Aims and Scope

All Azimuth, journal of the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, is an English-language, international peer-reviewed journal, published biannually. It aims:

• to provide a forum for academic studies on foreign policy analysis, peace and development research,
• to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements in the dialogue between the “center” and the “periphery”,
• to encourage publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches.
• to transcend conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries,
• to highlight works of senior and promising young scholars,
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In This Issue

This issue of *All Azimuth* offers a select collection of papers on several important topics, employing different methods and theoretical perspectives.

This issue opens with a research article by Kim and James, which directs our attention to the puzzling question of why and when states would challenge a hegemon and the order it has established, even if there is a wide discrepancy in their material powers. On this rather little understood subject, the authors argue that weak but strongly motivated states dissatisfied with the status quo are more likely to challenge the hegemon when the hegemon is preoccupied with war. This argument is interesting as it goes against conventional wisdom, which suggests that the hegemon’s projection of military power elsewhere can deter potential challengers. Relying on their empirical results using the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset with Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) and binary time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) models, the authors explain that the weaker states may opt to launch a challenge at a time when the hegemon is already engaged in military activities because ongoing war involvement distracts the hegemon and drains its material and ideational capabilities. In addition, they find, weaker states that have an alliance portfolio dissimilar to that of the hegemon are more likely than others to initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes.

Our second research article turns our attention away from the question of war involvement into the domain of peace, in particular the reconciliation process in the aftermath of conflicts. Kök Arslan and Turhan explore the reconciliation process in South Africa after the end of apartheid, and look at Nelson Mandela’s iconic role in bringing about reconciliation between different communities. They argue that there is direct positive relationship between Mandela’s leadership, personality and efforts and the prospects for reconciliation in South Africa. Building on Johann Galtung’s Conflict Triangle framework, they explore the effect of Mandela’s extraordinary endeavours on his country’s fate by looking into his normative statements, symbolic acts, as well as his judicial actions. In its use of statements and behaviours of those in power, the article offers a method that can contribute to the study of reconciliation at the national level.

Our third article focuses on another inter-communal conflict, i.e. the Thorny Peace in Northern Ireland. Borsuk argues that almost two decades after the peace deal, the Northern Irish are still living under the fog of insecurity. She outlines three reasons for this. First is the sporadic communal violence, particularly the activities of spoiler paramilitary groups, which reactivates inter-communal divisions. Second is the age-old political practices, mainly ethnic outbidding and intransigent party politicking, both of which pit communities against each other and keep the zero-sum perception between the groups alive. Finally, she points to the social vulnerabilities of working-class areas, which constituted the backbone of the political violence. A long-lasting social infrastructure for peace, she claims, necessitates dealing with problems such as the continuing paramilitary presence, the legacy of sectarianism in segregated neighborhoods, persistent mistrust toward the police, and growing youth unemployment. Borsuk’s article is important not only for its findings but also for the method used in acquiring these findings. During the summer of 2014, she conducted interviews with 23 people including local community workers, Northern Ireland deputies, and specialists on Northern Ireland. Combining the insights gathered from these interviews with those from her more informal interaction with residents of North and West Belfast, two of the districts
that were most affected by violence, she is able to give us a reliable evaluation of the current conditions as well as a genuine understanding of the region’s most pressing needs.

Our final research article also benefits from personal experience. Being both an academic and a former executive, who had worked in the Turkish Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM) for 14 years, Ekici is uniquely situated to evaluate shortcomings of the contemporary international drug control system. Despite the UN-led initiatives such as conventions, political declarations, and plans of action, and the vast resources allocated by international institutions and governments, he claims, global counter narcotics efforts have been ineffective on almost every front. The United Nations’ goal of a “drug-free world” is far from being reached, he declares: Both drug consumption and drug-related deaths have increased over the past three decades, many new psychoactive substances appear on the market each year, precursor chemicals are not efficiently controlled, and the drug supply consistently shifts to areas where law enforcement is weak and corrupt. Pointing towards the political consequences of drug trafficking, such as financing of terrorism and insurgency, and increasing pressure by dark networks exerted on governments in Latin America, Southwest Asia, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and West Africa, the article provides a scholar/expert’s insight into why the international efforts to control drug supply, drug demand, and drug-driven money have failed dramatically.

This issue’s commentary comes from Peter Volten, who simultaneously discusses two important subjects, one more conceptual, the other policy related. He juxtaposes his analysis of the relevance of hard power and soft power in contemporary international politics and his evaluation of the prospects for Turkey-EU cooperation, especially with respect to the problems facing the Middle East. Both Turkey and the EU have changed since the beginning of accession negotiations in 2005, but, he argues, Turkey and the EU can—and should—find and maintain a sensible balance between hard and soft power. The EU cannot ignore Turkey’s value as an economically and militarily important regional player, and the current situation in the Middle East urges the EU to cooperate more closely with it. On the other hand, the EU should never lose sight of its long-term values and mission, i.e. promoting a just, democratic order in the world. If it does, he warns, EU soft power will suffer tremendous setbacks, which may lead to its falling back in the hard power game, also with potential and aspiring states.

This issue’s review article is by Joe Lombardo, who focuses on Christopher J. Sneddon’s *Concrete Revolution* and uses this opportunity to explore the contributions made by scholars working within Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and, more generally, Science, Technology and Society (STS) in International Relations. Their most important contribution, he claims, was their emphasis on the political agency of non-human objects and organisms, which was picked up on by IR students to study the agency of objects ranging from drones to garbage. He then moves on to Sneddon’s work, analyzing the cases introduced in the book, and concluding that Sneddon’s particular novelty is his illustration of how encounters between people, objects and the environment fuse and mesh to become political networks. In doing so, Lombardo claims, he allows us to see not just how dams become “actors” but how technology and the zest for spreading technical knowledge undergird and highlight actors that would otherwise not be visible.

We believe that the contributions in this issue succinctly represent our journal’s commitment to diversity in theory, methodology and geography, as well as its overall dedication to peace and foreign policy research.
The Paradox of Power Asymmetry: When and Why Do Weaker States Challenge US Hegemony?1

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Abstract

Little is known about how, among weaker states, incentives to challenge the status quo are related to the expected response of the US as the system’s hegemon. In contrast to conventional wisdom that suggests militarized punishment can deter potential challengers, it is argued that weak but strongly motivated challengers can interpret the hegemon’s military intervention against adversaries as a window of opportunity to launch their own actions. Empirical results using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) and binary time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) models reveal that weaker states possess incentives to challenge the international status quo when the hegemon is preoccupied with prior foreign policy commitments, most notably war. In other words, weaker states dissatisfied with the status quo are more likely to challenge the hegemon when it is preoccupied with prior military commitments. They do so because war involvement distracts the hegemon, drains its capabilities and resolve, and opens up a window of opportunity for weaker states to issue challenges. In addition, weaker states that have an alliance portfolio dissimilar to that of the hegemon are more likely than others to initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes. Theoretically, this paper provides microfoundations to answer the question of why weaker parties instigate asymmetric conflicts when it might seem irrational to do so.

Keywords: Asymmetry, change, conflict, hegemon, power

1. Introduction

From its outset, All Azimuth encourages both thought beyond “primarily Western-produced concepts and ideas” and engagement with accumulated “knowledge in social sciences as developed in the United States and Europe”.2 This study, which focuses on challenges to hegemonic leadership, combines those priorities: on the one hand, it features quantitative analysis of standard data regarding interstate conflict to assess a general hypothesis about the timing of challenges by states, in the form of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), to the

1 All Stata programming used to produce this article is available upon request for purposes of replication. Data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Project (MID Dataset 3.1) is the source used for this study.

US-led world order. On the other hand, the topic itself engages, in a reflective way, with the normative question of the order itself. Furthermore, the present investigation is “puzzle- or problem-driven”.\footnote{Seekin Köstem, “International Relations Theories and Turkish International Relations: Observations Based on a Book,” \textit{All Azimuth} 4, no. 1 (2015): 64.} The focus is on an important real world issue – namely, the sources of, and degree of instability within, the international order – that is not fully explained or understood via existing theories, notably those on a grand scale.\footnote{Köstem, “International Relations Theories,” 62-4.}

One qualification to offer at the outset concerns the normative element regarding the findings. No assumption is made here that challenges to the US are (un)desirable. Instead, the search here is for pattern and meaning in the data as related to the ebb and flow of capabilities for the US in comparison to other states. From the standpoint of values, therefore, this study answers to the need to address changing “global dynamics”, preferably through acquisition of knowledge that promotes cooperation.\footnote{Nilüfer Karacasulu, “Interpreting Turkey’s Middle East Policy in the Last Decade,” \textit{All Azimuth} 4, no. 1 (2015): 27-38.}

Turning now to the empirical questions that provide direction for this study, we see consilience with the priorities just enumerated. Under what conditions do weak states confront the hegemon? When is a weak state willing to challenge the hegemonic state’s commitment to the status quo? Weak states are not ordinarily expected to pursue a foreign policy that defies a hegemon. However, North Korea and Iran challenge the United States by developing nuclear weapons. Other states fail to comply with the US-centered status quo as well. Thus it becomes interesting to consider when and why weak states will choose to defy the hegemon. How do they come to disregard such a stark power disparity in deciding upon foreign policy?


We argue that comparatively weak but strongly motivated challengers may interpret the hegemon’s military intervention elsewhere as a window of opportunity. This is because preoccupation of the system leader in an ongoing conflict increases uncertainty about its ability and willingness to engage and defeat other challengers. Deterrence, which depends on substantial military power disparity, is attenuated. All other things being equal, states dissatisfied with the international status quo are more likely than others to challenge the hegemon because they have stronger incentives to effect change.

This study proceeds as follows. The following section is a review of alternative explanations for conflict between weak and strong states, answering when and why challenges occur. It concludes by presenting the paper’s theoretical arguments and hypothesis. The third section explicates the research design, the choice of models and the variables. The fourth section deals with the data analysis, in which we analyze other states’ conflict behavior when the hegemon is busy. We test whether other states are more likely to challenge the hegemon in the same context. In the final section, we summarize the contributions of the study.

2. Foreign Policy Challenges: Why and When Do They Occur?

Following hegemonic stability theory and power preponderance theory, the hegemon (the system leader or a stabilizer) is identified as the single, dominant actor in international politics. The United Kingdom in much of the 19th century up to World War I and the US in most of the 20th century and beyond are prime examples. The status quo refers to economic, military and diplomatic rules created by the hegemon. Maintaining a stable international system by supplying the public good of order is assumed to be the hegemon’s basic foreign policy interest. While the hegemon supports the international status quo as a matter of self-interest, other states might not feel satisfied with it.

Challenge refers to attempts to modify the status quo. Two types of foreign policy challenges are possible: military and non-military. Military challenges include initiation of military conflict against either (a) the hegemon or (b) the hegemon’s international status quo, attacking rival or neighboring states when the leading state is less able to intervene in a conflict between them. Examples of the latter are Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Vietnam War. These cases are not examples of direct and overt challenges; instead, states dissatisfied with US hegemony attacked Washington’s allies and friends. Therefore, these events count as military challenges against the hegemon’s status quo. Non-military challenges involve reneging on the rules of international regimes and institutions. An example would be development of technology for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).

Challenges can take many forms, not just all out war or military action with fatalities. In other words, ‘challenge’ is assumed to include a willingness to irritate the preeminent power, create some regional maneuvering room, gain regional influence, and make ideologically confrontational statements. Given these diverse forms of foreign policy, we argue that weaker states are more likely to challenge when they can take advantage of a hegemon’s temporary weakness, other regional priorities, the tied down effect, and so forth. Moreover, the game of

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challenging can be very subtle at times; motives of challengers will vary. Thus, we assume that winning is not necessarily the only acceptable outcome to a challenger. It also can be positioning and signaling, along with demonstrating resolve to friends and adversaries.

If weaker states anticipate costly consequences, they should not ordinarily be expected to challenge the hegemon in the first place. However, why (for example) did North Korea renege on the Agreed Framework in 1994 and previous agreements from a series of Six-Party talks about WMDs? When the weak challenge the strong, it is reasonable to infer that they must have unobserved advantages. Sullivan elaborates and tests the following argument: “the more the actual costs of victory exceed a state’s prewar expectations, the greater the risk that it will be pushed beyond its cost-tolerance threshold and forced to unilaterally withdraw its forces before it attains its war aims.” Her results reveal that strong states sometimes lose wars against weak countries if they pursue political objectives (e.g., territory, political authority, resources, or nuclear programs) that can only be attained with a weak target’s compliance. The risk of underestimating the costs of sustaining a military operation to accomplish coercive force objectives is higher than those of brute force objectives, which can be achieved by military preponderance alone. Thus, military coercion can succeed only when a weak state perceives that costs of surrender are lower than those of resistance. If the strong country fails to anticipate costs that can be imposed by the weak country, then the strong country is less likely to achieve its political objectives. This could help to explain the behavior in cases such as North Korea’s reneging on previous agreements.

Based on the research summarized above, power disparity may not deter a weak state fighting for its survival (e.g., territory or leaders’ political survival). The threat to survival inspires people to absorb higher costs than those of the adversary, due to the inherent asymmetry of resolve between them.

Little is known, however, about when and why militarily weaker states challenge hegemonic countries in the first place. Wolf delved directly into the question of when the weak attack the strong. Based on cases where states had not been deterred from attacking far stronger powers, he detects at least three scenarios: (1) highly motivated “crazy states”; (2) when the weaker state incorrectly perceives the strong state to be vulnerable; or (3) when the stronger state actually is vulnerable. This enumeration falls short of a theory about general conditions that lead weaker states to wage wars against stronger states. Additionally, Wolf’s findings are based on historical cases before 1990. Thus we still do not know what factors motivate Iran and North Korea, for example, to challenge the US in the post-Cold War period.

Although numerous studies examine how and why weak countries win wars against strong countries and when strong countries are involved in wars against weak states, little systematic evidence pertains to when and why weaker states challenge the hegemon or its

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14 Sullivan, “War Aims”.

15 Sullivan, “War Aims”; Pap, Bombing to Win.

16 Arreguin-Toft, Asymmetric Conflict; Mack, “Big Nations”; Wagner, International Politics.

17 Wolf, “Failures of Deterrence”.


status quo. Therefore, the question remains unanswered, even as challenges continue. This situation implies that greater knowledge is needed about patterns that may emerge as a result of repetition in behavior, as a potential pathway toward superior explanation.\textsuperscript{20}

States go to war as a result of bargaining failures in prior foreign policy interactions. Bargaining failures are a function of either (a) asymmetric information about relative capabilities and resolve with an incentive to misrepresent; or (b) credible commitment problems that arise in specific circumstances.\textsuperscript{21} The claim is made that, if rulers intend to overturn a prior peace settlement by going to war, then there must be some change in their expectations with regard to current or future bargaining power.\textsuperscript{22} These inconsistent expectations about the distribution of their military capabilities and bargaining leverage in the future make states unwilling to commit to Pareto-improving or self-enforcing agreements.\textsuperscript{23} This credible commitment problem between states leads them to go to war even if they know it is \textit{ex post} inefficient.

Dynamics between the hegemon and other states are different from other types of relations. Even though doubt may exist, the hegemonic country has no incentive to renege on agreements. As power transition theorists argue, the hegemonic country, along with other major powers, is the main beneficiary from the international status quo.\textsuperscript{24} For this reason, the system leader and great powers are satisfied with the international status quo and defend it.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, even if states are not satisfied with the status quo, they may not want to publicly reveal their preference. They know the costly consequences of challenging the system leader, so incentives favor peaceful bargaining – mutually preferred to war.

