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In This Issue

In this issue of *All Azimuth*, we present three articles exploring the topic of international educational exchange and its relationship with the development of international peace and intercultural understanding. Educational exchange is understood here to be focusing on bilateral government-sponsored study programs such as Fulbright or Erasmus, not to individually initiated and sponsored study abroad experiences.

The issue begins with an article by Iain Wilson, investigating the fundamental assumption that international educational exchange programs contribute to peace and mutual understanding in international relations. He evaluates the evidence supporting this idea, first classifying it into four categories – signaling, attitude change, network formation, and institutional transfer. Wilson introduces the last of these categories and develops it by drawing on his own recent work applying Darwinian cultural selection theories to international politics. Based on both existing literature as well as his own empirical research, Wilson’s analysis reveals that while the connection is intuitively believable, and while there are indeed some findings to support it, there nevertheless remain gaps in actual concrete data explaining how exchanges may lead to more peaceful international relations. In particular it remains unclear how this potential impact evolves over time. He concludes his article with implications for how educational exchanges should therefore be organized and for what kinds of mobility should be supported.

Carol Atkinson’s article looks in detail at one particular type of educational exchange, US military educational and training programs, and provides a comparison between them and traditional civilian exchange programs. Her article begins with an overview of the different types of U.S. military education and training programs that are open to foreign participation and then places the educational exchange programs at the U.S. military’s war and staff colleges within this overall context. She provides a discussion of the nature of the military exchange experience for the participants, both U.S. and foreign, including the overall program structure, the curriculum taught, and extracurricular activities. Unique characteristics in the military programs such as the organization of the classrooms and the extensive amount of social interaction and experiential learning that is planned outside of the classroom are highlighted. Finally, she examines several important impacts of the military exchanges on their international participants and includes lessons that can be applied to the design and administration of international educational exchange programs.

In the final article, Hamilton Bean explores the fine line that government-sponsored educational exchange programs walk between practices and policies that actually serve to mutual benefit of the participating countries and those that seek more unilateral gains in the realm of public diplomacy. He describes a ‘marketization’ discourse in which the language and attitudes traditionally associated with business and marketing become insinuated into the rhetoric of other fields, in this case, educational exchange. After showing how 9/11 sparked a transformation in US governmental thinking about educational exchanges, Bean describes how the marketization discourse that then began typifying U.S. strategic communication has come to influence the meanings and practices of educational exchange. Through an analysis of five presentations and 34 program evaluations provided by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, his article explores the risks associated with marketization discourse for the development of mutual understanding and peace.
The commentary piece for this issue is written by Darla Deardorff, Executive Director of the Association of International Education Administrators and research scholar at Duke University. In her piece, Dr. Deardorff begins by debunking various myths that are often attributed to educational exchange, such as the idea that bringing diverse people together will miraculously result in better relations or that by participating in an exchange, participants will naturally develop greater intercultural understanding and competence. With the implication being that success in educational exchange can be linked to careful and purposeful planning, administering, and debriefing, she then outlines three value propositions recommended to inform future educational exchange efforts. She concludes with reflections on rethinking the broader role of international educational exchange in promoting peace and understanding.

The final work in this issue of All Azimuth is a review essay by Hatice Altun of R.S. Zaharna’s book, Battles to Bridges (2014). Altun provides a detailed account of this second edition exploring the subject of US public diplomacy towards the Middle East. In her review she carefully outlines Zaharna’s main critiques of US public diplomacy policies in both the immediate post-9/11 years and in the early days of the Obama administration, and highlights the author’s call for a paradigm shift in both public diplomacy conceptualization and practice as well as US strategic communication. Altun goes on to reflect on the book’s messages in light of more recent events, concluding with a still cautiously hopeful call for moving US policy in the Middle East towards one that can promote long-lasting peace and understanding.

We hope you enjoy all of these pieces, which together aim to provide an in-depth look at how educational exchange, as a form of public diplomacy, may—or may not—contribute to the expected outcome of more peaceful relations between nations and greater levels of intercultural understanding between those nations’ peoples.
Exchanges and Peacemaking: Counterfactuals and Unexplored Possibilities

Iain Wilson
University of Edinburgh

Abstract

We may expect international exchange programmes to contribute to peaceful international relations, but how strong is the evidence that they actually do? In addition to the intercultural education discussed elsewhere in this issue, I classify mechanisms by which exchanges might contribute to peace into four categories – signaling, attitude change, network formation and institutional transfer – and assess the evidence that exchanges affect international relations through each of these mechanisms. Despite considerable research there are still important gaps in the evidence, and these gaps may have significant consequences for how we organize exchanges and what kinds of mobility we support.

Keywords: International exchange programmes, peace, research evidence, institutions, learning

1. Introduction

International exchange programmes have been treated as means to political ends for hundreds of years.¹ Nonetheless, there are many gaps in our understanding of how exchanges influence international relations and how they might contribute to that most elusive of political goals: peace. In this article I sketch some of the most popular mechanisms by which exchanges are expected to influence international politics, and suggest that we need more evidence on whether they allow exchange programmes to fulfill the – often quite dramatic – expectations policymakers often have for exchanges.² Many of the authors in this issue are private advocates for greater international mobility, and making a case for public support of such mobility requires us to identify public benefits. Linking exchanges with peace establishes a clear public benefit, but advocacy is necessarily stronger when it is backed by stronger evidence. Tying cause to effect when it comes to exchanges and international relations is surprisingly challenging.

2. Benefits to Individuals versus Public Goods

Probably the most important qualification to make here is that this paper deals only with the link between exchanges and peace. This should not be taken to imply that the impact of mobility

¹ Richard Arndt. The First Resort of Kings (Dulles: Potomac, 2005).
on international relations is more important than the other consequences. The evidence that mobility brings other benefits is much more clear-cut. There can be enormous educational, social, cultural and career benefits from studying abroad to individual exchangees, which are well-documented. Spending time abroad at critical points of personal and intellectual development clearly has a huge impact on many individual students’ lives, with effects which go beyond just the impact of studying (which would also have occurred had they stayed in their home countries).

We might, of course, choose to believe that these kinds of benefits to individuals will almost by definition filter through to positive outcomes for society as a whole, and that this is sufficient reason to devote resources to exchange programmes. This is, after all, a popular rationale for public support of higher education generally, and might well be sufficient to endorse the relatively modest costs of promoting student mobility. Nonetheless, the question of how we can show a link between exchanges and peace – or if one even exists – is a distinct and much more intellectually challenging one. This challenge has the added bonus of being extremely interesting – and how analysts have attempted to answer it reveals a great deal about the technologies of governance.

3. Five Potential Links to Peace

The existing literature suggests four major effects of student mobility which might contribute to peace: signaling, attitude change, intercultural competence, and network formation. These mechanisms are implicit in a lot of the rhetoric surrounding exchange programmes, and also feed into the criteria by which governments which allocate funding to exchanges evaluate their impact. However, the popularity of a claim does not make it true. The existing empirical evidence that exchange programmes signal goodwill, change attitudes, train informal mediators, and produce long-term networks, and that these then contribute to peace, is far from watertight. We have a great opportunity to strengthen it.

I also want to propose a fifth and distinct mechanism by which exchanges might affect the prospects for peace, the transfer of governmental institutions between countries. This has been foreshadowed by administrators of several exchange programmes, especially the injection of significant funds into Eastern Europe to promote exchanges following the collapse of the Iron Curtain. However, that section of the paper offers a development of the theory behind those policy intuitions.

3.1. Signaling

Perhaps the most obvious political impact of exchange programmes is not directly related to exchangees at all. Inviting foreign nationals into a country under benign circumstances can have a healthy symbolism. By committing to host foreign visitors for years to come, and by sending impressionable young elites to live in a foreign country, government officials are signaling to their counterparts in a foreign country that they expect their two countries to enjoy peaceful, benevolent relations in the future. Creating exchange programmes can

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3 See e.g. Elizabeth Murphy-Lejeune, Student Mobility and Narrative in Europe (London: Routledge, 2002); Iain Wilson, International Exchange Programs, 139-93.
4 Iain Wilson, “Can We Infer That Mobility Has Political Impact? Some Historical Case Studies,” in International Exchange Programs, 19-47.
also communicate this expectation to wider civil society in both countries, as launches of exchange programs are typically well-publicized. Senior decision-makers are often pictured smiling for the cameras with foreign visitors, sign press releases, and so on. This signaling function falls within the familiar paradigm of “high diplomacy” in which the interaction between states’ elite decision-makers is all-important. From this perspective, exchanges matter because they help those elites to guess what their opposite numbers are thinking and help to smooth their social interactions. The people who actually travel abroad, and the more humble administrators who really facilitate their travel and make smaller policy decisions, seem almost incidental.

I have no reason to doubt that exchanges can have a symbolic impact, and that creating them may help politicians and diplomats communicate pacific intentions in ways that mere rhetoric cannot. But it is important to realize that this kind of impact is quite seriously self-limiting. Because this image of diplomacy is dominated by current elites (ambassadors, government ministers and so on) the students themselves are simply objects of exchange who do not play much of an active role in the relationship between the two countries. The main link to peace is that creating exchange programmes is part of a ritual through which elite policymakers in one country convince others that they really want to improve a relationship. From this perspective, those officials’ very visible public associations with the launch are vital to an exchange programme’s diplomatic function. Unfortunately, top decision-makers are busy people with only finite amounts of time to devote to any given relationship. They may be nominally responsible for many different exchanges, in addition to all of their other duties. And, of course, turnover among elites means that the minister who launches any programme will probably be gone within a few years, while an exchange may persist for much longer. Consequently, it is not realistic to expect top decision-makers to be personally involved in overseeing exchange programmes. They soon become routinized, administered by relatively junior functionaries who have little influence on high-level foreign policy, and decoupled from the very top decision-makers. Hence the signaling effect will be important at the creation of an exchange programme but much less potent when it has been running for a long time – although there might be costs to terminating an existing exchange.

Furthermore, my research has shown that in practice governments can launch student mobility programs for even more short-term reasons. In “Ends Changed, Means Retained,” I explore the history of three major scholarship programs disbursing public funding to successful foreign students aiming to study in the UK: the Marshall, Commonwealth and Chevening Scholarships. Each of these now has declared diplomatic ambitions, typically linked to the future careers of their alumni. But digging into their records revealed that they were actually set up to smooth relationships with foreign governments Britain had managed to offend in some way, avoiding diplomatic embarrassment in the short term. The Marshall Scholarships were offered to the USA as symbolic thanks for postwar Marshall Aid, but only after the Foreign Office had discovered that the gift the Americans really seemed to want – an original manuscript of the Magna Carta – could not be released. Commonwealth Scholarships were proposed by the Canadian delegation to a major international conference as part of a large package of ideas which the British Government perceived as risky and expensive, and spending a relatively small amount of money supporting the scholarships was

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6 Wilson, “Ends Changed,” 130-51.
seen as a way of softening the rejection. The Chevening Programme – which has now grown into a comprehensive scholarship programme, roughly a British equivalent of Fulbright – has developed from a fund designed to offset a steep increase in tuition fees for Commonwealth students attending British universities. Commonwealth governments, whose students had become accustomed to cheap tuition in the UK, were upset when Britain removed a subsidy in the early 1980s. The scholarships were intended to distract them from this irritation. In each case the Foreign Office facilitated student mobility not so much as a self-conscious signal to foreigners as to distract attention from an embarrassing situation in which there was a risk of offending dignitaries. Any impact created by the students themselves was incidental.

Perhaps the most famous example of a cultural exchange being used to transmit signals at elite level is the ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ between China and the USA which led up to Nixon’s visit to China. This was an excellent example of a cultural exchange being used as a signal of intent. Although American officials had been in surreptitious contact with the Chinese for some time, the public invitation of an American ping-pong team to China did open new diplomatic channels, and opened the relationship to view by the general public in both countries. But, as Griffin makes clear, the diplomatic importance of the ping-pong tour lay in the personal engagement of Chinese leaders, especially Zhou En-Lai who met personally with the visitors. Although the meetings between athletes were staged to seem like spontaneous people-to-people contact, they were actually carefully orchestrated by the Chinese government. The Chinese ping-pong players had very little agency, but were controlled by politicians – this was what made the signals so potent. Chinese elites were using private citizens who crossed international borders to signal their intentions to their American counterparts.

Creating exchanges may play a role in high diplomacy, with the people who actually travel abroad symbolic pawns in elite interactions. This is a familiar paradigm for international diplomacy. Nonetheless, over the years considerations of how exchanges can contribute to peace have tended to expand out from this putative signaling function. Where exchange programs are underwritten by foreign ministries, they are often evaluated in terms of attitude change.

3.2. Attitude change

In 2008 the British Foreign Secretary removed Foreign Office funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan. The Foreign Office contribution had helped mainly postgraduate students from wealthier Commonwealth countries to study in the UK. His reasoning for this was intriguing.

We propose a smaller, better organised programme, focused on the leaders of tomorrow, from a wide range of backgrounds… We will select more carefully to ensure our scholars really are potential future leaders, with our heads of mission having personal responsibility for ensuring their posts are getting this right.

Aside from the open question of how ambassadors were to be held responsible for selecting future leaders who will not reach their potential until long after those ambassadors had retired, this raises the question of why ‘leadership’ is so important, and what it actually means.

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7 Nicholas Griffin, Ping-Pong Diplomacy (New York: Scribner, 2014).
Some exchange programs involve very large numbers of participants. Typically these are genuine exchange programs, in which participants from one country literally swap places with participants from another. This design has a very long history for exchanges of school-age children, and it can be relatively cheap. If an American family is educating a teenager already, the costs of swapping him for a Turkish teenager for a few weeks are limited. However, most exchanges do not work that way, and for good reason. Strict exchanges suffer from most of the drawbacks of a barter economy. A straight swap is limited to situations where there is equal demand to go abroad in the two countries, and where there is adequate support already in place. If many Americans wish to visit Turkey but few Turks are willing to go to America, some of those Americans are going to be disappointed. There is always a risk of missing a future leader. Hence, many of the more familiar mobility programmes are actually what I term “pseudo-exchanges” in which new spaces are created, and funded, especially for a foreign visitor. The various iterations of the Fulbright Program offer good examples. Fulbright visitors to the USA are not displacing Americans, but the funding behind them allows universities, colleges, schools, offices and studios to open extra places designated for Fulbrighters.

Over the years, this method of facilitating mobility has allowed an international competition to develop, with countries seeking to attract the most promising students and young professionals. It has become possible for talented individuals to spend several years abroad, funded by foreign governments in the expectation that they will be useful allies in the future. Supporting them can become quite expensive for the host, so these programs rarely involve huge numbers of individuals. Given that international peace is a function of states rather than individuals, the impact on this relatively small number of individuals needs to be amplified by some kind of “multiplier effect” to affect the behavior of their state. There are basically two ways in which the impact of changed attitudes could be multiplied. Either alumni go on to become disproportionately powerful themselves, for example being elected to high office or holding top civil service positions (what I call the “elite multiplier”) or they have disproportionate influence on public opinion (for example, they become journalists, socialites or even teachers). As Giles Scott-Smith explains, from quite a critical perspective, this can be traced to an ‘opinion-leader model’ which has come to implicitly underpin the arguments for spending public money on most exchange programmes. In the opinion-leader model, returning students go on to shape mass public opinion about their former hosts, shaping the behavior of their country as a whole.

Both of these multipliers seem to rely on prior attitude change. The opinion leader model implies that exchanges change exchangees’ attitudes to foreign countries. Through multiplication, these changed attitudes among individuals go on to affect how the country as a whole relates to others, leading – theoretically – to improved international relations and prospects for peace.

3.2.1. State of the evidence

In my past work I have questioned whether living abroad actually has the kind of consistent impact on exchangees’ attitudes that we might expect from simple intuition. I have no doubt...
that some exchangees do return home with positive attitudes to the host country, but this information is not particularly helpful when we come to think about the broader impact of exchanges on peace. While international peace clearly has something to do with individual agency, it is far from sufficient to assume that attitude change at an individual level leads to peace. For one thing, even if some individuals do become more positive they may be counterbalanced by others who become disillusioned. And it is surprisingly difficult to establish a cause and effect relationship behind positive attitudes. People rarely recall their attitudes from even a few months ago with much accuracy, and usually struggle to explain what caused any changes in their attitudes, so the fact that they are positive now may reflect earlier socialization.

