eliminating and/or reducing all forms of indirect violence, thereby running the risk of disillusioning participants or worse, imposing, even if unconsciously, indirect forms of cultural violence.²³ Finally, critics argue that idealist and/or positive peace-based approaches have been less effective partly because they have failed to make explicit the type of social change and/or ends sought in the immediate, local, national, and international contexts.²⁴

Following this brief literature review, it is apparent that two dominant philosophical and theoretical approaches to peace education exist –idealist and functionalist. This article argues that both approaches represent regimes of truth, each deriving from diverse religions and/or ideologies. Although they disagree on the conceptualizations of peace and violence, both regimes aspire for peace through the use of peace education. This understanding illustrates

¹⁸ Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means* (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1996).

¹⁹ Galtung first distinguished two types of peace in his classic article, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.”

²⁰ Clarke-Habibi, “Transforming Worldviews,” 33-56.

²¹ Ilan Gur-Ze-ev, *Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2010a).

²² Betty Reardon, *Comprehensive Peace Education: Educating for Global Responsibility* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988).

²³ Ben-Porath, “War and Peace Education.”

²⁴ Ben-Porath, “War and Peace Education”; Gur-Ze'ev, *Diasporic Philosophy*; Ilan Gur-Ze'ev, *The Possibility/Impossibility of a New Critical Language in Education* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2010b).

that the quest for peace is not politically or culturally “neutral,” a fact that has only recently been reflected on or problematized. Peace education programmes continue to be developed in countries emerging from protracted conflict with practically no reflection on the foundation of their assumptions; rather, their rationality is assumed and never questioned. This thinking represents a potential ‘blind spot’ in the field of peace education. This article next examines how this phenomenon came to exist.

5. The Emergence of Peace Education as a Post-War Policy Tool of Peacebuilding

After the Cold War, a series of intra-state conflicts broke out in Central America, Southeast Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia. These conflicts have been referred to as *protracted social conflicts*, a concept developed by Azar²⁵ to distinguish them from inter-state conflicts. Protracted conflicts are marked by tremendous human loss and suffering, economic devastation, a breakdown of governance and/or political systems, and cause development setbacks. They impact every aspect of society and include “a mixture of ideological, political or resource issues with elements of communal and ethnic [racial, national, or religious] identity.”²⁶ Unlike inter-state wars, civilians, in particular women and children, are often targeted due to their membership within a particular community. Strategies often include sexual torture, mass rape, ethnic or social “cleansing,” and even genocide. Protracted conflicts may last for several generations due to their high levels of intensity and the duration of violence.

In response to these new disasters, the UN developed and proposed a number of strategies, outlined in *An Agenda for Peace*, including “preventative diplomacy,” “peacemaking,” “peacekeeping, and “peacebuilding.”²⁷ This paper focuses on peacebuilding, as it deals specifically with countries emerging from intra-state conflicts. The strategy of peacebuilding is defined by the UN and other private voluntary organizations as the aim to “identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people” in addition to “address[ing] the deepest causes of conflict.”²⁸ Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacebuilding operations have become increasingly ambitious and more complex. Initially, peacebuilding operations focused on rebuilding institutions and providing basic services (e.g. security, rule of law). However, in recent years, Paris argues that peacebuilding operations have sought “to ‘transplant’ the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states.”²⁹ This change is in part because it is assumed that democratic institutions and market mechanisms will provide the stable foundations for peace both internally and externally.³⁰

²⁵ Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990).

²⁶ Veronique Dudouet, “Transitions for Violence to Peace,” in *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006), 3.

²⁷ It should be noted that there exists no strong consensus on the definition of peacebuilding or the best means to achieve it. The term peacebuilding was originally coined in 1975 by one of the founders of *Peace Studies*, Johan Galtung, in his article, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding.” His observations have now come to define today’s notion of peacebuilding, namely the idea of addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict and of supporting local capacity to peacefully manage and resolve conflicts. In 1997, another key scholar in *Peace Studies*, Paul Lederach, called for the broadening of our understanding of peacebuilding to include more than simply resolving conflicts. He proposed transforming conflicts into something more sustainable and conducive to rebuilding relationships. Both approaches of peacebuilding suggest more of a bottom-up approach, unlike the UN’s method, which tends to be more top-down.

²⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 15.

²⁹ Roland Paris, “International Peacebuilding and ‘Mission Civilistrace,’” *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 4 (2002): 638.

³⁰ The premise of this idea is based on a study conducted in the 1980s by Michael W. Doyle, which statistically suggests that

In earlier peacebuilding operations, particularly in 1989 to 2005, education was not made a high priority by the international community. Only 11 out of 37 peace agreements for example mentioned education.³¹ Those that did focused on post-war priorities, referred to as “education in emergencies,” which included the physical repair and assurance of safe access to schools.³² This was in part because the international community recognized education as a domestic issue that would require a long-time commitment, as US occupation in post-World War II Germany and Japan demonstrated.³³

By the late 1990s, the international community began to shift its priorities and include education as part of its peacebuilding strategy. This change was in part due to the mounting evidence from researchers and practitioners that the content, structure, and delivery of education might be undermining organizations’ peacebuilding efforts by reinforcing the social divisions that were the deepest cause of the conflict in the first place.³⁴ In the cases of Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Mozambique, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, education was used as a weapon in cultural repression, to manipulate history for political purposes, and to reinforce segregation, inequality, and stereotyping.³⁵

Recognising the negative ways education can be used, the international community has also come to recognise the positive and strategic role it can play in post-conflict countries. Now, peace education programmes are included in the many education-related projects and initiatives the international community has supported. The international community has assumed that by mainstreaming peace education programmes in formal educational systems, it will assist them in their peacebuilding efforts by dampening the impact of conflicts. Education is now recognized as a major contributor to peace processes by nurturing an ethnically tolerant climate, desegregating minds, improving linguistic tolerance, cultivating a sense of inclusive citizenship, aiding in the disarmament of history, and contributing to national reconciliation and peacebuilding.³⁶ Peace education programmes, like peacebuilding missions more generally, are also seen as a means of disseminating “Western” core values and beliefs in — among other things — democratic governance, free market economics, and human rights, embedding these tenets into curriculums, teacher instruction, and education institutions’ frameworks.³⁷ Finally, peace education programmes are considered critical in

liberal democracies are more peaceful. See Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151-169.

³¹ Save the Children Norway, “Building Peace Out of War: Children and Young People as Agents of Peace- The Young Generations Challenge” (paper presented at the International Conference, Oslo Norway, June 29-July 3, 2005).

³² Mary Pigozzi, *Education in Emergencies and for Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach* (New York: United Nations Children’s Fund, 1999); Marc Sommers, “Peace Education and Refugee Youth,” in *Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries*, ed. Jeff Crisp, Christopher Talbot and Daiana B. Cipollone (Geneva: UNHCR, 2002), 163-216.

³³ James Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982).

³⁴ Kenneth D. Bush and Diana Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict* (New York: UNICEF, 2000); Valerie Perry, “Reading, Writing, and Reconciliation: Educational Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” (working paper no. 18, European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg 2003); Sobhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley, *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion* (Geneva: UNESCO International Bureau of Education, 2004); Alan Smith, “The Influence of Education on Conflict and Peace Building” (background paper prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011: The Hidden Crisis - Armed Conflict and Education, UNSECO, Paris, 2010); Kathryn Tomlinson and Pauline Benefield, *Education and Conflict: Research and Research Possibilities* (Berkshire, UK: National Foundation for Educational Research, 2005).

³⁵ Tawil and Harley, *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*, 5.

³⁶ Bush and Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education*; Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF”; World Bank, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005); Smith, “The Influence of Education on Conflict and Peace Building.”

³⁷ Ardizzone, “Towards Global Understanding: The Transformative Role of Peace Education”; Sommers, “Peace education and refugee youth”; Klaus Seitz, *Education and Conflict: The Role of Education in the Creation, Prevention, and resolution of societal crises - Consequences for Development Cooperation* (Postfach: German Technical Cooperation, 2004).

terms of linking top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace- and state-building.³⁸ These assumptions, however, as this next section will demonstrate, are based on limited empirical evidence and research.

5.1. Evaluation of peace education programmes

Without an agreed-upon conceptual framework, the literature has highlighted how the task of evaluating peace education programmes has remained difficult.³⁹ Furthermore, a study by Neve and Brem⁴⁰ found that only a few evaluations have been carried out on peace education programmes in the context of protracted conflicts. The lack of a clear conceptual framework and empirical evaluative evidence has led many within the field to criticize and even question the use of peace education as a post-conflict peacebuilding tool.⁴¹

Assessments have mainly consisted of project descriptions and opinion pieces based on subjective and self-reinforcing criteria. Generally these have ignored or failed to question the cultural assumptions underlying the programmes and how they may affect the societies in which they are implemented. Neve and Brem suggest low levels of awareness concerning the importance and usefulness of evaluation, the lack of expertise in evaluation methodology, budgetary and time constraints, and general avoidance as the leading reasons the evaluation of peace education programs remains underdeveloped.⁴² Steinburg has gone further by criticizing the field for its lack of “empirically useful analyses and prescriptions for resolving or managing protracted ethno-national conflicts,” although partially excusing this shortcoming due to the complexity of the subject.⁴³

Although existing evaluations suggest encouraging results, they are based on an insufficient number of case studies. Reports have consisted of *formative* or *summative* assessments, either focusing on programme improvement or the impact of peace education instruction on participants, respectively.⁴⁴ Further, the overall purpose and meaning of peace education has been taken for granted in all of them. To date, only a number of descriptive and normative case studies have been conducted on peace education programmes in the context of protracted conflicts (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Middle East, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, and South Africa, to name just a few). Often these studies have been tautological, without any independent and externally measurable variables to determine a programme’s success and/or failure, all of which has failed to provide academic scholarship with any enriching empirical data.⁴⁵ In the case of UNICEF, Fountain notes that “there is a clear need for systematic research and [the] evaluation of peace education programmes in UNICEF, in order to provide more information on factors that contribute to effectiveness in the wide range of social and cultural contexts in which UNICEF operates. Relatively

³⁸ Fitzduff and Jean, *Peace Education*; Valerie Perry and Soeren Keil, “The OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Testing the Limits of Ownership,” *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 41, no. 3 (2013): 71-394.

³⁹ Sommers, “Peace Education and Refugee Youth”; Ian Harris, “Peace Education Evaluation” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 21-25 April, Chicago, IL, 2003); Salomon, “The Nature of Peace Education”; Salomon, “Peace Education”; Fitzduff and Jean, *Peace Education*.

⁴⁰ Baruch Neve and Iris Brem, “Peace Education Programs and the Evaluation of their Effectiveness,” in Salomon and Neve, *Peace Education*, 271-82.

⁴¹ Ilan Gur’Ze-ev, “Philosophy of Peace Education in a Post-Modern Era,” *Education Theory* 51, no. 3 (2001): 315-36; Gur’Ze-ev, *Diasporic Philosophy*; Gur’Ze-ev, *The Possibility/Impossibility*.

⁴² Neve and Brem, “Peace Education Programs and the Evaluation of their Effectiveness,” 275.

⁴³ Gerald Steinburg, “The Thin Line Between Peace Education and Political Advocacy: Toward a Code of Conduct,” in *Education Towards a Culture of Peace*, ed. Yaacov Iram (Greenwich, CT: Information Age, 2004), 15.

⁴⁴ Harris, “Peace Education Evaluation.”

⁴⁵ Steinburg, “The Thin Line between Peace Education and Political Advocacy: Toward a Code of Conduct.”

few systematic attempts to evaluate peace education programmes have been carried out by UNICEF offices so far.”⁴⁶

The lack of empirical research and evaluation represents a second shortcoming of the field. As this article has highlighted, those working within the field are aware of the importance of empirical research in terms of documenting best practices, recording lessons learned, improving the quality of programs, demonstrating to funders that they are getting ‘value for their money,’ and in understanding how they are contributing to the reduction of violence and the construction of a culture of peace.⁴⁷ Harris adds that those working within the field face intense pressure to prove to the educational research community, policy makers, taxpayers, and the peace community that their peace education programmes are reducing violence.⁴⁸ Perhaps more importantly, this article draws attention to how the lack of evaluation reflects an absence of accountability in terms of determining what impact these programs are having on participants, and whether they are yielding their intended results. These shortcomings, however, have been excused by comparing the situation to the field of medicine 200 years ago, where “much activity [was] based on lots of good intentions, unchecked assumptions, and partly naïve beliefs with little scholarship to either guide or accompany it.”⁴⁹ Research on peace education, like earlier applications of science to medicine, has also been primarily carried out on the basis of rationalist and positivist foundations, thus reinforcing practitioners’ ‘blind spots’.

6. ‘Mainstreaming’ Peace Education Programmes

A number of peace education programmes have been initiated, with mainstreaming as the goal, in ethnically/religiously linked post-conflict environments. Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia are examples of these.⁵⁰ This section reviews four of the more ‘successful’ examples.

⁴⁶ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 32.

⁴⁷ Harris, “Peace Education Evaluation”; Salomon, “The Nature of Peace Education”; Nevo and Brem, “Peace Education Programs and the Evaluation of their Effectiveness.”

⁴⁸ Harris, “Peace Education Evaluation.”

⁴⁹ Salomon, “Peace Education,” 112.

⁵⁰ See e.g. Alan Smith and Alan Robinson, *Education for Mutual Understanding: The Initial Statutory Years* (Coleraine, Ireland: University of Ulster, 1996); Seamus Dunn and Valerie Morgan, “A Fraught Path: Education as a basis for developing improved community relations in Northern Ireland,” *Oxford Review of Education* 25, no. 1/2 (1999): 141-53; Pamela Baxter, “The UNHCR Peace Education Programme: Skills for Life,” *Forced Migration Review* 11 (2001): 28-30; Pamela Baxter, *UNHCR Peace Education Programme* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2000); Duffy, “Peace Education in a Divided Society,”; Bush and Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education*; Diane Bretherton, Jane Weston and Vic Zbar, “Peace Education in a Post-Conflict Environment: The Case of Sierra Leone,” *Prospects* 33, no. 2 (2003): 221-30; Michael Arlow, “Citizenship Education in a Divided Society: The Case of Northern Ireland,” in *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*, ed. Sabhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley (Geneva: UNESCO International Bureau of Education, 2004), 255-313; Juvenal Bazilashhe Balemire, Adelaide Dhorsan and Cristina Tembe, “Curriculum Reform, Political Change, and Reinforcement of National Identity in Mozambique,” in *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*, ed. Sabhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley (Geneva: UNESCO International Bureau of Education, 2004), 207-53; Nemer Frayha, “Developing Curriculum as a Means of Bridging National Divisions in Lebanon,” in Tawil and Harley, *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*, 159-205; Lal Perera, Swarna Wijetunge and Ajith S. Balasooriya, “Education Reform and Political Violence in Sri Lanka,” in Tawil and Harley, *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*, 375-415; John Rutayisire, John Kabano and Jolly Rubagiza, “Redefining Rwanda’s Future: The Role of Curriculum in Social Reconstruction,” in Tawil and Harley, *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*, 315-73; Sommers, “Peace Education and Refugee Youth”; Stabback, “Common Curriculum, Core Curriculum or Common Curriculum Standards: Finding a Solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina”; World Bank, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005); Simon Harris and Nick Lewer, “Peace Education in Conflict Zones - Experience from Northern Sri Lanka,” *Journal of Peace Education* 5, no. 2 (2008): 127-40; Mieke T.A. Lopez Cardozo, “Sri Lanka: In Peace or in Pieces? A Critical Approach to Peace Education in Sri Lanka,” *Research in Comparative and International Education* 3, no. 1 (2008): 19-33; Lydia Allen, et al., *The Peace Education Programme (PEP) Evaluation* (New York, NY: Columbia School of Public Affairs, 2009);

6.1. Northern Ireland

One of the most widely known and documented peace education initiatives has been Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU) in Northern Ireland. In 1989, the Department of Education for Northern Ireland (DENI) first introduced EMU. In 1992 it was mainstreamed and has since then been systematically embedded into the nation's educational system. The programme has sought to teach pupils

to learn to respect and value themselves and others; to appreciate the interdependence of people within society; to know about and understand what is shared as well as what is different about their [Protestant and Catholic] cultural traditions; and to appreciate how conflict may be handled in non-violence ways.⁵¹

During the introductory stages of the program, a number of formative assessments looked at the progress and challenges of implementing EMU.⁵² However, little research has since been done to determine EMU's long-term impact on attitudinal and behavioural outcomes.⁵³ For example, the programme has yet to receive unanimous support or adequately deal with the 'hard' issues pertaining to the divisions that persist in Irish society.⁵⁴ Shifts in national priorities and financial restraints also threaten the programme's sustainability.

In a number of other post-conflict countries, diverse international actors have sought to initiate and mainstream similar peace education programmes. Actors include the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Hague Appeal for Peace, Global Campaign for Peace Education (GCPE), International Peace Research Association (IPRA), Peace Education Centre at the Columbia University Teachers College, UN agencies (UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF), donor agencies, and (religious and non-religious) international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) with governmental or private funding.

Initially, International Organisations (IOs) and UN agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF, and the UNHCR sought to mainstream peace education in post-war education systems by cooperating with ministries of education and other governmental institutions at the national level. In particular, UNICEF has sought to initiate and mainstream its peace education programmes worldwide. Some of the more notable examples include: "Global Education" in Lebanon, "Psychological Rehabilitation" in Croatia, "Peacebuilding through Schools" in Eastern and Southern Africa, "Education for Peace" in Rwanda, "Education for Conflict Resolution" in Sri Lanka, and "Values for Life" in Egypt.⁵⁵ Fountain explains that "the choice of language used to describe peace education programmes in UNICEF is determined by local cultural and political sensitivities, as well as by the scope and objectives of the programme."⁵⁶ Unlike some peace education initiatives, UNICEF believes that peace education should be mainstreamed and systematically integrated into an entire curriculum and education system. In an in-depth study, Fountain (1999) identifies a number of approaches UNICEF has

Smith, "The Influence of Education on Conflict and Peace Building"; Manish Thapa et al., *Peace by Peace: Mainstreaming Peace Education in South Asia* (Sweden: Save the Children, 2010); Fitzduff and Jean, *Peace Education*; UNICEF, *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: Literature Review* (New York: United Nations Children's Fund, 2011); Hasan Aydin, "Education Reform in Nigeria: the Case of Multicultural Education for Peace, Love, and Tolerance," *South African Journal of Education* 33, no. 1 (2013): 1-19.