We claim that weaker states are more likely to challenge the status quo when they detect attenuation in the military capabilities of the hegemon due to prior commitments within other countries.\textsuperscript{26} Preoccupation of the leading state provides a significant informational advantage to weaker states. This signals reduced strength, which encourages states that lie in waiting to believe that they can achieve functional power parity with the hegemon. As a result, a weaker state is less likely to back down when threatened with punishment by the hegemon because both countries have greater uncertainty about the probable outcome of a war at parity.\textsuperscript{27} States go to war at parity because uncertainty about the outcome of militarized conflict and variance in distribution of defender types is greatest with a relatively equal distribution of power.\textsuperscript{28} Thus pairs of states with equal power will show greater variance regarding the perceived probability of winning a war or likelihood of achieving political objectives. Increases in variance are associated, as well, with the onset of conflict.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{21} Patrick James, \textit{Crisis and War} (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988), 40; James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” \textit{International Organization} 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-414; Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” \textit{International Organization} 60, no. 1 (2006): 169-203. In addition, Fearon acknowledges the significant effects of issue indivisibilities on the likelihood of war between states. However, he observes that issues in bargaining are sometimes divisible if leaders of countries that are in a dispute over salient issues can reach a rapprochement through diplomatic processes. Thus, we decide not to consider this factor as a main cause of bargaining failures.
\textsuperscript{22} Wagner, \textit{International Politics}, 165-71; Powell, “War as a Commitment”; Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations”.
\textsuperscript{24} Organski, \textit{World Politics}; Organski and Kugler, \textit{War Ledger}; Tammen et al., \textit{Power Transitions}.
\textsuperscript{25} Tammen et al., \textit{Power Transitions}, 9.
\textsuperscript{27} William Reed, “Information, Power, and War,” \textit{American Political Science Review} 97, no. 4 (2003): 633-41; Powell, “War as a Commitment”.
\textsuperscript{28} Reed, “Information,” 637.
\textsuperscript{29} Reed, “Information,” 640.
Will states necessarily challenge the hegemon when they observe a window of opportunity due to preoccupation with war? To assess the link between the hegemon’s preoccupation and challenges, we need to control for the distribution of benefits that states can obtain. According to power transition theory, conflicts rarely occur at the system level because great powers benefit from existing rules. Furthermore, the dominant power is the obvious defender of the status quo. By contrast, dissatisfied states are not able to accrue benefits equivalent to their expectations. As a result, they are more likely than satisfied states to challenge the dominant power. As Alsharabati and Kugler suggest, limited wars are possible at the margin on the international system where the hegemon’s interests are not at risk.

We also should recognize, however, variation among weaker states’ strategic choices. Even if some small powers are dissatisfied with the system leader’s status quo, they may not be inclined to act. This is because small powers are less likely to achieve power parity to modify the status quo than other, slightly weaker major powers. Interestingly, recalcitrant smaller powers, such as Iran and North Korea, sometimes do challenge the hegemon even if they cannot achieve effective power parity because of a belief that they are in a situation of extreme self-help. These states have become key concerns for the US in the post-9/11 era. Although power transition theory is useful to expound the causes of major power wars, it may only partially explain how and why weaker states strategically challenge the hegemon or its international status quo while knowing that there could be harsh repercussions.

Monteiro’s preceding theoretical explanations and the following three examples suggest how challenges occur. First, recalcitrant minor powers such as North Korea and Iran made extensive efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability because the US is involved in two wars (i.e., hegemon’s offensive dominance strategy). Second, the war between Pakistan and India over the Kargil sector occurred in 1999 because of US involvement in Kosovo (i.e., hegemon’s defensive dominance strategy). Third, Syria and Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 when the US faced a seriously declining situation in Vietnam (i.e., hegemon’s defensive dominance strategy).

In sum, preoccupation of the leading state in ongoing conflict increases dissatisfied weaker states’ uncertainty about whether the hegemon retains sufficient military capabilities to sustain its existing punishment strategy against their challenges:

**Preoccupation Hypothesis:** When a hegemon is preoccupied with a significant military campaign in another state, weaker states dissatisfied with the international status quo increase their challenges.

3. Research Design

3.1. Boundaries

The temporal domain is 1946-2000 because the US has been the dominant power since World War II. To capture distinct characteristics of each state, the dyad-year is employed as the...
unit of analysis. More specifically, when we use an event count variable (the number of MIDs in a given year) as the dependent variable, our dataset comes in a hybrid form. In other words, country-years are the unit of analysis in our data set structure, but they contain data which are dyadic and annual in their principal forms.

Some dyads engage in MIDs even if they lack opportunity. Therefore, models in censored samples including only politically relevant dyads (a nonrandom sample of all dyads) are more likely to produce inaccurate estimates. Furthermore, differences exist between states that are satisfied and dissatisfied, respectively, with the status quo. To appropriately compare the probability of asymmetric conflicts for dissatisfied states against satisfied states when the hegemon is preoccupied with a war, all countries in a given year are included to cope with these potential selection biases. Accordingly, the data structure for this research is pooled time-series cross-sectional data.

3.2. Variables

Conceptually, the dependent variable is weaker states’ military challenges against the hegemon’s international status quo. Thus the number of MIDs initiated by a weaker state in a given year is the dependent variable. Initiation of MIDs by weaker states involves any type of militarily hostile actions (e.g., threat to use force, display use of force, use of force, and war) against the hegemon’s international status quo. However, it does not always mean that weaker states are responsible for the conflict. Sometimes a weaker state may want to challenge the status quo if it knows the hegemon is preoccupied. In this case, the weaker state should not be considered as an initiator of a MID, because the hegemon effectively threatens it via military ascendancy in the first place. Rather, it could be a challenger that may go against the hegemon’s international status quo.

To operationalize this concept, MID 3.1 data is used. Its contents are well-suited to the tasks at hand: First, the number of MIDs in a given year generates the challenge variable. For instance, North Korea’s MIDs initiation in 1968 is coded as a “2” because North Korea attacked a US Navy ship (the USS Pueblo: AGER-2) in the East Sea (the Sea of Japan) and dispatched its special force troops to assassinate South Korea’s President Park in the same year. Second, to test the likelihood of weaker states’ challenge against the US when it is preoccupied with other commitments, we created a dichotomous variable using “‘Side A’ – the side that took the first militarized action” – due to the aforementioned reasons. Third, to check whether weaker states tend to challenge the hegemon by employing the low level of hostility owing to possible punishment from it, initiators’ hostility level variables in the MID 3.1 data are employed with the help of the EUGene program.

The question is whether a weaker state dissatisfied with the US’s status quo is more likely to challenge by using military means when the latter is preoccupied with other conflicts. Thus, the unit of analysis is not the system-year because variation is expected across levels of power and dissatisfaction among states.


Because of limited data on alliance portfolio similarity, unemployment, countries’ annual economic growth and for some other control variables, we narrow the temporal domain for this research. However, if we are able to get robust results without including current (and prominent) real world examples such as North Korea’s frequent military provocations against the US and South Korea, Iran’s nuclear challenge, and Russia’s invasion of Georgia, that may be taken as even stronger support for our hypothesis. We leave assessment of our theorizing over an extended temporal domain for future research.

Window of opportunity is operationalized in two ways: US War involvement (USWI) and functional power parity between the hegemonic country and individual weaker state (FPP). To operationalize the concept of an individual weaker state’s level of dissatisfaction, two measures are used: alliance portfolio similarity (Tau-b) and S scores. US-War Involvement (USWI) is a dummy variable that captures the idea of window of opportunity. Following the Correlates of War definition, a case is categorized as a war when it has over 1,000 casualties. Among five different hostility levels in the MID dataset, an observation is coded as 1 when the US is involved in a war (Hostility Level 5) in a given year and otherwise 0. A positive relationship is expected between this variable and the dependent variable.

Opportunity and willingness are the components that combine to convey what is meant by a challenge. Each is considered in turn. Opportunities for a state to challenge the hegemon are not fixed. Availability changes over time and depends on the hegemon’s political context (e.g. war involvements or rivalries). For example, in the Cold War period, the Soviet Union’s military capabilities evolved. Dramatic diminution of its capabilities ultimately led to the demise of bipolarity in 1989. Counterfactually, if no significant changes had occurred in that distribution of power, superpower rivalry presumably would remain intact. Thus, the Functional Power Parity (FPP) variable is used to capture the hegemon’s degree of preoccupation. This variable is designed to take into account changes in relative power disparities between the hegemon and each individual weaker state. FPP employs annual values for the computed Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score to calculate each state’s effective power parity score in a given year. FPP is calculated by subtracting the CINC scores of an opponent state(s) in a war and a challenger state from the US’s CINC score. 

\[ \text{FPP} = CINC_{US} - CINC_{US's opponent states in a war} - CINC_{challenger} \]

Willingness is the other dimension of challenge as an overarching concept. Alliance Portfolio (Similarity with respect to the US) captures an individual weaker state’s level of satisfaction with the hegemonic country’s status quo, with the Kendall Tau-b score calculated by the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program (EUGene program) as the conventional measurement. To check the robustness of our results, we also employ Signorino and Ritter’s ‘S’ scores for similarity of alliance portfolios. Negative

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42 A few features of interstate conflict cannot be addressed by using FPP, such as the US’s actual commitment to any given conflict, divergent preferences over mobilization level in the US-led war against weaker targets and the role of coalition partners in deciding war participation. Scott Wolford, “Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining,” *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 1 (2014): 144-56. We believe that Wolford’s findings can provide more cogent answers in understanding current wars; however, the purpose of this research is not to explain the dynamism in the US-led and NATO-led wars but to identify weaker states’ behavior directed against the US or its international status quo.

43 To operationalize the FPP, using the ratio between the challenger’s CINC scores and the US’ CINC scores after subtracting all of the opponents’ CINC scores might be more relevant than using a difference between them. However, we consider that they are mathematically the same (A-B-C = 0 equals A-B = C). In other words, it means that using ratio to calculate the FPP does not gain much explanatory power. As a result, we decide to use the difference to operationalize the FPP here and leave alternatives for future research.


45 The Kendall tau-b represents two states’ alliance portfolios that are “combined into a 4 x 4 table where alliances are ranked as 1 (defense pact), 2 (neutrality pact), 3 (entente) and 4 (no alliance)” [D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, *EUGene Documentation* (University Park, PA: Penn State University, 2007), 15]. It ranges from -1 to +1 – totally opposite alliance agreements to complete agreement in the alliances formed.

scores should be associated positively, on average, with the number of MIDs initiated. States with a similar alliance portfolio, by contrast, are not expected to take advantage of the system leader’s war involvement. Instead, they are more likely to support or even take part in the hegemon’s conflict as allies.

We claim that when the hegemon is busy, the more dissatisfied states are more likely to challenge the hegemon’s status quo. Hence, a combination of the hegemon’s preoccupation and level of dissatisfaction with the status quo should explain more effectively the challenges that appear. To operationalize interaction effects, the variables representing the hegemon’s preoccupation (USWI and FPP) are multiplied with variables measuring level of dissatisfaction (Alliance portfolio and S scores).

Six control variables are included to represent alternative explanations: salient issue, post-Vietnam War dummy, economic growth rate, unemployment rate, leadership change and distance between US and other states. These commonly employed control variables are defined in Appendix A and facilitate comparison of results from this study to those of others.

3.3. Models

Pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis from STATA is used to test a series of models. The dependent variable in this research is an event count, so it is essential to use event count time-series cross sectional models here. A negative binomial model is appropriate for this context due to possible existence of overdispersion in the dependent variable. The reason is that, if a dissatisfied state sees a window of opportunity to challenge the hegemon, then others also are likely to observe the same thing. As a result, we are more likely to see conflicts initiated by dissatisfied weaker states when the hegemon is preoccupied with other conflicts. Positive contagion is likely; thus, it causes problems for Poisson models, $E[Y] = Var(Y) = \lambda$, as well as Generalized Least Squares (GLS) models. Given this situation, if we use a Poisson model with overdispersed data, it leads us to underestimate our standard errors.

To avert this problem, Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) with an exchangeable GEE assumption (where all cross-country correlations are assumed to be equal) are used. Moreover, the test for overdispersion shows that events are not independent of one another. Thus we use XTGEE models with a negative binomial model for the family category and select a log link function. To check robustness of empirical results, also employed are negative binomial time-series cross sectional models with robust standard errors clustered by country, assuming AR (1) correlation structure in the negative binomial regression models. The basic model structure is as follows:

\[ Y \text{ (Number of MIDs Initiated by Weaker States)}_i = \]
\[ \alpha + \beta_1 \text{(Dependent Variable)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{(US Preoccupation, i.e., one of the measures for window of opportunity)}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \text{(Level of Satisfaction, i.e., one of the measures for willingness)}_{i,t} + \beta_4 \text{(US Preoccupation * Level of Satisfaction)}_{i,t} + \beta_5 \text{(Distance between the US and other countries)}_{i,t} \]


\[ + \beta_6 (\text{Salient Issue})_i + \beta_7 (\text{Vietnam War Dummy})_i + \beta_8 (\text{Other States’ Economic Conditions})_i + \beta_9 (\text{US Unemployment})_i + \beta_{10} (\text{US leadership change})_i + \epsilon_{it} \]

4. Results

4.1. Weaker states’ challenges to the hegemon’s international status quo

We test whether the interaction between (a) the hegemon’s preoccupation and (b) alliance portfolio similarity for the hegemon and individual weaker state (representing weaker states’ dissatisfaction) affects the number of MIDs initiated by weaker states in a given year. Results appear in Table 1. We use the USWI models to encapsulate the level of the hegemonic country’s preoccupation. The Tau-b score is used to capture weaker states’ level of dissatisfaction with the US status quo between 1946 and 2000. Additionally, the six control variables from Appendix A are included in the models.50

In Table 1, coefficients using a random effect negative binomial time series cross sectional model are reported first because of the existence of overdispersion in this dataset. Coefficients based on generalized estimating equation (GEE) models with a lagged dependent variable also are reported in USWI models 2, 5, and 6. To check the robustness of our results, GEE with AR1 correlations structure are used for USWI models 3 and 4. Additionally, to investigate the effect of alliance on weaker states’ conflict behavior, the Tau-b score is employed in USWI models. Signorino and Ritter’s S score is also introduced in USWI model 4. All of the control variables in USWI models are used to represent alternative explanations. To build in the diversionary concept, annual changes in weaker states’ economic growth (1951-2000) are employed in USWI model 5. Lastly, for Salience, the ICOW data is used in USWI Model 6.51

| Table 1 - U.S. War Involvement (USWI) and Alliance Portfolio Similarity (Tau-b/S) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Regressor                        | USWI Model-1    | USWI Model-2    | USWI Model-3    | USWI Model-4    | USWI Model-5    | USWI Model-6    |
|                                 | R.E.            | GEE w/lag       | GEE with corr (ar1) | GEE w/lag E/G/R52 (1951-2000) | GEE w/lag       | ICOW (1951-2000) |
| Initiators, \(s_{it}\)            | 0.152*** (0.011) | 0.359*** (0.032) | 0.354*** (0.035) | 0.323*** (0.058) |                   |                 |
| US War Invol’ (USWI)             | -0.042 (0.074)  | -0.044 (0.071)  | -0.054 (0.058)  | 0.167** (0.084) | -0.115 (0.078)  | 0.008 (0.115)   |
| Alliance Portfolio (Tau-b)       | 0.443** (0.209) | 0.408 (0.327)   | -0.167 (0.309)  | 0.414 (0.363)   | -0.121 (0.394)  |                 |
| Alliance Portfolio (S Scores)    |                 |                 | -0.617 (0.377)  |                 |                 |                 |
| USWI * Tau-b                    | -0.579*** (0.205) | -0.477* (0.247) | -0.495** (0.218) | -0.457* (0.255) | -0.678** (0.319) |                 |

50 We are aware of arguments regarding economy of explanation, but put a higher priority on omitted variable bias in constructing our models. Our results are substantively the same when the control variables are excluded.

51 To check the robustness of our results, we also employ the zero-inflated negative binomial models. Results are reported in Appendix B. Based on the ‘Vuong’ and ‘Zip’ test, the ZINB model does not perform better than the negative binomial models, but it performs better than the zero inflated Poisson model.
The Paradox of...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Coefficient 1 (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient 2 (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient 3 (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient 4 (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient 5 (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient 6 (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient 7 (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient 8 (SE)</th>
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<tr>
<td>USWI * S scores</td>
<td>-0.721*** (0.269)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Salient Issue (Terriss = 0)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001 (0.282)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post Vietnam War</td>
<td>0.077 (0.068)</td>
<td>0.062 (0.111)</td>
<td>-0.055 (0.100)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.099)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.119)</td>
<td>0.301 (0.190)</td>
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<td>Economic Growth (Change)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. unemployment</td>
<td>-0.0002 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.027)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.025 (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.007)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Term (1st Year)</td>
<td>0.027 (0.069)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.063)</td>
<td>0.028 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.045)</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.071)</td>
<td>0.049 (0.116)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.0001* (0.00005)</td>
<td>0.00007* (0.00004)</td>
<td>0.00004 (0.00004)</td>
<td>0.00003 (0.00003)</td>
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<td>0.0003*** (0.0001)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.427 (0.337)</td>
<td>-2.252*** (0.275)</td>
<td>-1.887*** (0.247)</td>
<td>-1.684*** (0.282)</td>
<td>-1.898*** (0.305)</td>
<td>-2.518*** (0.464)</td>
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<td>LR Test</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>7333</td>
<td>7334</td>
<td>5698</td>
<td>1503</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed). (Semi-Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.) Pooled-time series analysis in Stata 9.0/SE is used to estimate coefficients, assuming AR (1) correlation structure common to all panels. R.E. stands for Random Effect models. GEE stands for Generalized Estimating Equations.