As I have explained in detail elsewhere, until a few years ago there were some quite serious methodological problems in academic studies purporting to test the opinion-leader model. There was a real need for before-and-after tracking of participants, to get an accurate impression of whether their attitudes had really changed. We had no studies which both measured the attitudes of large groups before-and-after and compared exchangees with control groups of non-exchange students. Only before-and-after studies could show that net change was taking place at an aggregate level, and control groups would be needed to show that fluctuating attitudes did not simply reflect shifts in public opinion which had nothing to do with individuals’ mobility.

Having identified this gap in the evidence, Emanuel Sigalas and I independently conducted such studies and found surprisingly little evidence that attitudes systematically become more positive. Some exchangees returned with more positive attitudes than when they left home, but the changes were usually modest and were balanced out by others moving in the opposite direction. This might suggest that we will be disappointed if we conceptualize the impact of exchanges solely in terms of attitude change.

Before we jump to that conclusion, it is worth pointing out a few caveats. Firstly, this empirical evidence suffers from a Eurocentric bias. For good practical reasons investigators have focused on mobility within ‘the West’, particularly on the European Erasmus Programme. But we can easily imagine that mobility across greater cultural distances and from more restrictive political systems, which actively conceal information about the outside world from their citizens, could have a much greater impact on attitudes. In fact, the practical difficulties of recruiting students mean that respondents tend to come overwhelmingly from particular countries even within Europe. In a recent article in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Kristine Mitchell presents evidence which questions both my findings and Emmanuel Sigalas’. Both of our studies involved large numbers of Erasmus students moving between the UK and mainland Europe, and she suggests that there may be something about Britain which fails to promote Europhilia. We cannot simply dismiss this possibility since we know that the impact of mobility is generally contingent on circumstances. In fact, Mitchell’s findings underline our shared view that the question of whether and how exchanges affect

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11 Wilson, International Exchange Programs, 47-59.
political attitudes is a complex one which probably does not have one simple answer. We need to know much more about the social contexts within which exchanges take place before we can predict what kinds of attitude change any given sojourn may produce. We cannot assume that simple exposure to other cultures will consistently lead to desirable attitudes.

If assumptions about short-term impact are uncertain, then it becomes even more troublesome to find out whether positive attitudes provoked by exchanges will endure over the years. We still have limited evidence about the long-term impact of exchanges on attitudes, partly because we rarely have baseline measures of their political attitudes before they travel and partly because it is so hard to keep track of large groups of alumni over time. We do know that attitudes to a former host country are fixed rather than fluid, and even long after the exchangee returns home those experiences are reinterpreted in light of subsequent events. Gullahorn and Gullahorn and Murphy-Lejeune demonstrate that there are patterns in how exchangees’ attitudes to their hosts fluctuate, but these are complicated and attitudes definitely do not remain constant over time, either while abroad or after returning home. Typically, visitors tend to have very positive attitudes when they arrive, these degenerate over time in the face of everyday frustrations, and they then become more positive as they approach the end of their stay. On their return home, Gullahorn and Gullahorn suggest that exchangees experience a second emotional U-curve, in which short-lived euphoria at returning to a familiar culture is replaced by ‘reverse culture shock’ followed by a gradual re-acclimatization to the home country. We do not know for sure how these predictable attitudes to the home country might be reflected in attitudes to the former host, but it seems logical to expect some effect. On the other hand, the length (in time) of these curves may be idiosyncratic. This poses yet another challenge for attempts to measure attitude change, as we cannot know where in the re-entry curve respondents may be and how this could be distorting their opinion of the host country. However, it does seem like we cannot be confident that long-term attitudes to the host will be reflected in attitudes a few weeks after returning home – but for obvious practical reasons existing before-and-after surveys measure attitudes soon after returning home.

Despite all of these uncertainties about the long-term impact of exchanges on attitudes, to my knowledge no existing studies track systematic samples of alumni over decades. Instead, our evidence about the long-term impact of mobility usually comes from interviews with alumni who are keen to communicate with researchers or scheme administrators. It should not come as a surprise that these alumni tend to report positive attitudes, since they are largely self-selecting.

3.2.2. Differential multiplication

Traditionally, measurements of attitude change in populations such as exchange students have followed this simple quantitative logic. If more alumni developed positive attitudes than negative attitudes, weighted for the intensity of attitude change, then that would be considered a positive outcome; if more alumni developed negative than positive attitudes, then that would be considered a negative outcome. But this seems to miss some of the complexity of social interactions: not all attitude changes necessarily have equal practical

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16 Wilson, International Exchange Programs, 47-59.
impact. There is one other possibility to which none of us seems to be doing justice at the moment: multiplication may differ depending on the direction of attitude change. This is something I see as at least a theoretical possibility, but one which is completely untested.

Even if experimental designs reveal that the numbers of exchangees who develop positive attitudes are balanced by others who become more negative, it is possible that the positive alumni systematically go on to become more influential than the negative alumni. In this case, the multiplication of positive changes would be much more dramatic than the multiplication of negative changes. Perhaps positive alumni are inspired by their experiences and at a statistical level they have a tendency to go on to influential, internationally-oriented careers – while the others deliberately avoid international relations and therefore have little influence over them. Without long-term, systematic tracing of a large number of alumni – not skewed toward those enthusiastic alumni who take pains to stay in touch – we simply do not know if different kinds of attitudes are multiplied to the same degree.

3.3. International Networks

Even if their attitudes to the host country did not change significantly, exchangees could develop enduring links with the country they visited. There are two possibilities: exchanges may increase cultural competence and form social networks.

3.3.1. Competence

Cultural competence refers to individuals’ feeling of comfort dealing with nationals of their former host country. The experience of being immersed in another culture might also increase exchangees’ comfort in dealing with foreigners more generally or endow them with intercultural competence which is not specific to the host country they actually visited. Either of these might lubricate relationships between countries into the distant future and facilitate communication across borders. Again, however, there are open research agendas around the impact of exchange mobility on (inter)cultural competence, and on the kinds of contextual factors which might promote such competence among mobile individuals. Several of the contributors to this issue have a much deeper background on these issues than I can offer, and their analyses offer insights into both the role of exchanges in intercultural competence and the long-term consequences.

However, it is useful to reflect here on how (inter)cultural competence might fit into the political impact of exchanges within international relations. If international conflict is sometimes caused by a failure of states to appreciate different views of an issue, then accurate communication in critical situations may reduce tensions and this could be very important for the prospects of peace. Clearly, communication relies on much more than just vocabulary and grammar, but requires some level of overlapping cultural competence. Again, the direct impact will be on relatively small numbers of exchangees. In order for changes in a small number of people to affect international relations, they would need to either communicate those changes to many others or else go on to become disproportionately influential themselves (for example, as professional diplomats at the formal interface between societies). Theoretically, increasing competence among either the whole population, such that the general public push for more appropriate action towards foreign countries, or among elites in a position to directly influence government policy, could be important if exchangees
return with greater communicative competence and the changes in those individuals are multiplied up to affect international politics. Yet another possibility is that a combination of mobility and cultural competence helps people to form and sustain relationships with specific individuals in foreign countries, which in turn influences international politics.

3.3.2. Networks

Exchanges might contribute to peace by creating helpful social networks across national borders. The difference between this mechanism and cultural competence is that the intermediate step is a specific set of social linkages with individuals in a foreign country, rather than a more generic ability to interrelate with foreigners in general. Most obviously, exchangees might form influential networks while they are living abroad. The intuition here is that visitors from abroad meet many people they would never have encountered had they stayed at home, and that they will form ongoing relationships with some of them. These relationships will enable them to exchange favors or information or simply socialize into the future, keeping lines of informal communication between the two countries open.

As with intercultural competence, exchanges could contribute to the formation of networks with the host country but might also tie exchangees to third countries. This is reassuring since many exchangees seem to have quite limited contact with host nationals. University scholarships in particular can enable visitors to live in multicultural bubbles inside the host country, meeting largely other visitors from similar backgrounds.17 But this does not mean their networks could not have significant effects on peace by binding countries together. Peace is not always simply a function of relations between State A and State B: a situation where B is allied with C, but A and C have strained relations, can be troublesome for all of them.

Unsurprisingly, we do have reasonably strong evidence that exchangees form different kinds of relationships than they otherwise would while they are abroad.18 This is a necessary condition for exchange-facilitated networks to contribute to peace, but far from a sufficient one. Again, exchangees are rarely in a position to have much influence on international relations while they are abroad – the issue is whether the networks they establish in the present will be important in the future. Unfortunately, the evidence is less clear on the long-term impact of networks, on the scale of networking attributable to exchanges, and particularly on how they compare with the counterfactual. Do exchangees establish more powerful networks than they would have built up anyway had they remained in their home countries?

We can know that short-term networks are built up while exchangees are abroad. We might also point to anecdotes of such relationships sometimes being significant in international relations years later. Again, systematic tracing of alumni would strengthen our evidence. But such long-term tracing would not, in this case, be sufficient to address the counterfactual. If we understand networks as consisting of ongoing social contact with fellow alumni, it is possible to ask alumni whether they have ongoing contact; my experience of interviewing longstanding alumni suggests that some of them lose contact surprisingly quickly and it is difficult to locate influential linkages decades later.19 But this seems a rather narrow view of

17 Wilson, International Exchange Programs, 139-93.
19 Wilson, International Exchange Programs, 175-93.
how social networks operate, because it ignores latent networks. Put simply, latent networks are acquaintances, or acquaintances of acquaintances, of which we are not immediately conscious but who can prove very useful given the right circumstances. In fact, alumni themselves may not be able to estimate the impact of their networks: we can probably all come up with anecdotes about unexpectedly meeting former colleagues and classmates after losing touch for several years. These kinds of relationships might be very helpful in moments of tension, but by their very nature they are not easily quantifiable.

In other words, the difficulties of assessing how important networks formed by exchange programmes are do not simply reflect a lack of research. More fundamentally, there are epistemological problems we need to confront if we are to compare exchange programmes with a counterfactual in which students are not encouraged to go abroad. Again, anecdotes may suggest that networks traceable to exchanges can play a significant role in peacemaking, but we have less systematic evidence.

### 3.4. Institution transfer and selection

We know that exchanges could contribute significantly to peace through signaling (after they have been running for some time), attitude change, and network formation. Our information about how far each of these actually contributes is far from complete. But there is evidence that exchanges bring another benefit – one which could hypothetically be very significant for international politics. Mobility helps individuals to develop clear ideas about how public policies compare in different countries, which can contribute to changes in governance. Exchangees visiting another country see particular policy ideas in action, and come to think that some of these ideas might be implemented in their own country (and indeed vice versa). Visitors do not necessarily develop greater approval, and they seem just as likely to come away with a firm conviction that their country should avoid some possibilities they observe abroad. But their exposure does give them firm ideas about which alternatives they like and dislike.20

Perhaps more surprisingly, this knowledge seems to have an enduring effect on policy preferences in later life. In my interviews with longstanding alumni of elite scholarship programmes, those who went abroad many years earlier and returned to positions of prominence in their home countries, I was struck by their willingness to ascribe their support for specific policy ideas many years later, when they were established in their careers, to having seen similar policies in action while they were living abroad. The examples were often everyday, even banal – details of surgical services, town planning, bus timetables, and so on – but they were aspects of public policy the visitors would never have learned about had they not spent an extended period living relatively normal lives in the host country. In later life they pushed for elements of these policies to be implemented in their home countries. This advocacy was reflective and sensitive to local circumstances, but they were clear that their thinking had been heavily shaped by experience abroad – at least to the extent that they formed clear preferences where they had previously had none.21

Again, this finding comes with caveats. By their nature, these interviews give little sense of how common these kinds of policy changes are. They show only that policy change may

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20 Wilson, *International Exchange Programs*.

result from youthful participation. And their stories might underplay contextual factors which might have led former exchangees to converge on particular policies for other reasons. Again, we are discussing an implicit counterfactual. But it does seem intuitively plausible that being educated about practices overseas will affect someone’s policy preferences, and there is a substantial body of evidence on international policy learning.22

Such policy changes may not seem hugely important on the global stage, and they usually affect aspects of public policy we rarely associate with war and peace. However, I suggest that they will have implications for state behavior, even though the consequences for international relations are very hard to predict.

My recent theoretical work has been applying Darwinian cultural selection theories to international politics.23 Cultural selection theories help to show why seemingly trivial changes in domestic policies can potentially affect the prospects of international peace.

Darwinian theories are characterized by an emphasis on systematic selection among diverse, and often unpredictable, competing traits spread within a population. Social evolutionary theories extend this logic to social evolution, in which ideas are the units of selection. In any large population of individuals there will be variation in the ideas they hold, and individuals holding different combinations of ideas will tend to behave differently under similar circumstances. Selection means that ideas which fit the environment in some way will be more likely to be copied into other minds and spread throughout the population, displacing competitors. But the individuals themselves are also subject to selection, some becoming influential (and able to spread or act on their views), some relegated to obscurity.

While biological selection is relatively straightforward (individuals either reproduce or do not, often as a result of being killed) the selective environment offered by society is rather different. Ideas and patterns of behavior constitute social institutions and these institutions themselves are selective environments.24

When we are considering international peace, the important question is not just how individuals behave but how large collectives (most obviously, states) behave toward each other. Many individuals have an influence on this, but some have more influence than others. Who ends up with most influence is largely a result of institutional selection.

For example, the institution of electoral politics results from a particular idea being widespread in society. It exists because enough people behave as if it does. We print individuals’ names on pieces of paper, each mark one, count the pieces and then defer to the individual who received most marks. In order for elections to be meaningful, the idea of electoral politics has to get into enough minds. But once it has, elections become a means of selecting leaders, and will favor potential leaders with particular traits. They become part of the selective environment.

The formal process of selecting political leaders is an obvious example, but many other institutions go into sorting (or selecting) individuals into different positions in any society. For example, techniques for teaching languages may travel across borders, and they seem relatively innocuous. Yet in most societies political elites are drawn disproportionately from narrow and selective educational backgrounds. Having such a background may be treated

22 See e.g. Richard Rose, Learning from Comparative Public Policy (London: Routledge, 2005).
as an implicit signal of electability if previous incumbents have been similarly qualified. Performing poorly on an examination which emphasized particular kinds of language skills could tip the balance.

Thinking about domestic politics in this way underlines that policy transfers, by altering the selective environment, will inevitably affect international relations.

This theory may be phrased rather unconventionally, but the essence of it should be quite familiar. Political analysts regularly refer, at least implicitly, to the selective effects of institutions. One example which has received a great deal of attention in the international relations literature is (Liberal) Democratic Peace Theory, which basically asserts that democracies are dramatically less likely to go to war with each other than autocracies. This particular argument has been challenged, probably with good reason, but it is an example of an explanation of foreign policy based on institutional selection. Democracies, proponents argue, punish particular behaviors associated with fighting wars and select out leaders who show them. Autocracies, by contrast, do not select so strongly against bellicosity because leaders do not need to appeal to a plurality of the whole population, merely an influential minority (such as military officers). A similar argument, intriguingly, can be found in the early work of Kenneth Waltz suggesting that he saw international politics as a set of selective systems nested within each other: the international system selects states which behave appropriately for prominence, but their internal institutions select the individuals who set their behavior. Such reasoning may even be implicit in US foreign policy and its emphasis on spreading democracy – not just because this is considered a good thing in itself, but because it is seen as a means to the end of promoting peace and ultimately the US national interest.

If this argument is acceptable when it comes to contrasting democracies with autocracies – and while the empirics may be debated, the mechanics of the argument have not been debunked – it seems reasonable that it should apply to other institutions as well. Many different institutions select personnel for different positions in society. Different selection and promotion strategies put different soldiers in command of armed forces, different education systems put different kinds of students in elite universities, different systems of healthcare funding allocate resources to different patients - and may or may not prioritize the potentially career-ending illnesses of future leaders. All of these will affect what kinds of people born into a diverse society will be in a position to influence international relations.

In other words, following this line of deduction it seems quite plausible that the right mix of institutions would promote pacifist behavior in a state. Transfers of policy ideas from one country to another should have some impact on state behavior and, ultimately, on the prospects for peace. Furthermore, the prospect of exchange programmes helping policymakers to come to more informed decisions does seem intuitively appealing.

Unfortunately, this particular mechanism may not be very helpful for promoters of exchange programmes. It seems as if any career must result from the complex concatenation

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28 Wilson, “Darwinian Reasoning”. 
of many selective institutions, and this enormous complexity makes drawing inferences from selection a difficult proposition. The interactions among them mean that we cannot simply isolate one institution and pin the prospects for international peace on it, but we need to think about all of them interacting with each other. This implies an awesome amount of information. Unfortunately we cannot access a counterfactual by conducting controlled experiments, changing specific institutions to find out whether it improves or harms the odds of peaceful collaboration. This idea does suggest a mechanism by which exchanges could contribute to peace – through the intermediate step of promoting policy transfer – but it seems rather an unpredictable mechanism. Designing research which could link the two in particular cases would pose a formidable challenge.