⁵¹ Northern Ireland Curriculum Council, *Cross-curricular Themes - Guidance Materials* (Belfast: NICC, 1990).

⁵² Smith and Robinson, *Education for Mutual Understanding*; Dunn and Morgan, "A Fraught Path," 141-53; Duffy, "Peace Education in a Divided Society."

⁵³ Norman Richardson, "Transformation: Diversity and Mutual Understanding in Statutory Curriculum," in *Education for Diversity and Mutual Understanding: The Experience of Northern Ireland*, ed. Norman Richardson and Tony Gallagher (Bern: Peterlang, 2011).

⁵⁴ Duffy, "Peace Education in a Divided Society."

⁵⁵ Fountain, "Peace Education in UNICEF."

⁵⁶ Fountain, "Peace Education in UNICEF," 4.

employed, such as: “curriculum development (including the production of materials for teachers and children)” as a means of “integrating peace education into traditional subjects of the existing curriculum”;⁵⁷ “improving the school environment so that it becomes a microcosm of the more peaceful and just society”;⁵⁸ and teacher training that promotes “interactive and participatory teaching methods, organising cooperative group work, and facilitating group discussions” to “enable teachers to convey values of cooperation, respect for the opinions of children, and appreciation of differences.”⁵⁹

6.2. Sri Lanka

In 1990, UNICEF initiated a peace education programme called “Education for Conflict Resolution” (ECR) in cooperation with the National Institute of Education in Sri Lanka. The aim has been “to create awareness and strengthen beliefs, competencies and values in non-violent conflict resolution by creating an environment for peaceful living and co-existence.”⁶⁰ The programme implemented a number of curricular and pedagogical reforms, including the development of teachers’ manuals to “demonstrate ways of integrating peace education into traditional subjects of existing curriculum,”⁶¹ the development of one national teacher training college as a “focal point for the development of pre-service training programmes in peace education” to ensure it was integrated into each of the traditional subjects;⁶² and a teacher training college that “trains school principals in conflict resolution methods before [education] students are placed in schools to do their practice teaching” to ensure “administrative support for new teachers who are attempting to introduce peace education.”⁶³ Whether and to what extent mainstreaming has taken root remains unknown, since ECR, like many of UNICEF’s programmes, has not undergone any systematic evaluation. However, aspects of the programme, such as training and producing and integrating materials into the primary school curriculum, have reportedly produced favourable results in terms of service delivery, sustainability, capacity building, and cost effectiveness.⁶⁴

These findings, however, contrast a later assessment carried out by Lopes Cardozo (2008), who pointed out a number of weaknesses and problems with ECR. She argues that educational policies to date have rarely been implemented in practice.⁶⁵ In addition to UNICEF, her report draws to attention a number of other actors that have initiated a number of informal and formal peace education programmes in Sri Lanka. Some of the more notable include UNESCO, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GIZ; German Agency for Technical Cooperation), and Christian INGO World Vision.⁶⁶ Her report discusses how there has been a lack of cooperation and coherence between these organizations in developing a

⁵⁷ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 16.

⁵⁸ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 17.

⁵⁹ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 19.

⁶⁰ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 33.

⁶¹ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 17.

⁶² Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 20.

⁶³ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 20.

⁶⁴ Fountain, “Peace Education in UNICEF,” 32.

⁶⁵ Cardozo, “Sri Lanka: In Peace or in Pieces?” 24.

⁶⁶ World Vision (WV) is one of the most widely known faith-based INGOs. It has developed and implemented peace education projects in over 15 post-conflict countries and regions, including Burundi, Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bosnian and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Colombia, Central America, and the Dominican Republic. See Abuigideiri Salm, “From Conflict Resolution Training to Peace Camps,” in *And the Children Shall Lead Them: A NGO Journey into Peace Education*, ed. Bill Lowrey, Allen Harder, and Vachel Miller (Monrovia, CA: World Vision, 2005), 3-33.

national plan for peace education.⁶⁷ This problem has also been mentioned in a report by Save the Children.⁶⁸

For the reasons mentioned above, IOs/UN agencies have started focusing on functional rather than structural approaches to mainstreaming peace education programmes. In addition to the ministries of education and governmental institutions at the national level, IOs/UN agencies have started working more at the grassroots level and in greater collaboration with a number of other international and local actors “to develop and implement context-specific, culturally appropriate, and innovative peace education curricula and in-service teacher training [programmes] in divided and [post-conflict] countries.”⁶⁹

6.3. Nepal

Greater efforts to collaborate and coordinate peace education between international and local actors can best be illustrated in the Nepal for Peace Education Project. Initially in 2006, UNICEF, UNESCO, and Save the Children Foundation partnered with the Ministry of Education and the Curriculum Development Centre to develop and pilot a four-year peace education project in Nepal. A report by Save the Children notes a number of achievements, including “mainstreaming peace, human rights and civil education in national school curricula [and] to develop training models and resource material jointly with the National Centre for Educational Development and non-formal education materials in collaboration with the Non-Formal Education Centre.”⁷⁰ Peace education modules designed during pre-service teacher training have, since implementation, thought to have impacted an estimated 55,000 children.⁷¹ The project’s long-term impact and sustainability remains to be seen as there has been no systematic evaluation; evidence of the programmes’ impact is based on preliminary assessments. However, plans are already underway to replicate the “Nepal model” in a number of other South Asian Countries, in particular Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.⁷²

6.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Since 1995, an estimated 47 out of 57 projects have been carried out by a range of international actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), including UN-based agencies, donor agencies, and international non-governmental organizations.⁷³ Some of the more notable international actors include Civitas,⁷⁴ the Open Society Foundation, and Education for Peace.⁷⁵ Each programme has offered a different approach and vision on how peace can be mainstreamed into the country’s educational system, bringing with them private and governmental funding

⁶⁷ Cardozo, “Sri Lanka: In Peace or in Pieces?”

⁶⁸ Save the Children Norway, “Building Peace Out of War.”

⁶⁹ Fitzduff and Jean, *Peace Education*, 12.

⁷⁰ Thapa et al., *Peace by Peace*, 14.

⁷¹ Thapa et al., *Peace by Peace*.

⁷² Thapa et al., *Peace by Peace*.

⁷³ Wayne Nelles, “Bosnian Education for Security and Peacebuilding?” *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 2 (2006): 229-41.

⁷⁴ It should be noted that although Civitas BiH is a local NGO, it was originally formed in 1996 in a joint effort by the Center for Civic Education (Calabasas, CA) and the United States Information Service (USIS), with whom it continues to maintain strong ties.

⁷⁵ Marina Bowder and Valery Perry, “Returnees and the Challenges for Education Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Ellison,” in *Education and Internally Displaced Persons*, ed. Christine Smith and Alan Smith (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013); Astrid Fischer, “Integration or Segregation? Reforming the Education Sector,” in *Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten Years After Dayton*, ed. Martina Fischer, (Munster: Lit-Verlag, 2006), 297-324; Perry, “Reading, Writing, and Reconciliation.”

to experiment with their respective peace education projects. Many programmes have offered courses and/or activities focusing on a range of issues, including democracy, human rights, peace building, and the encouragement of other post-war peaceful values. Other programmes have sought to integrate the principles of their peace education programmes into the existing curriculum and educational structures to assist in trauma recovery and developing a culture of tolerance, peace, and healing. Peace education programmes in general have represented a broader effort to assist the international community rebuild and reform BiH's entire educational system against the backdrop of a recent civil war.

Education for Peace (EFP) is of particular interest, as it has remained one of the longest-running and largest projects of its kind. In 2000, EFP began as a poorly funded pilot project in six schools, but in a little over 12 years it has been adopted and mainstreamed as an integral part of BiH's educational system. Approximately 2200 primary and secondary schools have been reached, with about 1.5 million students and 110,000 teachers and school staff. The programme has received official recognition and endorsement from all participating school communities, the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all 13 ministers of education, and eight pedagogical institutes. Furthermore, the international community has recognized EFP including the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As of 2012, efforts have been underway to bring EFP into all eight public universities in BiH to train the future generation(s) of teachers, ensuring that EFP becomes a permanent feature of the entire country's educational system.

7. Conclusion

This article has provided a critical survey of the literature and reports on peace education – in terms of the field's history, how it has been conceptualised, how peace education as a post-conflict peacebuilding tool came to exist, how it has been researched, and where mainstreaming has been tried. More importantly, it has identified two considerable short-comings – the failure to reflect on the fundamental and yet unquestioned assumptions underlying peace education programmes and the lack of any systematic evaluation with which to demonstrate their empirical worth. Finally, this article has highlighted how, apart from EMU and EFP, no other peace education programme has been systematically mainstreamed throughout an entire nation's education system.

This article has underlined the need for a serious philosophical analysis of what 'peace education' is in terms of its implicit philosophical and possibly religious assumptions. Such an analysis would provide the basis for an assessment as to whether peace education has an intrinsic meaning, and, if so, whether it can be exported to other nations and contexts. In the specific case of EFP an independent, external assessment is needed to determine its effectiveness, and for this assessment an appropriate method needs to be designed.

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The Moroccan Monarchy and the Islam-oriented PJD: Pragmatic Cohabitation and the Need for Islamic Political Secularism

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Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the political relationship between the Moroccan monarchy and the moderate Islam-oriented Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which has been in power since 2011. The research methodology involves an in-depth case analysis and relies on a substantial number of primary and secondary sources such as official speeches, official political statements, journal articles and newspapers. The study finds the relationship between the PJD and the monarchy inconsistent, similar to the PJD's relationship with other political parties. The paper argues that adopting an approach based on an Islamic political secularism that considers Morocco's specific political realities may ease tension between the PJD on the one hand and the monarchy and other parties on the other.

Keywords: Islamic secularism, political Islam, Moroccan politics, Party of Justice and Development (Morocco), King Mohammed VI, Abdelilah Benkirane, *Makhzen*

1. Introduction

The moderate Islam-oriented Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which won the 2011 Moroccan elections, leads Morocco's coalition government. However, due to ideological conflicts with political parties in opposition and within the coalition, the PJD works in a difficult political environment. Further, some believe that behind the scenes, the *Makhzen*¹ has been attempting to weaken the PJD's popularity. In fact, although the party rode the wave of the Arab Spring to power, "the *Makhzen* still sees the PJD as a temporary appendage to the stability of the system."²

The success or failure of the PJD is of crucial importance, as it is one of the few cases in the Middle East where an Islamic party has achieved power through a consensual political agreement and without violent uprisings. It is also the only Islamist government in the Arab world since the ousting of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Morsi in Egypt and the loss of popularity of the Ennahda group in Tunisia. Thus, the nature and quality of the relationship between Morocco's monarchy and other political actors on the one hand and the moderate Islam-oriented PJD on the other deserves high attention in an unstable region. In this regard, a consensual policy based on a type of Islamic political secularism that respects

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¹ The *Makhzen* (the deep State, literally *storehouse*), represents an informal alliance among the monarch, his advisers, selected businessmen, high-ranking bureaucrats, the security system (military and police), and loyalist tribal chiefs.

² Anouar Boukhars, "Morocco's Islamists: Bucking the trend?" FRIDE Policy Brief No. 182, June 2014, 4, http://fride.org/download/PB_182_Morocco_Islamists.pdf.

Morocco's existing political realities may narrow divergences, create trust among all political actors, and open the door to Islamic interpretations that answer the needs of a growing, modern Moroccan society.

The next section analyzes the Moroccan political system and discusses the king's central political and religious role. The following sections deal with the PJD's gradual integration into the Moroccan electoral system, the pragmatic cohabitation between the monarchy and the PJD, the king's control and criticism of the PJD and the challenges that the PJD faces. The last section focuses on the need for an Islamic political secularism that considers Morocco's unique political realities. This article thus aims to analyze the political relationship between the Moroccan monarchy and the moderate Islam-oriented PJD and discuss the best approach to surmount challenges.

2. The Moroccan Political System

2.1. Political integration

Since its independence in 1956, Morocco has been governed by a semi-authoritarian regime, willing to share power long as it keeps overall control. In 1959, the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), later called the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), broke away from the Istiqlal party and began to vehemently oppose the monarchy. For many years, Istiqlal and the USFP united to fight a new constitutional amendment that sought to give the monarchy more power. Prior to the 1997 parliamentary elections, Morocco's political scene had become dramatically fragmented, and dominated by pro-regime parties (also called administrative parties). Between 1970 and 1990, the monarchy helped create regime-loyal parties such as the Mouvement Populaire (MP), the Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI), the Union Constitutionnelle (UC), and the Partie Démocratique Nationale (PDN). Nonetheless, the country's political arena has continued to include strong national parties, such as Istiqlal, the USFP, the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), and lately, the moderate Islam-oriented PJD, which formed in the mid-1990s.

Following the 1993 election, pro-monarchy parties (called the *Wifaq* (pro-government right) and composed of the UC, the MP, and the PDN) formed the government. Then, in an attempt to include the opposition (called the *Koutla* (opposition coalition) and composed of the USFP, the Istiqlal, and the PPS), King Hassan II suggested building a consensual coalition government. The *Koutla* initially rejected this arrangement because the king insisted on continuing to control Morocco's four most important ministries (Army, Justice, Religion and Interior), but in 1997, Abderahman Al-Yousfi, leader of the USFP, agreed. At that time, the USFP was considered "the most important political party in Morocco's 'democratic' movement,"³ and the arrangement was considered meaningful political reform that would provide an opportunity to challenge the monarchy's hegemony.⁴ However, although King Hassan II's opening up of the political system allowed socialists to become more integrated into Moroccan politics, it also helped to weaken their challenge to the monarchy's absolute power.

Once in government, the USFP and its *Koutla* allies promised to tackle Morocco's

³ James N. Sater, "Parliamentary elections and authoritarian rule in Morocco," *Middle East Journal* 63, no. 3 (2009): 382.

⁴ Mohamed Daadaoui, "Rituals of power and political parties in Morocco: Limited elections as positional strategies," *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no. 2 (2010): 195.

socioeconomic issues, to enhance democracy, and establish a state of law and human rights. Morocco is an emerging country, where all rights need to be promoted (employment conditions, women's rights, democracy, etc.). However, the government did not resolve the country's socio-economic problems (citizens' biggest concern) and Moroccans' disillusionment grew.

In the 2002 elections, the socialist USFP won again by a small margin, but the king appointed technocrat Driss Jettou as prime minister. This choice was interpreted as a failing of the democratic process because the monarch did not choose a representative from the USFP; however, the constitution at the time allowed the king to choose the prime minister. In the end, the USFP agreed to participate in Jettou's government after the monarchy agreed to allow USFP politician Muhammad Bouzoubaa to lead the Justice Ministry, a post until then reserved for regime loyalists. In the 2007 election, the USFP lost 12 seats, down to 38 from its 50 in 2002, ending up fifth in the polls. This regression resulted in Mohamed El Yazghi resigning as USFP First Secretary due to internal pressure, which then raised the question of how and whether the USFP would participate in the new government. Party activists wanted to cross over to the opposition side but party elite wanted to join the coalition government. The latter prevailed. Following the November 2011 elections, the USFP remained fifth, with 39 seats in the House of Representatives. After several days of delays and internal discussions, the party decided not to join the PJD government, preferring to regain a credible position in opposition. As Monjib states: "The party has lost its traditional base—the urban electorate, unions, employees, and civil servants—and has increasingly been dominated by notables who are more political entrepreneurs than engaged citizens."⁵ And in fact, the USFP had shifted from its progressive ideology and modernist ideals to political conservatism and a hierarchical internal administration. These transformations, which had been encouraged by the *Makhzen*, resulted in political suicide.

In the following section, I discuss the principal content of the 2011 constitution, the king's central religious role, and the PJD's integration into the Moroccan political scene.

2.2. The 2011 constitution

Morocco is defined in its 1996 constitution as a "democratic, social and constitutional monarchy." However, Morocco better fits the model of an 'executive monarchy,' where power is concentrated in the hands of the political authorities surrounding the monarch. As Kristina Kausch states about Morocco, "[formal] democratic structures and institutions veil an informal shadow governance structure, commonly called the *Makhzen*..., a network of the palace and its clients that dictate the main lines of policy and act as a gatekeeper for any kind of political reform."⁶ Kausch adds that "royal counselors, loyal technocrats of the king's personal entourage, are the true decision makers in the ministries."⁷ However, in March 2011, King Mohammed VI announced that he had designated a committee to prepare a "comprehensive constitutional reform,"⁸ to be presented in June 2011 to the Moroccan people in a referendum. In addition to strengthening human rights, political pluralism, and individual

⁵ Maâti Monjib, "The Democratization Process in Morocco: Progress, obstacles, and the impact of the Islamist-Secularist divide" (working paper 5, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, 2011), 15, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/8/morocco%20monjib/08_morocco_monjib.pdf.

⁶ Kristina Kausch, "The European Union and political reform in Morocco," *Mediterranean Politics* 14, no. 2 (2009): 168.

⁷ Kausch, "The European Union," 168.

⁸ Mohammed Alaoui, "Discours royal le 9 mars 2011," [March 9, 2011 Throne Speech] YouTube video, 13:48, March 9, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pTJoU13W8s>.

liberties, the monarch promised in his speech to the nation that the status of prime minister, “as head of an executive entity,”⁹ would be enhanced as part of the coming constitutional reform. The content of the new constitution, particularly in terms of human rights and good governance, quickly won the support of Moroccans, who believed it represented a turning point in the country’s history. The results of the referendum confirmed that trend: 98.50% of Moroccans voting in the referendum said “YES” to the new text.

The new constitution is based on several principles:¹⁰ (1) to guarantee the rule of law, human rights, and political freedoms; (2) to increase judicial independence; (3) to guarantee that the prime minister will be chosen from the party that wins the most seats in parliament; (4) to strengthen the role of political parties and civil society; (5) to enhance transparency and continue the fight against corruption; (6) to enhance good governance and the protection of individual freedoms and (7) to enshrine ethnic minorities’ rights (e.g., Berbers’ and Sahraouis’).