The first four USWI models show that neither US War Involvement (USWI) nor alliance portfolio similarity between the hegemon and individual weaker state (Tau-b with System leader / S with System leader) shows consistent and significant effects on the number of weaker states’ MID initiation. However, when the US War Involvement variable is interacted with weaker states’ alliance portfolio similarity, such as Tau-b scores in USWI model 1, 2, and 3 and S Scores in USWI model-4, they show significant negative relationships across the board. The results signify that weaker states dissatisfied with the hegemon’s status quo are, on average, more likely to initiate militarized disputes when the US is preoccupied with a war. Furthermore, even if we examine interactive effects on weaker states’ military challenges, controlling for weaker states’ economic conditions and existence of territorial claims in USWI Models 5 and 6, the significance of the interaction term for the number of weaker states’ MID initiation still holds. Moreover, models using S scores show the identical results.

The coefficients of interaction terms, however, do not convey anything unless we address the problems in standard errors of coefficients (βs) in models. The interaction term in empirical models generally obscures the interpretation of the coefficients in models as well as the significance test. To understand the real effect of interaction terms on the likelihood of weaker states’ conflict behavior, we show the marginal effect of USWI on weaker states’ MID initiation as Tau-b increases in Figure 1. Holding other variables’ values at their mean, Tau-b scores change from minimum to maximum numbers (-1 to +1). The black solid line denotes marginal effect of USWI (β1 + β3 (tau-b)) on the dependent variable. The dotted lines refer to the associated 95% confidence intervals around the observed range of marginal effect for USWI.

52 E/G/R. stands for weaker states’ economic growth rate, and w/lag means a model with a lagged dependent variable (T-1). Terriss refers to a dummy variable for territorial issues, which is derived from the ICOW dataset. From now on, these terms are used. 53 William Clark, Michael Gilligan, and Matt Golder, “A Simple Multivariate Test for Asymmetric Hypotheses,” Political Analysis 14, no. 3 (2006): 311-31.
The graph signifies that when the Tau-b score is negative (Tau-b: -0.3 to -1), the marginal effect of USWI, on average, increases the number of weaker states’ MID initiations against other countries. When the Tau-b score is between -0.3 and 0.2, states do not significantly challenge the hegemon by increasing the number of MIDs. However, when the Tau-b score is positive (Tau-b: 0.2 to 1), the marginal effect of USWI, on average, decreases the number of weaker states’ MID initiation against other countries, holding all other variables at their mean. In sum, weaker states that have significantly dissimilar (similar) alliance portfolios with the hegemon are more (less) likely to challenge the hegemon or its status quo when it is involved in a war.\textsuperscript{54}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Regressor & FPP Model-1 & FPP Model-2 & FPP Model-3 & FPP Model-4 & FPP Model-5 \\
& GEE & GEE & R.E. & GEE & GEE \\
\hline
Initiators\textsubscript{i,t} & 0.151*** (0.011) & 0.360*** (0.034) & 0.150*** (0.011) & 0.356*** (0.037) & 0.139*** (0.012) \\
& & & & & 0.315*** (0.056) \\
\hline
Functional Power Parity (FPP) & -1.509** (0.733) & -1.089 (1.382) & -0.540 (0.991) & 3.511 (2.982) & 1.863 (1.219) \\
& & & & & 2.164 (2.781) \\
\hline
Alliance Portfolio (Tau-b) & 0.735** (0.333) & 0.722 (0.573) & & 1.563*** (0.458) & 0.994 (0.963) \\
& & & & & (0.963) \\
\hline
S Scores & & 0.487 (0.512) & 1.707 (1.125) & & & \\
\hline
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Functional Power Parity (FPP) and Alliance Portfolio Similarity (Tau-b/S)}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{54} In this data, only 87 annual observations have a tau-b score below -0.3. Thus challenging the hegemon’s international status quo is not easy. In other words, the level of weaker states’ dissatisfaction needs to be quite high to consider a risk-taking foreign policy of challenge.
The results are consistent with the idea that dissatisfied weaker states are more likely than satisfied states to exploit the window of opportunity derived from the hegemon’s preoccupation. In sum, when the hegemon is involved with war, weaker states that do not have alliances with it are more likely to exploit their window of opportunity by militarily challenging the hegemon or its status quo. Therefore, in addition to the previous finding that alliance is related to the probability of MIDs,\textsuperscript{56} we find that it also matters for explaining asymmetric conflicts.

In Table 2, Functional Power Parity (FPP) is utilized to capture the concept of US preoccupation. This variable ranges continuously from -0.0399 to 0.3640. For FPP Models 1, 2, 5, and 6, we use Tau-b with system leader scores that measure weaker states’ dissatisfaction level. We also employ S Scores for FPP models 3 and 4 to check the robustness of findings from the FPP models with Tau-b scores. Results demonstrate that the effects of Functional Power Parity and Alliance Portfolio Similarity (Tau-b and S Scores) on the dependent variable are not consistent under different model specifications. By contrast, five out of six FPP models show that the interaction between these two variables has a negative and significant relationship with the number of weaker states’ MIDs initiation, controlling for all other variables.

\textsuperscript{55} The GEE models for both FPP Models 3 and 6 did not achieve convergence. Therefore, we ran random effect models (XTnbreg) to check the robustness of the results. Estimates produced by the two models are almost identical to those of other GEE models. For this reason, the results using random effect models that do not have convergence problems are reported.

As Clark, Gilligan and Golder suggest, to better understand the impact of change in constitutive and interaction terms on weaker states’ conflict behavior, we display the marginal effect of FPP on the dependent variable as Tau-b changes by using the results from FPP Model-1 in Figure 2.\textsuperscript{57} Holding all other variables’ values at their mean, Figure 2 signifies that when FPP changes from minimum to maximum, the existence of a military alliance between the US and an individual weaker state, on average, significantly decreases the marginal effect of FPP on weaker states’ MIDs initiation. While notable power disparity between the hegemon and individual weaker state decreases the number of MIDs initiated by weaker states that have a similar alliance portfolio (positive Tau-b scores), it has no effect on dissatisfied weaker states’ conflict behavior.

\textsuperscript{57} Clark, Gilligan and Golder, “Asymmetric Hypotheses”.

Figure 2: Effect of FPP on Weaker States’ Military Challenges as Tau-b Increases

Figure 3: Effect of Tau-b on Weaker States’ Military Challenges as FPP Changes
In addition, we display the effect of alliance portfolio similarity on the number of weaker states’ MID initiations in Figure 3. The graph indicates that if the US can maintain power ascendancy over weaker states, the number of MIDs initiated by individual weaker states is lower than that of situations in which functional power is at parity or reversed (e.g., conditions that weaker states achieve power disparity: a dissatisfied weaker state challenges when the US and USSR are engaged in a MID). Therefore, the change in relative power distribution between the hegemon and individual weaker states, which is modified by their alliance portfolio similarity, also matters for explaining why weaker states sometimes militarily challenge the hegemon or its status quo. To efficiently explain the effect of FPP on the dependent variable, we present the predictions of the FPP GEE model 5 regarding weaker states’ conflict behavior when the hegemon is preoccupied in Appendix B. Results are the same.

Among control variables, only Distance between the US and other states is significant. Geographically distant states from the hegemon are more likely to initiate MIDs against their neighbors or rivals, probably because this represents an ongoing source of relatively high opportunity to act in ways of which Washington might disapprove. In order to prevent distant countries’ conflictual behavior, the hegemon needs to have allies ‘in the neighborhood’ that respect the international status quo. This result indirectly explains the reason that US has tried to build strong alliances with South Korea and Japan based on the US strategic rebalance toward Asia and the Pacific even under the pressure of defense budget sequestration.

4.2. Weaker states’ challenges against the US

Do dissatisfied weaker states exploit the US’ preoccupation when they want to challenge the US? To answer this specific question, Table 3 shows that the number of weaker states’ MIDs against the US classified by the level of hostility level against the US. Between 1946 and 2000, weaker states revealed their hostility toward the US 139 times. They did it 33 times when the US was involved in a war. More interestingly, on average, weaker states resort more frequently to the display of force or use of force than the initiation of war against the US. However, if they decide to challenge by waging a war, then they are more likely to resort to the period when the US is involved in a war (80%).

| Table 3- Weaker States’ Military Challenges against the US (1946-2000) |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Hostility Level | Level 1 (No Militarized Action) | Level 2 (Threat of Force) | Level 3 (Display of Force) | Level 4 (Use of Force) | Level 5 (War) |
| Number of MIDs (139) | 9 | 5 | 15 | 105 | 5 |
| Number of MIDs when the US is involved in a war (33) | 3 (33.3%) | 0 (0%) | 5 (33.3%) | 21 (20%) | 4 (80%) |
In Table 4, we also provide the number of MIDs initiated by either satisfied weaker states or dissatisfied weaker states based on the level of hostility. The p-value of Pearson’s chi-square test is 0.059, and Fisher’s exact value is 0.052. We fail to reject the null hypothesis at the $\alpha = 0.1$ level. In other words, the number of MIDs initiated by weaker states under conditions of the hostility level is significantly different from zero with 90% confidence. Substantively, results in Table 5 imply that dissatisfied weaker states are significantly more hostile towards the US than satisfied weaker states between 1946 and 2000. Consequently, based on the results from Table 4 and 5, we identify that dissatisfied weaker states are more likely to initiate a war against the US-led status quo when it is involved in a war. These results strongly support the Preoccupation Hypothesis.

To test the results derived from descriptive statistics more rigorously, we employ a multinomial logit model using ‘Hostility Level 5’ as a reference category. Results in Table 5 show that the coefficients of interaction terms in all four categories are negatively related to the dependent variable (statistically significant at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level). This implies that weaker states that are dissatisfied with the US status quo are less likely to challenge the US by using threat of force, display of force, and use of force than resorting to war against the US-sponsored status quo. That is, if the US is preoccupied with other commitments, dissatisfied weaker states are more likely to initiate a war against the US’s friends in order to hammer out their political objectives.
Table 5- Weaker States’ Challenges against the US Using Low Level of Hostility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>No Militarized Action</th>
<th>Threat of Force</th>
<th>Display of Force</th>
<th>Use of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Portfolio (Tau-b)</td>
<td>63.410** (29.124)</td>
<td>66.583** (30.559)</td>
<td>68.006** (30.066)</td>
<td>68.119** (29.995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USWI * Tau-b</td>
<td>-73.676** (30.122)</td>
<td>-61.900** (30.559)</td>
<td>-70.756** (28.690)</td>
<td>-64.723** (29.515)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Vietnam War</td>
<td>14.503*** (1.366)</td>
<td>10.226*** (1.416)</td>
<td>10.839*** (0.864)</td>
<td>9.820*** (0.730)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. unemployment</td>
<td>0.697 (0.463)</td>
<td>0.828*** (0.423)</td>
<td>1.384*** (0.359)</td>
<td>1.412*** (0.253)</td>
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<td>Presidential Term (1st Year)</td>
<td>0.395 (1.081)</td>
<td>0.646 (1.093)</td>
<td>-0.990 (1.082)</td>
<td>0.031*** (0.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.0004 (0.0004)</td>
<td>-0.0005* (0.0003)</td>
<td>-0.0005* (0.0003)</td>
<td>-0.0004** (0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>0.024 (0.203)</td>
<td>0.026 (0.237)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.270)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>16.316* (8.531)</td>
<td>19.791** (9.072)</td>
<td>17.071** (8.370)</td>
<td>18.894** (9.019)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.1457</td>
<td>0.7334</td>
<td>0.7334</td>
<td>0.7334</td>
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</table>

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
* Multinomial Logit: Reference category (Hostility Level 5, War).

5. Conclusion

We have strived to answer two main questions – perhaps better described as policy-relevant puzzles– about foreign policy actions.58 First, what types of weak countries are more likely to challenge the hegemon’s status quo? Empirical results illustrate that weaker states dissatisfied with the status quo are more likely to challenge the hegemon when it is preoccupied with prior military commitments. Second, why do weaker states challenge the hegemon or its status quo? They do so because war involvement distracts the hegemon, drains its capabilities and resolve, and opens up a window of opportunity for weaker states to issue challenges. All other things being equal, bargaining failure between the hegemon and potential dissatisfied weaker states becomes more likely to occur. Thus, asymmetric conflicts between them become more likely than otherwise. These findings identify important repetitions in behavior, as per priorities for research identified by Balci.59

In addition, empirical results imply that weaker states generally keep an eye on what the hegemon is doing. They move strategically in foreign policy to achieve their political objectives when they believe the likelihood of being punished by the hegemon is at a minimum. Results also confirm the effects of distance. Future work on local factors as an explanation for challenges therefore can build on insightful work already in place.60

58 Köstem, “International Relations Theories,” 64.
59 Balci, “Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Thought”.
Consider implications for system-level theorizing as well. This study has found effects of a system-level property (i.e., the situation of the hegemon) through a statistical analysis of conflict at the dyadic level. Further theorizing at the level of the system thereby is encouraged by this study, which might be viewed as an affirmation of macro-to-micro effects when not much evidence of that previously had been forthcoming in the study of conflict processes. In addition, a regional approach, in line with Karacasulu, holds great promise as well.61

Finally, we have attempted to provide microfoundations to answer the question of why weaker parties instigate asymmetric conflicts when it might seem irrational to do so. The Preoccupation Hypothesis is supported by the evidence. We leave other possible causal mechanisms that have not yet been identified to future systematic research. In all of this we heed the warning from Sune about “unintentional reproduction” of Western centrism.62 As noted at the outset of this study, the research is not carried out from the standpoint of taking a side for or against efforts to revise the status quo. Instead, the goal is to provide improved, reproducible evidence about repetitious behavior in the system.63

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APPENDIX A

Pearson’s Chi-Square Test

We employ the Tau-b scores to measure the concept of weaker states’ level of satisfaction. We code it as a one if the Tau-b score is below zero (Tau-b ≤ 0). Otherwise, we code it as a zero.

Table A.1- Pearson’s Chi-Square Test for Weaker States’ Military Challenges

(a) When the U.S. is not involved in a war (U.S. War Involvement = 0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dissatisfaction (Tau-b Dummy)</th>
<th>Initiators</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No MIDs Initiation</td>
<td>MIDs Initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied (Tau-b &gt; 0)</td>
<td>1,510 (1518.3)</td>
<td>309 (300.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied (Tau-b ≤ 0)</td>
<td>2,979 (2,970.7)</td>
<td>580 (588.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,489 (4,489.0)</td>
<td>889 (889.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi square (1) = 0.4161, Pr < 0.51.

(b) When the U.S. is involved in a war (U.S. War Involvement = 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dissatisfaction (Tau-b Dummy)</th>
<th>Initiators</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No MIDs Initiation</td>
<td>MIDs Initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied (Tau-b &gt; 0)</td>
<td>660 (638.9)</td>
<td>96 (117.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied (Tau-b ≤ 0)</td>
<td>999 (1,020.1)</td>
<td>208 (186.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,659 (1,659.0)</td>
<td>304 (304.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi square (1) = 7.3024, Pr < 0.007.

* MID 3.1 data is used for this analysis.

Table A.1(a) shows that the number of MIDs initiated by either satisfied weaker states or dissatisfied weaker states. When the US is not involved in a war, the p-value of Pearson’s chi-square test is 0.51. We fail to reject the null hypothesis. Conversely, when the US is involved in a war in Table A.1(b), the p-value of Pearson’s chi square is below 0.05. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis because the deviation from expected outcome is statistically significant at the α = 0.5 level. In other words, the number of MIDs initiated by weaker states under conditions of US war involvement is significantly different from otherwise.

Substantively, results in Table A.1(b) show that dissatisfied weaker states are expected to initiate 186.9 MIDs. However, they initiated significantly more militarized interstate disputes when the US is involved in a war. Descriptive statistics clearly illustrate that there is a positive relationship between the hegemon’s war involvement and weaker states’ conflict behavior.

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64 Expected frequency is included in parentheses.
Control Variables

First, a *Salient Issue* variable is used to assess whether states that have salient issues are more likely to initiate military conflicts when the hegemonic country is involved in other conflicts. This variable is available from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) data.\(^{65}\) If a state has a territorial claim with the hegemon in a given year, it is coded as 1 and otherwise 0. A positive relationship is expected for salient issues and likelihood of MID initiation.