Exchanges do educate individuals about how foreign countries are run. Sometimes this does affect governance in their home country (although I cannot show how common this is). Logically this will lead to different (kinds of) people being selected to make important decisions than otherwise would have been, and this should affect international relations. Unfortunately, institutional interactions are so complex that it would be excruciatingly difficult to predict which kinds of institutions would promote peacemaking. This means the relationship between policy learning and peace seems likely to remain a wildcard among the possible links between exchanges and peace, albeit an intriguing one.

4. Conclusion

There is still a surprising amount we do not know about the impact of exchange programs on international relations. There are both gaps in our empirical evidence, particularly when it comes to the long-term impact of mobility, and epistemological challenges. While we may find the idea that exchanges contribute to peace intuitively plausible – and probably most people who spend a lot of their time thinking about this question do – knowing more about the impact of exchanges would be reassuring.

This is an intriguing intellectual challenge, but addressing some of these gaps would have political significance as well. Exchanges are somewhat marginalized in foreign policy strategy, and certainly far fewer resources are devoted to exchange programs than to armaments. Clearer evidence linking mobility with the prospects for peace - if the link is actually a strong one - should help. Perhaps more importantly, the different possible mechanisms by which exchanges might contribute to peace imply that different designs of exchange programmes would be most effective. If signaling is the only effective link, then governments seeking peace should select exchangees so as to gain maximum attention among foreign leaders and maximum publicity. If the opinion leader model holds, they should aim for exchangees who will go on to be influential opinion-formers. If networking is the most important, then it makes sense to pick visitors who seem likely to be making influential decisions themselves in the future. And relatively obscure civil servants might play important roles as policy entrepreneurs if they are exposed to new ideas in their youth.

We now think about the impact of exchange programs quite differently than we did 65 years ago. Nonetheless, when it comes to linking exchanges and peace there are still important gaps. Filling these would be both conceptually and practically useful. This classic sociological question remains both challenging and intriguing.
Bibliography

The Role of U.S. Elite Military Schools in Promoting Intercultural Understanding and Democratic Governance

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Abstract

Educational exchanges at the U.S. military’s war and staff colleges promote intercultural understanding, international security, and help the United States achieve its foreign policy goals. This article provides an overview of the different types of U.S. military education and training programs that are open to foreign participation, and explores the differences between these and civilian exchange programs. It looks at the impacts of military educational exchange programs on their participants, and also draws lessons learned for the design and administration of exchange programs.

Keywords: Education, military, soft power, exchange, IMET, socialization, constructivism

1. Introduction

Educational exchanges are often thought of as a formative experience in the life of a young college student who decides to spend a semester aboard or the mid-career adventure of a senior academic scholar who participates in one of the many Fulbright exchange programs. However, these are not the only types of exchange programs, nor are they the most influential in terms of policy impact. This article argues that some of the most influential international exchange programs are hosted by the U.S. military’s elite schools, its war and staff colleges. These military exchange programs are structured to build trust, intercultural understanding, and a shared frame of reference amongst U.S. military officers and their international counterparts. The result is a worldwide epistemic community of U.S. educated military officers.

U.S.-hosted military educational exchange programs are extensive and the professional networks that are built at these schools have had important impacts on their participants and, more generally, on international institutions and international security. This is especially true for the exchange participants at the United States’ elite professional military schools, the war and staff colleges. These schools host mid-level to senior-level military officers and defense-related civilians from around the world. The majority of these exchange participants are the rising elite in their home countries and they are likely to hold high ranking military positions in the future. Indeed, substantial portion of international graduates of U.S. war and staff colleges have become chief of their defense establishment or the commander of multinational forces. U.S. military exchange programs engage those leaders who have a real chance of instituting reforms and bringing change to their home countries. The military educational exchanges build cooperative relationships that have been shown to help maintain regional
peace and stability, and the exchanges are also explicitly tasked with supporting democratic institutions, values and norms.

This article describes how the exchanges at the U.S. military’s war and staff colleges are structured to achieve their goals and assesses the lessons that can be learned from them. The article begins with an overview of the different types of U.S. military education and training programs that are open to foreign participation and then places the educational exchange programs at the U.S. military’s war and staff colleges within this overall context. The nature of the military exchange experience for the participants, both U.S. and foreign, is described to include the overall program structure, the curriculum taught, and extracurricular activities. The educational experience at U.S. war and staff colleges is quite different from civilian exchange programs such as the Fulbright Scholar Program or as experienced by foreign exchange students at U.S. universities. These differences are on many levels from how the classroom is organized to the extensive amount of social interaction and experiential learning that is planned outside of the classroom by the military schools. The article examines several important impacts of the military exchanges on their international participants and includes lessons that can be applied to the design and administration of international educational exchange programs more broadly.

2. U.S. Military Educational Exchanges

There are a number of U.S. security cooperation programs that provide military education and training to foreign personnel, both soldiers and government civilians. Taken all together, the U.S. Department of Defense provides education and training to more than 55,000 foreign personnel each year.¹ The U.S. government program called International Military Education and Training (IMET) is its centerpiece exchange program; the U.S. Congress funds it, the Department of State manages the funding, and the Department of Defense designs and implements the curriculum. The U.S. Congress established it in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Today IMET education and training courses are quite extensive; on an annual basis the U.S. government provides grant funding for foreign participation in more than 4,000 formal courses at approximately 150 U.S. and NATO military schools and installations.² As directed by the U.S. Congress through the Department of State and the Department of Defense the official goals of the program are to:

1. Further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries;
2. Provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations’ military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S. forces; and
3. Increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government and military.³

The courses that are funded through IMET range from training courses that last for a couple of weeks, to the longer education programs at U.S. war and staff colleges that last

one year. Overall IMET is not very expensive, comprising about 0.2 percent of the budget of the State Department. In 2012, the cost of IMET was roughly $106.1 million dollars, but this relatively small amount of money funded over 6,000 foreign students from 135 allied and partner nations to attend courses. The participation in IMET programs by officials from Yemen, as described below, provides an illustration of the different types of programs that are funded and the various backgrounds of officials who attend.

In fiscal year 2012, 376 Yemenis attended IMET funded courses for a total cost of $2.38 million dollars. The courses that they attended varied and included: (1) U.S. taught courses in Sana’a, Yemen; (2) NATO and/or U.S. taught courses in third-party countries including Bulgaria, Germany, and Italy; and (3) U.S. taught courses at a variety of locations within the United States. Yemeni nationals who attended these courses came from the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs as well as personnel from the active duty military and other security related organizations such as the police. In terms of short training courses, one example is the attendance by two soldiers at the two-week civil-military relations course that is taught at the U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California. In terms of moderate length courses lasting several months, an example would be attendance by government and military personnel in English language training courses at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. In terms of the longer duration courses at U.S. military war and staff colleges, there were six officers and officials funded in 2012. Table 1 (below) shows which elite U.S. professional military institutes hosted the exchange students from Yemen and the organizations that these officials came from within the government of Yemen.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Location</th>
<th>Student’s Home Organization</th>
<th>Length of Course</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Command College</td>
<td>Yemen Coast Guard</td>
<td>27 Jul 2011 - 15 Jun 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Staff College</td>
<td>Yemen Coast Guard</td>
<td>27 Jul 2011 - 15 Jun 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Staff College</td>
<td>Yemen Navy</td>
<td>27 Jul 2011 - 15 Jun 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army War College</td>
<td>Republican Guards</td>
<td>2 Aug 2011 - 11 Jun 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
<td>Department of Military Intelligence</td>
<td>14 Feb 2012 - 16 Dec 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to attending the war or staff college as shown in Table 1, it is likely that these officers and officials also attended a month-long preparatory course at their U.S. war or staff college prior to the start of the formal course; and previous to that, some may have attended one of the IMET English language courses.

As the U.S. government’s centerpiece program IMET provides grant funding for countries that would not otherwise be able to send their personnel to participate in U.S.
military training and education courses. Funding for military exchanges in general comes from a variety of sources making it difficult to use IMET appropriations as a way to measure a country’s participation. The U.S. Congress appropriates grant funding for IMET as part of Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The United States also sells slots to its schools to foreign governments as part of Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The type of school varies widely from yearlong courses of study at the prestigious U.S. war colleges to shorter technical training courses on maintenance and operation of equipment purchased from the United States.

While there are several ways for foreign governments to fund study programs at U.S. elite military schools for their personnel, this does not mean that there are an unlimited number of slots. The State Department allocates slots (with the approval of Congress). There is generally only one slot per country at any one war or staff college in any one class. The U.S. government’s goal is to have a wide distribution of countries represented. For example, the current class (graduating in 2015) at the U.S. Army War College includes 79 foreign officers representing 73 different countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Austria, Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Yemen.6 In terms of the selection of specific persons for the military exchanges, the U.S. embassies play a role in vetting participants, but the exchange students are chosen by their home countries to fill the slots allocated to that country. The exchange officers constitute a significant portion of the student bodies at the war and staff colleges. Percentages vary by school with 10-20 percent of the students being foreign military officers.

The U.S. Army’s schools provide a useful illustration of the stature and influence of the international graduates of U.S. war and staff colleges. The U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) has the longest running program, hosting international officers since 1894.7 As of 2014, more than 7,500 foreign military officers had graduated from CGSC. Of these, more than half had obtained the rank of general and 253 officers from 70 different countries had become chief of their military, commander of a multinational force, or head of state. Notably, as of April 2014, 28 CGSC international graduates had achieved the highest position in their country as head of state.5 Former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is an excellent example. Yudhoyono, a former military officer, was a 1991 graduate of CGSC. In 2005, he became the first sitting head of state to be inducted into the CGSC’s international alumni hall of fame. Yudhoyono was recognized internationally for his role in bringing peaceful democratic transition to Indonesia.

At the senior-level school, the U.S. Army War College graduated its first international

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students in 1978 and approximately 10 percent of all its international alumni have become Army Chief or Defense Chief in their country.\textsuperscript{9} It is impressive to note that in spring 2013, twenty international alumni from this one school alone were serving as Army or Defense Chief in their countries – these countries included Germany, Korea, India, Canada, Denmark, Uganda, Norway, Egypt, Italy, Philippines, Lithuania, New Zealand, Oman, Australia, Hungary, Estonia, Georgia, and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{10} The current class of 2015 -- with 79 foreign officers representing 73 different countries -- is the largest international class ever at the Army War College.\textsuperscript{11} The above statistics on distinguished foreign graduates are consistent across all of the war and staff colleges with international graduates going on to hold very important political and military positions in their home countries. In fact, this is to be expected because both U.S. and foreign students are chosen for attendance because they are the rising elite-level leaders in their countries.

An important component of the exchange experience is the opportunity for the participants to bring their family along to live in the United States, and the majority of the participants do so.\textsuperscript{12} Each military school has formal programs and has organized volunteers from the local area to help the foreign participants and their families settle into life in their local U.S. communities. Local area civilian and military volunteers help the foreign participants and their families with such tasks as enrolling children in schools, offering volunteer-led English language classes for spouses and children, and setting up social events for the entire family. Since each school runs its own educational exchange program, there is some variation in how these volunteer programs are organized, but overall the experience for the officers is similar.

3. The Nature of the Exchange Experience at U.S. War and Staff Colleges

The U.S. war and staff college programs are one subset of the enormous network of educational opportunities available for foreign personnel in U.S. military schools, but they are a very important subset because they educate rising military leaders and defense-related personnel who are most likely to become elite-level decision-makers in their home countries. The educational experience at the war and staff colleges is intensive for both U.S. officers and for their international counterparts. The curriculum includes eight hours of classroom instruction each day as well as a number of activities in off-duty time. The organization of the students is an important way that the schools build esprit de corps, trust between officers, professional networks, and lifelong friendships. The students are broken into seminar groups of roughly 14-20 members (depending on the school). Each seminar group has its own room and the group stays together for 6 months and then the members are re-shuffled into a new seminar group for the second half of the course. For each course, a variety of instructors come into the seminar room and teach the group, but the group stays together. This is a significant difference from civilian university exchanges in which students are in a different room with different classmates for each class. Thus, the military students spend the majority of each day with the same people. Most of the military students remain in touch with their first seminar group as their primary set of friendships formed at the school. They also stay in touch with their seminar-mates after graduation as their primary (although certainly not

\textsuperscript{9} John Burbank, “German, Dutch Army Chiefs Inducted into Hall of Fame,” \textit{The Torch} (Spring 2013): 25.
\textsuperscript{10} Burbank, “German, Dutch Army Chiefs Inducted,” 25.
\textsuperscript{11} Army War College Community Banner, ”International fellows, US students honored by The Army’s ‘Old Guard’”.
\textsuperscript{12} At the expense of the officer, not the U.S. government.
exclusive) professional networking group.

Seminar composition represents the diversity within the school. For example, at the Air Command and Staff College a seminar group of 14 students will typically include 1-2 women officers; 1-2 officers from a sister service, the national guard, the reserves, or DoD civil service; 2 foreign officers (each from a different country); and the rest Air Force officers. The seminar groups spend the day together. The manner of instruction is generally first to attend a large lecture combining all students followed by seminar discussions. In the lecture hall the seminar group sits together. There may also be simulations and exercises where the seminar group will work as a team to solve a problem. On some afternoons there will be intramural sports and the seminar groups will compete with each other. In each seminar group the senior U.S. officer will be designated the seminar leader and other seminar members will be assigned to organize various tasks, such as study groups, sports competitions or social gatherings. It is common for the seminar group to have at least one social event (such as: barbecue, pool party, golf outing, musical concert, birthday party, or study group) each week during their off-duty hours and many of these events will include the spouses and children of the officers. The U.S. spouses also organize outings and events for fellow U.S. and international spouses and their children during the time that the officers are in school.

Like many other educational exchange programs, the students at U.S. war and staff colleges learn useful information in the classroom. Subject areas include military history, strategic theory, national security organization, international relations, military doctrine, civil-military relationships, interagency cooperation, resource management, military operational planning, and leadership. These subjects help provide a common frame of reference both intellectually and operationally for both the U.S. and foreign students. The Field Studies Program is an additional requirement for foreign students. The explicit goal of this program is to expose the foreign students “to the U.S. way of life, including regard for democratic values, respect for individual civil and human rights, and belief in the rule of law.” It includes classroom instruction as well as hands-on activities. Field trips are one of the highlights of the program. The field trips are a fun way to expose participants to U.S. institutions, society, and culture. Trips sponsored by U.S. military war and staff colleges are quite varied. Some examples of past visits include traveling to Washington, DC to meet with U.S. Congressmen, attending local town council meetings, visiting REI and Starbucks headquarters in Seattle, visiting local correctional facilities (i.e. prisons), and riding horses at a dude ranch in Montana. All of these varied activities that are part of the Field Studies Program help to introduce participants to different aspects of U.S. culture, politics, and institutions. Importantly, they also help to build comradery and friendships amongst the military officers.

In addition to knowledge acquired in lectures, seminars, and hands-on exercises, new perspectives and friendships are also gained through the intensive social integration and social interaction with U.S. military personnel both in and out of the classroom and with ordinary U.S. people in local communities. These types of social activities nurture positive perspectives of the United States and in the longer term help the United States to achieve foreign policy goals when its goals and preferences are shared across national boundaries. Indeed, the military officers are similar to exchange participants the world over in that they come away with more knowledge about their host country, warm feelings for the people who

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were their hosts, and a desire to maintain these friendships and professional connections for many years to come.\footnote{Carol Atkinson, \textit{Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy Through Military Educational Exchange Programs} (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).}

Sponsors programs are an important part of the exchange experience for the foreign officer and his/her family. Each foreign officer is assigned at least one sponsor from the military base or local community. The Army Command and General Staff College (located in Leavenworth, Kansas) assigns each foreign student three sponsors: one from the local military community, one from the local town of Leavenworth, and one from the greater Kansas City metropolitan area. The sponsor programs are run by volunteers and receive no U.S. government funding. While some sponsors are associated with the U.S. military, others have no immediate connection, but are ordinary people in the local communities. Some sponsors have volunteered for numerous years, even decades, to work with the foreign officers and their families. They are a key component in helping the exchange participants and their families navigate U.S. society and culture. The sponsors help the exchange officers when they first arrive in the United States to settle into the local community. They help the officer and his/her family for their entire stay. The sponsors invite the exchange officers and their families to their homes for events and holidays such as Thanksgiving and Christmas celebrations. They may also go to events such as state fairs or local concerts together. The sponsor programs support all three goals of the officer’s attendance at a war or staff college from providing information on U.S. society and culture to building a positive perspective of the United States, its citizens and way of life. An observation made by a foreign exchange officer from Asia-Pacific illustrates. When asked to describe his best experiences during his foreign exchange program, the officer said that his best experience was: “Our family could meet the wonderful sponsors. We spent much time with them; they were like our parents in the USA. We could learn how Americans think, feel, and also we could share common values with them.”\footnote{Atkinson, \textit{Military Soft Power}, 111.}

4. Lessons Learned from the Military Educational Exchange Programs

The military exchanges at the U.S. war and staff colleges are particularly successful in building trust, friendships, and intercultural understanding among participants from widely diverse backgrounds because they emphasize integration and intense social interaction as a mandatory part of the program for all students, both U.S. and non-U.S. There are at least seven lessons that can be learned from the exchange experience at U.S. war and staff colleges both for international exchange program design and for when we consider the role and functions of exchange programs as a component of foreign policy.