Jean-Noël Ferrié (as cited in Hélène Sallon, 2011) sees in these initiatives proof of the monarchy’s openness to the people’s requests and a “synchrony between the demands of the protestors and commentators, and what the monarchy is ready to give up.”¹¹ Ferrié adds: “all these things were maturing and needed a trigger. Mohamed VI has used, in the best sense, the manifestations of 20 February to boost some projects that were blocked for several years and rework the political and legal framework of the country with what Moroccans are asking for.”¹² Nonetheless, the real challenge is “implementation [rather] than codification [because] several of these elements are already ostensibly in the constitution of 1996, including equality of citizens before the law (Art. 5), freedom of opinion and association (Art. 9), and judicial independence from the executive and legislative branches (Art. 80).”¹³ In this regard, Kausch states that

powers are distinguished in law and discourse, but in practice there is neither separation nor balance of powers, with the palace-led executive exerting [a] leading influence over the legislature and judiciary. Government and parliament [still] execute the will of the *Makhzen* rather than the will of the electorate.¹⁴

2.3. The monarchy’s control of the religious field

Morocco has always lived with an identity that combines traditional culture, religion, and modernity; religion and politics are barely separable. The sultan (king), surrounded by a defined group of religious scholars, is a spiritual leader who rules his country in the name of Allah (God) because he claims descendancy from the Prophet Mohammed. In 1962, Hassan II introduced the king’s title *Amir Almouminin* (Commander of the Faithful) into the Moroccan constitution. The king of Morocco is then considered the guardian of an official and ‘controlled’ Moroccan Islamic model, a belief system based on a triptych of Maliki rites, Achaarite doctrines, and Sufism. As political analyst Mohammed Tozy¹⁵ notes, this doctrine

⁹ Alaoui, “Discours royal.”

¹⁰ Alexis Arief, *Morocco: Current issues* (CRS Report No. RL21579) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 3–4, <http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/row/RS21579.pdf>.

¹¹ Hélène Sallon, “Mohamed VI offre au Maroc une révolution tranquille,” *Le Monde*, March 10, 2011.

¹² Sallon, “Mohamed VI” (author’s translation).

¹³ Arief, *Morocco: Current issues*, 4.

¹⁴ Kausch, “The European Union,” 168.

¹⁵ “La restructuration du champ religieux marocain, entretien avec Mohamed Tozy,” *Infos Sezame*, January 16, 2007, <http://www.sezameg.net/société/39-entretien-du-mois/333-La-restructuration-du-champ-religieux-marocain,-entretien-avec-Mohamed-Tozy.html>.

is the spirit of a pragmatic Malekism, which is close to the concerns of Moroccans, rather than the dogmatic Islam of other Muslim countries. Moroccans also encourage Sufism and Maraboutism, of which the latter is an important Moroccan tradition; Tozy calls it the Islam of mediation.¹⁶ In fact, throughout history, Moroccans have encouraged a “Happy Islam,” an Islam of joy and music (*samaa*).¹⁷

Between 1970 and 1980 instruments of religious policy gradually emerged through a number of reforms by the Ministry of Habous and Islamic affairs, such as the establishment of regional *Ulema* councils (religious scholars), the Higher Council of *Ulema*, the 1982 restructuring of the ministry, the 1984 regulation on mosque construction, and the creation of high positions in charge of religious affairs in the Ministry of the Interior. In short, a set of measures was taken to better control the religious field.¹⁸

These institutional reforms reflected the authorities’ desire to frame and preserve Moroccans’ valued religious identity. To control the multitude of political expressions in the name of religion and to protect unity of worship, King Mohammed VI reminded citizens in his July 30, 2004 throne speech that he has been the only one to reconcile the political and the religious in order to safeguard the sanctity of religion, which he stated must remain outside the influence of various social and political opinion groups.

These new policies resulted in an administrative restructuring on how religion is managed in Morocco. There was a strong push for a Moroccan Islam by organizing the religious field and pursuing the training of religious scholars inside and outside the country. This initiative was a quick response to the terrorist events that occurred in Morocco on May 16, 2003; the policy aimed to deal with Islamic extremism and terrorism. Moroccan Islam, generally considered modern, clearly rejects extreme Salafism, including Jihadism.¹⁹

Katherine Marshall considers Morocco’s recent religious reform revolutionary, especially in relation to the *Moudawana* (the Family Code, which governs areas of family law such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody). She also discusses the innovative *Mourchidate* program, where women provide religious instruction and counseling, especially to other women, in a variety of venues, including local mosques. Marshall notes that Morocco is giving “a new and vibrant meaning” to what we may consider “moderate Islam”²⁰ by including women in promoting the doctrine. Nonetheless, specialists such as Driss Maghraoui argue that the reform of the religious field “was not so much about raising fundamental questions about the sacred text, the nature of religiosity or about the place of religion in politics, but more about pragmatic and politically strategic factors.”²¹ In fact, “a more moderate Islam is being promoted to counter the rising power of Islamist groups and more importantly radicalism.”²² Maghraoui adds that “the reforms of the religious field [have] taken up a security dimension in the sense of a ‘moral security’ that guarantees a ‘Moroccan moral order’ and security as it relates to the state in its attempt to counter Wahabism, Shia and radical Islamist groups.”²³

Even with this arsenal of measures, Tozy highlights that Moroccan religious institutions

¹⁶ “La restructuration.”

¹⁷ “La restructuration.”

¹⁸ “La restructuration.”

¹⁹ “La restructuration.”

²⁰ Katherine Marshall, “Morocco: It’s complicated,” *The Washington Post*, February 7, 2011.

²¹ Driss Maghraoui, “Introduction: Interpreting reform in Morocco,” *Mediterranean Politics* 14, no. 2 (2009): 147.

²² Maghraoui, “Introduction,” 147.

²³ Maghraoui, “Introduction,” 147.

no longer have a monopoly on the production or dissemination of religion. In fact, there has been an internationalization of religious discourses,²⁴ where state religious values are not necessarily a carbon copy of society's values. Tozy adds that a uniformly calibrated speech formulated by the state cannot meet this new demand of religiosity that is diverse, intense and both normative and intellectual. The state cannot accommodate all these fragmented requests, especially since it is not the only player in the religious field; there must be some kind of flexibility to address this diversity of offerings.²⁵

Yet, Moroccan Islam "is the example of an internal policy that can be exported.... Around the concept of 'spiritual security' it was necessary to erect a bulwark against fundamentalism and stand up in the same time to Wahhabism and Shiism."²⁶ Indeed, the Moroccan Islamic model has become a vision that the monarchy does intend to share; Europeans and other Africans have expressed their desire to send their imams to Morocco to learn its basics. The international community seems very curious about "this Moroccan model, based on a bureaucratization of the religious field. This involved, of course, the prestigious rank of the Monarch."²⁷

3. Openness to the Moderate Islam-oriented PJD

The PJD arose out of a radical Islamic group founded in 1969 by Abdelkrim Mutii and Kamel Ibrahim, known as *Al-Shabiba al-Islamiya* (the Islamic Youth), which was the first Islamist movement in Morocco to use violence as a political weapon – in this case, against Moroccan leftists and secularists in the 1970s. For that reason, "it was tolerated – some say encouraged – by the Makhzen."²⁸ At that time, *Al-Shabiba al-Islamiya* was also rejecting the existing political order and demanding radical change. Yet "a sizeable number of its members eventually realized that their strategy was not leading anywhere."²⁹ In fact, the movement lost most of its core membership and structure after 1981 due to government repression and divergent visions on how to achieve its goals. A moderate Islamist group (Movement for Unity and Reform; MUR) led by Abdelilah Benkirane (now Morocco's head of the government) emerged from *Al-Shabiba*, distancing itself from that group's confrontational approach to the monarchy. It acknowledged King Hassan II as Commander of the Faithful and turned its focus on the secularists (communists, socialists, feminists, and Westernized elite). With the authorization and encouragement of then-Minister of the Interior Driss Basri, the MUR eventually joined the *Mouvement populaire démocratique et constitutionnel* (MPDC), which had been founded in the late 1960s by Abdelkrim Al Khatib but by the early 1980s was functioning as an empty shell.

The MPDC, strong now, changed its name to the PJD in 1998. The party was content to remain in opposition for some time, believing that the political context was not conducive to joining the government. Learning from the Algerian events of 1990, "the PJD adopted a softly-softly approach, eschewing radical rhetoric and putting only limited numbers of

²⁴ "La restructuration."

²⁵ "La restructuration."

²⁶ Mohamed Tozy, "Mohamed Tozy: Le roi du Maroc gère le temps long, celui de la stratégie," interview by Youssef Ait Akdim, *Jeune Afrique*, August 5, 2014.

²⁷ Tozy, "Mohamed Tozy."

²⁸ Ana Belen Soage, "Political Islam in Morocco: Is there an 'exception marocaine'?" *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (Fall 2013): 3.

²⁹ Soage, "Political Islam in Morocco," 3.

candidates up for election.³⁰ To ensure its existence on the political map, the PJD shifted from questioning the legitimacy of king's political and religious authority to fervently defending the monarchy's symbols. Nonetheless, "by agreeing to play by the rules of the game and accepting the king as... Commander of the Faithful, the PJD is beholden to the same constraints as other parties."³¹

In 1997, the party won eight seats in the parliamentary election. In 2002, it won 42 out of 325 seats, winning most of the districts where it fielded candidates. In September 2007, Morocco organized nationwide, direct elections, which most analysts³² predicted would be won by the Islamist PJD. The political context was encouraging since the king himself had begun a few years earlier to send out signals concerning a range of socio-political reforms. He pushed for reforming the Family Code, expanding human rights, and for more freedom of expression. However, the PJD's anticipated victory did not materialize, as it garnered only about 37% of the vote. The reasons for the defeat are not clear. Was it because Moroccans were afraid of the PJD's radical ideas (no more music concerts and controlling foreign tourism)? Or was it because the PJD could not reach the tribal and rural milieu, where people are more loyal to traditional parties and do not vote for new ideological ideas? Regardless of the loss, the PJD

had in fact emerged as the most popular party – winning more votes than any other party, but was deprived of becoming the largest party by the mechanics of the electoral system[,] which had clearly favored the Istiqlal party [as it] had concentrated the votes it had received more effectively in the electoral districts than had the PJD."³³

The PJD was then forced to stay out of any governing coalitions and continued to situate itself in the opposition by maintaining a degree of distance from all political parties and the monarchy's advisors.

In November 2011, 45.4% of Moroccans voted to elect parliamentary members in the wake of the new constitutional reforms. The PJD won 107 seats out of 395, after waiting more than 15 years in the opposition ranks. In the era of the Arab Spring, the Islam-oriented PJD (which some call "the most internally democratic"³⁴ party in Morocco and one that "benefits greatly from its uncorrupt image"³⁵) used the country's political and social discontent evidenced by the February 20th Movement³⁶ to position itself as an alternative to traditional political parties.

4. Pragmatic Cohabitation between the Monarchy and the PJD

While Head of Government Benkirane publicly supports the monarchy, the latter has distanced itself from the management of public affairs to avoid the consequences of failure and accountability. The palace's strategy is "to deny Benkirane the right to co-decision over the strategic affairs of the state while allowing him to [make] unpopular decisions."³⁷

³⁰ Michael J. Willis, "Islamism, Democratization and Disillusionment: Morocco's Legislative Elections of 2007" (research paper no. 1, St Antony's College, Oxford University, 2008), 3.

³¹ James Liddell, "Notables, Clientelism and the Politics of Change in Morocco," *The Journal of North African Studies* 15, no. 3 (2010): 328.

³² Liddell, "Notables," 315.

³³ Willis, "Islamism," 8.

³⁴ Liddell, "Notables," 321.

³⁵ Liddell, "Notables," 321.

³⁶ The February 20th Movement is a movement led by Moroccan youth from different ideological affiliations in response to the 2011 Arab Spring.

³⁷ Boukhars, "Morocco's Islamists," 4.

4.1. Benkirane's loyalty to the monarchy

Since forming the government, the PJD has become convinced that its interests are to protect the monarchy, the only guarantor of unifying the country around the Moroccan model of Islam. Although the head of the government theoretically has, by the new constitution, more autonomy than his predecessors, it is the king who still has the last word. Pragmatic as he is, Benkirane has been careful thus far not to challenge the Mohammed VI's supremacy, preferring to maintain good relations with the monarch.³⁸ Indeed, political participation in Morocco depends on accepting that it is the monarchy that shapes big policies. The PJD has so far remained "deferent to the monarchy and to its executive primacy."³⁹ Yet, even if the PJD as a whole restrains from criticizing the king himself, "Benkirane frequently lashes out at the subterfuge of what he calls the 'ghosts' and 'crocodiles' of the invisible but powerful 'Makhzenian' force."⁴⁰

The PJD's leaders "prefer to be inside institutions and trying to [effect] change rather than being [kept] outside and... unable to see any of their most preferred policies implemented."⁴¹ For this reason, even if the Islamist Benkirane sometimes finds the monarchy's practices in contradiction with his own Islamic ideology, he refrains from saying so in public. In an interview with French media, Benkirane explains: "Initially, we had an absolute executive monarchy...and today we are moving towards a parliamentary monarchy."⁴² In a second French interview, while at the World Forum for Democracy in Strasbourg, Benkirane insists that "democracy is advancing slowly but surely.... We are in the process of taking small, but decisive steps."⁴³ Benkirane must maintain peace so that he will be better able to keep the king's support if and when other parties caution the monarchy and Moroccan citizens about the risk of allowing an Islamist party to govern.

4.2. Control and criticism of the 'Islamist government' by the monarchy

Since 2013, there has been a radical shift in King Mohammed VI's speeches, where they are more focused on specific topics and interspersed with explicit criticism of Moroccan authorities' performances both inside and outside the government. In Mohammed VI's early years as king, he refrained from such comments, but now he does not hide his disapproval of certain actions and initiatives led by the Islam-oriented PJD. In one of his speeches, the king praised the previous government and criticized the current one.⁴⁴ In another speech, he said "the current government should have invested in the education and training sectors" instead of engaging the country in educational programs that ultimately failed.⁴⁵

³⁸ Dominique Lagarde, "Maroc: un an après, Benkirane reste un Premier ministre populaire," *L'Express*, January 23, 2013.

³⁹ Emanuela Dalmasso and Francesco Cavatorta, "Political Islam in Morocco: Negotiating the liberal space post 2003" (paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop 1, 'Globalisation, Secularisation and Religion - Different States, Same Trajectories?', St. Gallen, Switzerland, April 2011), 7.

⁴⁰ Boukhars, "Morocco's Islamists," 3.

⁴¹ Boukhars, "Morocco's Islamists," 15.

⁴² Le Monde, "Abdelilah Benkirane," *Internationales* video, 45:12, February 24, 2013, <http://www.tv5monde.com/cms/chaine-francophone/Revoir-nos-emissions/Internationales/Episodes/p-24534-Abdelilah-Benkirane.htm>

⁴³ Abdelilah Benkirane, "Benkirane: Democracy in Morocco advancing slowly but surely," October 10, 2012, <http://moroccoonthemove.com/2012/10/10/Benkirane-democracy-in-morocco-advancing-slowly-but-surely-middle-east-online/#sthash.Oju2H05S.dpbs>.

⁴⁴ Mohammed Alaoui, "Discours à la Nation du 30 Juillet 2014 par sa Majesté le Roi," [July 30, 2014 Throne Speech] YouTube video, 30:27, July 30, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbLYQqrhDK>.

⁴⁵ Mohammed Alaoui, "Discours royal le 20 août 2013 - 60ème anniversaire de la Révolution du roi et du Peuple," [August 20, 2013 Throne Speech on the 60th Anniversary of the King's and People's Revolution] YouTube video, 14:54, August 20, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fp-jRMnMWFg>.

If we carefully analyze the king's speeches, the message is that the current government cannot easily erase all that has been done by previous governments, especially what has been initiated by the monarchy. When it comes to strategies and broad reforms, the government, Islamist or not, must run with what has been concocted by the shadow government (the king's advisors). The monarchy claims the power to direct, evaluate, and adjust all political projects, and publicly if necessary. Mohammed VI's criticism of the PJD emphasizes the regime's assertion that he is the guarantor of stability and continuity, which cannot be achieved without responsibility and accountability from the government. This shift in tone is also associated with the will to highlight the monarchy's legitimacy in a pragmatic world dominated by utilitarian interests.

It is true that some of the forces resisting change do not hide their desire to see the Moroccan regime oust the Islamists from government or even exclude them from political life, but the monarchy is wise enough not to fall into the trap of weakening moderate Islamists and thus strengthening their extremist wings. The monarchy is claiming to seek a balanced relationship with the Islamist movement, understanding that exclusion will not work. The complexity of Morocco's political and social contexts makes it difficult to the PJD's growing intellectual and conceptual propositional ideas related to their Islamic ideology, regardless of their effectiveness, because they represent an important percentage of the population.

5. Challenges for the PJD

After a year and a half, the Istiqlal withdrew from the government coalition in a game some feel was initiated by a number of the king's counselors to weaken the PJD's popularity. Instead of providing appropriate conditions to help overcome the economic crisis and preserve stability, the *Makhzen* appeared to be blocking the PJD from initiating real change by highlighting their lack of experience in public governance. And when the crisis intensified, the *Makhzen* appeared to ease the situation by proposing partial reforms, but they were ultimately inapt.

Concerning individual freedoms, Benkirane maintains that the government rejects "the idea of interfering in people's lives. People need to first obtain their [primary] rights."⁴⁶ Regarding detainment and torture, Benkirane insists that Morocco has no political prisoners. He added, "torture did occur in Morocco, and it dates back to 30 or 40 years ago. Now it's over... Our services and the Minister of Justice say that it is over."⁴⁷ Nonetheless, in its 2013 report, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights refuted Benkirane's statements, estimating the number of political prisoners at 217 in 2012. Regarding social reforms, Benkirane states that "opportunism, cronyism, and bribery are no longer seen as criteria for employment in Morocco. Perceptions are being corrected, and normal approaches based on competence and merit, integrity and transparency are being pursued."⁴⁸ Although just after his appointment he stated that his government's priority is to fight corruption and authoritarianism, Benkirane admitted in an interview with *Al Jazeera* that the government cannot totally eradicate political cronyism and corruption. "We cannot afford to light a candle and look into all the intricacies of the state regarding those who have engaged in corruption, because it would be a crime against the nation."⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Le Monde, "Abdelilah Benkirane."

⁴⁷ Le Monde, "Abdelilah Benkirane."

⁴⁸ Le Monde, "Abdelilah Benkirane."

⁴⁹ Al Jazeera, "Bila Hodoud," YouTube video, 49:03, August 2, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHSEZWD69uM>.