Second, a Post-Vietnam War dummy variable is created to unearth whether states are more likely to challenge the hegemon after the Vietnam War. This variable is coded as 0 before 1976 and 1 afterward. A positive relationship is expected between the number of MIDs initiated and this variable.\(^{66}\)

Third, to build in the diversionary argument, annual economic growth rate is employed. Data for this variable is derived from the Penn World Tables (1950-2000). If weaker states experience negative economic growth rate, they are more likely to initiate a MID against the hegemon.

Fourth, to operationalize the concept of strategic conflict avoidance, the unemployment rate of the US is used. The reason is that, as compared to other alternative indicators (e.g., inflation and GDP growth), US unemployment consistently influenced rival state behavior between 1948 and 1992.\(^{67}\) Data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and two other locations are used to measure annual unemployment from 1946 to 2000.\(^{68}\)

Fifth, a dichotomous leadership change variable is employed. The first year of a new US presidential term is coded as 1 and otherwise 0. Moreover, if a president gets reelected, the first year of the new term also is coded as 0 because weaker states do not need to draw new attention through a challenge. However, if the presidential inauguration occurred under abnormal conditions, the code for the next year is 1 (e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidential inauguration: November 22, 1963 and Gerald Ford’s presidential inauguration: August 9, 1974). States dissatisfied with the international status quo are more likely to challenge when the US experiences a leadership change.

Sixth, Wolf argues that attacks resulting from vulnerability of stronger states, such as the Falklands War, often reflect geography.\(^{69}\) To capture this concept, Distance between the US and Other States is employed as a variable. Gleditich’s data contains the great circle distance between capital cities in nautical miles.

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\(^{65}\) Due to the limitations related to ICOW (e.g., no data on Asia or Africa), the first alternative explanation is assessed in a separate table (i.e., see Hensel’s ICOW data manual).

\(^{66}\) Some might argue that other states no longer perceived the US to be a ‘paper dragon’ after the first Persian Gulf War. So perhaps the years after 1992 should be coded as 1. However, Iraqi forces and the Taliban still use the guerrilla strategy to fight against the US-led forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, which the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) had adopted in the Vietnam War.


\(^{68}\) For more information, refer to the following websites: http://www.miseryindex.us/urbyyear.asp and http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0104719.html.

\(^{69}\) Wolf, “Failures of Deterrence”.
Appendix B

Table B.1- U.S. War Involvement (USWI) and Alliance Portfolio Similarity (Tau-b/S)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>USWI ZINB Model-1</th>
<th>USWI ZINB Model-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiators,1</td>
<td>0.791*** (0.036)</td>
<td>0.793*** (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Portfolio (Tau-b)</td>
<td>0.096 (0.118)</td>
<td>0.084 (0.327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USWI * Tau-b</td>
<td>-0.583**** (0.214)</td>
<td>-0.563**** (0.215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Vietnam War</td>
<td>0.112* (0.068)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. unemployment</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Term (1st Year)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.076)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.0001*** (0.00002)</td>
<td>0.00006*** (0.00002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.184 (0.153)</td>
<td>-2.150*** (0.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflate US War Invol’ (USWI)</td>
<td>-16.680 (558393.6)</td>
<td>12.487 (360.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflate Post Vietnam War</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.262 (5865.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-30.803 (558393.5)</td>
<td>-32.781 (5876.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vuong test of zinb</td>
<td>-0.01 (Pr&gt;=z = 0.5031)</td>
<td>0.19 (Pr&gt;=z = 0.04232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zip test</td>
<td>529.60 (Pr&gt;=chibar2 = 0.00)</td>
<td>532.29 (Pr&gt;=chibar2 = 0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7333</td>
<td>7333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed). (Semi-Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.) Pooled-time series analysis in Stata 9.0/SE is used to estimate coefficients, assuming AR (1) correlation structure common to all panels. R.E. stands for Random Effect models. GEE stands for Generalized Estimating Equations.

Table B.2- Predicted Probability of Weaker States’ MIDs of Functional Power Parity (FPP) and Alliance Portfolio Similarity (Tau-b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Expected Number (95% Confidence Interval)</th>
<th>Predicted Probability (First Difference)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At Power Parity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Functional Power Parity = 0} (Tau-b: mean = 0.108)</td>
<td>0.377 (0.102, 0.746)</td>
<td>-16.4% (-0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 1: One standard deviation above zero (\textit{FPP = 0.054}: The hegemon has power ascendancy)</td>
<td>0.315 (0.124, 0.530)</td>
<td>-16.4% (-0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 2: One standard deviation below zero (\textit{FPP = -0.054}: A weaker state achieves power ascendancy)</td>
<td>0.460 (0.077, 1.137)</td>
<td>+22.0% (+0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Alliance Portfolio Similarity (Tau-b = 0: Indifferent)} (FPP: mean = 0.169: The hegemon has power advantage)</td>
<td>0.224 (0.147, 0.330)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3: One standard deviation above zero (\textit{Tau-b = 0.345})</td>
<td>0.211 (0.168, 0.263)</td>
<td>-6.16% (-0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 4: One standard deviation below zero (\textit{Tau-b = -0.345})</td>
<td>0.189 (0.121, 0.285)</td>
<td>-10.4% (-0.022)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: Predicted probabilities are based on FPP model 5 and consider one standard deviation changes in FPP and Tau-b. Positive predicted probabilities indicate more challenges from weaker states. Negative predicted probabilities indicate fewer challenges from weaker states. A 95% confidence interval is reported in parentheses.

To better understand the effect of FPP on the dependent variable, Table B.2 presents the predictions of the FPP GEE model 5 regarding weaker states’ conflict behavior when the hegemon is preoccupied. We calculate the expected number of weaker states’ MID initiation and confidence interval around this number through simulation (1000 trials) when either the hegemon’s preoccupation or the level of weaker states’ dissatisfaction changes from zero to one standard deviation above or below zero (e.g., FPP = 0.054 or Tau-b = 0.345).

According to Scenario 1, holding all other variables at their mean, the increase of one standard deviation from zero in Functional Power Parity (Power Parity Point: FPP = 0) leads to a 0.062 unit decrease in the number of weaker states’ MIDs initiation. In other words, when the hegemon maintains its power preponderance against a weaker state (FPP = +0.054), it decreases 16.4% of MIDs initiated by a weaker state. On the contrary, Scenario 2 shows that the decrease of one standard deviation from zero in Functional Power Parity results in a 0.083 unit increase in the number of weaker states’ MIDs initiation. This means that, when a weaker state achieves relative power ascendency against the hegemon due to the hegemon’s preoccupation with another major power(s), the weaker state’s function power parity results in a 22% increase in the number of MIDs initiated by weaker states.

In addition, Scenario 3 indicates that one standard deviation increase in the Tau-b score (Indifference point: Tau-b = 0) leads to a 6.16% decrease in the number of weaker states’ MIDs initiation. According to Scenario 4, when Tau-b is decreased by one standard deviation below zero, the number of MIDs initiated by weaker states also is decreased by 10.4%. Different from the predicted probability of FPP, the changes in weaker states’ alliance portfolio from positive to negative scores do not show any discernable effect on weaker states’ conflict behavior.70

This result is counter-intuitive at first glance. However it is understandable because the mean of Functional Power Parity in this model is 0.169. It means that the hegemon is still able to maintain its power preponderance over a weaker state. In other words, as Figure 3 displays, the hegemon’s war involvement generally decreases the number of weaker states’ MID initiations. However, when the hegemon loses its power ascendency due to its preoccupation with a war, dissatisfied weaker states significantly increase their challenges against the hegemon’s status quo (in comparison to satisfied weaker states) because they interpret this opportunity as a chance to take advantage of the hegemon’s ambivalent situation to accomplish political objectives.

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70 Some scholars argue that interacting two variables that have negative values might cause biased results. However, we claim that rescaling values of independent variables (e.g., add 1 to FPP or Tau-b) to create positive numbers (0 to 2) also causes unnecessary changes in coefficient as well as standard error of the coefficient for the interaction term: Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder, “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses,” Political Analysis 14 (2006): 68. Thus, we do not rescale values of independent variables for the analyses here.
Reconciliation-oriented Leadership: Nelson Mandela and South Africa

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Abstract

Heroic leaders advocating for reconciliation has become particularly significant in the process of conflict resolution. This article analyses the case of South Africa’s national reconciliation experiences and Mandela’s iconic role in this process. It is claimed that Mandela’s reconciliation-oriented leadership, his personality, and endeavours have directly affected the promotion of intergroup reconciliation in South Africa in a positive way. The article’s analytic framework is built on Galtung’s Conflict Triangle and applied to reconciliation initiatives employed by Nelson Mandela in South Africa. The research question that this study focused on can be expressed as follows: What is the role of leaders in the process of national reconciliation? From this perspective, Mandela’s extraordinary efforts to strengthen national reconciliation in South Africa are examined by looking into his normative statements, symbolic acts, and judicial actions. The method proposed in this article contributes to the study of reconciliation at the national level, dealing with the normative statements and behaviours of those in power. In the final analysis, it was determined that there is a close relationship between the prospective success of the reconciliation process and a leader’s contribution to bringing about reconciliation in a society.

Keywords: Reconciliation, leadership, Conflict Triangle, Mandela, conflict resolution

1. Introduction

In the last two decades, peace efforts and endeavours to deal with conflicts have been billed as either a “process of national unity,” a “national peace process,” or a “national reconciliation process.” In addition to national reconciliation initiatives, there has also been a global outburst in practical variations, such as UN peace operations (i.e. post-conflict peace-building operations), ad hoc international criminal tribunals, truth commissions,

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2 More than 17 national reconciliation commissions have been developed to foster peace and stability since the 1980s in various areas of the world, such as Argentina, Chile, South Africa, East Timor, Liberia, Morocco, and Peru, to name but a few. Christopher C. Joyner, “Reconciliation As Conflict Resolution,” (paper presented at the 17th ANZSIL Conference, Wellington, 2009), 44.
negotiations, and traditional rituals of integration, which are some of the array of practices employed to validate peace. Our era, thus, might be called “the age of peace-building”; even though we don’t live in an age of peace.

Despite an abundance of theoretical and methodological peace efforts, the contemporary world is not as peaceful as it should be, since large-scale conflicts persist in Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, Congo, Iraq, and several other locales. The old paradigm of industrial inter-state war no longer exists; the new trend is “war amongst the people,” and the most pressing troubles are violent acts that human beings commit against each other. There are two implications of the “war amongst the people”: first, in intra-state conflict, nearly 80% of the casualties are civilians rather than professional armies or militia, and second, after peace, former enemies, perpetrators, and victims must continue living side by side. In these circumstances, without a well-thought out and implemented reconciliation, peace can only be in a negative form, and the resumption of hostilities is imminent. This fact makes reconciliation, rather than peace, extremely important, since the former provides alternative platforms to prevent the re-emergence of conflict by bringing parties under the framework of shared values. Notably, national reconciliation has emerged as a societal conflict resolution strategy that seeks to transform attitudes through reparations, truth-telling, and healing amongst former adversaries. Although Lederach prefers to use “comprehensive” rather than “national” for this approach, national, in this sense, infers the participation of political leaders or groups whose influence over a given nation-state is accepted to shift the society ravaged by various forms of internal violence toward a non-violent structure. To support this paper’s argument of a leader’s strategic function in national reconciliation (as per Ratil Alfonsin in Argentina, Patricio Aylwin in Chile, and Aniceto Longuinhos Guterres Lopes in East Timor), Nelson Mandela’s efforts as a forerunner in South Africa will be identified.

The theoretical framework of this article is based on Galtung’s Conflict Triangle. Since national reconciliation is the formulation or demonstration of either the attitude or behaviour of national political leaders, throughout the article, Mandela’s reconciliation-oriented efforts (from 1989 to 1999) will be identified by two indicators: 1) normative statements (measuring attitudes) and 2) symbolic and judicial acts (measuring behaviours).

This article is organized in four parts. The first contains an extensive conceptual analysis of reconciliation, of which definitions and types are identified. To this extent, a broad understanding of the term reconciliation is explained. The next part provides the article’s theoretical background, that is, the “Conflict Triangle” developed by Johan Galtung on the bases of “conflict attitude (A),” “conflict behaviours (B),” and “contradictions, [the] conflict issue itself(C).” Galtung’s analytical framework is an applicable method for structuring the analysis of national reconciliation in this study. The third rubric of the article handles Mandela’s reconciliation-oriented characters (forgiveness, removing vindictiveness, and empathetic capacities), which favourably affected South Africa’s national reconciliation process. The

3 The UN launched 22 “post-conflict peace-building operations” between 1989 and 2000; ad hoc tribunals were established for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which were followed by the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court through the Treaty of Rome in 1998. Regarding Truth Commissions, since the 1970s, nearly 40 have taken place. For negotiations, from 1989 to 2004, more civil wars ended through negotiations than in the previous two centuries. Jennifer J. Llewellyn and Daniel Philpott ed., Restorative Justice, Reconciliation and Peacebuilding (New York: Oxford Uni. Press, 2014), 4.
4 Llewellyn and Philpott, Restorative Justice, 5.
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final part of the article analyses Mandela’s reconciliation initiatives through “Normative Statements,” “Symbolic Acts,” and “Judicial Acts” to illustrate the tangible implications of his work toward intergroup coexistence. The importance of Mandela’s overall implications is supported by three essential facts that made his reconciliation-oriented initiatives more strategic and durable: South Africa’s historical background, the heterogeneous structure of South African society, and the potential power of the white community in South Africa.

2. Reconciliation as Conflict Resolution: A Conceptual Scaffold

Although the background of reconciliation goes back as far as the eighteenth century, the term’s involvement in political studies and international relations by Peace Theory has only recently gained significance. For decades, political thinkers have considered the term an irrelevant concept due to its religious connotation. After the Cold War, however, literature studies on reconciliation notably increased, which helped to disassociate the term from a religious context, but much more critical discussion is needed. For instance, Susan Dwyer’s piece on Reconciliation for Realists, in contrast to religious affiliation, provides an image that is wholly distinct from the religious standpoint.

In the contemporary perception, reconciliation is a complex, vague, contested, and often slippery term with many possible meanings made up of various components that all play apart; as a result there is little agreement on the term’s definition. This situation is largely because reconciliation is considered both a goal – something to achieve – and a process – a means to achieve that goal. The goal of reconciliation is to create a common future, a permanent solution, perhaps even an ideal state to hope for. But the process, on the other hand, is very much a precursor, a way of dealing with how things are. Building a reconciliation process develops the means to work effectively and practically to access the goals. In contrast, however, Rosoux asserts that reconciliation is a process rather than a goal and that this process is not linear but a continuously evolving relationship between perpetrators and victims. Similarly, Goodman says reconciliation is an incremental and nonlinear process that involves replacing fear with non-violent coexistence. To widen the discussion, Michael Hardimon’s book, Hegel’s philosophy of reconciliation, is noteworthy. According to Hegel, reconciliation as it is ordinarily used, is systematically ambiguous between the process of reconciliation and the state that is its results. Further, reconciliation

10 In Christianity, reconciliation signifies sinner’s restoration of his/her relationship to God after breaching the moral law. Hofmann, “Reconciliation,” 8.
12 Llewellyn and Philpott, Restorative Justice; see also Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugg Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 247.
14 Bloomfield, “Reconciliation,” 12.
17 In fact, Hardimon makes a distinction between the English word reconciliation and the German word Hegel uses, Versöhnung. The basic variation is that, as Hardimon notes, unlike reconciliation, Versöhnung connotes a process of transformation, a process in which getting along is the result of a newly transformed relationship, which is why Versöhnung can sound churchy. On the other hand, reconciliation may imply resignation or submission with suggestions of acquiescence and surrender. For instance, a person can become reconciled to a circumstance despite it being contrary to one’s wishes, but if Versöhnung is possible, then resignation is unnecessary, writes Hardin. Michael O. Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85.
means different things to different people in different levels of conflict, such as between wife and husband, offender and victim, or nations and communities.

J. Paul Lederach, who has developed one of the rare theoretical conceptualisations of reconciliation, suggests that the “peacemaking paradigm of reconciliation involves the creation of social space where truth, justice, mercy and forgiveness are validated where justice and peace have kissed.” Even though the reconciliation process contains paradoxes and contradictions, Lederach writes most eloquently about it. He says reconciliation can be seen as dealing with three specific paradoxes. First, while reconciliation searches for the articulation of a long term and independent future, it provides an encounter between the open expressions of sorrowful past. Second, reconciliation ensures a platform for mercy and truth to meet, in which past suffering is explored for letting go in favour of a renewed relationship. Third, reconciliation requires a time to sustain peace and justice in which redressing the wrong is held together with the envisioning of a mutual, connected future.