First, the military exchange programs at the military schools are effective in socially constructing a U.S. centric network of military professionals across the globe because they emphasize social and professional interactions. After graduation, members of the network are linked together through common experiences and shared expertise. As described above, the military educational exchanges mix and mingle participants from different countries. As a military exchange participant, there is no escaping professional and social interaction, as for example might happen at civilian universities where civilian students might socialize only with others who speak the same home language, choose classes with compatriots, sit
together with compatriots in classes, or live in isolated enclaves with others from the same home country.

The social activities and interactions at the military schools foster professional and social networks amongst participants and provide a personal support system within the school that results in a professional network of friends and colleagues across the globe. With modern communication systems, it is now easier than ever to keep in contact across national borders. These networks function as transnational channels of information of all sorts, from continuing professional development to keeping up with friends. Because the officers in these networks are considered experts in their field and occupy, or are likely to occupy, important military positions, they often have contacts in important military and political institutions. In this sense they form an epistemic community or “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain.”16 According to Peter Haas, these types of professional networks are repositories of specialized knowledge that state leaders may draw upon in order to identify salient issues, define national interests, and formulate policies.17 In the case of the alumni of U.S. war and staff colleges, the officers share expertise as military professionals and are likely to share common frames of references learned during their U.S. military exchange program. Contacts within this professional network have been useful, for example, in facilitating U.S. operational deployments. The relationships built during military exchanges have helped the U.S. military to gain access to forward operating bases and to preposition weapon systems in a number of Middle Eastern countries.18

The second lesson for exchange program design is an assumed, but frequently unexamined, aspect of exchange programs: whether the participant returns home after his/her program is finished. If the goal of exchange programs is to build cross-cultural understanding between countries, then participants should be those seeking an exchange experience rather than immigration. Exchange participants that “go native” certainly demonstrate the powerful socializing impacts of travel and study abroad, but this behavior may defeat the core purpose of an exchange program to expand cultural awareness and cross-cultural competence between countries. Unlike many other types of exchanges, the military officers must return home; and when they do, they bring with them the knowledge, perceptions, and friendships built while abroad. Civilian exchange participants at U.S. universities often seek to remain in the United States; however, for the military exchange participants there is no such possibility. For the military exchange student, whatever is learned in and about the United States travels back to the student’s home country; “going native” is not an option.

A third lesson is related to the first two lessons and concerns the wider impacts that may occur as the exchange participant advances in his/her career and more compatriots return home with similar education and experiences. As more and more people from a country participate in U.S. hosted military educational exchange programs, the network of military exchange graduates in any one country will grow more influential. The influence of graduates grows as more and more of them enter into elite leadership positions and can design and implement national-level policies relying on fellow graduates for support. The network within

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17 Haas, “Epistemic Communities,” 2-3.
18 Derek S. Reveron, “Weak States and Security Assistance,” *PRISM* 1, no.3 (June 2010), 30.
any one country is important in helping senior officers to update, improve, or reform military doctrine and military operations by providing a support system of similarly trained colleagues who are likely to share the same goals. Thus, within the wider epistemic community there are also these smaller country-specific cohorts that can influence policy, particularly as the cohort grows in numbers. When asked about these country-specific connections, over 97% of foreign students at U.S. war and staff colleges said that they knew someone from their home country who had graduated in a previous class; and 67% knew of a previous graduate in their home country who had a “very important” military job.19

A fourth lesson for the design of international exchange programs is the importance of family in longer duration programs. At the military schools, the exchange participant’s entire family is welcomed and socially integrated within the local military and civilian communities through specific activities organized by the schools and by the U.S. military officers and their families. Thus, intercultural understanding and international friendships are built not only by the officer, but also by his/her entire family. Both spouses and children also come away with increased knowledge about the United States, new U.S. friends, a better ability to speak English, and a more positive view of the United States. Children expand the types of social interactions that the officers and their spouses experience, involving the entire family in activities that the exchange officer might not otherwise have such as becoming involved in his/her children’s schools, hobbies, and sporting events. These activities help widen the entire family’s circle of friendships. Spouses are also an important part of the entire socialization experience. They are a trusted person with whom to share the excitement of new adventures and who provide support and commiseration in case of problems. The opportunity to be accompanied by family members on an exchange is an underappreciated and under studied factor that can greatly improve the foreign exchange student’s experiences.

The fifth lesson relates to accomplishing one of the explicit foreign policy goals of the military exchange programs to “increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government and military.” 20  Statistical evidence shows that over the longer term countries that participated in the exchange programs at U.S. military war and staff colleges were more than twice as likely to succeed in their efforts to transition to more liberal/democratic forms of governance than countries that did not participate.21  During their year in the United States, participants from less-than-democratic countries were exposed to everyday life under democratic governance. As students and heads of their families, the foreign officers must navigate their local U.S. communities in which their schools reside. And over the course of a year they are exposed to democratic governance, both good aspects and bad aspects, as citizens of the United States experience it on a daily basis. While coursework might provide education on, for example, legal systems, the time spent off-duty living under mature systems of rule of law where policeman exercise authority in a system where all citizens are equal under the law exposes participants from less-than-democratic countries to real life functioning of rule of law. As an illustration, one exchange officer from a nondemocratic country remarked that one of the best aspects of the United States was that it was “a society that holds everyone

21 Atkinson, Military Soft Power, 143-147.
accountable, responsible but at the same time everyone has rights and privileges that he enjoys.”22 Both book learning and experiential learning provide useful information for those seeking to build and consolidate democratic norms and institutions in their own countries.

The sixth lesson focuses on how the potential to attend a military exchange program can have a wider effect beyond those who are chosen to participate. My research identified that for countries that are in the process of developing democratic governance, the possibility to attend a school abroad, particularly in the United States, provides motivation to develop the skills that are prerequisites for attendance such as fluency in the English language. An aspiring participant may choose to spend several years teaching themselves English through books, hiring an English tutor, or going to evening classes in English in order that they might have the opportunity to participate in U.S. IMET funded schools in the United States.23 This phenomenon has been noted in countries transitioning to more democratic institutions, thus it might also help in democratization processes because speaking and reading English opens up new sources of information even if the person never goes abroad.

The seventh lesson concerns how educational exchanges in general help to advance the interests and influence of the hosting country through soft power. Soft power is the ability to achieve goals by persuading or socializing others to adopt your own perspectives and preferences. This effect is particularly noteworthy in the case of the military educational exchanges because military organizations are usually associated with the exercise of hard power. The exchanges are one way that the U.S. military extends its influence through ideas, beliefs, and norms. According to Joseph Nye in his classic work on the topic, soft power can be built through agentive strategies and structural effects. The military exchanges encompass both mechanisms. Agentive strategies are programs and actions of government agents.24 As discussed above, the military schools’ officials (instructors, program officers, U.S. volunteers, and U.S. sponsors) play a key role shaping the perspectives of the foreign officers. Soft power can also be gained through what Nye called structural effects, meaning setting an example that others wish to emulate.25 According to Nye, structural effects are gained and soft power accrues to the entity whose culture is pleasing to others; whose values are attractive and consistently practiced; and whose policies are seen as inclusive and legitimate.26 The military exchanges are designed to show these aspects of life in the United States. It is expected that the military exchange participant, by living and interacting on a daily basis with U.S. people, is likely to come away from his/her experience with a more positive view of the United States. This is indeed what happens in the case of the military exchanges. When asked to reflect upon the most important thing they learned about the United States during their time at a U.S. war or staff college, international participants identify aspects of how Americans think and act, how U.S. democracy works, and different aspects about U.S. lifestyles and culture as the most important things that they learned during their exchange.27 While not all observations are positive, the overall impact is positive with both U.S. and foreign graduates calling their year at the war or staff college “one of the best years” of their lives.28

22 Atkinson, Military Soft Power, 121-124.
23 This observation is based on my interviews with Bulgarian graduates of U.S. and NATO military exchange programs.
5. Conclusion

Military educational exchange programs at U.S. war and staff colleges are structured to build trust, intercultural understanding, and a shared frame of reference among U.S. officers and their international counterparts. Because the programs are successful in doing this, the U.S. military has benefited from increased understanding, cross-national interoperability, and defense cooperation with militaries around the world. Additionally, the U.S. government has been able to support governments transitioning to more democratic forms of governance.

Three important aspects are worth reiterating here. First, the military exchanges at the U.S. war and staff colleges are particularly successful in accomplishing their goals because they emphasize integration and intense social interaction as a mandatory part of the program for all students, both U.S. and foreign. Second, having one’s family along on the exchange enhances an exchange participant’s overall positive experience. Sharing the trials and successes of living abroad with one’s spouse and children opens up new opportunities for interaction and lessens the effects of culture shock. The entire family builds memories and friendships that they will share together as a family once the year abroad is over. Third, an important aspect of international educational exchange program design is the incorporation of mandatory activities that enhance cultural and social learning. For the military officers, the Field Studies Program and sponsorship programs perform a key role in building a positive exchange experience because these programs introduce the exchange participant to opportunities, institutions, and experiences that they might not otherwise have on their own. Additionally, the volunteer-led sponsor programs help to ameliorate the stresses of new situations and lessen culture shock by providing an experienced personal guide to the local community. These aspects of the military exchange programs could also be implemented in other types of exchanges to improve their effectiveness in building friendships and professional networks that incorporate members from very diverse cultural, social, and political backgrounds.

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Strategic Communication and the Marketization of Educational Exchange

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Abstract

This article describes how the marketization discourse that typifies U.S. strategic communication also influences the meanings and practices of educational exchange. Through an analysis of five presentations and 34 program evaluations provided by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, this article explores the risks associated with marketization discourse for the development of mutual understanding and peace.

Keywords: Educational exchange, public diplomacy, discourse, marketization, engagement

1. Introduction

The Fulbright educational exchange program has been called “one of the most enlightened initiatives undertaken” by the United States. On August 1, 1946, President Harry S. Truman signed into law the Fulbright Act, which was intended to promote international goodwill through the exchange of students in the fields of education, culture, and science. Through the development of “mutual understanding,” citizens of the United States and other countries would, ideally, cultivate peaceful relations. The Fulbright program’s promotion of goodwill, mutual understanding, and peace was also strategic. Specifically, the Fulbright Act’s proponents claimed that by developing U.S. citizens who possessed in-depth knowledge of politically and economically important countries and regions, educational exchange would increase the security of the United States.

The tension between policies created for mutual benefit versus mostly for one’s own strategic gain characterizes public relations. Whether in the context of organizations or states, so-called “hemispheric communicators” in the fields of public relations, public affairs, and public diplomacy walk a fine line between mutual- and self-advantage, and as a result, they tend to “express messages that speak to only half the landscape. Like the shining moon, they present only the bright side and leave the dark side hidden”. For Moloney, “Modern PR is competitive communication seeking advantage for its principals and using many promotional techniques, visible and invisible, outside of paid advertising”.

Moloney identifies public relations as a form of “weak propaganda,” that is, the “one-sided presentation of data, belief, an idea, behaviour, policy, a good or service in order to gain attention and advantage

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for the message sender”. Such propaganda is “weak,” however, in that within pluralistic and democratic societies, it must compete for public attention with other self-advantaging messages.

This article argues that the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs’ (ECA) program evaluations are a form of weak propaganda. Specifically, ECA’s rhetoric evinces the influence of marketization: “market-oriented principles, values, practices, and vocabularies”. Leitch and Davenport explained that marketization “involves the introduction of economic factors as the basis for decision-making as well as deployment of the techniques of business such as marketing and public relations”. Marketization also refers to the “process of penetration of essentially market-type relationships into arenas not previously deemed part of the market”. Marketization bears a family resemblance to other neoliberal discourses such as “enterprise,” “entrepreneurialism,” “market evangelism” and “Total Quality Management”. Inflected in the vernacular of marketization, ECA’s evaluations reflect and reinforce taken-for-granted assumptions about educational exchange that may subtly hinder the development of deeper mutual understanding and peace.

Let me be clear: Educational exchange certainly makes useful contributions to cross-cultural awareness, sensitivity, security, and competitiveness. I am more concerned in this article, however, in marketization’s role in shaping the meanings and practices of educational exchange in the context of U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communication. Specifically, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 ruptured traditional conceptualizations of educational exchange, shifting the emphasis in the United States from mutual benefit toward strategic self-advantage. This shift toward strategic communication involved the intensification of neoliberal policies and the proliferation of marketing-oriented discourses across multiple sectors and institutions, the consequences of which are still not well understood. This article considers some the risks that marketization discourse poses for international educational exchange stakeholders.

The structure of this article is as follows. First, it provides a discourse-oriented theoretical framework. It then uses that framework to describe how 9/11 served as a catalyst that transformed the meanings and practices of educational exchange in the United States. This transformation coincided with broader policy shifts toward strategic communication, marketization, and engagement within the public diplomacy arena. Third, the article explains how marketization discourse influences educational exchange program evaluation at ECA. It concludes with a summary of the risks associated with marketization for the development of mutual understanding, reflexivity, and peace.

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5 Moloney, Rethinking Public Relations, 167.
9 A. I. Marcus, “‘Would you like fries with that, Sir?’ The evolution of management theories and the rise and fall of total quality management within the American federal government,” Management & Organizational History 3 (2008): 311-38.
11 J. Gygax and N. Snow, “9/11 and the Advent of Total Diplomacy: Strategic communication as a primary weapon of war,” Journal of 9/11 Studies 38 (2013): 1-29; Marcus, “‘Would you like fries with that, Sir?’”
2. Discourse

Discourse is a term not easily summarized because different speakers use it in multiple (and at times conflicting) ways. This article focuses on the U.S. State Department’s “organizational discourse,” a term that similarly escapes easy summary but generally refers to talk and text within organizational contexts, rather than smaller interpersonal or group, or larger macro-social contexts. The scholarly focus on discourse can be traced to the “linguistic turn” that shook the foundations of the humanities and social sciences during the latter half of the twentieth century. In response to the idea that language constructs social reality, the practice of “discourse analysis” developed within and across the fields of sociology, social psychology, anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, communication, and literary studies. Discourse analytic methods involve the use of interpretive, critical, or postmodern perspectives. Organizational discourse analysis has thus grown from diverse theoretical roots and methodological approaches. The definition of organizational discourse used in this article is “the structured collections of texts embodied in the practices of talking and writing…that bring organizationally related objects into being as these texts are produced, disseminated and consumed”.

Discourse scholars tend to conceptualize discourse as both reflective and constitutive of social reality. This conceptualization affirms Foucauldian assumptions regarding the way that language “bears down” on individuals, shapes overall societal conditions, and influences what speakers can say or not say about a given phenomenon. To explain how a discourse “works,” however, an analyst generally must demonstrate how people in a particular time and place bring forth, maintain, or transform a construction of social reality through the linguistic resources used in speech and writing. A discourse becomes powerful and influential when its underlying assumptions become taken-for-granted or institutionalized. However, even entrenched discourses can serve as a site of struggle among individuals and groups vying to establish preferred meanings and uses of complex symbols. Thus, the perspective used in this article is similar to previous studies that have examined how institutional members have strategically appropriated various macro-social discourses to advance their more narrow organizational or bureaucratic interests. For Hardy, this perspective helps scholars to explain how macro-social discourses “appear” within organizational discourses “and, in so doing, legitimate them and enhance their performativity, through both unconscious and strategic processes”. This perspective necessarily maintains a constructionist orientation to language, as well as a focus on texts as the “unit” of discourse analysis. Using this theoretical perspective, the next section explains how 9/11 served as a catalyst for a historical transformation of U.S. educational exchange discourse.