In fact, with no majority to govern alone, the PJD has been forced to negotiate alliances with parties from different ideological affiliations that lost credibility decades ago in the eyes of Moroccans, when they failed to fulfill their promises of raising the standard of living. Further, because of the international situation, there has been a decrease of foreign inflows from Moroccans abroad, and tourism revenues have not been enough to bridge the trade deficit.⁵⁰ Helpless at the economic level between 2011 and 2014, the PJD seemed to focus on the social issues. However, except for few symbolic measures, its electoral promises to fight corruption and unemployment have not translated into action. Nonetheless, the drop in oil prices and a good 2015 agricultural year, thanks to abundant rain, may help Benkirane's government to implement some of its promises by the end of December.

Under the above constraints, the PJD will not be able keep all of its campaign promises, especially since it has inherited heavy issues such as a public deficit, housing problems, health and social security problems, and huge educational demands. Room to maneuver is particularly limited since the new constitution preserves the monarch's political, religious, and legal supreme powers. The shadow government continues to intervene in decision making, blocking the government from managing important and strategic economic and political files. Hence, the PJD runs the risk of disappointing its trusting grassroots supporters because real reforms are not being implemented. To assume governmental responsibility under difficult circumstances (international economic crises, the post-Arab Spring era, and the absence of national good governance and accountability) without real authority was a challenging decision for the PJD.

6. The Need for an Islamic Political Secularism

Josep Dieste states that "in spite of its political participation, the PJD defends an Islamist project that proposes the purification of Moroccan society through an application of the shariaa."⁵¹ This may be true for some radical voices in the PJD, but other leading figures in the party think that the call for an Islamist government to apply the shariaa is unrealistic in an open society like Morocco, and further, not an interpretation that they support. In 2005, Saâdeddine Al-Othmani, a senior leader in the PJD and a former minister of foreign affairs, compared the party to "Christian Democratic parties in Europe that base their platforms upon the principles of Christian faith although their platforms may be civil in nature."⁵² Al-Othmani thinks his party must make decisions according to civil political realities, but must continue to view things through an Islamic lens.

The PJD is diligently trying to rationalize itself while keeping the banner of religion hoisted. This moderate Islam-oriented party is being called on now more than ever to propose a new interpretation of the Islamic texts, one compatible with modern views. It is true that the PJD's reference is Islam, but discussions about a specific type of Islamic political secularism must start to take place among party thinkers. Lessons can be learned from Turkey (the most obvious model of combining Islam and democracy) and even from France and the United States. Of course, Turkey has a legacy of secularism, but an Islamic political secularism in Morocco that respects citizens' political, social, and cultural choices would help create a

⁵⁰ "Morocco's Trade Deficit Rises," *Reuters*, September 17, 2012.

⁵¹ Josep L.-M. Dieste, "Demonstrating Islam: the Conflict of Text and the *Mudawwana* Reform in Morocco," *The Muslim World* 99, no. 1 (2009): 141.

⁵² Amr Hamzawy, "Interview with Saad Eddin Al Othmani, leader of Morocco's Party of Justice and Development," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 20, 2005, 1.

political environment that engages different ideas and avoids superfluous clashes between secularists and Islamists. Such Islamic political secularism must be understood as principles that are crucial to the functioning of society in a democratic way and would not stop Moroccans from practicing their religion.

There is no one kind of secularism, and secularism in Morocco must not be seen as an attempt to take religion away from the people. Ahmet Kuru notes that secular states with legal systems free from religious control pursue substantially different policies toward religion. He explains that “in France and Turkey the dominant ideology is ‘assertive secularism,’ which aims to exclude religion from the public sphere, while in the U.S., it is “passive secularism,” which tolerates public visibility of religion.”⁵³ For example, the French and Turkish states have banned student headscarves in public schools, whereas the U.S. allows students to wear religious symbols and attire. In considering similar issues, the PJD must activate the old scholarly consensus and the *Ijtihad*⁵⁴ process to interpret the *Hadith*⁵⁵ and other Islamic texts to find solutions to current issues in modern Moroccan society. Such decisions would be about a new interpretation of the Koran and other religious sources of legislation – not rejecting Western ideals related to democracy, human rights, equality, and freedom, but also not contradicting Islamic principles. In this sense, the Koran and other religious texts can be interpreted commensurately with what is happening in the twenty-first century. Morocco

should come up with a model of governance that is harmonious with the universal principles and not discordant with the Islamic teachings; a model that does not disregard the successful experience of democracy in some western countries nor...is a simple facsimile of the Islamic Empire’s legislations that were applied centuries ago.⁵⁶

Islamic political secularism means interpretations that must parallel the evolution of modern society in areas such as democratization, women’s rights, freedom of expression, and minority rights; an Islam able to disseminate religious knowledge that combines authenticity and modernity. These kinds of interpretations will help find answers to many issues of concern that Moroccan society may face, which will guide the future generations within a pluralistic society. On a 2011 visit to Tunis, then-Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said, “A Muslim can govern a secular state in a successful way.”⁵⁷ He was paraphrased as saying that Tunisia should have nothing to fear from the influence of Islam in politics: “[t]he most important thing of all and Tunisia will prove this; Islam and democracy can exist side by side.”⁵⁸ Erdogan does distinguish, however, between secularism at the individual and the state levels. For him, it “is not secularism in the Anglo Saxon or Western sense, a person is not secular, the state is secular.”⁵⁹

Between the 1970s and late 1990s, Moroccan Islamists and secular leftists struggled to find common ground due to their profound ideological differences. Since the 2000s, the two groups have moved beyond ideology and have been confronting each other on concrete political issues such as democracy, accountability, human rights, and development. These

⁵³ Ahmet T. Kuru, “Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion,” *World Politics* 59, no. 4 (July 2007): 1.

⁵⁴ In Islamic law, *Ijtihad* is an independent interpretation of problems not precisely covered by the Koran.

⁵⁵ The *Hadith* are the collections of the reports of the teachings, deeds, and sayings of the Islamic prophet Mohammed.

⁵⁶ Zouhair El Aouni, “Morocco: A Case Study for Political Schizophrenia,” *Tariq Ramadan*, May 6, 2014, <http://tariqramadan.com/english/2014/05/06/morocco-a-case-study-for-political-schizophrenia-by-zouhair-el-aouni/>.

⁵⁷ Sylvia Westall, “Islam can exist with democracy, Turkish PM Erdogan tells Tunisians,” *Reuters*, September 15, 2011, <http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2011/09/15/islam-can-exist-with-democracy-says-turkish-pm-erdogan/>.

⁵⁸ Westall, “Islam can exist with democracy.”

⁵⁹ Westall, “Islam can exist with democracy.”

meetings have led to dialogue and cooperation between Islamists and secular-leftists due to a convergence of interests and opinions. In the last few years, the PJD has found it easier than when it was in opposition to achieve alliances with non-Islam-oriented political parties and secular civil society. Indeed, “it is the relationship with the Monarchy that determines the relationship with other political and social movements.”⁶⁰

The 2011 mobilizations during the Arab Spring provided young Moroccan, secular, and Islamist militants the opportunity to struggle together, share the public space, and impart new visions to the old guard in their respective camps.⁶¹ This situation was an example of mutual compromise because the real problem is less related to religion and other secular ideologies than it is to social and economic problems. The outcome is another example that when religion is not involved, common ground can be found between different groups with different ideological affiliations.

The PJD has been working in a difficult environment since it came to power in late 2011. “Complicating matters for the PJD is that the combination of opposition obstructionism, bureaucratic contestation, elite intrigue and media hostility has bogged down the party’s efforts to shape public policy and legislation.”⁶² These blockages led to several months of political crisis in 2013, which resulted in the Istiqlal party’s withdrawal from the government. Furthermore, the USFP continues to resent the Islamists’ monopolization and use of the religion card, and accuses Benkirane of renouncing his constitutional power. Adding more fuel to the fire, in April 2015 Hamid Chabat, Secretary General of the Istiqlal Party, leaked the news of what Moroccans now call “the government couple.” Married Islamist Habib Choubani, minister delegate in charge of Relations between Parliament and Civil Society proposed to divorced Islamist Soumia Benkhaldoun, Minister Delegate to the Minister of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Executive training. Although Islam accepts polygamy, the case has stirred controversy both in Morocco and abroad because such marital arrangements go against what many Moroccan citizens believe today. Benkirane recently expressed his discontent with the romance, saying the relationship has tarnished the image of the PJD and presented a golden opportunity for political rivals to sharply criticize the Islamist party.⁶³

A political secularism that respects the Moroccan Islam model would still allow non-religious ideals to be respected and non-Islamic groups to be involved in political debates. This type of secularism, however, must maintain the role of the monarch as the Commander of the Faithful, presenting him as the only figure who can reconcile the political and the religious and counter the rising power of Islamist groups, and more importantly, stop radicalism. In a society where almost the entire population identifies as Muslim, it would indeed benefit the PJD to stop using religion to promote its political agenda. The PJD must explicitly define the fine line between religion and politics in Morocco, because neither political successes nor failures should be justified by religion or piety.⁶⁴ Islamist or otherwise, Moroccan political parties must deal with issues concerning the economy, education, unemployment, and human rights, and not interfere with the Commander of the Faithful in the religious field.

⁶⁰ Dalmaso and Cavatorta, “*Political Islam in Morocco*,” 16.

⁶¹ Jean-François Bayart, “Etre laïque en terre d’islam,” *Le Monde*, November 28, 2011.

⁶² Boukhars, “Morocco’s Islamists,” 4.

⁶³ Akhbar Alyaoum, “Benkirane breaks his silence about the case of Choubani and Benkhaldoun,” *Alyaoum 24*, April 23, 2015, 1, <http://www.alyaoum24.com/pdf/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%af%d8%af-1658>.

⁶⁴ “La restructuration.”

7. Conclusion

The arrival of Islamists to power has helped ease tensions in the streets and reinforced the image of a stable Moroccan system within a difficult regional Arab environment. Today, the moderate Islam-oriented PJD is attempting to serve Moroccan society and alter the political game from within. The party is convinced that it should protect the monarchy because the king is the only guarantor of national unification. However, it has been difficult for the PJD's leaders in the government to take real political, economic and social action, because the departments and authorities within the Moroccan political system are so intertwined. In fact, it is complicated for any official without the backing of the monarchy to make substantial decisions. The PJD continues to believe, however, in achieving change by parliamentary means and by participating in sharing executive power. Therefore, rather than adopting rapid and radical transition, it sees a gradual transition to real democracy through reforms initiated by the monarchy.

Moroccan politics today is about a pragmatic cohabitation between the king and the Islam-oriented PJD, where the country's interests and stability are emphasized. Yet, major strategic plans will continue to be set largely by the monarchy, despite some steps towards devolving more power to the Head of Government. It is true that the PJD has found common ground with the monarchy on general issues such as human rights and development, but it must also have the courage to confront corruption and clientelism in the political elite, as those issues are blocking real change. The PJD's main challenge, however, lies in ensuring efficient governance of public affairs now and in the future. It is true that the PJD was voted in to avoid the scenarios of Algeria and Egypt happening in Morocco, but the Islamist party may yet lose credibility since it has been thus far unable to fulfill its promises, especially in job creation and the fight against corruption.

To ease tensions between the Islamists and other political actors (the monarchy, the *Makhzen*, other political parties and secular associations), the PJD feels it must adopt a type of Islamic political secularism that respects the Moroccan Islam model. As a matter of fact, this secularism exists implicitly but is dominated by a political Islamism in which the king and Islamist parties play different roles. To promote the moderate Islamism that most in Moroccan society support, and to counter any other interpretation of Islam that may be claimed by extremists, Morocco needs to promote a type of political secularism that would preserve the monarch's title as Commander of the Faithful yet open society to modernism. This type of political secularism would also allow the PJD to gain more power by opening itself up to new ideas and actors; "the party's base...is still largely limited to teachers and civil servants, and it still badly lacks support among the intelligentsia and business elites."⁶⁵ Such a move would put the PJD in a strong position and begin to allow the implementation, even partially, of its political agenda.

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⁶⁵ Liddell, "Notables," 322.

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Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union: An Impossible Dream?

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Abstract

There has been a shift in the intelligence and security strategies of the states since 9/11. The attacks created a new security environment in which intelligence has become increasingly significant. Not only have the responsibilities and tasks of intelligence agencies become more important, but the necessity for intelligence and security service cooperation among nations has also increased. Accordingly, intelligence agencies had to update their strategies to put more emphasis on collaboration. This article analyzes the current EU intelligence network and tries to answer whether full intelligence cooperation in the EU could develop into a discrete organization in the aftermath of 2004 Madrid, 2005 London and the 7 January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, or whether it is an impossible dream to have concerted action whereby states acknowledge their mutual alliances, interests, and strategies.

Keywords: Intelligence, European Union, intelligence organizations, intelligence cooperation, terrorism

1. Introduction

The term *intelligence* refers to the process in which any kind of information is collected, analyzed, evaluated, and presented to decision makers to prevent tactical or strategic surprises. Intelligence has always been a crucial part of the security strategies of the states especially during the Cold War, but a shift in such strategies has been observed since the 2001 9/11 attacks. These attacks created a new security environment (including, but not limited to international terrorism, organized crime, pandemics, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and internet crime), in which intelligence has become increasingly significant. Therefore, not only have the responsibilities and tasks of intelligence agencies become more important, but the necessity for intelligence and security service cooperation among nations is also increasing. As a result, intelligence agencies have had to change their strategies of intelligence collection, processing, and analysis to place more importance on collaboration.

The 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks solidified that global (or transnational) terrorism and crime affect all states. These events, as well as the drastic changes to the international politics arena in the aftermath of 9/11, have necessitated concerted action whereby states acknowledge their mutual alliances, interests, and strategies. Hence, cooperation efforts in the field of intelligence, which emphasizes shared beliefs and interests, have intensified. Such efforts have been either bilateral, as between the US and the UK, or multilateral, as

among NATO's member states (such as the UKUSA agreement among the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,¹ as well as the Kilowatt Group,² which includes EU member states, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, the US, Israel, and South Africa).³ Such agreements also exist within the EU itself, and it is these cooperation agreements and efforts that I focus on in this paper.

I first deal with the current state of intelligence cooperation and the mechanisms of such cooperation within the EU. Second, I analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of existing EU intelligence cooperation with respect to the steps of the intelligence process. Third, I elaborate on the overall evaluation of the current intelligence-sharing framework to determine whether the current system meets the needs of the EU as an effective political actor in the new security environment. Fourth, I focus on the recent Al Qaeda attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* newspaper in Paris and what it represents in terms of long-needed intelligence cooperation within the EU. Finally, I try to answer whether full intelligence cooperation in the EU could develop into a discrete organization or whether it is an impossible dream.

2. Intelligence Cooperation within the EU

As noted earlier, intelligence cooperation is one of the most significant items on states' agendas, and the EU is no different. Since the Cold War years, intelligence cooperation has occurred between groups with different foci but the same aim, which is to protect the European continent. The next section presents an analysis and explanation of such groups and efforts.

2.1. The Club of Berne

Founded in 1971, the Club of Berne is a forum of EU member states, Switzerland and Norway, developed to enable the exchange of classified information, particularly on terrorism and subversion.⁴ The Club has a rotating chair, and holds regular meetings, technical conferences, and investigation operations, and has its own communications system.⁵ It has also established working groups on terrorism and organized crime, which led to the creation of the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), elaborated on below. The Club of Berne does not base its activities on the formal EU charter and therefore operates outside EU institutions.⁶ In addition, the group does not expect that all members will share relevant intelligence with the other members;⁷ in other words, intelligence sharing or exchange of intelligence, experience, and/or data within the Club is on a voluntary basis.

¹ Originating in 1941, the UKUSA is a multilateral agreement for cooperation in signals intelligence between the mentioned countries. It facilitates the exchange of products from the collection of traffic, acquisitions of communication and equipment, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, and translation and acquisition of information regarding communications organizations, procedures, practices, and equipment.

² Formed in 1977 especially as a response to 1972 Munich Olympics events, the Kilowatt Group cooperates around intelligence services on counterterrorism.

³ Stéphane Lefebvre, "The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16, no. 4 (2003): 527-42.

⁴ Fred Schreier, *WMD Proliferation: Reforming the Security Sector to Meet the Threat* (Virginia: Potomac Books, 2009).

⁵ Lefebvre, "The Difficulties and Dilemmas."

⁶ I. James Walsh, "Intelligence Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough," *JCMS* 44, no. 3 (2006): 625-43.

⁷ Walsh, "Intelligence Sharing."

2.2. Europol

Europol is the EU's law enforcement agency; it was created in 1995 by a convention signed by all member states and began operations in 1999. Its main responsibility is to make Europe a safer place by assisting member states in their fight against international terrorism and crime.⁸ Europol focuses on transnational trafficking in drugs, human beings, and vehicles, as well as illegal immigration, terrorism, forgery, money-laundering, and cybercrime.⁹ It also acts as the major centre of expertise in the key fields of law enforcement activity and as a European centre for strategic intelligence on organized crime.¹⁰ Although Europol has no direct powers of arrest,¹¹ it supports other law enforcement agencies by gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information, and by coordinating investigations, especially in the area of organized crime.¹²

Each member state is represented at Europol headquarters in The Hague by a European liaison officer, who is required to share relevant intelligence on behalf of his or her state. However, the main mechanism of intelligence sharing in the institution is the Europol computer system, known as TECS. The system consists of two different types of intelligence, the first of which is mainly concerned with perpetrators' basic identifying characteristics, and the second of which are the work files providing relevant information on specific offences.¹³ The TECS system consists of three modules: 1) the Europol information system about suspects who have committed or are involved in organized crime, 2) an analysis records system studying specific criminal phenomena and groups, and 3) an index system allowing Europol liaison officers and non-participating states to consult inventory data stored in the system.¹⁴

2.3. European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

The EUMS is the source of the EU's military expertise, and is comprised of military experts seconded from member states to the Council Secretariat. The organization provides an early-warning capability by planning, assessing, and making recommendations regarding crisis management and general military strategy.¹⁵ The EUMS works under the guidance of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) by implementing its decisions and supporting it in situation assessments and the military aspects of strategic planning.

The EUMS is also a center for intelligence sharing to support the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This task is carried out by the group's Intelligence Directorate, whose mission is to provide intelligence input to early warning and situation assessments, contribute to EUMS planning through providing intelligence and intelligence planning expertise, and provide intelligence input to crisis response planning and assessments of operations and exercises.¹⁶ The Directorate uses intelligence shared by member states as

⁸ Europol official webpage, accessed August 20, 2010, <http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=introduction>.

⁹ Walsh, "Intelligence Sharing."

¹⁰ Europol official webpage.

¹¹ Europol official webpage (Europol profile), accessed August 20, 2010, <http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=facts>.

¹² Europol profile.

¹³ Walsh, "Intelligence Sharing."