On the other hand, Johan Galtung formulates reconciliation as Reconciliation = Closure + Healing. Closure means not reopening hostilities, and healing is used in the sense of being rehabilitated. In this vein, Danish peace researcher Jan Öberg writes: “reconciliation is synonymous with saying goodbye to revenge.” Sampson emphasizes that “reconciliation is synonymous with coexistence,” simply saying that reconciliation is “the absence of violence or a departure from violence.” Brounéus’ and Bloomfield’s remark that reconciliation is a societal process that consists of accepting past suffering, and while not necessarily loving them or forgiving the perpetrators), changing destructive behaviours and attitudes into constructive means by convincing society that we will all have better lives together than we have had separately.

The strength of this definition lies in the centrality of the following components: changes in emotion (mutual acknowledgment of suffering), attitude, and behaviour. From all of the definitions, we see that reconciliation is a societal, incremental, and non-linear process that involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships. We do not necessarily become friends with those we disagree with, but we construct a relationship through and in a non-violent setting. Therefore, reconciliation can be delineated into three parts: emotions, attitudes, and behaviours, all of which involve reparations, truth-telling, and healing among former adversaries.

Looking at the varieties of reconciliation we see that the empirical research of reconciliation occurs on three levels: the individual level focuses on trauma and how victims experience participating in a truth-telling process for reconciliation; the social level focuses on how former conflicting parties perceive each other before, during, and after this process; and the national level focuses on how governments and rebel groups act during reconciliation.

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20 J. P. Lederach, Building Peace, 2.
25 Brounéus, “Reconciliation,” 294. See more about Meierhenrich, “Varieties of Reconciliation,” 195-231; Trudy Govier and
Simply put: national reconciliation represents the macro level, which includes the attitudes and behaviours of national political leaders (government and/or opposition) and those in power.

3. Galtung’s Triangle of Conflict

Peace is more than the absence of war, says Howard, so the ultimate goal of reconciliation is to maintain both negative and positive peace through creating newly defined social relations between the formerly oppressed and their oppressors. From this perspective, Johan Galtung developed a “Conflict Triangle.” Its three corners consist of the following: (A) conflict attitudes, (B) conflict behaviours, and (C) contradictions, [the] conflict issue itself. Accordingly, reconciliation urges a change in attitude and behaviour as well as being concerned about incompatibility. Galtung’s analytical framework therefore proves useful for structuring an analysis of national reconciliation.

In fact, the ABC conflict triangle model was originally aimed to operate in war situations, but over the years, it has been used to resolve other conflicts, such as family violence, racial discrimination, and human rights abuses, in addition to reconciliation. In general, the method deals with destructive or violent conflicts and reflects the normative aim of preventing, managing, limiting, and overcoming violence; in Galtung’s view, violence begins with cultural and structural repression.

![Figure 1: Galtung’s Conflict Triangle](image)

According to Galtung, there are various types of violence that could roughly be classified into three categories: the first category is cultural violence (or conflict attitudes—A), which involve assumptions, cognitions and emotions that one party may have about itself and the other, such as self-righteousness or superiority, and these factors represent the invisible part of the conflict. The second category is direct violence (or conflict behaviours—B), which represents the visible category and contains mental, verbal, or physical insults and expressions put forth in a conflict, such as the actions, thoughts, and words demonstrated when a conflict occurs. The third category is structural violence (contradictions; the conflict issue itself—C),


The distinction between positive and negative peace according to Galtung: negative peace is merely the absence of war; positive peace is the establishment of life-affirming and life-enhancing values and structures, and constructing society on the basis of equality, justice, and dignity. See more about Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research* VI, no. 3 (1969): 167-91.


which is the perceived incompatibility or clash between the goals of two or more parties that represents the invisible part of the Triangle. Contradiction causes violent attitudes and behaviours. Each angle of the triangle can serve as a gateway to peacefully influencing the conflict. Galtung emphasises attitudes and behaviours, which are identified by two indicators: measuring attitudes (normative and strategic policy statements) and measuring behaviours (symbolic and judicial acts). Therefore, in this paper, Galtung’s conflict triangle is applied to Mandela’s initiatives under the rubric of normative statements, symbolic acts, and judicial acts.

4. Reconciliation-oriented Leadership: Nelson Mandela’s Peace Characteristics

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. My ideal is a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunity. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and achieve, but, if need be, an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

Nelson Mandela, 1963

South Africa has made surprising strides in race relations, and Mandela can be credited with the lion’s share of that success. The name of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela is synonymous with South Africa’s liberation struggle, freedom, peace, and reconciliation. Without Mandela, South African history would have taken a completely different turn. After the collapse of apartheid in early 1990, the response to South Africa’s nation-building challenge was most visibly adopted through Mandela’s own mythology and became intertwined with that of the “new nation”. Despite the prophetic name he had been given – Rolihlahla; “trouble-maker”–Mandela became a person of integrity and sound principles, and a peace-making leader. His last quality is exceptionally rare in the world of politics. He also became a fighter for equal rights, describing himself as having a “stubborn sense of fairness,” where the terms inferior and superior did not exist for him. One of Mandela’s fundamental character traits is “unitive” leadership, which embraces all diversities. He moved from a self-focused responsibility (such as his own freedom) to a socially oriented responsibility (i.e., freedom for all), so he remarks that “my hunger for the freedom of my own people became the hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black.” He did not speak as a dissident representative of a minority view, but projected a national vision to the people of South Africa and the world at large. While in prison, he always used the word ‘We’ rather than ‘I,’ which is further proof of his dedication to his people. Although Mandela has several distinctive peace traits, for

31 Hofmann, “Reconciliation,” 8.
32 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, 114.
35 Apartheid was a policy or system of segregation or discrimination on the grounds of race, implemented in South Africa. The term drew upon segregation and Afrikaner (the white community in South Africa) nationalist ideologies to create a landscape of social and economic dislocation.
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the purposes of this paper, we list three relating to the reconciliation process: forgiveness, dissolving vindictiveness, and empathetic capacities.

If forgiveness were applied as a distinction to Nelson Mandela it would seem that he was a man of forgiveness, says Shawn O’Fallon. However, forgiveness by itself is not an often-used term in Mandela’s writings and speeches. For instance, in his second autobiography and in nearly 1200 electronically collected speeches and interviews, there are just 19 examples of the uses of forgive or forgiveness. Due to the constructed nature of the boundaries around the term forgiveness, Mandela instead talks about the spirit of forgiveness. As is evident by Mandela’s symbolic acts, he himself was able to treat those that unjustly imprisoned him for 27 years with the spirit of forgiveness.

Due to South Africa’s historical background, forgiveness was needed as various emergent acts to achieve success in reconciliation. Racial conflict began with the first white settlers in 1652. When the National Party came to power in 1948, the apartheid regime was accepted as official state policy, although it had been de facto policy since 1910. Therefore, colour-based societal disintegration ideology was accommodated with several oppressive legislations which left deep-seated challenges to reconciliation. For oppressed blacks, the historical background caused an accumulated hatred with a strong drive for vengeance. This situation could have resulted in mass executions or a bloody civil war once the black community gained power. Therefore, Mandela’s great achievement was to transform that anger into peaceful and non-violent protest despite fierce opposition. Integrating isolated blacks into the new peaceful system, convincing them to live side by side with white minorities and building a colour-blind society could not have been achieved without the forgiveness-oriented character of Nelson Mandela.

The lack of outward vindictiveness toward adversaries is another characteristic of Mandela’s. Saths Cooper, who shared a cellblock with Mandela for five years, says:

Mandela was able to get on with every person he met...Despite having ideological disagreements, he was always able to maintain personal contact, it doesn’t matter if you differ, he is always polite. He never gets angry. All he will do is try to have the discussion as amicably as possible.

According to Stengel, who worked with Mandela on his autobiography, the latter’s great achievement as leader is his ability to show the smiling face of reconciliation rather than frowns of bitterness and lost opportunity.

Mandela also has an empathetic capacity, which helped him in his political efforts and makes him more likely forgive others. Tom Lodge, one of the respected historians who worked on Mandela’s life, says, “Mandela possesses a genuine capacity for empathy, to shift from one kind of social etiquette to another, an ability that indicates an unusually imaginative capacity for empathy.” Empathy became part of Mandela’s life philosophy; thus he believed that the Afrikaners had a right to be in South Africa, and never threatened to drive them from the country. He was able to understand how isolated whites were in the situation, and that

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43 Lieberfeld, “Mandela and Qualities,” 36.
45 Lodge, Mandela, 50.
they tended to know blacks only as servants. While applying the skill of empathy, he always sought mutual ground that united the nation in sharing anti-colonial Afrikaner/African identity.\footnote{Mark Young, “Playing Red and Playing Blue: The 1990-94 Negotiation Miracle in South Africa,” \textit{International Negotiation} 12, no. 2 (2007): 308.}

In a nutshell, Mandela was an exceptionally motivated, philosophically pragmatic, and intellectually creative leader who exhibited the merits of gentleness, compassion, hospitality, openness to others and knowing that one’s life is closely bound to all other lives. Thus, he always spoke of \textit{ubuntu}, an African concept of human brotherhood, mutual responsibility, and compassion, which infers that ‘a person is a person through other people.’\footnote{In fact, \textit{ubuntu} came to be closely associated with Desmond Tutu, the first Archbishop of Cape Town and the chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Tutu uses \textit{ubuntu} and reconciliation interchangeably. Ubuntu, wrote Tutu in his book “No Future without Forgiveness,” infers that “my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours; and a person is a person through other people.” This notion opposes Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am.” Tutu suggests that \textit{ubuntu} says “I am human because I belong,” and this contrasts with the ethos of the West. (Desmond Mpilo Tutu, \textit{No Future without Forgiveness} (NY: Doubleday Pub., 1999, 31).} Consequently, Mandela’s reconciliation-oriented characters helped to transcend the anger, bitterness, and vindictiveness that existed between the white and black community.

\textbf{4.1. Mandela’s reconciliation initiatives through normative statements}

Normative statements made by those in power, representing measuring attitudes in Galtung’s conflict triangle, disclose the ambience and perception regarding the atmosphere for reconciliation. J. Paul Lederach emphasises the necessity of this category for setting the space to envision a commonly shared future.\footnote{J. P. Lederach, \textit{Building Peace}, 77.} A general picture of society is painted through normative statements, yet no moral or ethical considerations are taken into account. In this regard, we analyse three of Mandela’s essential statements that had a watershed effect on national reconciliation.

The first statement occurred when Mandela was released from prison on February 11, 1990. South Africans and the world had been waiting for this iconic moment, to hear his vision for South Africa. Therefore, his first address to the crowd carried the codes of the new nation’s metaphor:

\begin{quote}
We call on our white compatriots to join us in the shaping of a new South Africa. The freedom movement is a political home for you too....I wish to quote my own words during my trial in 1964.... ‘I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But, if need be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.’
\end{quote}

This speech sent a striking message to the white and black community to ensure that Africa belongs to all, irrespective of race, sex, ethnicity, and stature.

The second strategic discourse was made during the Hani crisis. In the early days of the 1994 national election, the biggest threat to the country’s transition came with the assassination of Chris Hani on April 10, 1993. Hani was General Secretary of the South African Communist Party and considered to be Mandela’s successor. He was immensely popular, and his death was followed by riots in which 70 people died. After the assassination,
serious tensions led to fears among whites and blacks alike, so Mandela played a key role in calming the situation through a television broadcast:

Now is the time for all South Africans to stand together against those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for – the freedom of us all. Now is the time for our white compatriots, from whom messages of condolence continue to pour in, to reach out with an understanding of the grievous loss to our nations... This is a watershed moment for all of us, to every single South African black and white.50

Thanks to Mandela’s appeal, the ensuing protest was peaceful and calm returned. The Chris Hani issue shows that no other single event in the reconciliation process provoked such a dramatic shift in the balance of power, proving how significant Mandela’s statement was. One of Mandela’s biographers notes that no other event revealed to the white community how significant Mandela was to their future security.51

The third landmark statement was occurred in the aftermath of the first all-races election on April 27, 1994. At the time, the situation was quite dismal; the night before the election many supermarkets ran short of long-life milk and similar products as many whites prepared for war-like conditions.52 The Mandela-led African National Congress (ANC) won South Africa’s first democratic election, and in his inaugural address on May 10, 1994, Mandela made a remarkable speech:

The time for the healing of wounds has come, the moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come, and the time to build is upon us... We know it well that none of us acting alone can achieve success. We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation-building, for the birth of a new world. Let freedom reign. We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity – a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world.53

Mandela selected a truly cross-cultural cabinet, with white and black ministers, illustrating that the country belongs to all. Fifteen politicians who had served in the apartheid era were re-elected. De Klerk himself, the last head of state of the apartheid era, and who worked to end it, became one of Mandela’s deputy presidents.

4.2. Mandela’s reconciliation initiatives through symbolic acts

Symbolic acts accommodate measuring behaviours, and can be in the form of apologising, establishing a truth commission, introducing new national symbols or a flag that represent unity to create positive spirals of behaviour. Aware of the importance of such acts, the Mandela-led government introduced new symbols, notes and coins, and a new national flag and anthem. The anthem combined the popular African liberation song Nkosi Sikelel’i Africa (God Bless Africa) and parts of the old anthem Die Stem, and was a strategic implementation that reflected hope in a peaceful post-apartheid society.54 The merger of symbols was harmonised via several legal adaptations which illustrated a new national identity linked to reconciliation, non-racialism, rebirth, and unity.
Mandela also pursued an array of symbolic gestures that paved the way for the reconciliation process. He paid a visit to Percy Yutar, the prosecutor who had sent him to jail for 27 years, held a tea party with former (white) politicians, hosted a dinner party for the former commander of Robben Island (where Mandela was imprisoned for most of his sentence), and met with H.F. Verwoerd’s (prime minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966) widow Betsie Verwoerd, and former president Botha.\(^55\) Despite fierce opposition in the ANC leadership towards Mandela’s unilateral symbolic acts, he believed in the significance of such initiatives for reconciliation. Mandela believed that given time, the Afrikaners would accept the new South Africa and make a significant contribution to the Rainbow Nation. These gestures had a tremendous impact on building national trust between parties.\(^56\)

Building reconciliation through sports has been in place for many years,\(^57\) and Mandela included some in his symbolic acts. In South Africa, soccer was perceived as black, cricket as white and English, and rugby as white and Afrikaans, therefore the sport’s influence on the country was beyond dispute. In June 1995, the South African rugby team, the Springboks, defeated New Zealand in Johannesburg in the World Cup. Hosting the World Cup presented an opportunity to demonstrate the government’s commitment to support a cause close to Afrikaners’ hearts and bring black and white together. For Mandela, it was the right place and moment to lead the country into a further reconciliation process, although many black leaders called on Mandela to boycott the games. In addition, South African rugby authorities were famously conservative and did not buy into Mandela’s strategy due to insufficient trust. Despite the unfavourable circumstances, Mandela attended the game wearing a Springbok rugby jersey and presented the winner’s trophy to the Springbok captain. His visits to players were well publicised, which opened a new page in national reconciliation. At the end of the game, the new national anthem was sung and the handshake between team captain Francois Pienaar and President Nelson Mandela was widely portrayed throughout South African society. Mandela’s intrepid action received wild applause from all circles of Afrikaner rugby fans, who started to chanting ‘Nel-son, Nel-son.’\(^58\) After that, the white singer P.J. Powers wrote new lyrics echoing the official slogan, “One team, one country/Gathering together/One mind, one heart/Every creed, every colour/Once joined, never apart.” Inevitably, this action took the process of reconciliation into another dimension. Through Mandela’s symbolic acts, interaction between people of different races was transformed from alienation to an intended search for dialogue and contact, particularly amongst youngsters.\(^59\)

The social fabric of the country made Mandela’s symbolic behaviours that much more significant. South Africa’s complex history has bequeathed to the present day a rich ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious diversity. Nearly 79 percent of people classified themselves as black African (which includes ethnic groups such as Zulu, Xhosa, Basotho, Bapedi, Venda, Tswana, Swazi, and Tsonga); nearly 9.6 percent of people are white; 8.9 percent are “coloured” (mixed-race people) and 2.5 percent are Indian/Asian.\(^60\) This complexity encompasses 11 languages plus several dialects. This heterogeneity has evolved into a homogenous framework through Mandela’s reconciliation efforts.