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13 Grant et al., The Sage Handbook, 3.
17 Hardy, “Scaling Up,” 421.
19 Grant et al., The Sage Handbook, 3.
3. 9/11 and the Strategic Value of Educational Exchange

On its website, ECA provides “An Informal History of the Fulbright Program” that summarizes the ways in which the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, the American academic community, and various binational commissions historically have viewed educational exchange in its foreign relations context:

The basic functions of educational exchange from a foreign policy standpoint are to broaden the base of relationships with other countries, reduce tensions, lessen misunderstandings, and demonstrate the possibilities and values of cooperative action. In short, educational exchanges pave the way for closer and more fruitful political relations. Rather than following political diplomacy, educational diplomacy normally precedes or keeps step with it, opening up and nourishing new possibilities for international cooperation.

Despite its outstanding reputation and track record for promoting goodwill, mutual understanding, and peace, educational exchange is not a panacea for political intolerance and violent extremism. All four of the pilots of the hijacked aircraft on 9/11 had international educational experiences. Three of the pilots, Mohamed Atta (Egypt), Marwan al-Shehhi (United Arab Emirates), and Ziad Jarrah (Lebanon), had attended universities in Germany. The fourth pilot, Hani Hanjour (Saudi Arabia), had briefly attended the University of Arizona and had lived off-and-on in the United States over several years. Significantly, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Kuwait) had attended Chowan College in Murfreesboro, North Carolina, later transferring to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, where he earned a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering in 1986. A CIA report later claimed that “Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s limited and negative experiences in the United States — including a short stay in jail — almost certainly helped propel him on his path to become a terrorist”. Despite the 9/11 Commission’s findings concerning the educational backgrounds of the attack’s mastermind and pilots, the Final Report claimed: “The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States”.  

The theme of educational exchange-as-antidote-to-extremism would soon be codified within official discourse as U.S. lawmakers and officials turned to educational exchange as a resource in the fight against terrorism. Section 7112 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the law based on the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, stated:

(1) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs are effective ways for the United States Government to promote internationally the values and ideals of the United States. (2) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs can expose young people from other countries to United States values and offer them knowledge and hope.

In an influential report on U.S. Strategic Communication, the Defense Science Board (DSB) noted, “From 1993 to 2001, overall funding for the State Department’s educational and cultural exchange programs fell more than 33 percent—and exchanges in societies with significant Muslim populations has declined”. The DSB was emphatic, “This must change.


Increased, expanded and targeted exchange programs must be significantly ramped-up under the new strategic communication function”.24

Educational exchange gained prominence through numerous post-9/11 reports, laws, and recommendations;25 however, the tension between mutual benefit and self-advantage could not be reconciled. For example, the WMD Commission (2005), formed in the wake of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, noted in its final report how educational exchange data might directly support U.S. national security interests at the expense of the privacy of international students:

ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] collects reams of data on foreigners entering the United States and manages the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System database, which includes information on foreign students studying in the United States. However, whether agencies like ICE are equipped to make this information available to the Intelligence Community in useable form remains unclear. ICE officials explained that they would not give other agencies unfettered access to their databases (despite those agencies’ wishes) because of unspecified legal constraints. We find this September 10th approach to information sharing troubling…26

The WMD Commission’s recommendation is representative of how 9/11 helped to redraw the acceptable limits of self-advantage within the educational exchange domain—a domain ostensibly developed for mutual understanding and benefit. As Campbell lamented, “The mobility of students, scholars and researchers has been severely threatened by the strictures of homeland security, while advocates of educational exchange argue its value in the ideological battle”.27 In sum, following 9/11, educational exchange was enrolled as a strategic resource in the War on Terrorism and became a key plank of broader U.S. strategic communication efforts.

However, those efforts have suffered from officials’ ill-fated attempts to downplay or deny the self-advantaging and hemispheric tendencies of U.S. strategic communication. Officials have attempted to manage these tensions, in part, through the development of the discourse of “engagement,” that is, an approach to public diplomacy that emphasizes listening and dialogue. Notably, a 2009 White House report, undertaken at the direction of congress, entitled National Framework for Strategic Communication stated: “It is vital that the United States is not focused solely on one-way communication, which is why we have consciously emphasized the importance of ‘engagement’ – connecting with, listening to, and building long-term relationships with key stakeholders”.28 In referencing “engagement,” the National Framework for Strategic Communication evoked a “cocreational” public relations paradigm. The cocreational paradigm emphasizes “dialogic” activities that foreground the relationship between speaker and audience.29 Cocreational approaches view publics as “cocreators of meaning” and communication “as what makes it possible to agree to shared meanings, interpretations, and goals”.30 Cocreational approaches maintain that publics “are not instrumentalized but instead are partners in the meaning-making process”.31

25 Campbell, “International Education”.
The National Framework for Strategic Communication describes engagement as “critical to allow us to convey credible, consistent messages, develop effective plans and to better understand how our actions will be perceived”. However, both the strategy and its theoretical underpinnings cannot adequately account for stakeholders who believe that U.S. influence within their societies is fundamentally illegitimate. When attempting to engage with “extreme” audiences in the Arab world, for example, U.S. strategic communication reverts to largely one-way, asymmetric approaches that are based on a direct “media effects” ontology. The discourse of engagement thus elides the self-advantaging tendencies of actual communication practice. U.S. strategic communication efforts, including those conducted under the friendly moniker of “engagement,” attempt to focus audiences’ attention on America’s values and away from its core strategic interests.

The effort of organizations to dialogically “engage” their stakeholders is not new, nor is its critique. Through the articulation of their “two-way symmetrical” model of public relations in 1984, Grunig and Hunt argued that “excellent” organizations use research and two-way communication to understand and foster dialogue with their stakeholders. Ideally, this dialogue leads to mutual understanding and mutually beneficial outcomes. Grunig and Hunt’s model has served as the dominant theoretical (and normative) paradigm of public relations over the past two decades. U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communication nevertheless reveals consistent ambiguity as officials oscillate between images of communication as fundamentally “two-way” and mutually beneficial versus “one-way” and conduit-like. This oscillation contributes to U.S. officials’ persistent inability to adequately account for the historical and structural inequalities within the regions where they conduct their work. This oscillation also contributes to the contradictions of U.S. “soft power” rhetoric.

Given these conditions, in an article for International Communication Gazette, Comor and Bean critiqued what they termed “America’s ‘Engagement’ Delusion”. The Obama administration initially embraced engagement as the dominant concept informing U.S. public diplomacy. Yet, despite its emphasis on facilitating dialogue with and among Muslims overseas, Comor and Bean demonstrated that, in practice, engagement aimed to employ social media technologies to persuade skeptical audiences to empathize with U.S. policies. Engagement, Comor and Bean argued, actually perpetuated the communication-as-dominance underpinnings of U.S. strategic communication. Perhaps based on similar critiques, at the end of 2013, the word “engagement” was quietly removed from the U.S. State Department’s definition of public diplomacy. However, the marketing-oriented, hemispheric tendencies of engagement live on in other sectors of government, including educational exchange.

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37 “Engaging” seems to have disappeared from one of the State Department’s definitions of public diplomacy,” John Browns Notes and Essays, December 21, 2013, http://johnbrownsnotesandessays.blogspot.com/2013/12/engaging-seems-to-have-disappeared-from.html.
4. The Marketization of Educational Exchange at ECA

The mission of ECA is to foster mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries to promote friendly and peaceful relations. ECA accomplishes this mission through academic, cultural, sports, and professional exchanges that engage youth, students, educators, artists, athletes, and rising leaders in the United States and more than 160 countries. In 2010, about one quarter of ECA program participants were U.S. citizens; the rest were foreign nationals. ECA is home to the Fulbright Program, “the flagship international educational exchange program sponsored by the U.S. government … designed to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.” Along with the Fulbright Program, featured prominently on ECA’s website is a section titled “Impact.” In this section, readers can learn how ECA “fosters cross-cultural understanding and supports top talent” by viewing visual representations of ECA’s impressive growth and expansion. For example, from 2008 to 2010, ECA exchange participants increased 25 percent, from 46,415 to 57,801. Of 1 million program alumni, 364 are current or former heads of state, 55 are Nobel Prize winners, and eight are current or former United Nations ambassadors. Visitors to ECA’s website thus confront overwhelming evidence of ECA’s success.

That evidence is also prominently featured on the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange’s website. The Alliance is an association of 86 nongovernmental organizations comprising the international educational and cultural exchange community in the United States. The Alliance claims:

Exchanges are an essential element in our smart power strategy to maintain and strengthen U.S. global leadership. Exchanges enhance U.S. national security and prosperity by building personal connections, mutual understanding, and productive partnerships that help us address critical global issues: managing the world economy, combating terrorism and regional conflicts, and dealing with environmental, public health, and humanitarian challenges.38

The Alliance cites several ECA figures to support its claim. Specifically, “98% of Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program respondents reported that their Fulbright experiences gave them a deeper understanding of the United States, while 93% believed their experiences heightened their awareness of social and cultural diversity among different nations.”39 Additionally, “97% of International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) alumni respondents agreed that the program develops friendly and peaceful relations between the United States and other countries.”40 Such eye-popping figures suggest that ECA’s programs are beyond reproach. However, the nearly universal belief in ECA programs’ effectiveness raises the question of just what, exactly, is being evaluated. ECA’s figures give the impression that educational exchange provides the quintessential remedy to ignorance and intolerance. A critical perspective, however, asks whether mutual understanding can be improved by closely examining the experiences of the handful of educational exchange participants who, apparently, do not agree that ECA programs heighten awareness of social and cultural diversity nor help develop friendly and peaceful relations. Because such critical inquiries appear to be off the table, evaluation practices at ECA may miss an opportunity to truly deepen mutual understanding.

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39 “The Impact of International Exchange Programs”.
40 “The Impact of International Exchange Programs”.
Prior to the 1990s, market-oriented principles did not play a prominent role in educational exchange discourse. However, educational exchange’s post-9/11 enrollment as a strategic communication resource brought it further into the realm of marketization. As a result, the discourse of educational exchange has subtly shifted from one of mutual understanding, goodwill, and peace to one of “impact,” “effectiveness,” and “accountability.” The ways that educational exchange contributes to the economic, political, and social goals of its primary funder—the U.S. federal government—have gained currency.

The marketization of educational exchange has been driven, in part, by the wider push across government for “accountability.” In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that, in return for $10 billion worth of communication initiatives (its estimate of total strategic communications spending since 9/11), “limited data exist on the ultimate effect of U.S. outreach efforts.” The GAO explained that agencies cited three challenges in measuring the effectiveness of their strategic communication efforts:

First, strategic communications may only produce long-term, rather than immediate, effect. Second, it is difficult to isolate the effect of strategic communications from other influences, such as policy. Third, strategic communications often target audiences’ perceptions, which are intangible and complex and thus difficult to measure.

Despite these difficulties, the GAO recommended market-oriented means of assessing public diplomacy, e.g., “private-sector measurement techniques” that included “the use of surveys and polling to develop baseline data, immediate follow-up research, and additional tracking polls to identify long-term changes over time.”

Following Simpson and Cheney, there are several potential outcomes stemming from the influence of GAO’s marketization discourse vis-à-vis educational exchange evaluation.

First, educational exchange organizations can simply adopt market-oriented vocabulary to refer to earlier practices. For example, officials may announce a new focus on “accountability” for departments while those departments may simply conduct business as usual. The second level of influence is what Simpson and Cheney call “the cafeteria approach,” whereby organizations adopt or appropriate marketization practices in ways that affirm regional, local, or organization-specific practices. The third level of influence involves the wholesale transformation of an organization. Here, the pretense of non-market concerns is dropped in favor of privatization or market-based regulation. At ECA, developments currently resemble the first and second outcomes.

As within the domains of strategic communication and public diplomacy, at ECA, a risk is that marketization operates as a “universal discourse that permeates everyday discourses but goes largely unquestioned.” Although it is not necessarily antithetical to the development of mutual understanding, peace, and goodwill, marketization tends to naturalize and legitimate a set of business-oriented commitments, practices, and ways of conceptualizing and talking about educational exchange that subordinate intangible outcomes to market-oriented logic.

For example, as the head of ECA, Assistant Secretary, Evan Ryan, recently remarked in several speeches provided on ECA’s website, “Our programs need to be more flexible,

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41 Campbell, “International Education”.
45 Simpson and Cheney, “Marketization, Participation.”
responsive, agile, impactful, and innovative...America must do better if we want our young people to be able to compete in a globalized world,”47 Secretary Ryan declared. Secretary Ryan asked, “[H]ow many vulnerable youth learned that there are alternatives to terrorism because they were exposed to critical thinking skills?” For Secretary Ryan, the discourse of mutual understanding, peace, and goodwill has evolved into a commitment to “building relationships that create resilient communities, democratic societies, and a world where countries are primed to work together to solve our most vexing problems.” Secretary Ryan also recently noted that President Obama “recognizes that it [educational exchange] can no longer be an afterthought, or something we do because it’s nice. It needs to be integrated into our foreign policy strategy at the ground floor.” Invoking the strategic dimension of educational exchange, Secretary Ryan stated, “International exchanges are the secret weapon of foreign policy and we must be on the cutting edge.” Secretary Ryan’s discourse illustrates how ECA’s mission and goals have become inflected in marketization’s vernacular of bottom lines, innovation, and problem solving.

Marketization discourse increasingly involves an emphasis on measurement and evaluation. For example, the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) recently launched a campaign that urged communication professionals to make the “business case” for public relations. Seemingly ahead of the trend, evaluation comprises its own division at ECA. This Division aims to enhance the effectiveness of ECA’s educational and cultural programs, and its work consists of two types of initiatives: evaluations and performance measurement. ECA claims that its evaluations are “retrospective and encompass cross-cutting themes” and “incorporate case studies to highlight findings” to “provide data for program planning and goal setting”.48 Performance measurement initiatives, by contrast, “monitor the Bureau’s programs to track results,” “establish baselines and collect end-of-program and follow-up data from participants,” “compare data across the three points to assess effectiveness,” and “provide data for program planning and goal setting”.49 In addition to evaluations and performance measurement, ECA also provides visitors to its website “Resources and Tools” to guide evaluation and performance measurement efforts. These resources include performance measurement and evaluation presentations and research papers, external materials, a bibliography of work in the field, and other information.

There are five presentations listed on the Evaluation Division’s website. These include: “Defining Outcomes and Goals;” “ECA Evaluation: Assessing Public Diplomacy;” “Monitoring and Evaluation;” “Performance Measurement for Program Officers;” and “Planning and Monitoring at Program Level.”50 The presentation, “Defining Outcomes and Goals,” authored in 2009 by ECA’s Chief of Evaluation, provides a five-part model for evaluation. “Planned work” entails a combination of (1) “inputs” and (2) “activities.” These, in turn, lead to “intended results,” i.e., (3) “outputs,” (4) “outcomes,” and (5) a “goal.”51 The model helps evaluators avoid confusing outcomes and goals with activities.

and it aids officials in determining “whether inputs are being used as intended, outputs are occurring, and outcomes and goals are being achieved”. This vocabulary reappears in another presentation, “ECA Evaluation: Assessing Public Diplomacy.” In this presentation, authored in 2010, audiences are told that ECA conducts evaluation and performance measurement for four reasons. First, it “ensures programs are effective in achieving State Department, ECA, and program goals”. Second, it helps ECA meet “Congressional, OMB, other mandates for evaluation, PM, and results reporting”. Third, it “provides data for use by program managers and grantees”. And finally, it “contributes to [the] body of knowledge for practitioners and scholars across sectors”. ECA evaluations are thus conducted primarily to demonstrate to officials and funders that ECA’s programs are effective. However, the stated goal of using evaluations to contribute to the body of knowledge for practitioners and scholars opens a door to more critical and reflexive perspectives.

As of August 2014, 34 completed evaluations are available via ECA’s website. Of these 34 evaluations, none contain in-depth discussion of participants’ negative experiences. Almost no criticism of the United States, its people, or way of life is to be found in any of the evaluation reports. For example, the evaluation for the Youth Exchange and Study Program (YES) provides a typical passage:

Upon completing the program and a year after returning home, a large majority of participants had a ‘more favorable’ view of Americans as a result of their YES experience. The most important thing they felt they learned about Americans is that they are friendly, kind, helpful, open-minded and tolerant. Many commented on how friendly and welcoming Americans are to foreigners, such as YES students.