¹⁴ Frederic Lemieux, "Information Technology and Criminal Intelligence: A Comparative Perspective," in *Technocrime: Technology, Crime and Social Control*, ed. Stephane Leman-Langlois (Willan Publishing: London, 2013), 139-68.

¹⁵ European Union Law, *Military Staff of the European Union*, accessed August 17, 2010, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r00006_en.htm.

¹⁶ "Providing Military Capabilities to the EU," European Union Military Staff, accessed August 20, 2010, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUMS-June-2010.pdf>.

well as intelligence gathered by other EU bodies to produce assessments for the Military Committee, the EU's High Representative for foreign policy, and other EU organizations.¹⁷

2.4. The Counterterrorism Group (CTG)

The CTG is an offshoot of the Club of Berne, created after 9/11 to further intelligence sharing among the European intelligence structures. Mainly working in the area of terrorism intelligence, it cooperates with member states in an extra-legal and secret understanding and its main focus is conducting threat assessments about extremist Islamic terrorism.¹⁸

The CTG does not have its own sources, thus it works in cooperation with the other intelligence bodies within the EU. It channels its strategic and tactical intelligence analyses to the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), which provides the Union with a streamlined internal and external analysis capability.¹⁹

2.5. The European Union Satellite Centre

Located in Torrejon, Madrid, the Satellite Centre is the EU's body concerned with geospatial intelligence, providing "geospatial products resulting from the analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data in order to support the operations and missions of the European Union and its Member States."²⁰ Examples of such operations and missions include, but are not limited to, PROXIMA and CONCORDIA (both in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), EUFOR-ALTHEA (in Bosnia Herzegovina), and EUJUST LEX (in Iraq).²¹

2.6. The EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) and INTCEN

Originating from the European Security and Defence Policy of 1999, SitCen, INTCEN's predecessor, was responsible for providing the Council with high-quality information on matters of public security in the form of early warnings, assessments, and services in cases of emergency. It also constituted a contact between the High Representative and the intelligence community of EU countries.

SitCen's intelligence sources derived mainly from the seven countries in the EU at the time of its formation (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK), who thus also shaped the perception of a terrorist threat to the EU and the development of countermeasures to it.²² SitCen was responsible for analyzing not only external threats to the EU but also internal threats, which included internal security, intelligence investigations, border surveillance, and crisis management.²³

Renamed and restructured as INTCEN in 2012, the organization comprises intelligence institutions from all countries currently in the EU. Tasked with providing intelligence analyses, early warnings, and situational awareness to EU states and institutions in the fields of security, defence, and counter terrorism, INTCEN also influences member states' intelligence decision-making processes.

¹⁷ Walsh, "Intelligence Sharing."

¹⁸ Jelle van Buuren, *Secret Truth: The EU Joint Situation Centre* (Amsterdam: Eurowatch, 2009).

¹⁹ van Buuren, *Secret Truth*.

²⁰ The European Union Satellite Centre official webpage, accessed August 25, 2010, http://www.eusc.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7&Itemid=15_

²¹ For more detailed information on the Centre's activities, visit its webpage, <http://www.eusc.europa.eu/>.

²² van Buuren, *Secret Truth*.

²³ van Buuren, *Secret Truth*.

The institution's main functions include:²⁴

- providing information not available overtly or not provided elsewhere;
- providing assessments, briefings, and a range of products based on intelligence and open sources;
- acting as a single entry point in the EU for classified information coming from member states' civilian intelligence and security services; and
- supporting and assisting the presidents of the European Council and Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations.

INTCEN currently operates within two divisions: the Analysis Division, which is tasked with providing strategic analysis based on input from member states' security and intelligence services, and the General and External Relations Division, which works on legal, administrative, and information technology issues, and undertakes open source analysis.²⁵ INTCEN is also responsible for preparing special reports that are usually thematic or based on a topic of current interest and intelligence summaries on risks for EU personnel in any given country.²⁶

3. Effectiveness and Efficiency of Current Intelligence Cooperation within the EU

This section analyzes the strengths and the weaknesses of the current intelligence cooperation within the EU to determine whether the system is effective. I take the steps in the intelligence cycle (process) (i.e. collection, processing, analysis and evaluation, dissemination, and tasking and control) as the basis for analysis, as done by Müller-Wille in his 2002 and 2008 studies.²⁷ I choose this approach to provide an overview of the framework of the EU intelligence process rather than focusing on each organization.

Collection: Apart from the EU Satellite Centre, no joint resource exists for intelligence collection in the EU. As Cross states, the EU has “no formal mandate in intelligence gathering.”²⁸ Therefore, each member state collects intelligence from its own sphere of interest (i.e. southern states deal with the south, northern states deal with the north).²⁹ When it comes to collecting open source intelligence, however, the EU is at an advantage as it benefits from its diplomatic missions worldwide. Moreover, it can also collect this type of intelligence through INTCEN's General and External Relations Division.

Processing: The Union is at a disadvantage at this stage of the intelligence cycle because it does not have its own processing capabilities. It uses the facilities of the Torrejon Satellite Centre, which does not, however, own or operate its own satellites but purchases commercial imagery and analyzes it for the EU and/or for individual member states.³⁰

Analysis and Evaluation: According to Müller-Wille, the EU's capacity for analyzing crisis prevention and management is mainly in the civil sphere, which is not a problem in

²⁴ INTCEN Fact Sheet, quoted in Chris Jones, “Analysis: Secrecy Reigns at the EU's Intelligence Centre,” *Statewatch* 22, no. 4 (2013), accessed May 24, 2014, <http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-223-eu-intcen.pdf>.

²⁵ Jones, “Analysis.”

²⁶ INTCEN Fact Sheet quoted in Jones, “Analysis.”

²⁷ For more detailed information, see Björn Müller-Wille, “EU Intelligence Co-operation. A Critical Analysis,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 23, no. 2 (2002): 61-86 and Björn Müller-Wille, “The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-operation,” *JCMS* 46, no. 1 (2008): 49-73.

²⁸ Mai'a K. Davis Cross, “EU Intelligence Sharing and The Joint Situation Centre: A Glass Half-Full” (paper prepared for delivery at the twelfth biennial conference of the European Studies Association, March 3-5, 2011, Boston, Massachusetts), accessed May 24, 2014, http://www.euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/3a_cross.pdf.

²⁹ Müller-Wille, “EU Intelligence Co-operation.”

³⁰ Müller-Wille, “EU Intelligence Co-operation.”

itself because the EU is considered a primarily civil organization,³¹ but it means that the EU's civil capabilities cannot be integrated into the Common Foreign and Security Policy, thus resulting in the EU lacking a military intelligence and an analysis capacity.³² This issue, however, can be overcome, to some extent, with the capacities of the EUMS and INTCEN.³³

Dissemination: Because the Union does not have its own collection sources, it depends on the contribution of national intelligence organizations for dissemination. Consequently, the EU cannot exercise any power on what intelligence can be shared and to what extent it will be shared.³⁴ Because secrecy is the key to dissemination, this situation gives rise to an internal mistrust problem: How can secrecy be maintained when there is no open flow of internal information within the national agencies of the member states?³⁵

Tasking and Control: The EU is again at a disadvantage in the tasking and control aspects of intelligence because it can request, but not demand or task, collection of specific intelligence or information.³⁶ The EU can only control and task within its own limited analysis capacity. Nonetheless, just as in the analysis and evaluation step of the intelligence cycle, this disadvantage can be overcome through INTCEN through its own strategic analysis capacities; however, as that organization also has limited capabilities, tasking and control may not be able to be fully achieved in the EU due to the order of priority for the EU's preventive actions. For example, issues relating to the Middle East may dominate the EU's agenda of the EU, whereas issues related to the Balkans may not receive much attention.

After analyzing the steps of the intelligence process with respect to EU intelligence cooperation, one can argue that although institutions to share intelligence do exist, current mechanisms and beliefs do not let member states fully do so, thus limiting the EU's power against new threats to security and its influence as a global political actor in the new security environment. Specific examples of this situation can be seen within Europol and INTCEN. According to Europol, the organization does not have the ability to provide intelligence for European police operations conducted outside EU territory, such as those for organized crime or human trafficking.³⁷ Europol also does not function effectively as a centralized intelligence agency offering support to national agencies.³⁸ As for INTCEN, because, as noted above, it does not have a monopoly on intelligence,³⁹ member states are the real decision makers in terms of what intelligence to share. Consequently, analyses provided by INTCEN may be subjective, perhaps reflecting the views of the intelligence contributors but not of the EU as a whole.

The above discussion reveals that intelligence cooperation within the EU has many weaknesses, outweighing the strengths, such as access to open source analyses via EU missions worldwide. Consequently, this situation necessitates an evaluation of the EU's current intelligence cooperation efforts and of the issues involved, such as obstacles to intelligence cooperation. The next section of the paper provides a general evaluation of these concerns.

³¹ Müller-Wille, "EU Intelligence Co-operation."

³² Müller-Wille, "EU Intelligence Co-operation."

³³ Ilkka Salmi, quoted in Kristof Clerix, "Ilkka Salmi, the EU's Spymaster," *Mondiaal Nieuws*, accessed May 24, 2014, <http://www.mo.be/node/3789>.

³⁴ Müller-Wille, "EU Intelligence Co-operation."

³⁵ Müller-Wille, "EU Intelligence Co-operation."

³⁶ Müller-Wille, "EU Intelligence Co-operation."

³⁷ Müller-Wille, "International Terrorism."

³⁸ Müller-Wille, "International Terrorism."

³⁹ Müller-Wille, "International Terrorism."

4. Overall Evaluation of Intelligence Cooperation Efforts in the EU

Though desirable for all member states and the Union as a whole, intelligence cooperation within the EU is not fully occurring. A report by the UK's House of Lords' EU Committee on the EU's response to the Madrid bombings stated that the EU is "making an important contribution [to intelligence cooperation by] supporting Member States - who have the primary responsibility [for intelligence] - but its structures are complex and confusing and need to be streamlined."⁴⁰ The problematic status of the current framework can be linked to numerous factors, analyzed below.

One such factor is security, which goes hand in hand with the issue of trust. For all national intelligence agencies, protecting sources is critical to preventing security failures. For the EU, then, because intelligence sharing is on a voluntary basis⁴¹ and states are the decision makers in intelligence cooperation, member states can refrain from sharing sources or intelligence on the grounds that doing so will affect the security of their sources and may lead to security failures. Sharing sources can also be considered a breach of national security and a threat to sovereignty: member states are "unwilling to give up sovereignty in such a secretive and sensitive area."⁴² However, when states trust another state, this fear lessens, allowing intelligence to be shared more easily, such as in cases of global terrorism. Still, trust remains an issue, because although member states desire to cooperate, they do not want to risk spoiling "their privileged relationships with [non-EU] significant partners as a result of increased European exchanges."⁴³ For example, the UK is unwilling to extend its existing intelligence cooperation with the US (i.e. cooperation in national security intelligence especially with respect to counterterrorism) to greater Europe in other areas of intelligence cooperation (e.g. law enforcement intelligence or criminal intelligence) because it does not want to threaten its relationship with the former⁴⁴ (yet the Kilowatt Group functions as a counterterrorism intelligence cooperation organization among these parties). Cooperation with other intelligence agencies does not mean destroying or spoiling relations with current collaborators. On the contrary, such cooperation would benefit all states, allowing access to more valid and reliable sources of intelligence, which would limit intelligence failures.

Another obstacle relevant to the issue of trust, according to Politi, is that each EU intelligence agency has faith and confidence only in what it produces. In other words, states have no confidence in the intelligence produced by others, despite some intelligence interdependence inherent within the current system.⁴⁵ Therefore, although non-confidence may appear to be an issue, member states must depend on each other in areas where they do not have full dominance because "broader political considerations tend to dictate a certain leeway in the way exchanges are managed."⁴⁶

The other obstacle in European intelligence cooperation is that "an agency belonging to a smaller country runs the risk of being infiltrated, influenced, controlled and ultimately

⁴⁰ "Call for Better EU Intelligence Sharing to Tackle Terrorism," *Politics*, March 8, 2005, accessed August 28, 2010, [http://www.politics.co.uk/news/call-better-eu-intelligence-sharing-tackle-terrorism-\\$30161.htm](http://www.politics.co.uk/news/call-better-eu-intelligence-sharing-tackle-terrorism-$30161.htm).

⁴¹ Walsh, "Intelligence Sharing."

⁴² Mai'a K. Davis Cross, "A European Transgovernmental Intelligence Network and the Role of IntCen," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 14, no. 3 (2013): 388-402.

⁴³ Alessandro Politi, "Why is a European Intelligence Necessary?" in *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*, ed. Alessandro Politi (Institute for Security Studies, 1998).

⁴⁴ Politi, "European Intelligence Necessary?"

⁴⁵ Politi, "European Intelligence Necessary?"

⁴⁶ Politi, "European Intelligence Necessary?"

swallowed by bigger partners.⁴⁷ Smaller countries within the EU do not want to be dominated by the UK, France, and Germany. However, no nation in the EU wants to be dominant in the field of intelligence because it would likely be the target of severe criticism in the event of intelligence failures. As Politi (1998) states, no one country would be willing to take the whole blame for such occurrences, especially when it would have to “accept being constantly dwarfed [with regards to intelligence collection] worldwide.”⁴⁸

On the other hand, some feel that INTCEN, as a trans-governmental intelligence agency, could achieve intelligence cooperation within the EU.⁴⁹ As Cross (2013) maintains, the resistance of member states to share intelligence is not really a roadblock to creating a “European intelligence space” because the current relationship building and networking among intelligence professionals already results in sharing best practices and know-how to cope with the challenges brought by globalization and the information revolution.⁵⁰ Although Cross has a point in this respect, I believe that currently, not more than a *space* can be achieved; cooperation might take place around ‘soft’ issues, but hard-core security issues will still remain in the domain of national intelligence agencies. For example, more cooperation could likely be achieved in transnational crime, but national security issues would probably remain excluded from the cooperation agenda.

Looking at obstacles to cooperation and the current state of the EU intelligence community, in which the Council has some responsibilities for strategic decision making but does not play a significant operational or tactical role⁵¹ in addressing new security threats, one might conclude that a central European intelligence agency may never be realized. However, the Paris attacks have once again shown that such an agency is a necessity; it is not possible to prevent such events by solely relying on one member state’s intelligence mechanisms. The next section briefly explains what the Paris attacks have shown us in terms of the dire need for intelligence cooperation.

5. The January 7 *Charlie Hebdo* Attack: Another Indicator of Required Intelligence Cooperation

In this section, I briefly analyze why the recent *Charlie Hebdo* newspaper attack and the event’s aftermath function as another indicator of long-needed intelligence cooperation within the EU. As noted at the beginning of this article, one of the most important functions of intelligence is to prevent tactical or strategic surprises. Nonetheless, the *Charlie Hebdo* attack was a bombshell for European states, especially France, of course. Although the magazine’s writers had received threats from radical Islamists several times, an attack of such scale was completely unexpected.

Quoting Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Özcan puts forth that the Union should have a joint security and intelligence mechanism, just as it does with the joint currency unit.⁵² The EU’s Achilles heel is the lack of a common foreign policy and security strategy. To overcome this weakness the Union needs to create a common intelligence framework and

⁴⁷ Politi, “European Intelligence Necessary?”

⁴⁸ Politi, “European Intelligence Necessary?”

⁴⁹ Cross, “European Transgovernmental Intelligence.”

⁵⁰ Cross, “European Transgovernmental Intelligence.”

⁵¹ Müller-Wille, “The Effect of International Terrorism.”

⁵² Nihat Ali Özcan, “Avrupa Birliği’nin İstihbarat Örgütü Kurma Arayışı” [The Quest of the European Union to Set Up an Intelligence Organization] *Milliyet*, accessed January 28, 2015, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/avrupa-birligi-nin-istihbarat/gundem/yarday/1997738/default.htm>.

intelligence sharing system; it has become quite obvious that transnational terrorist and crime organizations such as Al Qaeda have militants who are EU citizens and need to be monitored.

However, as Özcan also notes, establishing such a strategy and system is a difficult task given the compartmentalized intelligence mechanisms throughout the 28 member states and these agencies' difficult relations with decision makers.⁵³ Moreover, such an agency would likely be considered a serious bureaucratic and political issue because of the lack of trust among states;⁵⁴ countries may avoid sharing what they have so as not to destroy their own intelligence sharing systems, such as the case between the UK and the US. As a result, although a joint EU intelligence agency seems like a necessity, establishing one may be an impossible dream, an issue I explore in the next section.

6. EU Intelligence Cooperation: An Impossible Dream?

“[H]ow a [central] intelligence agency might fit in the overall European Union mechanism and what its shape and role might be” may be difficult to determine,⁵⁵ and given the factors discussed in the above sections, one might conclude that full intelligence cooperation in the EU may even be impossible. This belief may be strengthened by the fact that, for the following reasons, national security and defence identities are still dominant in operational and tactical responsibilities for fighting terrorism and organized crime.⁵⁶ First, national agencies have more opportunities than an overarching EU body would to oversee operational and tactical responsibilities and are more able to do so due to their locations, integration within the system of national authorities and decision makers, knowledge of and established contacts within the underworld, and their societal and cultural knowledge.⁵⁷ Second, national electorates still hold their own governments responsible for fighting terrorism and other threats within their territories.⁵⁸ Third, policy-makers are only accountable to their citizens and governments, not to citizens of the EU as a whole or to any supranational authority.

However, the benefits of a central intelligence agency in the EU can be listed as follows:⁵⁹ 1) more-coordinated efforts in gathering intelligence from different sources, such as open sources, 2) shared budgetary demands of intelligence collection and analysis, and 3) shared policy maker accountability.

From the information presented, it seems apparent that increased intelligence cooperation is important for the EU. This does not necessarily mean that the EU should have its own intelligence agency, as advocated by Nomikos (2003, 2004), who states that “compared to the Central Intelligence Agency in the U.S. political structure, the European Union Intelligence Agency should be independent and not part of any other institution within the European Union.”⁶⁰ Rather, it means that there should be more efforts to cooperate so that something that is not currently produced at any current level can be achieved.⁶¹ Although member states apparently prefer to cooperate mainly in the area of operational information pertaining to

⁵³ Özcan, “The Quest of the European Union.”

⁵⁴ Özcan, “The Quest of the European Union.”

⁵⁵ John Nomikos, “Does the European Union Need a Common Intelligence Policy?” accessed August 18, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=8661.