\(^{56}\) Vorster, “Nation Building,” 482.


\(^{58}\) Beck, *The History of South Africa*, 197.

\(^{59}\) Vorster, “Nation Building,” 482.

\(^{60}\) Anthony Butler, *Contemporary South Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Pub, 2009), 45.
4.3. Mandela’s reconciliation initiatives through judicial acts

Judicial acts are one of the most significant indicators of reconciliation initiatives; therefore law has a pivotal role to play in the reconstruction and empowerment of society. As John Hatch states that “justice equals reconciliation”\(^{61}\) and W. Zartman remarks that “there is no lasting peace without justice,”\(^{62}\) emphasising the significance of equal justice for all. However, maintaining justice in peace-building represents a sensitive part of the process, so a balance must be found between the necessity for tribunals to punish perpetrators and granting perpetrators amnesty to avoid disturbing a fragile peace. In the early days of the Mandela government, the primary issue was how to deal with the human rights abuses committed during apartheid. After long negotiations, the parties accepted an Interim Constitution (1993-1999), which allowed institutions to confront the legacy of human rights abuses and contained an amnesty provision for those who were responsible for offenses committed for political reasons. A centralized constitutional court model was chosen for the Interim Constitution to make a distinct break from the previous constitutional dispensation. The main principle was to protect basic human rights without discrimination; therefore it contained a chapter on fundamental rights to invalidate any law that might restrict basic human freedoms, irrespective of which party had political power in the country.

Other important judicial acts included the Land Restitution and the Affirmative Action Programme. The former intended to grant access to farming land for the black population, which has been prohibited from such land since 1913, and was quite successful. The latter aimed to introduce black people into areas of labour and the economy that had not been accessible to them in the past. The land restitution programme was prepared to tackle land issues and produced some encouraging results; for instance, by 2005 nearly 58,000 of the 79,000 claims that had been brought forth were solved amicably.\(^{63}\) Although there has been further improvement, one of the strong criticisms of Mandela’s government has been land restitution, the overall results of which have not satisfied black society. Several other programmes have achieved a huge measure of social engineering in the process of reconciliation. However, the most well-known action is the 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No.34, which established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

Most of the cases dealing with reconciliation in practice accept the TRC as a suitable model. Thus, truth commissions have usually emerged as part of transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic political systems. These commissions are non-judicial bodies that generally prepare a report of their investigation with recommendations for future reform. However, some truth commissions have implemented additional activities, including naming perpetrators, granting amnesty, or providing reparations. Since the 1970s, nearly 40 truth commissions have been established to uncover the truth about human right abuses. However, the best known among these is South Africa’s. Although commissions do not have prosecutorial powers, the South African TRC had the power to grant amnesty.\(^{64}\)


\(^{63}\) Vorster, “Nation Building,” 475.

By far, the most important and controversial of all Mandela’s initiatives was establishing the TRC. In November 1995, Mandela was selected as head of the TRC, with Archbishop Tutu as chair and Alex Boraine (South African Politician) as vice-Chair. The TRC’s overarching goal was to promote national reconciliation and unity in a spirit of understanding. The TRC objectives were to investigate the gross human rights violations committed between March 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994, which was the period of legalized apartheid. The specific violations under investigation were killing, torture, abduction, and severe ill-treatment. The TRC allocated the conflicts and divisions of the past to one of three sub-commissions: human Rights Violations (HRV), Amnesty, and Reparation and Rehabilitation (R&R). The TRC also had an investigative unit and witness protection programme.

The HRV Committee was authorized to take, investigate, and verify victim testimony; to establish the identity of individual and institutional perpetrators; and to designate accountability for gross human rights violations. The Committee was responsible for collecting statements from witnesses and victims recording the extent of these violations, and the Committee invited victims to speak in a public forum about their suffering. The Committee took the testimony of over 21,000 victims, with nearly 10% of these testimonies being given at public hearings on TV, in churches, and at town halls. The public hearings started on April 15, 1996 and lasted for two years.

The Amnesty Committee considered granting amnesty to apartheid perpetrators under strict conditions: 1) the crime had to have been committed between May 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994; 2) the crime had to be “associated with a political objective,” so the applicant had to have been an affiliate of one of the political parties during the conflict; and 3) “the perpetrator had to admit fault” (but a justification such as self-defence) and thus he/she had to disclose the full truth. If any person was deemed eligible for amnesty, the committee had to consider the person’s motive as well as the nature of the act. The TRC Act specifies that any person who acted for personal gain would not qualify for amnesty. If the crime was a gross violation of human rights, the Amnesty Committee had to conduct a public hearing before granting amnesty. The amnesty programme was a highly controversial issue and the ANC faced a massive dilemma in this regard.

The task of the R&R Committee was to provide recommendations on victim reparation. The Committee members were medical doctors and mental healthcare professionals was charged with the responsibility of evaluating the statements and applications provided by the HRV Committee and the Amnesty Committee. If the HRV Committee approved applicants as victims, then those people and their families could apply to the R&R Committee for reparation. The R&R Committee then made recommendations to the president of TRC about

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69 The role of women in court and the TRC testimony was significant; 52.9% of witnesses (11,271 out of 21,297) were women. Mothers could speak and cry on behalf of their children, unlike men, who were not as comfortable showing emotions publicly. Hayli Millar, “Women and Transitional Justice: A Preliminary Assessment of Women’s Experiences with Truth Commissions,” in Listening to the Silences: Women and War, ed. Helen Durham and Tracey Gurd (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 18.
70 TRC Act, sec. 20 (3)
71 TRC Act, sec. 19(3)(b)(iii)
how to restore the victims’ human and civil dignity. The Committee recommended that each victim or family receive approximately $3,500 USD each year for six years. As balancing the inequality and degrees of suffering would be difficult to price, the committee recommended the same reparation for each individual. As a general point, the R&R Committee could not meet expectations of the victims. In the payment of reparations, long delays took place and the amount of reparations paid to 21,000 victims was quite lower than what it has been recommended. Additionally, government refused to announce the amount of remaining money that was reserved for reparations, therefore R&R is seen as the least successful, but also the least contested of the three committees.

The mission of the HRV Committee finished in June 1998. The proceedings of the Amnesty Committee continued until 2001 due to the overwhelming number of amnesty applications. The TRC’s Final Report was presented to then-President Thabo Mbeki in 2003. The HRV Committee documented more than 22,000 registered victims, of which 2,500 received the opportunity to testify. Over 8,000 South Africans (including members of the South African government and resistance groups) applied for amnesty, and the TRC pardoned several hundred of these applicants. Regarding aspects of reconciliation, both whites and blacks confessed to apartheid crimes of police brutality and collective punishment during the apartheid years. Though the ANC initially refused to seek amnesty for any of its own members, 22 ANC members who confessed to killing and maiming were tried and pardoned. Truth telling, seeking forgiveness, and confronting past suffering was essential in achieving reconciliation.

Although the TRC’s overall contribution to South Africa’s national reconciliation process is irrefutable, several criticisms have been raised against its structure, implications, and expected outcomes. To cover all criticisms is beyond the scope of this article; however, substantial ones are underlined. First, the TRC was accused by activists and scholars for re-traumatising victims and denying them true justice, especially by granting amnesty to perpetrators. Lerche maintains that the TRC favoured perpetrators over victims and that the perpetrators had more to gain by receiving amnesty than victims had through reparation. As some claim that when punishment is denied it leads to resentment and vigilantism, they say that the TRC failed to save victims’ respect and dignity when it encouraged them to forgive and reconcile with perpetrators. Pursuing reconciliation without punitive justice was a controversial and explosive issue which further underscored the inequality between perpetrators and victims. It has also been argued that pursuing reconciliation was fundamentally illiberal, and several questions about the achievements of the TRC and national reconciliation initiatives have not been resolved. All these criticisms have some sort of legitimacy; however, given its situational constraints of the time and atmosphere, the TRC still made great strides in achieving reconciliation.

73 “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report.”
74 The TRC Act also provided for a small-scale Witness Protection Programme, which served over 150 witnesses; see more in Zyl, “Dilemmas of Transitional Justice,” 656.
76 Beck, The History of South Africa, 203.
77 Bairstow, “Amnesty,” 93.
80 Lerche, “Truth Commissions,” 7
reconciliation. The process may have resulted in less than perfect justice, but releasing the truth (from both the black and white perspective) and seeking forgiveness smoothed the process; the TRC in South Africa resulted in more reconciliation in less time and at a lower cost than war crimes tribunals have, such as those of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.\(^{51}\)

As a result, contrary to the expectations of the many who predicted conflict and chaos after apartheid, South Africa has come through the process with minimum losses thanks to the reconciliation efforts of Mandela. The question of whether these efforts really had an influence on interracial coexistence is outside the scope of this study, but Gibson’s survey provides a general answer. Gibson analysed the replies of 3727 respondents to nine survey statements about racial reconciling in 2004. Nearly half of the black respondents scored as “less reconciled.” In the same research, he found that more than half the white and coloured South Africans expressed some form of reconciliation, while only one third of black South Africans did so.\(^{82}\) From these results, although reconciliation efforts appear to have had more of a positive impact on non-black society than on black society, there are still positive effects.

Mandela’s success cannot be fully understood without knowing the potential power of white minorities. At the time of democratic transition, white minorities were still influential in all spheres of society, which could have made them capable of sustaining the apartheid regime for at least a few more decades. Mandela was well aware that there would be no solution and progress without the consent of the whites, and he through there may be two outcomes: white minorities would leave the country or, if they felt there was no future for them within South Africa, they would try to set up a separate state. While their economic, military, and human capabilities were quite sufficient to maintain the latter, Mandela’s reconciliation-oriented efforts gave whites a sense of belonging in the new South Africa. Such persuasion was no mean feat; preventing a massive exodus of white people and convincing black people of the merit of reconciliation instead of retribution was the key to success in the new democratic South Africa.

5. Conclusion

This article has scrutinized the national reconciliation of South Africa and the role of Nelson Mandela through his normative statements and symbolic and judicial acts. Instead of investigating the results of reconciliation-oriented efforts on society, the paper points out Mandela’s strategic function in orchestrating intergroup coexistence. Throughout this article, we claim that grassroots leaders play a strategic role in maintaining national reconciliation. As illustrated in the case of South Africa, no leader but Mandela, especially within his/her lifetime, could have eradicated the legacy of racial acts that left a society suffering from psychological and physical injuries for nearly a century. Considering Mandela’s situational constraints, his contributions toward national reconciliation are irrefutable; and it is precisely these that turned South African history in a positive direction. Abolishing long-lasting apartheid rules, enforcing the Truth and Reconciliation process, implementing restitution, and in particular affirmative action, land restitution, black economic empowerment, constitutional development, ending political violence, and transforming the educational system are some of Mandela’s initiatives that occurred within the first decade of the new nation.

\(^{82}\) Meierhenrich, “Varieties of Reconciliation,” 218.
Reconciliation-oriented Leadership...

This article has also underlined three essential facts for understanding the strategic importance of Mandela’s efforts: 1) South Africa’s historical background; 2) the society’s heterogeneous structure; and 3) the potential power of the white community. Being aware of the difficulty of reconciliation right after apartheid, Mandela’s endeavours stand as a great example of success despite of his social, economic, and political constraints, even if the degree of reconciliation thus far achieved is considerably less than complete. It is clear that the process of national reconciliation was well-established in the Mandela era. Before the 1999 general election, public satisfaction with Mandela’s performance stood at 80 percent; even 59 percent of white South Africans believed that Mandela was doing his job well. However, when Mandela stepped down from government in 1999, reconciliation began to lose its impetus and motivation. Subsequent leaders have not carried on his legacy; they have not implemented effective measures to continue to address South Africa’s problems. Today, although South Africa has one of the world’s most advanced democratic constitutions; the apartheid era’s racial classification has been replaced by economic classification. Currently, South African society faces an increasingly widening gap between rich and poor, a high level of corruption in the private and public spheres and a less-than- effective administration of justice.

Bibliography


Violence and Security Concerns in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland

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Abstract

Eighteen years after the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland struggles with a lingering sense of insecurity. This article discusses the underlying reasons for a sense of insecurity and vulnerability in this post-conflict context. First, ongoing sporadic communal violence reactivates communal divisions and the psychological burden of “the Troubles.” The activities of spoiler paramilitary groups and sporadic communal troubles still fuel people’s anxiety about the possibility of renewed violence, as the history of political violence proves how these influences can be a destabilizing factor in inter-communal relations. Second, the unchanging patterns of political mobilization, based on the historical division of unionism and nationalism, reinforce the previous cleavages and continue to inform the boundaries of the communal divide. The political arena is still plagued by ethnic outbidding and intransigent party politicking, both of which pit communities against each other and keep the zero-sum bias between the groups alive. Third, the working-class communities that constituted the backbone of the political violence carry on the legacy of war with their continued paramilitary presence and legacy of sectarianism. The social vulnerabilities of working-class areas, such as continuing paramilitary presence, the legacy of sectarianism in segregated neighborhoods, persistent mistrust toward the police, and growing youth unemployment, need to be addressed in order to generate a long-term social infrastructure for peace.

Keywords: Post-conflict, Northern Ireland, violence, security, spoilers

1. Introduction

The post-conflict period denotes the transitional period between war and peace, but the boundaries of war and peace are far from clear—in fact, they are blurry in most cases. Post-conflict countries display a high range of variance in terms of violence, such as the increased death rates in Guatemala or the outbreak of hostilities in Sri Lanka. The term “post-conflict” is in itself ambiguous, as the prefix “post” implies that the conflict is over, whereas the reality is that these countries are plagued with such problems as ragged ceasefires, false promises of non-violence, delayed reforms, etc. The post-conflict period does not bring about an immediate transition to peace in the positive sense, as associated with robust justice, liberty, and equity, with heightened levels of security and relatively little violence. It can generate a weak and fragile peace unless the socio-economic transformation is accompanied by a lack
of violence. Rather than a smooth transition to normalcy, it is more reasonable to expect a post-conflict period in which peace is contested with bottlenecks and setbacks. Insecurity and violence can be an intrinsic property of the post-conflict process due to the legacy of war:

Human security regularly deteriorates in the delicate period after wars are officially declared over. As a result, so-called post-conflict realities rarely bear much resemblance to what is implied by their definition. Rather, death and injury rates often remain comparatively high even after an armed conflict has come to an “end.”

The conflict in Northern Ireland stems from the millennia-old political tensions between unionism and nationalism, as unionists (composed mainly of Protestants) refused to join in a united Ireland, whereas nationalists (composed mainly of Catholics) contested the legitimacy of British rule in Ireland. Northern Ireland was instituted as a devolved government of the UK in 1921, but Catholics were discriminated against socially, politically, and economically under unionist governments (1921–72). The outbreak of communal tensions at the end of the 1960s and the ensuing 30 years of communal conflict, known as “the Troubles,” claimed over 3,700 lives in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2001. This number may sound small for large populations; however, it had a substantial and traumatic impact for a population of about 1.6 million. Eighteen years after the 1998 Belfast Good Friday Agreement (GFA), Northern Ireland is a post-conflict society that is described by scholars as “no peace, no war,” “imperfect peace,” or “in the shadow of the gun.” These epithets refer to a post-conflict environment in which the use of violence is still on the horizon and feeds into fears about a potential lapse back into collective violence.

The Northern Ireland case illustrates that insecurity in a post-conflict context is adaptive and persistent. People still associate safety with their segregated neighborhoods and they feel safer keeping the peace lines, the physical barriers separating the communities that built up during the Troubles. Recent research shows that although 58 percent of respondents want to see the destruction of the peace walls in the future, the same percentage is also unsure about the ability of the police to ensure their safety once they are removed, and 68 percent of respondents still think that peace walls are necessary to keep them safe and protect them from sectarian attacks. Although crime rates in Northern Ireland have seen a downward trend since 1998, with lower crime rates compared to England and Wales, a significant

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9 2012/2013 NICS (Northern Ireland Crime Survey) shows that 59 percent of respondents think that crime in Northern Ireland has increased in the last two years, only 33 percent perceive a parallel increase in local crimes.
11 U.K. Department of Justice, Analytical Services Group, Experience of Crime: Findings from the 2012/13 Northern Ireland
majority (59 percent) of the 2012–13 Northern Ireland Crime Survey (NICS) respondents perceive that crime levels in Northern Ireland have increased in the preceding two years, and they express higher levels of insecurity compared to the actual risk than their counterparts in England and Wales. Existential anxiety has been a constant feature of Northern Ireland, and this is based on “fear of what can happen, rather than what ‘is.’”