While some participants’ negative experiences are occasionally alluded to, these cases are not explored in any substantive way. Educational exchange is not evaluated in order to identify the ways in which negative experiences might inadvertently contribute to antipathy toward the United States. It is also possible that participants who report favorable responses nevertheless harbor distrust or skepticism of U.S. foreign policy. In general, ECA’s evaluations decouple program experiences from foreign policy-oriented concerns. Seldom are policy-related questions even asked. Measurement of participants’ perceived “understanding” or “view” of Americans should not be conflated with an embrace of American values nor support for U.S. government policies.

Educational exchange evaluation at ECA, as it is currently conceptualized, aims to prove to funders that programs bolster America’s positive image and reputation. While an implicit objective of educational exchange is for foreign participants to become more accommodating, understanding, or supportive of U.S. economic, political, social, or technological interests, values, and aims, there are clear limits to exchange. Rarely is it suggested that the values of others might inform how Americans view and conduct themselves in a globalized world.

In sum, consideration should be given to how ECA’s evaluation techniques make sense in light of growing anti-U.S. extremism. As Comor and Bean have suggested, stakeholders ought to consider the possibility that uncritical and narrow means of evaluating educational

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exchange *may itself entrench a kind of myopia.*\(^{54}\) If educational exchange is evaluated using limited snapshots that overwhelmingly showcase positive benefits, officials could be hindered in their ability to even recognize the ways that educational exchange might in some cases inadvertently contribute to negative international sentiment or political extremism. More to the point, such evaluations may subtly evoke a *causal* relationship between educational exchange and support for U.S. foreign policy that is not empirically supported. The marketization of U.S. educational exchange at ECA thus reflects and reinforces a hemispheric approach U.S. strategic communication that impedes the development of more critical, reflexive, and democratic conceptualizations of U.S. public diplomacy.

5. Conclusion

Recently, the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACDP) released a report, “Data-Driven Public Diplomacy Progress Towards Measuring the Impact of Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting Activities,” that supports the arguments contained in this essay. In its report, ACDP claimed that State Department officials needed to better recognize the importance of research in public diplomacy, reform risk-averse organizational cultures, develop more consistent strategic approaches to evaluation, increase training, and boost funding.\(^{55}\)

According to ACDP, evaluation activities at ECA in 2013 totaled $1.3 million, which is less than .25 percent of ECA’s total budget. It is therefore unsurprising that ACDP found considerable room for improvement, despite lauding ECA for its evaluation efforts within existing constraints. Specifically, ACDP recommended that evaluators at ECA: “(1) connect program objectives with research design; (2) separate short-term from long-term goals; (3) avoid reports that rely on self-evaluation data; (4) supply greater context of country, regional and global trends; (5) encourage constructive criticism through evaluations; (6) clarify descriptions of research processes; and (7) distinguish between what’s inferred versus what is directly assessed or observed”.\(^{56}\) ACDP’s fifth recommendation closely aligns with this essay’s argument. In reviewing ECA’s publicly available evaluations, ACDP similarly concluded that ECA’s reports “provided a strikingly positive view of performance measures, which focused on self-reported changes in participants and included positive quotes from participants who filled out the surveys”.\(^{57}\) Notably, however, ACDP did not explicitly call for ECA to investigate negative cases; rather ACDP urged ECA to conduct “more objective data analysis” in order to detect and understand “the reasons for both the formation of and shifts in attitudes and behavior among foreign publics toward the United States”.\(^{58}\) ACDP’s recommendation is a helpful and necessary first step; however, in absence of a mandate for more critical and reflexive investigations, ECA officials will likely avoid exploring information from program participants that could challenge taken-for-granted assumptions, policies, and practices. The point of critical and reflexive investigation is to promote self-

\(^{54}\) Comor and Bean, “America’s ‘Engagement’ Delusion”.


\(^{56}\) “Data-Driven Public Diplomacy,” 29.

\(^{57}\) “Data-Driven Public Diplomacy,” 32.

\(^{58}\) “Data-Driven Public Diplomacy,” 32.
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discovery and self-knowledge; it is not to convince audiences of the overwhelming success of a particular program.

ACDP’s recommendation aside, marketization at ECA is likely to endure due to the entrenchment of the promotional framing of evaluation, the cost and time of evaluation, institutional inertia, and the discomfort that arises when officials confront voices critical of their efforts. This article’s recommendation could certainly spark defensiveness and a counterargument that academics lack awareness of ECA’s day-to-day constraints that delimit what evaluation practices are possible. Overcoming reactionary responses is necessary if officials are to meaningfully reduce foreign audiences’ suspicions of U.S. aims and intentions. Fear of being rhetorically attacked, confronted with conspiracy theories, or forced to account for historical examples of U.S. hypocrisy likely keep officials from engaging in international fora where communication is not carefully scripted or controlled. The development of critical and reflexive evaluation practices might therefore demonstrate goodwill, honesty, and a genuine interest in listening to and responding to the wants, interests, and needs of foreign audiences. In theoretical terms, such evaluation practices would do much to promote dialogic communication’s principles of mutuality, propinquity (shared bonds), empathy, risk, and commitment.59

This article has considered how marketization discourse promotes a particular kind of evaluation process that inadvertently hinders the development of deeper mutual understanding, transformation, and peace. Similar to the tensions and contradictions associated with the strategy of “engagement,” commitment to mutual understanding requires the development of critical insight, genuine dialogue, and reflexivity. Analysis of ECA evaluation presentations and reports suggests that a “customer orientation” characterizes ECA’s approach to educational exchange.60 This orientation necessarily reflects and influences the way that stakeholders conceptualize public diplomacy. ECA’s orientation potentially undermines critical exploration of educational exchange programs that have failed to produce desired outcomes for specific individuals. While negative individual cases may be rare, investigation of those cases could help officials and citizens develop a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the benefits, risks, and consequences of educational exchange. Customer-centric discourse encourages officials to downplay or ignore negative cases in favor of evaluation data that satisfies customers’ demands, paints programs in the best light, and promotes expanded funding and operations.

ECA notes that independent evaluation firms conduct its evaluations, but when evaluation is performed principally to showcase success, it loses some of its supposed objectivity. At worse, evaluation instead “functions to reassure, exonerate, and glorify” the organization that has paid for it.61 Within a marketization paradigm, the products of evaluation risk becoming self-serving: The goal of increased mutual understanding becomes subordinated to the goal of bureaucratic continuance and resource accumulation. While the marketization of relations among government agencies is designed to improve efficiency and effectiveness, marketization discourse discounts a perspective that views public diplomacy as a taxpayer-supported function with a responsibility to critically inform not just other federal agencies,

59 Kent and Taylor, “Toward a Dialogic Theory”.
60 Marcus, “ ‘Would you like fries with that, Sir?’”
Strategic Communication and... congress, and the executive branch, but also scholars and citizens. ECA’s own evaluation presentations indicate that possibilities for more critical engagement exist and can be cultivated. Asking evaluation questions that promote understanding of the potential risks and consequences of educational exchange should therefore be on the table.

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The BIG Picture: Reflections on the Role of International Educational Exchange in Peace and Understanding

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As humans we’ve always lived in relation to each other – whether in small local groups of hunters/gatherers or in virtual social networks that connect us with strangers around the world. Mobility and exchange have always been part of human history, although much of it relegated to history books and long since forgotten - such as Cahokia, now a historic site in the U.S. state of Illinois but at one time the largest and most sophisticated prehistoric city north of Mexico, whose people maintained vast trade networks throughout the eastern half of the North American continent. In many ways the realities of geo-political developments in current times are simply a variation on past human history, albeit with graver issues that confront human kind.

The horrific devastation and realities of twentieth century world wars resulted in the intentional creation of numerous organizations and programs with specific missions to further peace and international understanding in the hope of preventing such horrors in the future. Examples include American Field Service secondary exchanges, started by ambulance drivers in World War I, the International Baccalaureate Organization, the formation of the Institute of International Education after World War I, the formation of the U.S. Peace Corps after World War II, as well as other programs like Fulbright exchanges and later the Chevening Scholarships. In these examples, the underlying assumption was that peace and understanding was not just the purview of nation states (as addressed through the establishment of the League of Nations and later the United Nations) but could also be addressed through “soft power” at the individual level, with the ultimate goal being a more peaceful world. As Wilson notes, there is a dearth of research about whether educational exchange leads to a more peaceful world, particularly given that there are limits to individual-level peacemaking within the broader nation-state system. Nonetheless, there are numerous examples of individuals who have indeed made a difference in the world, including giants such as Martin Luther King Jr., Mother Theresa, or Nelson Mandela, as well as many unsung heroes, and some of the programs mentioned here operate on the premise of the power of the individual to affect change in the world. Since World War II, there has been an increase in educational exchange, particularly at the post-secondary level. The articles in this issue explore various aspects of this: Atkinson’s article looks at lessons learned from educational exchange that occurs within US military institutions; Bean’s article highlights the Fulbright program and looks at...
strategic messaging and communication of such programs, and Wilson’s article addresses this question even more directly in looking at how exchanges can contribute to peacemaking. This commentary outlines some prevailing myths around educational exchange, sets forth three value propositions to inform future international educational exchange and concludes with the bigger picture of the role of educational exchange in promoting peace and international understanding.

1. Some Myths

Let’s start with some myths about international educational exchange:

1) Bring diverse people together and “magic” will happen.
2) Study abroad and come back interculturally competent.
3) Exposure to another culture is sufficient for intercultural understanding.
4) No special training is needed when going into another culture.
5) Results of international educational exchange can be measured by one evaluation tool.

Though the above statements are all indeed myths, they nonetheless are stated with frightening frequency. In debunking these myths, several theoretical frames can be utilized including Putnam’s work which conclude that simply being in the vicinity of difference does not result in meaningful, intercultural learning. In fact, Putnam found that such contact can result in greater mistrust between groups of people, and Allport found that certain criteria need to be in place for more meaningful interactions to occur, including common goals and similar status (and Atkinson’s article provides a good example of this). Further, according to my dissertation study resulting in the first research-based definition and framework of intercultural competence, intercultural competence is a lifelong process (beyond one experience) and must be intentionally addressed (beyond one training or class) as such competence does not generally occur naturally. Additionally, much has been written about the importance of how international educational exchange is conducted so that such exchange does not reinforce ethnocentrism but indeed does lead to transformative learning and attitudinal change. In terms of evaluating results of educational exchange, much research has actually been undertaken over the last couple decades in this regard, with common themes emerging as to the importance of multiple measures of assessment and evaluation (Bean’s article, for example, discusses just one evaluation while, in fact, there would need to be multiple measures, beyond self-report, to ascertain concrete results), as well as longitudinally over time (Study Abroad for Global Engagement (SAGE) project actually looked fifty years back in terms of study abroad students’ changes over time including their life choices.)

7 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice.
2. Implications and Three Value Propositions

The predominant implication of these myths and underlying theoretical frameworks for organizations involved in international educational exchange is this: *Intentionality is key* in preparing, sending, and debriefing from such experiences. It’s not enough to put students on planes and send them abroad. Rather, intentional intercultural training is crucial before students leave, while they are abroad and especially after they come back, as they process what they experienced and learned. Further, given that intercultural competence development is a lifelong process, it’s important to recognize that a one-size-fits-all approach will not work since students are at different places in their journeys, even before they venture abroad. The experience itself is instrumental in terms of how it is set up and the various parameters in which students engage in the local culture and community. Beyond these implications, though, there are deeper questions about the extent to which such exchanges indeed lead to peace and understanding.

For example, one burning question is this: What is necessary for humans to get along together? This is the question that I’ve spent the last decade researching and exploring through the concept of intercultural competence. Upon further reflection of the literature around this concept, and by way of synthesizing some of the points in the articles here, I’d like to put forth three value propositions that could inform international educational exchange at its very core, providing a foundation for peace and understanding:

1) *Extend Respect.* Respect, which means truly valuing the other as a fellow human, needs to be at the heart of human interactions. Some languages use the term “honor” – honoring others which is about valuing humans and ensuring their rights as humans. Regardless of whether we agree with each other, we need to humanize the other, even and especially when it is difficult. One of the surest routes to violence is when we dehumanize others and consider them as less than human. In looking back at history, we can see countless examples of what happens when humans are categorized as less than human – rather through slavery, through war, genocide, or through gross violations of the human spirit. Respect, then, must be at the core of any international educational exchange, as well as any human interaction. Respect resists categorization of others. A key element in respect is *mutuality* – how much are we able to learn from each other in the international experience? There is much that each of us has to learn from the other; one measurement of a successful exchange may be the degree of mutuality and co-learning from “the other.”

2) *Enact Ubuntu.* Ubuntu, initially a humanistic value originating from South Africa, sees humanity as bound together. Literally, this value means that a human is human through others. Desmond Tutu further explained this term in the following way: “Ubuntu speaks particularly about the fact that you can’t exist as a human being in isolation. It speaks about our interconnectedness. You can’t be human all by yourself, and when you have this quality – Ubuntu – you are known for your generosity. We think of ourselves far too frequently as just individuals, separated from one another, whereas you are connected and what you do affects the whole World. When you do well, it spreads out; it is for the
whole of humanity.” Other cultures have similar concepts such as *kizuna* (Japanese), *siratulrahim* (Malay) and *alli kawsay* and *nandereko* (Andean). This concept also highlights the importance of seeing from other cultural perspectives, so there is not a reliance solely on concepts within one culture to define values in human interactions. At the post-secondary level, many universities espouse the concept of “global citizenship” which is in a similar vein and yet, this value of Ubuntu goes even a step further to a deeper identity of an interconnected human being, living in community, with community being defined both locally and globally. This implies a paradigm shift for many from the traditional “us” vs. “them” to an expanded identity of “we’re in this together.”

International educational exchanges, in promoting peace, need to ensure this value of Ubuntu permeates intercultural experiences so that participants gain this deeper sense of interconnectedness, beyond individual identity, and beyond “us versus other.”

3) *Encourage Neighborliness.* Neighborliness is a term not often found in current Western literature and yet this value dates back to the earliest days of humanity. Ancient literature discusses the importance of loving one’s neighbor – of not only being in relation with each other but in the *resulting actions* that occur through neighborliness- and in the end, literally loving one’s neighbor. Both Confucius and Jesus commanded “Love thy neighbor as thyself.” Religions note the importance – and even centrality – of loving one’s neighbor. This is not just the purview of religion though. In the 17th century, famous Enlightenment philosopher John Locke stated, “To love our neighbors as ourselves is such a truth for regulating human society, that by that alone one might determine all cases in social morality.” How do we *behave* toward our neighbors, locally as well as neighbors through international exchange? What does it mean to be a “good neighbor?” Even more than that, how might the world be different if humans practiced actually loving their neighbors (which includes enemies) and putting others’ needs as equal to one’s own? Martin Luther King Jr.’s mentor, Howard Thurman, observed that “The first step toward love is to a common sharing of a sense of mutual value and worth. This cannot be discovered in a vacuum or in a series of artificial or hypothetical relationships. It has to be in a real situation, natural, free”. Thus, international educational exchange provides the real-life situations and contexts in which neighborliness can be practiced so that such experience goes beyond an academic exercise – or even a pleasurable touristic pursuit – to one that has the potential for building lasting relationships, expanding one’s capacity to love, and in the end, for making a lasting investment toward building a more peaceful world.

These three core value propositions – of extending respect, enacting Ubuntu, and encouraging neighborliness – are interconnected and can be the basis of educational exchange moving forward, in not only ensuring that such exchanges go beyond academic study only but in fulfilling the broader role of moving toward a more peaceful world. Implementation will not necessarily be easy though, since each of these three values imply hard work, especially when confronted with the harsh realities of existing tensions and conflicts. Rather than give up or shy away, though, these are the instances when international educational exchange can play an even more vital role in peacemaking when embracing these core values. This, then,
The BIG Picture:...

means that international educational exchange needs to go beyond “safe realities” of the traditional exchange locations.

If we are to promote peace and understanding, however, we must also go beyond educational exchange. It’s a start but it’s not enough to simply move students around the world through these exchanges. Educators need to focus on ALL students, not just those privileged enough to study abroad. What does this mean? This means intentionally working with teachers so that they are adequately prepared to guide students in their intercultural learning – meaning that teacher education becomes an absolutely essential focal point for promoting peace. This means academics at higher education institutions need to be better prepared as well, through faculty development opportunities to enhance their own intercultural competence. This means infusing the curriculum at all levels of education with intercultural and international dimensions – beyond adding a reading or lecture – but in addressing the proposed value propositions throughout the curriculum, regardless of discipline.