⁵⁶ Nomikos, “Need a Common Intelligence Policy?”

⁵⁷ Müller-Wille, “International Terrorism.”

⁵⁸ Müller-Wille, “International Terrorism.”

⁵⁹ These advantages are a summary of the benefits listed by Politi in “European Intelligence Necessary?”

⁶⁰ See Nomikos, “European Union Intelligence Agency”; and Nomikos, “Need a Common Intelligence Policy?” for his ideas on a European intelligence agency.

⁶¹ Müller-Wille, “EU Intelligence Co-operation.”

the CSDP, no single national intelligence agency can cope with the demands of the new security environment.⁶² Increased cooperation should be designed in a way that would not weaken existing special relationships but strengthen them;⁶³ this cooperation would offer better opportunities for information exchange so that all parties, including allies outside the EU, would benefit.

Planning for and implementing these changes require time and enormous effort, and perhaps the most important issue to focus on is dissolving the mistrust that exists between parties. Secret and sensitive information on issues specific to each member state could be kept within each national intelligence agency, but information relating to the EU as a whole should be shared so that the EU can more effectively and efficiently respond to threats from the new security environment.

7. Conclusion

In this paper I aimed to address the issue of intelligence cooperation within the EU. Although cooperation has gained more importance globally, especially within the new security environment, this has not been the case among EU member states. Although EU states have set up cooperation arrangements such as the Club of Berne, Europol, the EUMS and CTG, the European Union Satellite Centre, and INTCEN, none of these organizations serves as a central intelligence agency for the EU, mainly because of member states' personalized interests. Member states, especially the UK, France, and Germany, are hesitant to share intelligence with other parties and do not trust each other's intelligence sources. This situation inevitably leads to inadequate sources for intelligence collection and analysis. Furthermore, the fact that the EU has no supranational authority to exercise tasking and control means that each national intelligence service is only engaged in activities in its own spheres of interest, thus information that may benefit the EU as a whole must be cobbled together from various sources, and activities that may counter terrorism and organized crime are perhaps not being implemented.

Greater intelligence cooperation would result in professional, financial, and political advantages, allowing the EU to pursue a more effective security and defence policy and be a more effective actor in the global political arena. Because of these benefits, the relevant actors in EU intelligence should seriously consider increasing cooperation. Such changes, however, mostly depend on changes at the national level. For now, a central European intelligence agency may be an impossible dream, but initiating more attempts at cooperation is well within reach.

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⁶² Cross, "European Transgovernmental Intelligence."

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Conflict Resolution Revisited: Peaceful Resolution, Mediation and Responsibility to Protect

Seán O Regan

1. Introduction

Alan Tidwell, the author of *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*,¹ wrote in the preface “Not all conflicts can or should be resolved; frankly there are some conflicts I do not wish to resolve – I want to win them.”² This is a real challenge to every person who aspires to be a peacemaker, and challenges, as Tidwell intended, the notion of peace at whatever cost. Tidwell argues that that while morally inspired positive peacemaking is a “good thing,”³ it can lack a sense of proportion, ignoring justice, right and wrong and deep-seated reasons for grievance. Similarly, evangelical theorists “propagate the value of conflict resolution at all costs”⁴ and in the process lose a sense of reality about what can realistically be achieved. The increased adoption by states of early warning, conflict prevention and conflict resolution policies is often based on notions of positive peacemaking and inspired by evangelical theorists. Latterly mediation has been added to the arsenal of state-led conflict resolution tools.

This commentary will explore the limitations of mediation in relations between states, consider the implications for conflict resolution practice and advocate a principled international response to conflicts, including, if necessary, the need to win them.

2. Principles of Peaceful Resolution

The legal codification of the conduct of war, technological advances and the emergence of citizen armies through the nineteenth century all presumed that war is inevitable. The preambles of *fin de siècle* treaties⁵ on the conduct of war, where they exist, decry the evils of warfare but aim only to ameliorate rather than end those evils and their impacts on wounded combatants and civilians. While these could be devastating, in that era the overwhelming majority (95%) of the casualties of war were the combatants.⁶ Even in the 1914-1918 war

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¹ Alan Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution* (London: Pinter, 1998).

² Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved?* xi.

³ Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved?* xi.

⁴ Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved?* xi.

⁵ For example, the Geneva Convention of 1906 begins as follows: “Being equally animated by the desire to lessen the inherent evils of warfare as far as is within their power, and wishing for this purpose to improve and supplement the provisions agreed upon at Geneva on 22 August 1864, for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded or sick in armies in the field.” International Committee of the Red Cross, *Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 6 July 1906*, accessed May 17, 2015, <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=6EA2B84E6E475670C12563CD00516215>.

⁶ UNICEF, *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, accessed May 17, 2015, <http://www.unicef.org/graca/patterns.htm>.

between the European great powers, civilian casualties were limited to 15%, but by the end of the Second World War this had risen to 65%.⁷

The devastating impact of the 1914-1918 war led to the establishment of the League of Nations, whose purpose was stated in its founding Covenant as being

to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security, by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another⁸.

The failure of the League of Nations to prevent the resumption of war in Europe spelled its end as an organisation, but the same principles were applied in the establishment of the United Nations in 1948. Its preamble opens as follows: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,” and goes on to enumerate principles of respect for human dignity and rights and the peaceful resolution of disputes between nations.

Regional organisations also committed themselves to peace. The origins of the EU lay in a determination that war should not occur in Europe again and aimed to achieve this through sharing the means of production and binding the nations of Europe together in their common interest. Until the early 1990s, the EU was still a small organisation of just 12 Member States, and had been extremely successful in ending the perennial conflicts between western European nation states. It had not until that point been especially engaged in conflict prevention beyond its borders and had largely confined itself to activity within the organisation itself.

Similarly, the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) in its Bangkok Declaration affirmed that it was established “[t]o promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.”⁹ Its 2007 Charter states that one of its purposes is “[t]o maintain and enhance peace security and stability and further strengthen peace oriented values in the region.”¹⁰ The African Union, built on the Organisation for African Unity, states in its Constitutive Act that “the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent” and says “the need to promote peace, security and stability” is “a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda.” It defines one of its objectives as to “promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.”¹¹

Thus, there is a well-rehearsed commitment to the principle of peace and by implication the peaceful resolution of disputes. The bipolar world order established after the Second World War made a mockery of this commitment. The term *conflict prevention* in this era meant containing the potential for nuclear war between the major blocs. The ideological struggle between those blocs was carried into conflict all over the globe, notably in East Asia (Korea

⁷ UNICEF, *Impact*.

⁸ League of Nations, *Covenant of the League of Nations*, 1924, accessed May 18, 2015, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.

⁹ ASEAN, *The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967*, accessed May 22, 2015, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration>.

¹⁰ ASEAN, *Charter of the Association of South East Asian Nations*, November 20, 2007, accessed May 22, 2015, <http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-charter/asean-charter>.

¹¹ African Union, *Constitutive Act*, July 11, 2000, accessed May 22, 2015, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Constitutive_Act_en_0.htm.

and Vietnam), Africa (the Congo and Angola) and Latin America (Chile and Nicaragua). The international community's response was generally to insert peacekeeping forces between parties in conflict without necessarily dealing with the root causes of the conflict. Many such conflicts ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but long-suppressed animosities between the constituent republics of that Union and its client states erupted. The international community's failure to deal with the ethnic/sectarian conflicts in the Caucasus and South Eastern Europe on the one hand and the Rwanda genocide on the other impelled discussion of conflict prevention from academia to foreign policy formation. While the UN and the OSCE had long-standing commitments to conflict prevention, exercise of all possible options was in practice limited by international politics. When it became clear that, as Smith¹² put it, the balance of terror of the Cold War would not be replaced by peace and security, the issue of *conflict prevention* became prominent for the international community.

3. Current Conflict Resolution Practice

Van Waalraven¹³ explored the conflict policies of a sample of Western countries (Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and found that general conflict policy, as against specific conflict intervention, was embedded in other, mainly development assistance, policies. He found it difficult to identify generic approaches to conflict prevention, although all countries examined used similar language in their descriptions of conflict and its causes, even if there was only vague consensus on what those causes are.

The Council of the European Union, at its June 2001 meeting in Gothenburg,¹⁴ endorsed a programme of conflict prevention,¹⁵ stating this would “improve the Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action [to prevent conflict]” and that “[c]onflict prevention is one of the main objectives of the Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects.” This document and the European Security Strategy¹⁶ provided the foundation for the elaboration of a whole series of policies, including the promotion of mediation in conflict prevention and resolution. It was followed in 2009 by the “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities,”¹⁷ which uses the term *mediation* to encompass improved communication, negotiation, dialogue and facilitation through the offices of a third party, namely the EU. In this document mediation can be directive and coercive. It also notes the EU’s financial power and moral authority as positive factors in a mediation process.

A number of individual countries have claimed particular attachment to conflict prevention and resolution as a fundamental part of their foreign policy. Finland promotes mediation as a core tool to resolve all phases of the conflict cycle, and with Turkey, initiated a Friends of Mediation group at the United Nations in 2010. In addition, in 2011 it published a national action plan to support mediation in conflict prevention.¹⁸ For its part, Turkey asserts that each

¹² Karen Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

¹³ Klaas Van Waalraven, *Conflict Policy in some Western Countries* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Studies, Clingendael, 1999).

¹⁴ EU Council, *Council Conclusions SN 200/ 1/01 Rev 1*, Goteberg: European Union, June 16, 2001.

¹⁵ European Commission, *Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts 9537/ 01/ 1 Rev 1*, Brussels, June 7, 2001.

¹⁶ EU Council, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, December 12, 2003, accessed May 18, 2015, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

¹⁷ European Commission, *Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities 15779/09*, Brussels: EU, November 10, 2009.

¹⁸ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, *Mediation*, April 23, 2014, accessed May 17, 2015, <http://formin.finland.fi/public/>

conflict “has its own dynamics and conditions; and that mediation efforts should be carried out with a view to safeguard differences and in a manner which is flexible and free from uniformity.”¹⁹ Turkey outlines certain principles that it claims are required of a mediator, including extensive expert knowledge, the capacity to propose flexible but value-based strategies, the ability to earn the confidence of the parties and a commitment to confidentiality. Together with Finland and Switzerland, Turkey established a “Friends of Mediation Group” within the OSCE in March 2014.²⁰ Switzerland has an extensive and long-standing commitment to conflict resolution. Its wide range of activity includes the advancement of power sharing, democratic reform (including control of security forces and election management, human rights and humanitarian international law, reconciliation processes, mutual ideological understanding and disarmament (especially land mines and small arms)). Switzerland claims that since the end of the Cold War almost all conflicts have been resolved through the good offices of a third party, and distinguishes in this between *facilitation* (a more neutral, less directive and almost external role) and *mediation* (which it sees as requiring a mandate from the parties to the conflict and the mediator playing an active role in finding a solution for the parties).²¹ While Norway has not published a conflict resolution policy, it is widely regarded as a leading proponent of conflict resolution. In a speech in Ankara in 2013,²² Norway’s Foreign Minister outlined that country’s approach to conflict resolution. He noted that while each process is different, they do have commonalities, and outlined four basic principles: dialogue is crucial; peace processes take time; inclusiveness is key and experience of other peace processes is helpful. Embedded in the Norwegian approach are commitments to strengthening international law, human rights (including fundamental freedoms), gender equality, social justice and economic development. Although not explicitly stated, there is also recognition of the importance of mediation.

The above is a small sample of the conflict resolution efforts of many countries, but what is interesting about this grouping, which ostensibly works together to promote conflict resolution, is the diversity of approach. Norway uniquely contemplates that military force may be necessary in the resolution of conflicts (although qualifies this by saying force is not sufficient of itself). Only Finland has a national action plan to promote mediation. Switzerland relies on government-funded NGOs to advance its international efforts and Turkey uses its own state instruments. There are differences in the emphasis on the reasons for promoting conflict resolution as part of state policy, ranging from state security, through regional influence and economic well-being, to human rights and justice. These differences may well be regarded as the sort of variation in style that is widely discussed in the literature but they are beyond the scope of this essay. However, there is also a body of literature that examines why states mediate, and some of the reasons for variation may be found there.

Zartmann and Touval²³ found that states seek to resolve conflict out of self-interest. This may be defensive, aimed at increasing security (globally or regionally); or protecting

default.aspx?contentid=259341&contentlan=2&culture=en-US#National_measures_to_promote_mediation.

¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, *Resolution of Conflicts and Mediation*, accessed May 17, 2015, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa>.

²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, *Conflicts and Mediation*.

²¹ Switzerland Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *Peace*, February 20, 2015, accessed May 17, 2015, <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/dfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace.html>.

²² Borge Brende, “International Mediation Trends: Processes and Experiences” (opening speech at the Seminar on Turkish and Norwegian Approaches to Mediation, Ankara, Turkey, November 6, 2013).

²³ I. William Zartmann and Saaid Touval, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era,” in *Managing Global Chaos*, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall, 445-61 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).

external interests or blocking another state from becoming involved in the conflict resolution process; or offensive, aimed at increasing influence or reputation. Smaller states may engage in mediation because they lack other tools to achieve defensive or offensive foreign policy objectives. Zartmann and Touval interestingly note that states in conflict only engage in mediation if continued conflict or failure to engage with the mediator will result in greater harm to themselves, or if it might provide future advantage. The mediation process is therefore engaged with also out of self-interest. In short, positive peace is seldom the motivation for state engagement in mediation.

Melin²⁴ confirmed this finding with an elegant demonstration that the number of state-led mediation processes increased in line with the number of conflicts and is not dependent on any presumed finite number of mediators. She argued that states will act as mediators only if to do so “enhances their influence, resources and power.” She also cited evidence that states are more likely to mediate if they have political or economic ties to one or both of the disputing parties; that is, they are unlikely to be neutral. Melin went on to describe seven factors that increase the likelihood that mediation to resolve conflict will occur: democracy (democratic states are more ready to mediate, as mediators and disputants); capability (which affects willingness to mediate, acceptance by the parties and success of outcome); cost of conflict (opportunity cost of not resolving conflict); impasse or stalemate in conflict; secular rivalry or reoccurring conflict; the conflict is inter-statal not intra-statal and a history of previous mediation.

4. The Limitations of Mediation

Bercovitch defines mediation as

a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behaviour, and do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.²⁵

Much of Bercovitch's work focussed on distilling best practice from empirical studies. His analysis is based on long-term samples in multiple regions and the establishment of robust data sets, which allowed him to offer more objective measures of policy success and failure than individual case studies might. Although his study was not limited to the mediation efforts of state actors, Bercovitch found that 75% of attempts to mediate international conflicts between 1945 and 2000 failed at least partially. By his count, 272 of the 333 conflicts in the period were subject to some form of external intervention, and of those 192 were mediations, some of which comprised multiple mediation efforts. The outcomes include reduction, not end, to violence in 27% of cases and outright failure in 57% of cases.²⁶

Perhaps the most mediated conflict of the past seven decades is that between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbours. Given the multiplicity of efforts by states, NGOs and prominent individuals, it is difficult to establish precisely how many mediation attempts have been made to resolve the conflict. The vast majority has failed. Siniver²⁷ counts five that

²⁴ Molly Melin, “When States Mediate,” *Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs* 2, no. 1 (April 2013).

²⁵ Jacob Bercovitch, “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice,” in *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, ed. I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1997), 130.

²⁶ Daniel Druckman and Carmela Lutmar, “Jacob Bercovitch: Understanding Hands across the Divide,” *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research* 5, no. 4 (2012): 325-30.

²⁷ Asaf Siniver, “Power, Impartiality and Timing: Three Hypotheses on Third Party Mediation in the Middle East,” *Political*

have had any success: the 1949 agreements defining the Green Line; US Secretary of State Kissinger's two interventions after the Yom Kippur War in 1973; President Carter's Camp David mediation leading to the Israel-Egypt peace treaty of 1979 and the Oslo process, the principles of which endure despite the failures in implementation. In each of these cases, there were elements of coercion by the mediator, there was a power balance between the disputants and the mediator had a high status and was perceived to be partial. Although historically much of the focus in the Middle East has been on the mediation of the Israeli-Arab conflict, there are multiple other conflicts in the region, many of which have also been subject to failed mediation (for example, the mission of Lakhdar Brahimi in Syria²⁸ and international efforts in Egypt²⁹).

Similar patterns of the failure of mediation were repeated in Somalia,³⁰ Sri Lanka,³¹ Congo and Sudan³² and in other conflicts. It is beyond the scope of this essay to examine why these failures occur with such frequency but Lakhdar Brahimi lists the deadly sins of mediation as ignorance, arrogance, partiality, impotence, haste, inflexibility and false promises.³³ In the international context one has to add also geopolitical realities. This is well demonstrated in the case of Sri Lanka, where the principal mediator identified geopolitical rivalry between India and China as a major factor in the collapse of its mediation efforts.³⁴

5. Responsibility to Protect, Legitimate Intervention and Armed Force

Against this background of the general failure of mediation, and bearing in mind Tidwell's concerns about reality, proportionality, justice, ethics and grievance, one has to ask if there is a better way for the international community to resolve disputes between and within states, including taking sides and winning them.

Although there are a wide variety of traditions surrounding the propriety of using violence to assert or restore justice, in the Western world it is St. Augustine of Hippo who is usually described as the originator of Just War doctrine. St. Thomas Aquinas elaborated the doctrine within the Roman Catholic tradition, putting lawful authority, just cause and right intention at its centre. He was followed by several others, including de Vittoria, in the development of an elaborate tradition of tests to be passed to ensure that a war was entered into justly (*jus ad bello*), conducted justly (*jus in bello*) and exited justly (*jus post bello*). The tradition evolved in parallel with the evolution of the Westphalian model of sovereign states and ultimately became defined in the context of war between states. This broad tradition has been brought back to public consciousness by the scholar Michael Walzer, largely because of his principled and vocal opposition to certain military actions, notably the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq,

Studies 54, no. 4 (2006): 806-26.

²⁸ Ian Black, "UN Syria envoy Lakhdar Brahimi resigns after failure of Geneva talks," *The Guardian*, May 13, 2014, accessed May 23, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/13/un-syria-envoy-lakhdar-brahimi-resigns>.

²⁹ "Egypt says foreign mediation has failed to resolve crisis," *BBC*, August 7, 2013, accessed May 23, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23601349>.

³⁰ Ken Menkhaus, "Mediation Efforts Somalia," AFRICA Mediators' Retreat 2007 - The Oslo forum Network of Mediators, accessed May 23, 2015, <http://www.osloforum.org/sites/default/files/MediationEffortsSomaliaKenMenkhaus.pdf>.