This article discusses the underlying reasons for violence and security concerns in a post-conflict period, based on the case of Northern Ireland. It draws attention to three dynamics that feed into the undercurrents of insecurity in post-conflict Northern Ireland. First, the ongoing sporadic communal violence reactivates communal divisions and the legacy of terror. Second, the unchanging patterns of political mobilization, based on the political polarization of unionism and nationalism, continue to reinforce the sectarian divisions and preexistent cleavages despite the GFA. Third, the social infrastructure of the conflict, which is composed mainly of working-class communities, still carries some generic features that can predispose them toward violence. This study is based on 23 interviews conducted in Northern Ireland during the summer of 2014 that included local community workers, Northern Ireland deputies, and specialists on Northern Ireland conflict. The author also conducted informal interviews with residents of North and West Belfast, two of the districts that were most affected by violence.

2. Sporadic Communal Violence

The level of political violence dropped significantly after the GFA in Northern Ireland, but institutions that are remnants of communal violence, such as dissident militant groups, peace walls, and small-scale sectarian violence, continue to influence people’s perception of security. In Northern Ireland, the loyalist and republican paramilitary groups became signatories of the GFA and agreed to the provisions related to the demilitarization of the area. After seven years of negotiations and pressure upon the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and its political wing, Sinn Fein, the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) announced in 2005 that the PIRA had finally completed the decommissioning of its weaponry. However, only the main organization was disbanded, leaving behind disdissident republican militants that were not content with the GFA, notably the Real IRA (RIRA), the Continuity IRA (CIRA), and Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH). These organizations are the spoilers of the peace process in Northern Ireland. Spoilers are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” Spoiler militant groups use violence to keep the flame of resistance alive, sabotage the agreement, and challenge its content and implementation. The distribution of power during the peace process and the opportunity structure provided by such distribution can lead to the development of spoilers or their weakening. In Northern Ireland, the progress of peace negotiation pushed main militant organizations to sign up to the principles of...
nonviolence. The lack of external powers that would sponsor militant organizations and punishments on spoiler groups prevented dissident militants from steering the peace process away from its course.\textsuperscript{15}

Republican and loyalist spoiler groups’ activities create suspicion of the decommissioning and revive fears of a potential return to political violence. Dissident republican militants launch bomb attacks targeting police stations, soldiers, courthouses, and Catholic police officers in order to deter them from their involvement in the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).\textsuperscript{16} The Violent Dissident Republican Database from 1997 to 2010 shows 711 violent incidents, 187 non-violent incidents, and 70 incidents labeled as threats of violence, with an overall increase after 2007.\textsuperscript{17} The militant dissidents also engage in moral policing, executing punishment attacks, and other forms of vigilante justice against suspected drug dealers and sex offenders.\textsuperscript{18} However, the militant activities of dissident republicans remain minor and limited compared to those of the PIRA. As the IMC report indicates, their violent campaign “in no way matches the range and tempo of the PIRA campaign of the Troubles.”\textsuperscript{19}

On the other side, the primary paramilitary organizations of loyalism, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Red Hand Commandos (RHC), the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), adopted a conflict-transformation role and banned their members from perpetuating sectarian violence and criminality.\textsuperscript{20} However, not all factions of these organizations are committed to conflict resolution, so there remain groups engaged in criminal activities. Loyalist paramilitaries are more fractured and composed of loose structures compared to the PIRA; thus, they have more factions that take the lead in criminal business such as drug dealing, robbery, the sale of counterfeit goods, intimidation, and extortion. The IMC report states that “in contrast to PIRA, loyalist groups are finding it very difficult to contemplate going out of business.”\textsuperscript{21} The veteran members of the UVF who are at loggerheads with the current leadership reveal to the public that the UVF is making a fortune from racketeering and taxing of its own men and continue its recruitment by filling its ranks with drug dealers, the unemployed, and people inclined to anti-social behavior.\textsuperscript{22} The IMC also acknowledges that the UDA continues the recruitment of youth, which is “inconsistent with an organization which is going out of business as a paramilitary group.”\textsuperscript{23}

The PSNI statistics show a significant decrease in the number of paramilitary shooting and bombing incidents after 2005, particularly in 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 (see Table 1). The causalities due to paramilitary-style assaults and shootings also decreased after 2005 from

\textsuperscript{15} R. Mac Ginty, “Northern Ireland”.


\textsuperscript{18} Horgan and Morrison, “Here to Stay?” 643.


\textsuperscript{23} Independent Monitoring Commission, Twenty-fifth report, 18.
three-digit numbers to two-digit numbers, and increased back to three-digit numbers only in 2009/2010 until 2014. In addition, security-related deaths dropped substantially to one death per year starting in 2010/2011 and only increased to two in 2012/2013.

Table 1-PSNI Security Statistics 1998/1999–2013/2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Deaths due to security situation</th>
<th>Shooting incidents</th>
<th>Bombing incidents</th>
<th>Casualties as a result of paramilitary-style assaults and shootings</th>
</tr>
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<td>1998-1999</td>
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People’s sense of insecurity is also fed by the resilient sectarianism in the segregated areas that shoulder the burden of the legacy of the Troubles. Belfast is historically a “polarized city”24 in which highly politicized communities are situated in segregated areas. For years, whether it was done directly or indirectly, residents of segregated areas were exposed to the dehumanization of other communities. The violence has significantly decreased in the last years, but in the past, it was possible to hear petrol bombs, nail bombs, and rioting every single night in the interfaces between the segregated residential areas. Interfaces can be defined as “conjunctions of working class residential zones which identify with opposing ethnic/political communities.”25 The peace lines were the flashpoints of communal attacks during the Troubles, because the majority of deaths took place around them.26 After the GFA, the number of peace walls increased from 18 to 88 by 2009,27 but daily sectarian attacks continue to haunt the interfaces, and this revives the psychological stress of the deep-rooted distrust between communities. This psychology of constant vigilance still marks sectarian enclaves, as described by a civil society leader working in North Belfast:

25 N. Jarman, Demography, Development and Disorder: Changing Patterns of Interface Areas (Belfast: The Institute for Conflict Research, July 2004), 1.
People are very aware of where they are walking here, very aware of where the other community is, very worry[sic] about what clothes they wore, they’re very worry[sic] about the names of their children, what they understand from the names of their children cause you give out who they are. That’s becoming less and less but in the recent past, this was something very predominant.28

The nature of interface conflict depends on various factors: the legacy of the Troubles, the leadership of paramilitaries, internal feuding between paramilitaries, antisocial behavior of youth, tit-for-tat attacks, and interpersonal frictions. Jarman’s study on interfaces reveals five events that provoke conflict around interfaces: parades, football, bonfires, Halloween, and Gaelic matches. It also points out three groups involved in the interface troubles: youth, anti-social elements, and people from outside the immediate area.29 In some areas, there is a “tacitly accepted level of violence” in neighborhoods under the control of paramilitaries:

Tacitly accepted levels of violence exists in many areas. Increasingly, in some areas people will work with the police, report to the police; they will try to stop the violence. There are some areas worse than others recently. Let’s say, for example, tensions have been worse around Short Strand. The UVF there is at odds with the UVF in the west of the city. So the UVF in the east of the city is more criminal in terms of protecting their territory. They do abducting and things like that. In some areas, you find people from republican groups and people from loyalist areas, they work together to reduce tensions in interfaces. In East Belfast, this is not happening at the moment. Because it probably suits the people in the UVF in particular to keep the tensions there. It gives them an opportunity; they recruit people to get them to attack. That gets them rolled into the organization and committed to the organization.

In some parts of the city, tensions are much lower. It is not the same in all interfaces.30

Today, these attacks are another means of pursuing communal confrontation by intimidating the other community and asserting territoriality. Some incidents are referred to as “recreational rioting,” which involve youth groups that riot for fun.31 North Belfast is emblematic of the sectarian rioting in interface areas, as it is a patchwork of nationalist and loyalist communities compared to West and East Belfast, which is composed of more homogenous communities and segregated peace lines. Moreover, the symbolic premises of communities, such as schools, churches, Orange Halls, and properties of the Gaelic Sport Association, are also targets of sectarian attacks. Apart from the communal tensions around interfaces, unionist–nationalist confrontations also occur in Belfast during demonstrations or protests such as anti-internment marches or demonstrations for the Palestine–Israel conflict.32

3. Old Cleavages in the Post-GFA Period

Supported by the Protestant majority, unionists took hold of the political power for fifty years and prevented the participation of Irish nationalists in policy-making until the introduction of direct rule in 1972. Against the hegemony of unionist governments (1921–72), the GFA introduced power-sharing arrangements between Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists. The Agreement is a historical turning point not only because it ended the political violence of three decades but also because it instituted a power-sharing government between the two

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28 Rab McCallum, in discussion with the author, North Belfast Interface Network, 9 September 2014.
30 Neil Jarman, in discussion with the author, Queen’s University of Belfast, 22 August 2014.
32 Demonstrations for Israel-Palestine conflict sometimes turn into nationalist-unionist confrontations in Northern Ireland reviving the tensions between the settler and the native.
conflicting political traditions. The political system in Northern Ireland is exemplary of Lijphart’s consociational model, which is founded on a grand coalition that is representative of the diversity within society.\(^{33}\) Lijphart proposes a “consociational democracy” approach to govern plural societies. It has four main pillars: minority veto power, proportional representation in the voting system, public sector recruitment, and segmental autonomy in the cultural sector. The Northern Ireland Assembly produces a collective executive drawn from political parties with significant representation in the Assembly. The Assembly is composed of 108 members elected by the single transferable vote (STV) proportional representation system, which is designed to transfer votes across nationalist and unionist blocs. The GFA introduces the requirement that all the major decisions that pass the Assembly should be based on cross-community support and approved by a majority of representatives of each community. The Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) cast their votes by designating themselves as “nationalist,” “unionist,” or “other” to ensure that important decisions are made with cross-community support. In addition, Northern Ireland communal division is recognized in the positions of heads of government, as the posts of First Minister and Deputy First Minister are instituted as joint premiers with equal status and they are elected by the Assembly based on cross-community voting. In the distribution of ministerial positions, the d’Hondt system is implemented to distribute ministerial posts according to party strength. This system ensures that the two main communities in Northern Ireland take seats in the government and collaborate to run the country. The power-sharing arrangements of Northern Ireland are exemplary of consociationalism, but have also its unique qualities: the role of external actors in its institution and management, its capacity to address self-determination claims of unionism and nationalism, its internal arrangements to promote reforms, and its electoral system that distributes power.\(^{34}\)

The GFA was predicated upon constructive ambiguity that led both unionists and nationalists to interpret the provisions of the agreement differently. However, the GFA did not address the root causes of the conflict: the communities’ historically entrenched, conflicting aspirations. In order to circumvent this problem, it set the principle of consent to change the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, which left room for both sides to realize their ethno-national agendas in the limits of law and the possibilities of politics. The main political actors of unionism and nationalism, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Social Democratic Labor Party (SDLP), and Sinn Fein, signed up to the GFA, while the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the more hardline wing of unionism, rejected the agreement. The Agreement was also a “marriage of force” under the pressure of third parties and did not bring about a political reconciliation.\(^{35}\) Unionist and nationalist parties even canvassed popular support for the GFA referendum based on the conflicting national aspirations.\(^{36}\) Many provisions of the GFA concerning early release of prisoners, reform in the police sector, and the decommissioning of the IRA, pumped new life into party politicking around communal divisions.

Contrary to what was expected, the architects of the Agreement, the UUP and the SDLP, were not rewarded with electoral gains in the long term, as the hardline wings of unionism

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\(^{35}\) Adrian Guelke, Personal communication, Queen’s University of Belfast, August 18, 2014.

and nationalism, the DUP, and Sinn Fein became the leading parties of Protestant and Catholic communities after 2003. The GFA survived not thanks to the performance of local parties and the executive, but due to the UK government’s ability and capacity to implement the necessary policies and institutions to sustain the peace process. The Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended four times because unionist parties withdrew their support from the executive due to the resistance of the PIRA to decommissioning. The most lengthy and serious interruption was from October 2002 until May 2007, but it was re instituted after the Saint Andrew’s Agreement. The pace of consociational politics also succeeded in bringing hardline parties to the negotiation table. Since 2007, the hardline parties of unionism and nationalism, the DUP, and Sinn Fein have cooperated in the devolved government, joined in parliamentary meetings, met the other communities’ civil society organizations, and produced local decision making. In 2011, the first full term of devolved government came to an end. The consociational arrangements also eroded the radical lines of the hardline parties, which revised their ideological platforms for electoral gains and political legality. While Sinn Fein evolved from militant republicanism to constitutional republicanism and achieved the support of middle-class nationalists as well as its traditional electoral base of poor, urban working-class Catholics, the DUP moderated its position on power-sharing and policing. Nonetheless, it is still not possible to talk about a normalization of relations between unionism and nationalism. The five deputies in my interviews confirm as well that without consociational arrangements, it would not be possible for unionist and nationalist parties to cooperate in a government.

The electoral behavior that is divided between unionism and nationalism has not changed significantly since the GFA and maintains the preexistent cleavages in the post-conflict period. Power-sharing arrangements such as cross-community voting and veto power became an instrument of ethnic competition and a catalyst of single-identity politics. Although the designation of votes as “nationalist,” “unionist,” or “other” in the Northern Ireland Assembly and government aims to assure cross-community support for major decisions, it also institutionalizes and rigidifies the communal divisions between Catholic nationalism and Protestant unionism. This system puts additional stress on bi-confessional parties because they are “squeezed out” by nationalist and unionist blocs. The Alliance Party opposes this designation, complaining that the “other” voting has lower comparative advantage compared to “unionist” and “nationalist” voting. According to a 2010 NILT (Northern Ireland Life and Times) survey, close to 60 percent of Protestant and Catholic respondents view this
type of voting as a catalyst of old sectarian politics. The ability of the single transferable vote to generate cross-community voting was also limited, with low vote transfer between nationalist and unionist voters. According to a 2013 NILT survey, support for a united Ireland dropped below 15 percent among Catholics, but it is still highly unlikely for a Catholic to vote for unionist parties and for a Protestant to vote for nationalist parties. According to Anno Lo, South Belfast deputy of the Alliance Party:

The constitutional issue is still so black and white to many people. There seems to be no budge, no softening. It is an either/or issue. I think it is very much to do with the loyalist, unionist community that they want to stay in the UK. On the other side, nationalists and republicans want a united Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement has that principle of consent if the majority of people still want to stay in the UK. The politics here become so tribal now that there is still very little leadership from the top to try and break down these barriers between the two. There are many things the Alliance Party advocates for, like integrated education, shared housing, shared spaces. They are not happening. That’s the very frustration of our party. Integrated education has shown to be wanted by parents and young people over 80 percent from each poll in the last year. Whether from parents or young people, all say that they want to see more integrated education. Even the business sector, over 70 percent, 73 percent or something, says that they see the integrated education as a means for prosperity and economic progress in Northern Ireland. But that’s not happening. The budget for integrated education still remains under 7 percent of the education budget. Shared housing is still a pipe dream. Public housing in Northern Ireland, 92 percent of our public housing, is single-identity housing. So if you segregate them from the age of three and four, educate them, and you put them in separate areas, there is no hope of people learning about each other and living beside each other, working beside each other, play[ing] beside each other, form[ing] relationship[s] with each other. The divide continues.

While the GFA recognized the legitimacy and equality of both cultures, it opened up a new battlefront for politics based on identity issues, which gave leeway to political parties to cling onto their ethno-political trenches. After the GFA, the symbols related to Britishness and Protestantism, which were the dominant symbols during the hegemony of unionist governments, were reduced based on the principle of parity of esteem. This intensified unionists’ besieged minority mentality, as they considered this reduction as erosion of their Britishness and the Britishness of Northern Ireland. The debates on cultural matters, such as marches, parades, and flags, have been an instrument of ethnic outbidding by unionist and nationalist parties in order to manufacture a rally around the flag effect on their voters. The parity-of-esteem concept falls prey to party politicking and partisan debates on the matters of politico-religious parades. The parade season historically inflames communal tensions in Northern Ireland, especially the Orange Order parades that are linked to the unionist tradition and Protestantism. The routes of parades passing by Catholic neighborhoods invigorate

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43 According to 2013 NILT, none of the respondents who categorize themselves as Catholics support the main unionist parties, the DUP and the UUP and only 1% of the respondents who categorized themselves as Protestants support the SDLP while this figure is 0 for Sinn Fein. See 2013 NILT Survey, accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2013/Political_Attitudes/POLPART2.html.