In looking more broadly and reflecting on what we’ve learned and what may be needed in the future, some common themes emerge:

1) Focus on building community. It’s about community, about learning from each other and not just learning from the holders of knowledge. It’s about truly valuing each other – beyond the confines of one program or institution. How will we work together within our local communities? Within the global community? What are our obligations to each other? And what is necessary for us to get along together, whether locally or globally?

2) As we build community, let’s engage in authentic mutual dialogue with the goal being not to necessarily reach agreement – or to further a one-sided message- but to mutually enrich our understanding of each other, and the world, and so doing, being willing to be changed through the dialogue.

3) As we engage in dialogue, let’s approach each other with cultural humility – as we strive to truly respect and value each other and understand that our way of seeing the world is just one way, that our knowledge is not the truth and acknowledge that there are multiple truths.

3. Looking to the Future: The Bigger Picture

Twenty-five years ago, in 1993, a political scientist named Samuel Huntington wrote this of the future: “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”13 Huntington’s subsequent book in 1996, Clash of Civilizations, led to a flurry of criticisms and responses, two of which I want to share briefly with you as a way of thinking about the future and framing some possible rethinking about the role of international educational exchange in promoting peace and understanding.

A Ghanaian-British-American philosopher named Kwame Anthony Appiah rejected the notion of a clashing world, and while recognizing the serious differences that exist, he

13 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22.
admonishes us to stop thinking of the world as “divided between the West and the Rest, between locals and moderns, between Us and Them”. But, rather, we need to remember the powerful ties that connect people across religions, culture and nations. The way forward, according to Appiah, is through mutual respect and understanding among the world’s people and as idealistic as that may sound, he suggests that this can occur through the recognition that every person matters, that each person has a right to a life of dignity. This underscores the value proposition of respect, which I discussed previously. Seeking understanding does not mean seeking agreement, he goes on to say, and this understanding occurs through mutually enriching dialogue in which we remain open to being changed by the other, not trying to get others to agree with us. In so doing, we recognize our obligation to each other. So, one question is how do we engage others in mutually enriching dialogue? How can such dialogue become more integral to international educational exchange? And more importantly, how can we all remain open to being changed by others when we encounter difference—and similarity?

A second response to this clash of civilizations comes from a French political scientist and founder of the French Institute of International Affairs, Dominique Moisi, who explored the far-reaching emotional impact of globalization through what he calls the clash of emotions. He observed three common responses to globalization—hope, humiliation and fear—and suggests that in order to understand our changing world, we need to confront emotion—in ourselves and in society. In fact, he goes so far as to say that emotional frontiers will become as important as geographic frontiers, and calls for the mapping of the geopolitics of emotions. The way forward for Moisi is three-fold: 1) teach history and culture so as to better understand the context of emotion; 2) gain greater self-knowledge; and 3) transcend beyond fear and humiliation to embrace a hopeful future. This, then, provides an agenda for future international educational exchange and Moisi’s perspective raises a second practical question: How do we engage emotion as a tool for understanding the complexities of the 21st century?

Seventy-years ago World War II ended, bringing about a renewed commitment to peace and international understanding. And while this modern period has been deemed the most peaceful time in human history, there are still countless clashes occurring, fueled by greed, misunderstandings, and a lack of Ubuntu. The challenges confronting us as humans are many—as are the opportunities, and I’d like to sum up both with one word: Balance. Restoring or achieving balance is at the core of many of the world’s issues such as geopolitics, the environment, injustices, poverty… and therein also lies opportunity. To that end, what is the role of international educational exchange in addressing the imbalances that face us as humans, imbalances that exist between nations and continents, imbalances that exist in local communities, and imbalances that exist in the environment? What are the opportunities presented through these imbalances and how might international education exchange integrate such opportunities?

Inspirational leaders such as Mandela, King, Gandhi—as well as scholars of today such as Appiah and Moisi—have provided insight into how to proceed: to give dignity to each human

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The BIG Picture: being, to go beyond a focus on ourselves as individuals to embrace our broader humanity—so as not to reinforce the status quo, or to perpetuate the divide between the haves and the have-nots. As Mandela noted, education is truly the most powerful weapon we have to change the world.\(^{17}\) International educational exchange can play a continued role in changing the world through embracing a vision of truly caring for each other as humans sharing this planet, through building deeper relationships, through living in authentic community with each other—community that upholds human dignity for all. As we look to the future, let’s (re)think about what it means to be true global citizens of the world, living out underlying values of respect, Ubuntu, and neighborliness as we keep this bigger picture in mind—of ultimately bringing balance to this world in which we live, and of what it means to instill students and all those connected to us, with not just the knowledge to succeed but with all that is necessary to succeed together in the future that tomorrow holds.

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US Public Diplomacy in the Modern Era: A Review of Battles to Bridges

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Review article of:


1. Introduction

In Battles to Bridges, R. S. Zaharna has put together detailed empirical evidence, carried out in line with a rich theoretical framework, to enable a thorough descriptive and analytical treatment of the subject of US public diplomacy for the Middle East. The subject is a timely one in light of the debates that have ensued in the US since the 9/11 attacks, and the book is a must-read for all who want to gain insights into the US’s efforts to address and engage with diverse global publics in the postmodern era.

The past decade has been a playground for accelerated economic and cultural globalization. Although globalization is hardly a new concept, the processes involved in the current phase of globalization are novel in intensity, scale and scope. Sociolinguist and anthropologist Jan Blommaert argues that the world is no longer a global village, as metaphorized by McLuhan over five decades ago, but “a tremendously complex web of villages, towns, neighborhoods, settlements connected by material and symbolic ties in often unpredictable ways.”1 Communication, as an essential top aid of globalization, has revolutionized world affairs, and through this complex web, news is transmitted at light speed across the globe. This new phase of globalization has also challenged the powers of the world which previously dominated the transmission of knowledge and shaped the opinions throughout the world. As Simon Anholt, an independent policy advisor and the founder of the Good Country Index, noted in 2014 at a software conference, “there is only one superpower left on the planet and its name is global public opinion”. Today, global civil society is the new actor determining the success or failure of policies. The US government, though it struggles diligently, has arguably not been able to keep pace with this shift in world affairs. Zaharna provides a guide to what the Bush administration did and did not do in light of the challenges posed by new globalization processes. Her criticisms leveled first in 2010 and now in a new, 2014 edition enriched by Nicholas Cull’s foreword, seem to remain unaddressed under the Obama

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administration, which suffers from many of the same problems with respect to America’s
global standing in relation to the Islamic State or al-Qaeda. This second edition is timely
therefore in addressing the overarching question: “What is wrong with US public diplomacy
and how can it be fixed?”

This review essay begins with an overview of Zaharna’s book in three sub-sections: the
legacy of lessons taken from post-9/11 public diplomacy; the impact of changes in political
and communication dynamics on US public diplomacy; and the public diplomacy theory
building process. This is then followed by a reflection by the author on the relevance of the
grand strategy and tactics offered by Zaharna on contemporary US public diplomacy.

2. Overview of the Book

Zaharna’s *Battles to Bridges* is well-researched and embedded in theory, and it relates public
diplomacy with culture and intercultural communication. The author’s adept language allows
her to step out of the scholarly Ivory Tower and communicate her work with larger audiences,
including those who seek to grasp the field of public diplomacy from outside the walls of
academia. Zaharna’s book serves two aims. First, it is written for the students, scholars and
practitioners of the emerging field of public diplomacy. To that end, she reviews the two
The earlier period is particularly important because, she argues, it enables the reading public
to reconstruct the rich details of the period with original documents likely to disappear rapidly
from the Internet. The second purpose of the book is to lay the grounds for preliminary theory
building in public diplomacy, which is a burgeoning field of study. Zaharna aims to provide
students, researchers and diplomats with the necessary theoretical lenses to define effective
public diplomacy. The book is divided into three main sections with three chapters in each.
What follows is an overview of the three main sections.

2.1. Legacy of the lessons of post-9/11 public diplomacy

Chapter 1, *America’s Communication Problem*, opens with the now-forgotten outpouring
of support the US received right after the 9/11 attacks and then traces the political events
that gave rise to the decline of this worldwide support. Zaharna first depicts the general
atmosphere of the critical period (2001-2004) and provides compelling and comprehensive
details of the political moves as follows. Most of the world, including all Middle East
countries, from Jordan to Indonesia, all the Arab and Islamic world, Africa, Asia, Europe and
Australia showed their verbal and symbolic support following the attacks, and more than 100
countries vowed to grant military, political, economic and legal cooperation to America in a
true international war on terrorism, which started in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 against
al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. As America’s diplomatic campaign for a full-fledged attack
in Afghanistan became more aggressive and the rhetoric began to switch from “terrorism” to
“radical Islam,” concerns grew in the Islamic Arab world, and anti-American demonstrations
from Pakistan to Indonesia started under the unifying banner of Islam. Reactions spread
throughout the international community after the 2002 declaration of the expansion of war
against terrorism to comprise the Arab Gulf region and with the growth of US public diplomacy
rhetoric such as the “axis of evil”, “you are either with us or with the terrorists,” and wanting
Osama bin Laden “dead or alive.” Such moves strengthened stereotypes of America as being
“hypocritical, arrogant, inattentive, unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue,” (16) and helped spark worldwide antiwar rallies from Tokyo to San Francisco. In 2003, as the US entered Iraq in disregard of the UN report stating a failure to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, France, Germany and Russia all voiced strong opposition to the invasion, which then strengthened anti-American and/or anti-Bush sentiment worldwide.

Although many analysts focused on anti-Americanism at the time as it affected the US economically, politically, and militarily, Zaharna argues that the phenomenon was more complex than simply a need to improve the US’s image in the world arena. According to her, America’s communication problem led to a broader decline in its stature despite its communication efforts during the first critical phase of the post-9/11 period. Zaharna draws on the “mirror phenomenon” and on “perpetual gaps” to explain the communication breakdown that occurred between the international public and the American public. Mirror images of the two parties, the American image in the Islamic world and the image of Islam in America, were mutually reinforcing, i.e., in the countries or regions where America’s image was low, the American public opinion of those regions was similarly low. As for Europe, Zaharna refers to perpetual gaps between American and international public opinion. Large perpetual gaps, i.e., to what extent the two parties share similar perceptions and opinions, exacerbated the communication breakdowns. Particularly, the negative perception of American power in Europe, and America’s not taking her allies’ opinions into consideration about the war in Iraq drastically worsened the relations in this critical period.

Although Zaharna draws on the “mirror phenomenon” and “perpetual gaps” to explain the reasons for the major communication breakdown at this time, her analysis could have benefitted from a historically grounded and politically engaged perspective on the matter rather than mainly basing her research on public opinion polls and surveys. We can consult Edward Said’s *Orientalism* to inform ourselves on the complex, denigrating characterization of the East (including the Arab world) in the eyes of the colonial West, and Buruma and Margalit’s *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies*, which highlights the anti-Western attitude in the larger East from Syria to Japan, where the writers diagnose the source of Occidentalism as the West itself. These refrains, *orientalism* and *oxidentalism*, can be deemed as the main contributors to the mirror images in both realms. The consequences are deep cultural misunderstandings of the Arab world and thwarted US political actions in the region, as Zaharna emphasizes.

In Chapter 2, *Battle for Hearts and Minds*, Zaharna surveys the intensive and expansive public diplomacy initiatives in the first phase post-9/11, 2001-2004. She highlights the central issue of most Americans having been “blissfully unaware of how they were perceived or what the consequences could be of anti-American sentiment” (29) prior to 9/11, and then examines in vivid detail the efforts subsequently made to improve America’s image. From the comprehensive fact book “the Network of Terrorism,” an electronic pamphlet entitled “Muslim Life in America,” and an emphasis on the “Shared Values” theme, to “Hi” magazine, the pop music channel “Radio Sawa,” and “Al-Hurra,” a 24-hour Arabic language satellite TV station, Zaharna describes a number of “extremely innovative, ambitious and very expensive” public initiatives that never fulfilled the expectations of “winning hearts and minds” or of promoting American values, but served rather the opposite. Zaharna explicates
how these attempts were considered as “condescending,” “arrogant,” “patronizing” and “slanted” because the audiences in the Arab world took them as an assault on their identity. At the same time, the brutal and insensitive actions of the troops in Iraq and particularly toward Abu Ghraib prisoners and to their culture and values were considered as reflecting Americans’ true feelings towards the public in the region. She concludes that the US was not able to “cross the cultural and political hurdles” because they were not able to understand and value their audiences as being comprised of individuals.

In chapter 3, Search for Answers, Zaharna analyzes the failure of public diplomacy initiatives by examining the historically important special body of government and private reports that shaped US public diplomacy post-9/11. Unlike others, such as Kohut and Stokes, Zaharna argues that the US government realized that the communication breakdown did not stem from a lack of knowledge about American values and culture, and they began to seek answers for the inefficiency of US public diplomacy. Zaharna illustrates the process through a range of reports such as that by the Council on Foreign Relations in 2001, the Government Accountability Office’s, and the 9/11 Commission’s in 2004. She pinpoints that all these reports highlighted the origin of the problems in US diplomacy as dating back to the 1990s and to the end of the Cold War, and listed the major problems as “funding, structure, coordination, resources and strategy;”(58) the resulting offered solution being to develop a strategy resembling the Cold War model. Zaharna then describes the emphasis of individual diplomatic attempts made between 2004-2008 to improve America’s stature in the global arena by stating many important names that worked as assets in this period, and concludes that however much effort was spent, US public diplomacy had neither the stability nor efficiency to succeed.

2.2. Changing dynamics

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on the impact of changing political and communication dynamics in the international platform on US public diplomacy, and explore these dynamics under three sub-headings: connectivity, interactivity and cultural diversity. Chapter 4, which serves as an introduction chapter to the above mentioned issues, is twofold. First, it describes a historical context of US public diplomacy during times of war since the American Revolution and surfaces a detailed account of the recurring debates on traditional US public diplomacy patterns from the pre-Cold War and Cold War era. What follows is a helpful discussion of the key terminology associated with international relations (IR) by stating the nuances between phrases that are usually controversially used such as propaganda, public diplomacy, public relations and cultural diplomacy. In the second half of the chapter Zaharna portrays the post-Cold War era and the challenges encountered by US public diplomacy in a new globalization era revolutionized by digital communication. Zaharna then particularly explains the new power tools, people and dynamics of new public diplomacy in this era such as interactive social media, networking, the celebrities and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). She

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3 In their book America Against the World, Kohut, the director of the Pew Research Center, and Stokes, NPR commentator, vaguely argue that the rest of the world hates Americans because they do not understand or they misunderstand Americans values of individualism, exceptionalism, and optimism in worldly issues. According to the Pew survey, polled in 50 countries with 91,000 people, it is concluded that the autonomous and mostly unilateral way of acting that America has demonstrated is considered by the world public to be mostly driven by America’s over-nationalism and religiousness. The authors, however, argue that data collected in the US suggested that Americans do not feel that way and are not enthusiastic about their government’s actions.
criticizes US public diplomacy for trying to catch up with the post modern era by “simply employing new communication technology,” rather than by developing new communication strategies to exercise soft power in the international arena such as “net activism, cyber-advocacy and e-advocacy based on efficient message exchange” to overcome the challenge posed by “the shift from message content to message exchange” (90).

Chapter 5 deals with the topic of soft power, i.e., “how to influence others through persuasion rather than force” and its two main assets: connectivity and interactivity, which have replaced the mass communication models that rely on information transmission (92). Zaharna draws attention to the key concepts and terminology in the field of public diplomacy and seeks to address to the differences between mass communication dynamics and network communication dynamics, i.e., “the first results in wielding soft power and the second in creating it” (111). She highlights the latter as the new age’s source of creating soft power via agents like NGO and TAN (transnational advocacy networks), and illustrates the inner workings or networking of these agents to facilitate message exchange. Zaharna graphically exemplifies how an initiative based on network communication dynamics could possibly ease communication across cultural barriers via the example of Al-Hurra television. She then describes the three interrelated components of a network communication approach: a network structure that facilitates information exchange; network synergy as members combine power to multiply the effect of exchange; and network strategy that “uses information to co-create credibility, master narratives and identity” (107); and expounds on the reasons why US public diplomacy needs to adopt this approach. She argues that the reason for the failure of US public diplomacy is the dominant use of a mass communication approach which is inherently a message transmission strategy focusing on message content and dissemination of information used in the Cold War era.