³¹ J. Jeganaathan, "Norway in Sri Lanka: A Tale of the Failed Peace Process," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, November 30, 2011, accessed May 23, 2015, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism/norway-in-sri-lanka-a-tale-of-the-failed-peace-3502.html>.

³² Laurie Nathan, "The Challenges Facing Mediation in Africa," AFRICA Mediators' Retreat 2009 - The Oslo forum Network of Mediators, accessed May 23, 2015, <https://www.osloforum.org/sites/default/files/The%20challenges%20facing%20mediation%20in%20Africa.pdf>.

³³ Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, *In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation* (New York: Centre on International Cooperation, 2008).

³⁴ NORAD, *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka 1997-2009*. (Oslo: NORAD, 2011).

and his justification of others. His recognition of the changed nature of modern war, as being often between state and non-state actors and the application of the Just War tradition is especially important. Also of great importance has been Walzer's examination of who is now the "lawful authority" required under the Thomist definition of "just war." He has largely, but not uncontroversially, exempted US citizens from responsibility for the Iraq war on the grounds that they were excluded from the decision making process and deliberately isolated from its effects by the US administration. Thus, their proper role as the lawful authority was removed.³⁵ Walzer's greatest contribution, however, may be his reminder to the international community that, in certain circumstances, war, in some form, might be a moral imperative. This would clearly be the case in respect of gross violations of international humanitarian law of the type seen in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and in Rwanda during the genocide of 1994. However, it was often less clear in the Balkans in the 1990s.

It was largely in response to such events that the Government of Canada announced in September 2000 the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The Commission built on Francis Deng's seminal work *Sovereignty as Responsibility*³⁶ to produce a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*.³⁷ Deng had argued that sovereignty could not be regarded as a guarantee of non-interference but rather had to be thought of as a responsibility to citizens and the wider international community to ensure good governance, which in turn implied political stability, economic development and social justice. The ICISS set out a new framework for the concept of sovereignty and insisted that it was not declaring a right to intervene but rather a responsibility to protect. Within that framework it set out a need to redefine security to include the idea of human security, recognising that there was already in place an international legal framework (including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions and additional protocols, the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court) and an emerging practice at the UN Security Council and in regional organisations to recognise internal political instability and violence as a threat to international peace. In order to exercise the responsibility to protect, the ICISS suggested that there were additional responsibilities, namely to prevent (conflict), to react (when conflict breaks out) and to rebuild (when conflict ends). The timing of the publication of the report in December 2001, shortly after the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York was not auspicious. Nor was the cause of the Responsibility to Protect concept assisted by its conflation with humanitarian intervention, a narrower concept, and the assertion that the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was for humanitarian purposes. However, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan persisted and the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP), which he constituted, set out a new set of principles for the better application of existing international law.³⁸ The HLP asserted that

the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task [of maintaining peace and security]: Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-

³⁵ Garry Wills, "What is a Just War?" *New York Review of Books*, November 18, 2004.

³⁶ Francis Deng, *Sovereignty as Responsibility* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 1996).

³⁷ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

³⁸ High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (New York: United Nations, 2004).

understood scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the Security Council to deal with every kind of threat that States may confront. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better than it has.³⁹

The HLP embedded the international responsibility to protect in its report and offered five criteria that should be met to legitimate military intervention (which remarkably echo traditional just-war principles): seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences. The HLP report was part of a wider UN reform agenda, and while there was broad agreement about the principles set out in the report and Kofi Annan's own response⁴⁰ to it, reform has progressed at a glacial pace.

Scepticism about responsibility to protect, expressed as a belief that it is nothing more than a front for neo-colonialism, neo-imperialism and regime change, is widespread, as any Internet search will reveal. The continued instability in Libya and Tunisia and the ongoing conflict in Syria are also cited by those opposed to responsibility to protect. These criticisms generally fail to distinguish between military intervention cloaked in humanitarian justification and real responsibility to protect, which includes not only a military phase, but also prevention and rebuilding phases.

Despite these challenges, Responsibility to Protect is still strongly advocated by the NGO community and by many states and in the academic world. The current Secretary General of the UN has said that he will spare no effort to operationalise responsibility to protect⁴¹ and associated concepts like human security, peacebuilding and stabilisation have been mainstreamed. The US military doctrine has evolved to include humanitarian protection and the EU has developed an impressive array of civilian crisis management tools which depend on the Responsibility to Protect concept.

As Responsibility to Protect evolves, it separates itself further from the concept of humanitarian intervention, as envisaged in the ICISS report. It becomes less about the legal right to intervene and more about the moral obligation to do so. What still remains difficult is the definition of who exercises the responsibility to protect. Welsh said that if everyone is responsible nobody is responsible⁴² but acknowledges there is no clear answer. Several regional organisations and large states have taken the responsibility unto themselves but this has raised questions of legality and legitimacy and the UN itself continues to assert that sovereignty, in the Westphalian sense, cannot be breached.⁴³

6. Conclusions

The international community has for generations sought to achieve peace within and between states. It has moved from a treaty-based enforcement of rules of war to a broad consensus that peace is preferable. However, it has not determined a way to prevent all conflict and the attachment to peaceful resolution of disputes through negotiation and mediation has not been

³⁹ High-level Panel, *A More Secure World*, 143.

⁴⁰ Kofi Annan, *In Larger Freedom* (New York: United Nations, 2005).

⁴¹ Mary Kaldor, "A Decade of the 'War on Terror' and the 'Responsibility to Protect': the Global Debate about Military Intervention," 10 Years after September 11, accessed May 24, 2015, <http://essays.ssrc.org/10yearsafter911/a-decade-of-the-%E2%80%9Cwar-on-terror%E2%80%9D-and-the-%E2%80%9Cresponsibility-to-protect%E2%80%9D-the-global-debate-about-military-intervention-2/>.

⁴² Cited in Jennifer Welsh, interview by Alex Leveringhaus, "Interventionism, the 'Responsibility to Protect' and the Interaction between Academics and Policymakers," *University of Oxford*, 2014, accessed May 31, 2015, <http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/ke-feature/interventionism-the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-interaction-between-academics-and-policymakers.html>.

⁴³ Jayshree Bajoria and Robert McMahon, "The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed May 31, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/p16524>.

successful. Indeed, periods of negotiation and mediation have been used by parties to conflict to re-arm and re-establish in preparation for the resumption of hostilities. If the international community is truly interested in ensuring peace and stability, it has an obligation to mitigate the reasons for conflict, anticipate conflict and where possible prevent it. Where that fails it must also be prepared, having applied the criteria of seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences, to intervene with military force to stop conflict, including through the removal of the conflict instigators. In itself this is not sufficient, however, because the international community must not forget that it also has an obligation to rebuild a society in which peace has broken down, and this must include a full programme of societal transformation to address historical grievance, economic inequality and political disempowerment which are at the heart of almost all conflicts.

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Non-Western International Relations Theory and Ibn Khaldun

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Review article of two books:

1. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia* (NY: Routledge, 2010, 242 pp., USD 36.28, paper).
2. Seyfi Say, *İbn Haldun'un Düşünce Sistemi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı* (İstanbul: İlk Harf Yayınları, 2012, 808 pp., TRY 32.50, paper).

Discussion of the Western centrism of international relations theory is not a recent trend for IR scholars. Since the 1960s and the 1970s, especially with the decolonization period, Western-centric IR has been criticized by the Dependency School and World System theorists. However, efforts aiming to generate a non-Western IR Theory within peripheral states is a phenomenon of recent years. Even though the majority of such studies are located in Asian countries, the Turkish academy is not an exception, regarding the debate on the possibility of an Anatolian school of IR.¹ This review critically examines one of such efforts by another Turkish scholar, Seyfi Say, who in his book *İbn Haldun'un Düşünce Sistemi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı* (Ibn Khaldun's System of Thought and International Relations Theory)² aims to go beyond the Western centrism of IR by employing the ideas of Ibn Khaldun.

As Western-centric IR theories continue to dominate the field despite these persistent initiatives, this review first concentrates on the book entitled *Non-Western International Relations Theory*,³ edited by Acharya and Buzan, and their introductory question, namely "Why is there no non-Western International Relations theory?" The evaluation of the book ends with its concluding chapter, whereby Acharya and Buzan discuss the possibility of non-Western International Relations theory. Then, the paper moves on to the review of Seyfi Say's piece and analyzes whether his integration of Ibn Khaldun into International Relations creates a non-Western IR theory or whether it reproduces the premises of Western-centric theories that dominate the field.

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¹ See; Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews, "Periphery Theorising for a Truly Internationalised Discipline: Spinning IR theory out of Anatolia," *Review of International Studies* 34 (2008): 693-712.

² Seyfi Say, *İbn Haldun'un Düşünce Sistemi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı* [Ibn Khaldun's System of Thought and International Relations Theory] (İstanbul: İlk Harf Yayınları, 2012).

³ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan eds., *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia* (NY: Routledge, 2010).

1. Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?

Acharya and Buzan, in the introductory chapter, ask the question of why there is no non-Western IR theory and suggest possible explanations. Even though the book contains chapters covering both the theoretical experiences of individual countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, India and Indonesia, as well as regional study of Southeast Asia, this review will concentrate on this introductory question and the responses in the book's final chapter. It also reviews a chapter written by Barry Buzan and Richard Little, in which they suggest implementation of the world historical perspective in IR theory in order to go beyond Western centrism. As this review is mainly concerned with analyzing whether or not Seyfi Say successfully integrated Ibn Khaldun's thoughts into IR theory with the aim of saving it from the trap of Western centrism, it also gives special attention to the discussion of the Islamic worldview and IR theory in the chapter authored by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh.

In their introductory chapter, regarding the absence of a non-Western international theory, Acharya and Buzan suggest five possible explanations that concentrate on ideational and perceptual forces influenced by Gramscian hegemonies, ethnocentrism and the politics of exclusion.⁴ The first explanation for the Western dominance of IR is the universality of Western IR theory, which implies that Western IR has discovered the right path in understanding international relations. The second one is that Western IR theory has gained a hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense, which in turn leads to an unconscious reproduction of Western centrism by others. The third explanation suggested by Acharya and Buzan for the nonexistence of non-Western IR theory claims that in reality, non-Western theories exist but are hidden due to difficulties such as language. The fourth is that local historical, cultural and political conditions discriminate against the production of IR theory. The last explanation suggests that the West has a big head start and the rest of the world is in a period of catching up.

Acharya and Buzan leave the evaluation of these possible explanations to the final chapter, as how IR theory in different countries and cultures has emerged and developed is analyzed in a detailed way in the following chapters. For the first explanation, which attributes the nonexistence of non-Western IR theory to the success of Western IR theory, Acharya and Buzan claim that the cases in their collection proves that there is no evidence supporting this explanation.⁵ In fact, in Chapter 9, Buzan and Little identify five shortcomings of Western IR theories that prevent them from capturing the nature of international relations: *presentism*, or a tendency to see the past in terms of the present; *ahistoricism*, or the belief in the existence of universal regularities that are not bound by time and space; *Eurocentrism*; *anarchophilia*, or the equation of international relations with the existence of anarchic system and *state-centrism*.⁶ As to the second line of argument, Acharya and Buzan claim that in the absence of non-Western IR theory, the hegemony of Western IR is regenerated and reinforced by "essentialized Eurocentrism" in the works of non-Western IR scholars as well.⁷ The third explanation, which asserts the existence of non-Western IR theories but underscores their absence in the public eye, seems to be irrelevant for Acharya and Buzan. The fourth account,

⁴ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 16-22.

⁵ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 222.

⁶ Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "World History and the development of non-Western International Relations Theory," in *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Acharya and Buzan (NY: Routledge, 2010), 197.

⁷ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 223.

on the other hand, stands very powerfully for them in explaining the absence of non-Western IR theory. In this respect, local conditions, even though they vary in form from place to place, may create material barriers that may prevent the emergence of a non-Western IR. Another strong explanation, according to the authors, is the fifth hypothesis, which suggests that the rest is trying to catch up the West. In this connection, the authors acknowledge that this is an important reason for the underdevelopment of the non-Western IR theory.

As Acharya and Buzan indicate, the goal of the book is “to introduce non-Western IR traditions to a Western audience and to challenge non-Western IR thinkers to challenge the dominance of Western theory.”⁸ However, they have not given special attention to developing an overall non-Western IR theory. Instead, they criticize how Eurocentric the dominant IR theories are and assess the possible contributions of the non-Western world to IR theory. Nevertheless, it is possible to extract some premises from their writings suggesting how to go beyond Western-centric IR.

For example, in their chapter, Buzan and Little try to show how an historical perspective may be employed by non-Western IR theories to move away from European history and Western IR theory. They suggest that non-Western IR theorists follow the route charted by non-Western world history theorists, since going beyond Western dominance requires knowledge about the development of international relations in different regions.⁹ A global historical perspective may prevent the oblivious entrapment of non-Western scholars in a Eurocentric historical framework. In this sense, Seyfi Say’s analysis of Ibn Khaldun’s ideas as a source of a non-Western IR theory seems a meaningful initiative, even though his success in doing so is questioned in the following evaluation.

Another proposition to develop a non-Western IR theory is to apply classical traditions and the thinking of non-Western religious, military and political figures to IR theory. From this perspective as well, Say’s initiative to develop a non-Western IR theory through applying Ibn Khaldun’s ideas seems an important step. Furthermore, Acharya and Buzan suggest recovering civilizational histories previous to encounters with the West and scrutinizing them with the aim of finding alternatives to the Eurocentric Westphalian model. In this respect, for example, Say emphasizes Ibn Khaldun’s notion of “*asabbiyah*” (a constitutive principle)¹⁰ for prioritizing a civilizational model to bypass the Westphalian one.

Apart from these ideas that may be discerned from the text, Acharya and Buzan directly suggest a method called “constitutive localization,”¹¹ which is argued to be more effective in explaining the universality of human experience and go beyond Western centrism. The method is defined as the active construction of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the latter developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices. In other words, it asserts a mutual adaptation of local and foreign ideas, giving dominant status to the former instead of projecting purely indigenous ideas or completely borrowing foreign ones.

In a similar vein, in her chapter, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh talks about hybridity as a remedy for going beyond Western centrism. As the main concern of the book is to explore whether Asia or Islam can be taken as the basis for International Relations Theory, one chapter is

⁸ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 2.

⁹ Buzan and Little, *World History*, 214.

¹⁰ There are various terms used for the English translation of “*asabbiyah*,” such as group solidarity, natural solidarity, social solidarity, group feeling, etc. I, however, prefer to translate it as “a constitutive principle,” since it seems more appropriate in capturing the content of the term.

¹¹ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 229.

devoted to an analysis of the Islamic world. This chapter as a potential source of non-Western IR deserves special attention within this review, as the upcoming pages concentrate on the integration of an Islamic scholar into IR theory.

Tadjbakhsh claims that Islam as a worldview has sought a different foundation of truth and the good life; therefore it has the potential of presenting alternatives to Western IR theory.¹² She indicates that a potential non-Western IR theory differs in essence from Westphalian approaches. Within this context, she questions materialism and empiricism as the only acceptable methodology for organizing and processing data. As mentioned by Seyfi Say, Ibn Khaldun's methodology is a combination of materialism and idealism. However, Tadjbakhsh states that although an Islamic IR theory is possible and in fact exists, the challenge is to put it into practice. In this connection, I will turn to Say's work and critically review his attempt to operationalize Ibn Khaldun's ideas through creating a non-Western IR theory.

2. Ibn Khaldun's System of Thought and International Relations Theory

There are many studies on the relevance and importance of Ibn Khaldun's ideas for IR.¹³ However, Seyfi Say's book comes into prominence within these studies since it is one of the most detailed works on Ibn Khaldun and IR. The author states that the goal of his study is to analyze Ibn Khaldun's ideas on issues related to the IR discipline and to evaluate the thinker's theoretical contributions to the field.¹⁴ He also indicates that since IR as a scientific discipline came into being in the West and developed with a Western-centric perspective, it has ignored non-Western scholars such as Ibn Khaldun.¹⁵ Say underlines that because IR scholars only concentrate on Western philosophers such as Machiavelli, Grotius or Kant, and ignore non-Western ones, they reproduce the Western centrism of the field.¹⁶ Thus, Say also questions universalism and Western centrism by integrating Ibn Khaldun's ideas.

Say's book is composed of three chapters. While the first chapter is an introduction to Ibn Khaldun's life and his understanding of science, the second one is concerned with the concepts used by Ibn Khaldun. This review briefly discusses these first two descriptive chapters and mainly concentrates on the third part, where Say discusses Ibn Khaldun's ideas on the issues influencing IR, with a special focus on the last part. Say assesses that Ibn Khaldun's theoretical understanding relates to issues of IR but do not compose an IR theory by themselves.¹⁷ Therefore, in this section he tries to integrate Ibn Khaldun's concepts into the IR discipline in order to surpass Western centrism of the field. Thus, as being the only original part of the book, this subchapter deserves further attention.

Before analyzing and accounting for the relation of Ibn Khaldun's ideas with IR, Say explains the main concepts that Khaldun uses, such as *umran* (civilization), *asabbiyah* (constitutive principle), state and state authority and *bedavet and hadaret* (urban and rural life). The concept of *umran* resembles the term *civilization* but it defines social life with all

¹² Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "International Relations Theory and the Islamic Worldview," in *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Acharya and Buzan (NY: Routledge, 2010), 174.

¹³ See. Robert Cox, "Towards a post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun," in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. J. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992); see also, Jack Kalpakian, "Ibn Khaldun's Influence On Current International Relations Theory," *The Journal of North African Studies* 13, no. 3 (2008), 363-76.

¹⁴ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 6.

¹⁵ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 71.

¹⁶ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 346.

¹⁷ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 674.

of its aspects. In this sense, *umran* is viewed as an entire product of human beings; therefore, it is not possible to talk about Christian or Muslim *umrans*, just as we cannot talk about Christian or Islamic mathematics.¹⁸ Another concept, as indicated above, is *asabbiyah*, which defines the main elements that induce human beings to form a society. *Mulk*, on the other hand, describes an organization equipped with sovereignty. In this sense, the ultimate target of an *asabbiyah* is said to be the *mulk* or, a takeover of state authority. Within this context, Ibn Khaldun perceives the state as an avatar of *umran*, which, on the other hand, is composed of *bedevi* life (rural life) and *hadari* life (civilized life).