In chapter 6, Zaharna explores culture and identity as important components of the new global era and deals with US public diplomacy with regard to its own cultural features. She discusses the underlying assumptions and presumptions of how cultural diplomacy played an essential role as “the linchpin of public diplomacy” (4) during the Cold War era. In the post 9/11 era, it was deemed that promotion of US cultural values had proved to be an effective public diplomacy asset behind the iron curtain, and thus the same tool could again be used to penetrate into the Islamic world. However, such attempts to promote US culture were already taken as identity assaults by the Islamic world. Thus, she argues that such an aggressive Cold War strategy cannot be as effective as it was in that era due to new globalization in the postmodern era. Unlike the narrow view of culture as a tool for communication of public diplomacy, IR studies, she argues, should focus on culture as a notion that spreads across the globe and should aim to help US public diplomacy develop a multicultural approach which feeds on cultural diversity. In this vein, since “culture becomes the new frontier for defining identities and allegiances” (115), it should be recognized as an integral part of communication that permeates several areas of IR and politics rather than as a tool for public diplomacy. Zaharna draws attention to the inherent cultural divergences between the West and the East and defines the problem in several US public initiatives as “not a lack of information but the differing cultural perspectives used to interpret the information” (120, italics mine). She thus contends that although it is the most challenging task to develop a multicultural approach by skillfully blending multiple perspectives in IR, such an approach may help public diplomacy tremendously to develop a more cognizant perspective of the Islamic world and deal with culturally diverse publics.
2.3. Expanding the vision of strategic US public diplomacy

This third and last section of the book deals with the process of developing US public diplomacy theory across the three essential steps: grand strategy, strategy, and tactics. Chapter 7 draws mostly on two main approaches assessed in chapter 5: mass communication and network communication dynamics. Zaharna introduces two main frameworks to analyze the US public initiatives in the post-9/11 period at the strategic and tactical levels. Given the discussions about the definition and contents of public diplomacy, she outlines the dominant features of an information framework, which basically assumes communication breakdowns occur either because of a lack of information or from mis-information, and thus relies on the control of information to fix such communication problems. Zaharna gives as examples various US initiatives: international broadcasting, information campaigns, nation branding, and media relations from the perspective of an information framework, and points out that this framework in US public diplomacy attitudes has been pervasive particularly in relation to the Islamic world. The other framework that Zaharna reviews is a relational framework, which focuses on setting up and maintaining relationships to solve communication problems. It is emphasized that US public diplomacy refers to cultural and educational exchange programs such as Fulbright and Humphrey as relational initiatives. Zaharna convincingly argues that in order to be able to expand the vision of US public diplomacy, both frameworks should be embraced complementarily; however, implementation of these frameworks will not be enough to make sure that US public diplomacy is effective and counterproductive. Therefore, she underscores the essential need for having a grand strategy that matches the communication and politics dynamics of the international arena to guarantee the effectiveness of US public diplomacy.

In chapter 8, Zaharna argues that failure of the US public diplomacy efforts in the post-9/11 period stemmed from two crucial reasons. The first one is related to the lack of theoretical knowledge to differentiate between the grand strategy of public diplomacy and the tactics and strategies of individual public diplomacy efforts. Drawing on Carl Botan’s guideline to distinguish among the three levels of grand strategy, strategy, and tactics in public communication, Zaharna analyzes the existing grand strategy of US diplomacy as very similar to intransigent and resistant grand strategy, i.e., autonomous, highly motivated to defeat all competitors, public and communication technicians are excluded from the policy decision makings, control is vital, and change is not welcome. However, the presence of this already existing grand strategy is not recognized in public diplomacy, which makes the assessment of its match with the dynamics of the world very difficult.

The other and more important reason is the mismatch between the already existing grand strategy and the underlying communication dynamics of the new global era in the international platform. Zaharna argues that when one judges the expressed US diplomacy policy, specifically its focus on the dialogue with international publics, one can consider that US public diplomacy should in fact have a cooperative or integrative grand strategy, in which the organization is considered to be interdependent with the environment, the public is viewed as a legitimate stakeholder in the decision-making process, and change is preferred. However, a close look at the underlying dynamics of US diplomacy reveals that it is more likely to adopt intransigent or resistant grand strategies, which were viable during the Cold War era mainly because they corresponded with the communication and political dynamics of the time—a time when information dominance helped to win the battle.
In line with Botan, Zaharna does not prefer one grand strategy over another, but rather, argues that the effectiveness and counter-productiveness of a grand strategy does not rely on its internal logic but on the match between the world view of the organization and the dynamics of the external world. In this vein, US public diplomacy suffered from this mismatch during the post-9/11 period. Given that, Zaharna suggests a grand strategy that would capitalize on a network communication approach and on connective, relational strategies, which are in accordance with the underlying political and communication dynamics of the new global era. She suggest that building bridges as a grand strategy works best with culturally diverse populations because it incorporates the two frameworks, informational and relational, and thus gives a cooperative angle to US public diplomacy to claim power in today’s world. Zaharna concludes that “those with the most extensive and strongest communication bridges will command power in the global communication era” (173).

In the Epilogue, Zaharna expresses her raised hopes for a change in public diplomacy under the new Obama government, which had by the time of writing completed its 100th day in the office, due to the new administration’s apparent adoption of a grand strategy of building bridges as judged by the early acts such as signing an executive order to close Guantanamo Bay within a year, withdrawing US troops from Iraq and the emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy at the highest level. She observes that Obama’s individual stance had initially created enthusiasm and sympathy around the world but this would not be enough for the implementation of building bridges as a grand strategy rather than fighting information battles. Zaharna recommends studying public diplomacy as a multidimensional area of research in close connection with culture, ethics, and non-state actors. She concludes the book by stating the need for a paradigm shift in US public diplomacy and an expansion of vision in strategic communication and public diplomacy, and suggests that unless US public diplomacy changes to keep up with the era, “increasing the budget and intensifying communication efforts may only further alienate publics and magnify problems rather than ameliorate them” (5).

In conclusion, when considering the detailed and careful exploration of the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of US public diplomacy in the post-9/11 period, the book is likely to become a key manuscript for those who are involved in public diplomacy and international relations studies. By virtue of the importance of the subjects addressed in the book, it should also serve a wider interest to all who are involved in the area through research, teaching, and as practitioner diplomats. For those less familiar with or sympathetic to the field, a warning about the terminology and jargon: be ready to closely follow the steps, stages and levels that Zaharna provides in order to properly grasp her framework. By placing the discussion of US public diplomacy in its historical context, Zaharna eases the readers’ path to comprehend the tangled issues about ideological and theoretical perspectives. Attentive perusal of the chapters is mandatory to avoid coming away with the impression that Zaharna is emotionally attached to the topic and is bent on criticizing the Bush government. The book is very likely to accelerate the on-going debate about US public diplomacy while tackling with the war on

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4 As of today, Guantánamo Bay is still open and after delivering an economic speech in March 18, 2015, in Cleveland, Ohio, President Obama commented that he was regretful for not closing the detention camp and said that “I think I would have closed Guantánamo on the first day,” but it is stated that closing Guantánamo would require cooperation from Congress, where Republicans have shown little indication that they would be willing to lift current restrictions on the closing of the prison. Although Obama repeated his intention to shut down the facility several times, the president has only been able to reduce the population at Guantánamo to 122 prisoners.
terrorism focused now on both ISIS and al-Qaeda, and may tell us about the extent to which we need to re-think the previous decade and theories in public diplomacy to illuminate the contemporary times, and as such is an addition to the discussion in the following section.

3. Reflections on the Obama Administration

Addressing the summit on countering violent extremism held on February 18, 2015, President Barack Obama said “We are not at war with Islam. We are at war with people who perverted Islam,” thus seeking to strike a balance between gaining the confidence of the Muslim world while accentuating the US policy to stay determined and aware of the ideologies of the Islamic State or al-Qaeda terrorists. Prior to the summit, Obama was already trying hard not to attribute Islamic fundamentalism to the creed itself, and at the same time, according to his aides, what he aimed at was not to play into the hands of the ideological stand embraced by the Islamic State or al-Qaeda. However, Obama’s word choice, including “Countering Violent Extremism” or “brainwashing” rather than “Islamic extremism,” to describe the acts of the Islamic State or al-Qaeda terrorists, has been the topic of harsh criticism, particularly in domestic politics. Rudi Giuliani, the former New York City mayor and one-time presidential contender, went on record saying, “I do not believe - and I know this is a horrible thing to say - but I do not believe that the President loves America,” and added: “He doesn’t love you. And he doesn’t love me. He wasn’t brought up the way you were brought up and I was brought up through love of this country”. Obama’s vague phrasing, the opponents, vehemently on the right, a few liberals and former security officials, say, reflects uncertainty and weakness against extremists who claim to fight in the name of Islam and threaten America and its interests around the world.

On the other hand, Obama’s rhetoric and his cautious stance for distancing Islam from the terrorist groups with whom Islamic peoples and governments never identify was appreciated by the Muslim world overseas and many advocates for Muslims: “We support the Obama administration and the administration before them for not falling into the al-Qaeda-ISIS trap of saying this is a religious war,” said Farhana Khera, executive director of Muslim Advocates, a US-based Islamic group.

Peter D. Feaver, a political scientist at Duke University, deeply involved in helping shape President George W. Bush’s language, argues that choosing what to say about the enemy during the long campaign against al-Qaeda was a challenge for Mr. Bush, and now Mr. Obama has the same problem with the Islamic State. Zaharna too states that this has been a major challenge for both presidents: that of “how to bridge the inconsistencies between US public diplomacy goals and US domestic sentiment toward foreign publics” (178). In that sense, US domestic public opinion serves as a gauge for measuring the US image by the foreign publics. This discrepancy that the US presidents are displaying – the US public’s actual sentiments and efforts to promote the likeability of the US in the Islamic world - has always the potential to cripple the effectiveness of US public diplomacy. Professor Akbar

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8 Shane, “Faulted for Avoiding ‘Islamic’ Labels”.

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Ahmed, chair of Islamic Studies at American University, who has been called “the world’s leading authority on contemporary Islam” by the BBC, said that he approves of the Obama administration’s diligence in avoiding a counterproductive smear of all Muslims. Yet he also said the President at times seems to draw on an academic approach to an ingrained, highly politicized discussion: “He sounds like a distinguished professor in the ivory tower, and he may have to come down into the hurly-burly of politics”.9

Bernard Lewis, in his book *What Went Wrong?: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*, contends that though it may be commonplace to consider unavoidable the conflictual resulting nature of different cultures confronting, it’s only indicative of the recent breakdown in communication and exchange between them. The insidious deeds of the Islamophobes, conceivably, has penetrated pop culture. In one recent example, Bill Maher, an American comedian, well known for the HBO political talk show *Real Time with Bill Maher*, said that “Obviously the vast majority of Muslims would never do anything like this [referring to the Charlie Hebdo attacks], but they share bad ideas”. In that program he invited in Salman Rushdie, and quoted Sam Harris, an American author, who, as a guest on an earlier program had stated “Islam is the motherlode of bad ideas”.10 Such portrayals of Muslims feed antagonism in the American public and create a larger Islamophobia. In tandem with Zaharna, it can thus be argued that in order to bridge the gap between the Western and Islamic worlds, the required change should be two-pronged in line with a contrary thinking against both orientalism and occidentalism. While the US should take pains to improve its image in the Arab and Islamic world, the Arab and Islamic world should also go over with a fine comb its own understandings of and policies towards the US. For now, however, both parties seem to reflect the metanarrative of the “clash of civilizations” in various ways.

Zaharna cautions that US credibility can be undermined unless the inconsistencies between US public diplomacy and US foreign policy are reconciled, and sees these deviations as having been the main challenge of the Bush government and to-be-challenges of the Obama government. In the same vein, in his recent book, *Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam*, Ahmed criticizes both governments and argues that although Presidents Bush’s and Obama’s styles and content are different, the results have been the same. Arguing that there is an actual war going on in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan between the American drones and tribal Islamic civilization, he projects his sentiments towards both governments:

Bush’s administration, I felt, was spectacularly wrong because it was imposing a prefabricated ideological frame on different cultures and societies, an exercise that was predictably bound to run into trouble. Obama’s administration was spectacularly unsure, and I looked in vain for a coherent frame. It gave the impression of lurching dangerously from one crisis to another as events on the ground developed and it reacted to them. Neither approach helped the United States and the Muslim world resolve the problems that plagued them after 9/11. Both administrations were driven by issues almost wholly on a political level, neglecting the moral and social dimensions and their implications.11

Zaharna’s invaluable exploratory study is still illuminative in both senses. Thanks to her work, the Bush-era US public diplomacy lessons will not be forgotten. Moreover, through

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9 Shane, "Faulted for Avoiding ‘Islamic’ Labels".
her wisdom, it is very striking to see through the growing scale of challenges that face US public diplomacy even as we start nearing the end of the Obama years. Although the negative repercussions of US foreign policy are still visible in the international arena, there is reason for hope that the tides will not return to the particularly problematic post-9/11 period, as long as the profundness of the relational approach within the immense network of villages is mastered skillfully by US public diplomats. Acknowledging that the Cold War era is over, US public diplomacy should develop new strategies taking today’s network-based communication dynamics into consideration in order to put an end to Battles and move the country towards Bridges to establish a long lasting peace and understanding between the United States and the rest of the world.

Bibliography


Abstracts in Turkish

Değişim Programları ve Barış: Karşı Olgular ve Keşfedilmemiş Olanaklar

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Özet

Uluslararası değişim programlarının uluslararası ilişkilerin daha barışçı olmasını katkıda bulunacağını düşünülebiliriz, ancak bunun böyle olduğunu dair kanıtlar ne derece güçlüdür? Bu makalede, derginin bu sayısında tartışılacak kültürlerarası eğitimini yanı sıra, değişimın barışa katkıda bulunduğu mekanizmalar dört kategoride sınıflandırılmıştır: sinyalizasyon, tavr değişikliği, ağ oluşumu ve kurumsal transfer. Bu mekanizmaların her bir aracılığı ile değişimın uluslararası ilişkiler üzerindeki etkisine dair kanıtlar değerlendirilmiştir. Yapılan çok sayıda araştırmaya rağmen kanıtlarda önemli boşluklar bulunmaktadır ve bu boşluklar değişim programlarının nasıl düzenlenceği ve ne türden bir hareketliliğin destekleneceği bakımdan önemli sonuçlar doğurabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası değişim programı, barış, araştırmaya, kanıt, kurumlar, öğrenim

Kültürlerarası Anlayış ve Demokratik Yönetişimin Gelişmesinde Elit ABD Askeri Okullarının Rolü

Carol Atkinson

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Özet

ABD ordusunun harp ve kurmay okullarındaki eğitim değişim programları kültürlerarası anlayış ile uluslararası güvenliği teşvik etmeye ve ABD’nin dış politika hedeflerine ulaşmasına yardımcı olmaktadır. Bu makale, ABD’de yabancıların katılmasına açık olan çeşitli askeri eğitim ve öğretim programlarına bir bakış sağlamakta ve bunlarla sivil değişim programları arasındaki farkları araştırmaktadır. Askeri eğitim değişim programlarının katılımcılar üzerindeki etkilerine bakılarak aynı zamanda değişim programlarının tasarımı ve yönetimine dair bazı dersler çıkarılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eğitim, ordu, yumuşak güç, değişim, UAÖE, sosyalleşme, inşaatlık
Stratejik İletişim ve Eğitim Değişiminin Piyasalaştırılması

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Özet
Bu makalede, ABD stratejik iletişiminin tipik bir özelliği olan piyasalaştırma söyleminin, eğitim değişiminin anlam ve uygulamalarını da nasıl etkilediği anlatılmaktadır. ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı Eğitim ve Kültür İşleri Bürosu tarafından hazırlanan beş sunum ve 34 adet program değerlendirilmesi analiz edilerek, piyasalaştırma söyleminin karşılıklı anlayış ve barışin gelişimi açısından yarattığı riskler araştırılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eğitim değişimi, kamu diplomasisi, söylem, angajman
Manuscript Submission:

Manuscripts submitted for consideration must follow the style on the journal’s web page (http://www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org/doc/authors-guideline.doc). The manuscripts should not be submitted simultaneously to any other publication, nor may they have been previously published elsewhere in English. However, articles that are published previously in another language but updated or improved can be submitted. For such articles, the author(s) will be responsible in seeking the required permission for copyright.

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