The introduction of these concepts is important within Say's study, since in the following parts of the book they are used as the sources of surpassing Western centrism in IR. However, before doing that, Say explores Ibn Khaldun's ideas on issues that may be categorized as the subject matters of IR. These ideas may show the originality of Ibn Khaldun's thinking. However, whether this originality has been transformed into an original study by Seyfi Say is a question to be answered in the last part of this review article.

One example of these ideas in IR is the causal relation that Ibn Khaldun builds between geographical conditions and political events. In a similar vein, Say underlines that Ibn Khaldun analyzes how climate affects the behaviour of societies. Furthermore, the thinker perceives population as an important source of state power. Since he correlates population with production, he views an increase in population as the foundation of an increase in material capability. Natural resources are another source of state power, and Ibn Khaldun sees the existence of these in a state as a source of peaceful foreign policy.

In short, by assessing the relation that Ibn Khaldun establishes between the social form of life, economic structure, geography and physical environment, Say tries to demonstrate how Ibn Khaldun's ideas embrace issues related to IR and how original those ideas are. He underlines that according to Ibn Khaldun, societies do not have stable characters but they have environmental conditions. Say suggests that Ibn Khaldun's conceptualization of *asabbiyah* appears as an original term in understanding this changing character, since as environmental conditions change, the conditions providing a social group the potential to establish their power within a given territory change. In other words, the *asabiyyah* changes. Therefore, understanding the nature of *asabiyyah* and physical conditions such as population, climate, availability of natural resources, production, etc. may provide us a true understanding of IR, according to Say. Apart from that, Say thinks that through the ideas of Ibn Khaldun, IR may go beyond the international-domestic divide since his notion of "Mulk-u Hakiki" (*the real sovereignty*) deals with both the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty as it defines the situation of the effectiveness of a state in internal affairs and its ability to protect itself against outside powers.¹⁹

As indicated above, the last part of the last chapter evaluates the importance of Ibn Khaldun's ideas for the IR discipline. Two main propositions come to fore in this part. First, similar to Buzan and Little's proposition, Say underlines the importance of the historical perspective. He suggests that a process has already started in IR in which positivism is being replaced by historicism, enabling IR scholars to go beyond state-centric analyses.²⁰

¹⁸ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 310.

¹⁹ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 569.

²⁰ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 665.

He echoes Wallerstein's argument²¹ and claims that positivism enables Western-centric IR theories to assert objectivism and universalism by neglecting the fact that they are a product of their own historical conditions.²² He maintains that civilization as a level of analysis may be useful to get beyond Western centrism. In this sense, he points to Ibn Khaldun for the historicism and civilizational approach. He states that Ibn Khaldun does not accept dominant theories' unitary understandings of state and views them as functionally different. Say notes that Ibn Khaldun underlines not only the difference between states but also points out the structural transformation of such differences triggered by time and space. In this sense, Say claims that Ibn Khaldun has a historical perspective that reflects on changes in the context of time and space. In this way, according to Say, Ibn Khaldun appears as an important reference to capture the change, dynamism and renewal of IR. Furthermore, his *umran* science claims to enable us to go beyond the state-centric approach and think about civilizations as the unit of analysis in international relations.²³

Say also contends that Ibn Khaldun's ideas may be seen as a source of synthesis of Realism and Idealism.²⁴ He asserts that, contrary to Machiavelli, who refuses idealism and buckles down to realism, Ibn Khaldun one can find elements of both Idealism and Realism. For example, while he accepts the importance of power, similar to realists, he makes a distinction between fair/unfair and faithful/unfaithful powers. Say maintains that this understanding gives Ibn Khaldun a normative dimension that may be seen as a bridge between Idealism and Realism.²⁵

3. Ibn Khaldun and Non-Western IR Theory

This part of the article is devoted to a critical evaluation of Say's book, particularly with regards to its main goal of integrating Ibn Khaldun into the IR discipline and creating a non-Western theory. In other words, my aim here is to assess whether Say's work goes beyond Western-centric IR theories. From the outset, it should be noted that Ibn Khaldun's ideas possess the potential to provide a ground for a non-Western IR. As Acharya and Buzan suggest, one way to go beyond the Eurocentric Westphalian model is to recover civilizational histories.²⁶ Moreover, Acharya and Buzan also underline that one of the themes in Eurocentric narration is Realism's role in defining the mainstream subject matter of IR in state-centric terms.²⁷ Within this perspective, Ibn Khaldun's conceptualization of *umran* provides a basis for a non-Western IR theory, as it suggests a civilizational approach instead of a state-centric one. However, Say fails to transform Ibn Khaldun's original ideas into an original study that challenges the Western centrism of mainstream IR.

One of the reasons for this failure is mainly related with the book's organization. It is almost 800 pages but only 40 pages are reserved for the original part, where Say tries to integrate Ibn Khaldun into IR theory. The rest of the book is descriptive, in that it summarizes the life, ideas, concepts, understanding of science, and methodology of Ibn Khaldun in detail. In other words, the book concentrates more on Ibn Khaldun's ideas and their importance

²¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, "Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science," *Sociological Bulletin* 46, no.1 (1997): 21-39.

²² Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 669.

²³ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 667.

²⁴ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 684.

²⁵ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 697.

²⁶ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 228.

²⁷ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 6-7.

instead of trying to integrate his ideas into IR in a sophisticated manner to create a non-Western IR theory. Even though this descriptive part is quite comprehensive for readers wishing to learn about Ibn Khaldun and his ideas on issues related to IR, it does not create an original study on a non-Western IR theory. For example, in the last part of the last chapter, Say claims that Ibn Khaldun combines Idealism and Realism with his normative dimension. However, he does not explain how through this combination it is possible to produce a theory that surpasses Western centrism.

He also does not define IR. And as he does not identify what he means by the subject he studies, the book stands out as a collection of Ibn Khaldun's ideas on any subject that may be incorporated into the subject matter of IR. Therefore, rather than employing the thinker's ideas to create a non-Western IR theory, Say uses them to expose the Eastern origins of Western theories, or Western centrism. In other words, his initiative seems to aim to demonstrate how the ideas that are associated with the West have actually been discovered/discussed before by Ibn Khaldun. In this sense, he legitimizes Western-centric theories by showing that Eastern thinkers reached same conclusions long before they did. For example, Say argues that it is possible to find the distinction that Ibn Khaldun makes between *bedavet* (rural) and *hadaret* (civilized) in Durkheim's works.²⁸ In a similar vein, he also contends that Ibn Khaldun was well aware of the impossibility of explaining the social reality with one variable even before Darwin and Marx.²⁹ Say also notes that Ibn Khaldun had studied climate before Bodin and Montesquieu and rural life before Weber.³⁰ Further, he deems Ibn Khaldun as the real pioneer of Keynesianism and the real father of Economic Liberalism.³¹ Perhaps the most extreme example where he complains about the attribution of parallel ideas to Western thinkers instead of Eastern ones is the part where he finds the roots of the concept of "balance of power" in Ibn Khaldun. Despite the fact that he himself is very critical of the concept of balance of power as a product of Western centrism, which forces IR scholars to pay attention to great power politics only and ignore the rest,³² in the following parts he claims that even though Ibn Khaldun did not use the term "balance of power," he in fact defined the same situation.³³ Moreover, Say views Ibn Khaldun as the founder and pioneer of Realism and Social Constructivism, and claims that it is possible to find elements of Liberalism, Marxism and Postmodernism.³⁴ In this sense, Say ironically justifies Western-centric concepts and theories by Ibn Khaldun's ideas, and thus fails to go beyond Western centrism. Against the emphasis of Say on the Eastern origins of Western texts, one can point to Acharya and Buzan's critique in their concluding chapter, where they claim that the existence of non-Western sources of IR does not mean that there would be a non-Western IR theory.³⁵

Say also fails to go beyond Western-centric IR theories in another way, for instead of transforming Ibn Khaldun's ideas into a non-Western IR theory, he rather integrates the thinker's ideas into the concepts of IR that have developed by Western-centric theories. This dislocation in turn results in an anachronism that is dominant in the book. For example, he associates Nationalism, a term that emerged after the French Revolution, with Ibn Khaldun's

²⁸ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 333.

²⁹ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 396.

³⁰ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 407-28.

³¹ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 465-71.

³² Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 345-51.

³³ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 429.

³⁴ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 72 and 682.

³⁵ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 234.

conceptualization of *asabbiyah*. By claiming that Ibn Khaldun's *asabbiyah* is not much different than the nationalism of today,³⁶ he ignores that these institutions are products of historical processes. Another example of a similar fallacy is that Say explains Imperialism – a nineteenth-century phenomenon – by employing Ibn Khaldun's idea that a state would be a warrior and expansionist at the time of its creation. This weakness of the text is further reiterated by the fallacy of tempo-centrism. Say claims that in order to go beyond Western centrism, IR should be rescued from chronofetishism, a term used by John Hobson to define the theoretical mistake of explaining the present only by examining the present.³⁷ However, Say falls into tempo-centrism, which Hobson in the very same article labels as the second mistake that mainstream IR theories have made. Tempo-centrism is defined as a way of thinking that assumes there is a regular tempo in history that beats to the same rhythm of the present.³⁸ Say openly claims that Ibn Khaldun's ideas are crucial for the contemporary world since the period in which Ibn Khaldun was alive is not really different than today's world.³⁹ In other words, his reason for proposing Ibn Khaldun's ideas as an important source for understanding IR today is that in his time there was a similar historical structure to the contemporary epoch. Furthermore, through this tempo-centrism, Say establishes links between Ibn Khaldun's concepts and the current structure of IR, and thus constitutes a narration not much different than realists do. For example, he argues that an analysis of international relations through the concept of *asabbiyah* leads to the conclusion that realists are right in their claim that cooperation between states under anarchy is not possible without the existence of a hegemonic power.⁴⁰ In this respect, Say appears to employ Ibn Khaldun's ideas to reproduce a realist discourse of anarchy that accommodates and reinforces Western centrism.

Lastly, it would not be wrong to argue that Say's work suffers from what Buzan and Little call "essentialized Eurocentrism."⁴¹ This may be related to what Acharya and Buzan state as the second possible source of the nonexistence of a non-Western IR theory, i.e. that Western IR theory has gained a hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense, which results in the unconscious reproduction of Western centrism by others.⁴² For example, Say makes an analogy between mainstream IR theories' premises that economically underdeveloped states follow aggressive foreign policies, and Ibn Khaldun's proposition associating the simple lives of *bedevis* with their inclination for waging war. However, the author ignores the fact that the association of peace with development is a phenomenon that entered IR in the post-Cold War period, and that this association lies at the heart of Western centrism as it legitimizes certain policies towards the developing world. As Rajagopal points out, "The articulation of an intricate nexus between peace, democracy and development has become a central feature of international interventions in the Third World."⁴³

³⁶ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 529.

³⁷ John M. Hobson, "What is at Stake in Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International Relations? Transcending Chronofetishism and Tempocentrism in International Relations," in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. S. Hobden and J. M. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 6.

³⁸ Hobson, "What is at Stake," 9.

³⁹ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 441.

⁴⁰ Say, *Ibn Haldun*, 537.

⁴¹ Buzan and Little, *World History*, 201.

⁴² Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 17.

⁴³ Balakrishnan Rajagopal, *International Law from Below: Development, social movements, and Third World resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 138.

In light of the above points, it should be concluded that Say's study not only fails to go beyond Western centrism but also serves to reproduce or legitimize Western-centric ideas. In this sense, the book appears to be an avatar of Eurocentrism, as coined by Wallerstein.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the author fails to develop a theory out of Ibn Khaldun's original ideas. Therefore, one can regard the theoretical contributions in this book as a *pre-theory*, which is defined by Acharya and Buzan as elements of thinking that do not necessarily add up to a theory in their own right.⁴⁵ Acharya and Buzan also maintain that parallel with Western IR theory's focus on key figures such as Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli or Kant, there are theories concentrating on non-Western philosophic, religious, political or military figures, and it is more suitable to call these initiatives *soft theories*.⁴⁶ In this sense, it is possible to label Say's initiative as a soft theory.

4. Conclusion: What is to be done?

The majority of studies aiming to go beyond Western centrism unfortunately ends up with an unintentional reproduction of it, mainly because these initiatives adapt IR concepts and issues without subjecting them to epistemological and ontological questions. As the epistemological and ontological choices of Western-centric theories impose certain patterns of thinking, adaptation of them by non-Western intellectuals results in the reproduction of the same understanding. Therefore, we should first study the roots that make social science Western centric and attempt to avoid or replace them. In this respect, Wallerstein defines five different ways in which social science is said to be Eurocentric. The first way is *historiography*, which is the explanation of European dominance of the modern world by virtue of specific European achievements. The second way is the claim of being *universal*, which is the view that there exist scientific truths that are valid across time and space. The positivist epistemology enables these theories to claim to be universal. The third one is *civilization*, which refers to associating certain civilized characteristics with the West and contrasting them with primitiveness and barbarism. The fourth is *orientalism*, which refers to a stylized and abstracted statement of the characteristics of non-Western civilizations. The last is the *belief in progress*, which may be associated with Enlightenment thinking.⁴⁷

Theoretical efforts in creating a non-Western IR theory should question these epistemological and ontological fallacies in order to shake the basis of Western centrism. As Seyfi Say's study shows, efforts to surpass Western centrism without examining its roots are unable to escape from the trap of Western centrism.

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⁴⁴ Wallerstein, "Eurocentrism," 21-39.

⁴⁵ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 6.

⁴⁶ Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western IR Theory*, 10.

⁴⁷ Wallerstein, "Eurocentrism," 94-101.

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Abstracts in Turkish

Barış Eğitimi: Evrimleşmiş bir Şiddetsizlik Bilinci için Eğitim

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Özet

Bu makale beyin temelli ön bir barış eğitimi modeli sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Günümüzdeki barış eğitimi modellerinin vurguladığı insan hakları eğitimi, çevre eğitimi ve çatışma çözümü eğitimi konularının yanısıra, bu model şiddetin nörobiyolojik nedenleri ve erken önlenmesi meselelerinin ele alınabileceği yeni bir seviye -hücresele seviye- öne sürmektedir. Özellikle, bu model, şiddetin nörobiyolojik sebepleri ve önlenmesi ile erken travmanın doğum öncesi, doğum sırasında ve sonrasında gelişmekte olan beyin üzerindeki etkisi hakkındaki bilgileri yayılmasını savunmaktadır. Sevgi ve şiddete ilişkin kimyasallara dair temel ve beynin esas yapısı bu erken dönemlerde oluşmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle bu model, çocuklar, ergenler ve yetişkinlerin eğitimi yoluyla şiddetin önlenilebileceği hücresele bir boyut olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış eğitimi, doğum tramvası, şiddetsizlik, beyin zenginleştirme, güçlendirme

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Hacettepe Üniversitesi

Özet

Bu makale, şiddetli çatışma ortamlarından çıkmış ülkelerdeki barış eğitimleri üzerine hazırlanan literatür ve raporlar hakkında eleştirel bir analiz sunmaktadır. Makale, ilk olarak barış eğitiminin tarihinin gözden geçirilmesi ile başlamaktadır. Sonrasında, barış eğitiminin nasıl kavramsallaştığını ele almakta ve neden zayıf bir şekilde tanımlanmış olarak kaldığını incelemektedir. Daha sonraki bölümde çalışma, uluslararası toplumun bir araç olarak barış eğitimini uzun çatışma dönemlerinden geçmiş ülkelerdeki kendi barış inşası faaliyetlerine katkı sağlamak amacıyla kullanmaya başlamasının ortaya çıkışını ele almaktadır. Makale, barış eğitimi programları üzerine yapılmış araştırma ve değerlendirme çalışmalarını gözden geçirdikten sonra, etnik ve dini bağlantılı çatışma sonrası çevrelerde gerçekleşen barış eğitimi programlarının genel bir değerlendirmesi ile sona ermekte ve daha detaylı araştırmaların yapılması gereken alanları belirlemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış, barış eğitimi, barış-inşası, çatışma sonrası yeniden yapılandırma, uzun süren çatışmalar

Fas Monarşisi ve İslam Odaklı PJD: Pragmatik Birliktelik ve İslami Siyasal Sekülerizme İhtiyaç

Abdellatif Hissouf
Walden Üniversitesi

Özet

Bu yazı, Fas monarşisi ve 2011'den beri iktidarda olan ılımlı İslam odaklı Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (PJD) arasındaki siyasal ilişkiyi analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Araştırma metodolojisi, derinlemesine bir vaka analizi ile resmî konuşmalar, resmi siyasi açıklamalar, makale ve gazeteler gibi önemli birincil ve ikincil kaynaklara dayanmaktadır. Bu çalışma, PJD'nin diğer siyasi partilerle ilişkisinde olduğu gibi monarşi ile arasındaki ilişkiyi de tutarsız bulmaktadır. Makalede, PJD'nin Fas'ın belirli siyasi gerçeklerini de dikkate alarak İslami siyasal sekülerizme dayalı bir yaklaşımı benimsemesinin, hem monarşi ve hem de diğer partiler ile arasındaki gerginliği azaltabileceği savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslami sekülerizm, siyasal İslam, Fas siyaseti, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Fas), Kral VI. Muhammed, Abdelilah Benkirane, *Makhzen*

Avrupa Birliği'nde İstihbarat İşbirliği: İmkansız Bir Hayal mi?

Şeniz Bilgi
Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi

Özet

9/11 saldırılarından sonra devletlerin istihbarat ve güvenlik stratejilerinde bir değişiklik gözlenmektedir. Bu saldırılar, istihbaratın giderek daha önemli hale geldiği yeni bir güvenlik ortamı yaratmıştır. İstihbarat teşkilatlarının sadece sorumluluk ve görevleri önem kazanmamış, aynı zamanda milletler arasında istihbarat ve güvenlik hizmeti işbirliğinin de gerekliliği artmıştır. Buna bağlı olarak, istihbarat ajansları da stratejilerini, işbirliğine daha fazla önem verecek şekilde güncellemek zorunda kalmışlardır. Bu makale, mevcut AB istihbarat ağını analiz ederek 2004 Madrid, 2005 Londra ve 7 Ocak 2015 Charlie Hebdo saldırıları ertesinde AB içerisindeki azami istihbarat işbirliğinin ayrı bir örgüte evrilmesi mümkün müdür yoksa devletlerin ortaklaşa bağlantılarını, çıkarlarını ve stratejilerini kabul edip elbirliğiyle hareket etmeleri imkânsız bir hayal midir sorusuna yanıt aramaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İstihbarat, Avrupa Birliği, istihbarat örgütleri, istihbarat işbirliği, terörizm

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