44 Anna Lo, in discussion with the author, South Belfast, 29 August 2014.


sectarian hostilities. The flag protests that erupted in 2012 typify the ethnic outbidding on the basis of cultural matters. In the aftermath of Belfast city council deciding to fly the Union Jack on designated days, the DUP and UUP activists sent out 40,000 leaflets to their voters, whipping up their feelings in order to outbid the Alliance party that cooperated with nationalist parties on the flag issue. Loyalists that were already sensitized to cultural matters took to the streets.

4. Social Vulnerabilities of the Working Classes

The main social issue of the Troubles was the fact that the paramilitaries were mainly recruited from working-class communities, which are disproportionately affected by political violence and deprivation compared to the middle and upper classes. The Troubles were also described as a working-class war. Although working-class areas are better off now than they were in the times of the Troubles and have increased safety measures, the perceived vulnerability of these areas still has not faded away, because the tangible effects of the peace did not filter down to the ground. While the vibrant civil society sector of Northern Ireland focuses on improving relationships, the context of the conflict still affects the residents’ perceptions and behavior in sectarian enclaves. In the interface areas, there is a lack of hope, a feeling of being left behind with little opportunity for employment or educational attainment and a fear of sectarian attacks:

[There is] a lack of hope, nothing that sort of tangible that [a person can] touch in terms of changing their lives, feeling sort of left behind, forgotten, not much opportunity for employment, no educational change, so think all of those . . . A lot of young people who are looking for significance and belonging get the sense of value in these organizations . . . . Political parties, when it comes to elections, you will see them all around. But once they get your vote, you hardly see them again. A lot of those areas where there was conflict like interface areas, there is disillusionment with politics and there is disconnection between what is happening on the ground and what is happening in the Stormont. There is a disconnection and a lot of people now feel that it has nothing to do with them.

Paramilitaries are illegal military structures recruited from communities and they emerged as “defenders” of their communities at the beginning of the Troubles. The robust community structures of the working-class areas were the perfect social networks for paramilitaries to flourish, and the British state could not penetrate into the social base of the paramilitaries. Communities were not homogenous in their sympathy or support for these extra-military structures, but they overtly or covertly gave support to them in certain times of the Troubles, which in turn provided the paramilitaries with the motivation and the capacity to reform and engage in the conflict. The existence of paramilitaries stemmed from a triadic relationship

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52 Alistair Little, in discussion with the author, Beyond Walls Project, 2 September 2014.
between state, community, and paramilitary forces. Alienated from police, communities demanded justice from paramilitaries to fulfill the policing vacuum in their neighborhoods.

With the release of paramilitaries under the terms of the GFA, ex-combatants adopted political, military, and communal roles in conflict resolution. In today’s Northern Ireland, it is very common to see ex-combatants engage in conflict resolution work, keeping the youth off the streets by leading them into bands, football clubs, and cultural activities. Youth bulge is accepted as an important dimension of urban unrest. There are alarming figures about the growing youth unemployment in Northern Ireland. The Labor Force Survey displays an increase in unemployment among Protestant youth: 24 percent of Protestants within the age group of 16–24 are unemployed compared to 15 of their Catholic counterparts. In addition, the youth who grew up in the post-ceasefire period did not give up the sectarian mental map that is divided between us and them, and they show less support than the adults for integrated housing, workplaces, and education. Youth in marginalized neighborhoods are still skeptical about the police due to their entrenched mistrust against the security forces. Coupled with the alienation of loyalist working-class areas from the peace process and the ongoing activities of loyalist paramilitaries, this youth bulge constitutes a risk group that can be drawn into criminality and sectarian rioting:

Yes, we have seen peace in a political sense but we have not seen peace on the ground; we have not seen peace being delivered on the ground. You can go back and you can say that there is nobody being killed, left behind. But you will still hear usually daily attacks by republicans or people offending their own communities. There are still bomb attacks. Peace has not still filtered down to those areas that are most affected. That would be working-class areas, either nationalist or loyalist. Within these areas, sectarianism is still rife and the peace process has not been built down on the ground. It has politically to a certain extent. Even politically, you will still see that political leadership is still run along sectarian lines. If you are nationalist, you get something and me, as unionist, I want the same thing. It is still one for them and one for the other community. Now we have a political framework but it has not filtered down on the ground and communities are not settled . . . Young ones’ mindset says that because they weren’t born during the conflict, they missed something. They missed the chance to defend their country; they missed the chance to go to jail. While you still see the Troubles glorified, you will still have young ones who still feel the need to step up and defend their country. You will see, on lots of things across loyalist working classes, the slogan “we won’t be the generation to let these down” . . . We’ve got to remember that paramilitaries are people from that community. They were people who protected these areas . . . Young people will look for leadership and they will look for leadership from those who were connected to paramilitaries. They know who stood up, either in a political sense or in a military sense, to defend their areas. So, young people will always look up to these people. If the people who they are looking up to are charged with different ways forward and say the failures that didn’t work in the past won’t work again, that’s the best way we can show leadership to young ones.

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59 Jarman and O'halloran, “Recreational Rioting”.
60 Mark Vinton, in discussion with the author, Belfast Conflict Resolution Consortium, 19 August 2014.
However, some factions of paramilitaries continue in-group policing by executing vigilant justice or becoming involved in criminality. Working-class areas are also deeply affected by the psychological distress of the Troubles.\textsuperscript{61} In some working-class areas, paramilitaries still assume a disciplinary role in the community by controlling the antisocial behavior of youth, such as vandalism, rioting, and verbal abuse of adults. The PSNI, which metamorphosed into a more neutral and equitable organization, still has a bad reputation in some areas. While the 2014 Policing Board Public Perception Survey demonstrates an improved image of police, with 68 percent of respondents thinking that the PSNI is doing a very/fairly good job in Northern Ireland, the class differences need to be considered.\textsuperscript{62} The Northern Ireland Crime Survey of 2010/2011 points out that respondents from high antisocial behavior areas have an alarming impression of police and the justice system, as they are most likely to perceive an increased level of harm caused by organized crime (35 percent), they are the least likely group to believe in policing (66 percent), community engagement (28 percent), and the fairness (45 percent) and effectiveness (28 percent) of the criminal justice system.\textsuperscript{63} Furthermore, the ongoing residential segregation provides paramilitaries with a proper space to execute their activities. The segregation of working-class areas did not significantly change after the GFA. With the impetus of economic development, the middle and upper classes have become more mixed together in the more prosperous areas, but the working classes that are affected by deindustrialization continue to live in sectarian enclaves. Over 90 percent of social housing in Northern Ireland is still segregated.\textsuperscript{64} Moreover, the middle classes in working-class areas began to move away after the Troubles for several reasons, such as the construction of new building in other areas, the control of paramilitaries, and a low level of social services in these areas gives paramilitaries more room to maneuver and operate.\textsuperscript{65} The visual culture of the working-class areas reflects the paramilitaries’ power and status in the community. If you are a foreigner walking around East and West Belfast, you could infer from the visual culture of the neighborhoods that intercommunal tensions are still alive and well in Northern Ireland. While the murals in West Belfast reflect the commemoration of republican militants and the history of resistance, the murals in East Belfast commemorate the ex-loyalist combatants and the settlement history with the pictures of William Orange and the Battle of Somme.\textsuperscript{66} Segregated neighborhoods with these murals, flags, and banners have a significant role in the construction of sectarian identities and spaces.\textsuperscript{67}


\textsuperscript{65} Neil Jarman, in discussion with the author, Queen’s University of Belfast, August 22, 2014.


5. Conclusion

Three decades of inter-communal violence in Northern Ireland left behind a persistent sense of insecurity that operates beyond the confines of the Troubles. However, this sense is not immune to change, as the Northern Ireland peace process has witnessed outstanding achievements, not only with the GFA but also with the restoration of relationships between conflicting parties, both at the upper- and middle-class level and at the working-class level. The situation in post-conflict Northern Ireland shows that conflict transformation is not a straight line; rather, it is jagged or zigzagged in its character. This article draws attention to three dynamics that feed the lingering sense of insecurity in post-conflict Northern Ireland. The activities of spoiler paramilitary groups and sporadic communal troubles still fuel people’s anxiety about the possibility of renewed violence, as the history of political violence proves how these influences can be a destabilizing factor in intercommunal relations. Moreover, the political arena is still plagued by ethnic outbidding and intransigent party politicking, both of which pit communities against each other and keep the zero-sum bias between the groups alive. In addition, the working classes, which were exposed to the highest political violence during the Troubles, still have the lowest prospects for a safe environment in which meaningful intercommunity relations can flourish. The social vulnerabilities of working-class areas, such as continuing paramilitary presence, the legacy of sectarianism in segregated neighborhoods, persistent mistrust toward the police, and growing youth unemployment, need to be addressed in order to generate a long-term social infrastructure for peace.

Bibliography


Why Does The International Drug-Control System Fail?

Behsat Ekici

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Abstract

The international community has been building a drug-control system for over a century. The UN-led initiatives drafted very detailed conventions, political declarations, and plans of action. International institutions and governments have been allocating vast resources for national, regional, and global counter narcotics initiatives. Law-enforcement agents, judicial officers, diplomats, and demand-reduction experts devote enormous efforts to global drug-control efforts. However, the latest field studies clearly indicate that the global war on drugs has been lost on virtually every front. Drug consumption and drug-related deaths have increased over the past three decades. Every year, many new psychoactive substances appear on the market. Precursor chemicals are not efficiently controlled. The drug supply consistently shifts to areas where law enforcement is weak and corrupt. Drug money has allowed the dark networks to exert an increasing influence on the governments in Latin America, Southwest Asia, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and West Africa. The drug trade undermines global security by financing terrorism and insurgency. In this context, the United Nations’ goal of a “drug-free world” is far from being reached. This paper provides an insight as to why the international efforts to control the drug supply, drug demand, and drug-driven money have failed dramatically.

**Keywords:** Drug trafficking, global prohibition regime, transnational crime, UNODC, counternarcotics

1. Introduction

Drug trafficking has become a global threat that undermines the security, development, and rule of law in almost every state. Drug networks gain enormous profits through exploiting the price differences between source countries and final markets. This desire for profit sparks massive bloodshed among rival groups in Mexico, Colombia, Afghanistan, West Africa, and many other regions. Globally, drug-related deaths are much higher than the casualties of international terrorism. Narco-trafficking plays a significant role in the financing of terror networks such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and Los Zetas. Massive profits allow these criminal organizations to prolong violent campaigns against state institutions, rival groups, and civilians.
After the Cold War, international security scholars increasingly acknowledged the transnational crime challenge, but law-enforcement officers and diplomats have been attempting to forge an international drug control system for over a century. Subsequent to the notorious British–Chinese opium wars, the International Opium Commission in Shanghai in 1909 and The International Opium Convention in The Hague in 1912 laid the grounds for a global prohibitionist regime. However, due mainly to world wars and economic crises, drug control was overshadowed by economic, military, and geopolitical agendas.

After World War II, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) of the United Nations assumed coordination of the international drug-control system, but there was an urgent need for an all-encompassing convention to provide a legislative framework. Following decade-long, complex bureaucratic and diplomatic deliberations, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) members signed the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961. The Single Convention brought together all previous international agreements under one umbrella and laid the bedrock of an international prohibitionist regime. The 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances prohibited the production, trafficking, and consumption of psychotropic substances. The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances proposed effective measures against money laundering, trafficking of chemical precursors, and the production of drugs. States were encouraged to carry out advanced investigation methods such as international controlled delivery and undercover operations.

In the post-WWII context, there was an urgent need for international institutions to monitor the implementation of the UN conventions, to carry out the secretariat of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) meetings, and to coordinate global initiatives. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) were founded to perform these tasks. The UNDCP also assumed the duties of data collection, strategic analysis, global monitoring, and policy evaluation. The name of the institution was changed to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2002. A major achievement of the institution was carrying out the secretariat for the Political Declaration and Plan of Action that was signed at the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) in 1998. The Political Declaration endorsed the prohibitionist system and laid out the roadmap for global initiatives on reduction of supply and demand, as well as control of illicit money and precursors.

International drug control has evolved into a multifaceted policy arena. Along with the international institutions, it engages the diplomatic, military, intelligence, and law-enforcement machinery of the countries. Countries and international agencies conduct countless bilateral and multilateral meetings to coordinate a myriad of anti-drug initiatives. However, figures of the past three decades indicate that global supply- and demand-reduction efforts have failed dramatically. Despite the massive efforts of the countries and international organizations, drug consumption continues to increase and criminal networks thrive across the world. Prisons are overcrowded with drug criminals, but countless new producers, traffickers, and distributors emerge in the illicit markets. Prices of drugs have been declining in line with increasing availability. In this context, drug scourge seems insurmountable. The failure of the global prohibition regime has instigated calls for the decriminalization of drugs.

1 According to www.worldodometers.info global population increased around 20% between 1998 and 2013. However, global drug abusers increased 37% during the same period. It means that drug consumption grew faster than the world population.
Critics claim that the prohibition regime fosters organized crime and drug violence on an unprecedented scale. Many countries, such as the Netherlands, Canada, and Honduras, are revising their posture towards the global prohibitionist regime.

Every year, participants at the CND convene and issue resolutions with the prospect of tangible progress. Each following year, though, delegates reconvene and do not find any significant improvements in the drug scourge. As a representative of Turkey, I have attended numerous INCB, UNODC, and CND meetings. Over the years, it was disappointing to see no major progress achieved on the main pillars of the Political Declaration. Countries and international organizations keep pronouncing their commitments to a “drug-free world” without delving into the underlying reasons of the dramatic failure.

There is a dearth of critical academic literature on the international drug regime. Existing studies predominantly focus on chronological developments in counternarcotics institutions, the evolution of the UN conventions, and problems in specific regions, such as Afghanistan, West Africa, and Colombia. This paper fills an important gap in security studies through probing into the main reasons for the failure of the international drug-control regime. More specifically, it explores why global supply reduction, demand reduction, and anti-money-laundering initiatives have failed despite the massive efforts of governments and international institutions.

2. Why Do the Attempts at Supply Reduction Fail?

The international drug-control system has been predominantly built upon supply reduction policies. For decades, the bulk of the global counternarcotics budget has been allocated for law-enforcement measures. The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs targeted the elimination of opium production in 15 years, as well as that of cocaine and cannabis in 25 years. In 1998, the Political Declaration sought to significantly reduce the global drug problem by 2009. Some 55 years after the Single Convention, the international control regime is nowhere near eliminating the drug problem. Drug markets are flooded with supplies of illicit drugs and psychotropic substances. For instance, drug production in Afghanistan has increased 250 percent from 64,000 hectares to 224,000 hectares between 1998 and 2014. The global coca cultivation has remained stable, but the number of new psychoactive substances increased from 126 to 450 between 2009 and 2014. According to the UNODC there has been a sharp increase in global ATS production, which led to a 158 percent increase in methamphetamine seizures between 2008 and 2013. Except for various short-term regional scarcity problems, all types of drugs are widely available at lower prices. Skilled international drug networks find astonishing ways to produce, traffic, and market drugs, despite the measures taken by national governments and international organizations. The high availability of drugs indicates a dramatic failure of the global supply-reduction efforts. The reasons for these failures are analyzed in three pillars: i) eradication of the illicit crops, ii) interdiction of trafficking schemes, and iii) control of precursors.

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4 UNODC, 2015.
2.1. Eradication of the illicit crops

Cutting down the flow of narcotics at the production sites is a principal goal of international drug-control efforts. For over a century, Western governments have attempted to stop the illicit substances before their entry into domestic markets. In the aftermath of World War II, the US-led efforts of Western countries and international organizations designed the drug-control system with this purpose in mind. The Single Convention and the Political Declaration lay emphasis on stopping the drugs at the production sites more than interdicting them on the final markets.

It is easier to detect coca and poppy fields than a concealed transportation of manufactured drugs. Current satellite surveillance systems allow governments and international institutions to identify plantations of illicit cannabis, opium, and coca. The UNODC uses this technology to explore poppy crops in Afghanistan and coca harvests in the Andean region. Along with international institutions, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Russia, and Turkey run various assistance programs to increase eradication of plant-based drugs at the source countries. They deploy economic, technical, and training assistance to capacity-building programs. They provide equipment to law-enforcement agencies of source and transit countries. Only the US government spent over $6 billion on counternarcotics campaigns in Afghanistan since military intervention in 2001.5

However, it became increasingly evident that national and international policies have no defining impact on poppy and coca cultivation. Every insider acknowledges that the governments of the Andean States and Afghanistan have failed to enforce the counter-narcotics strategy due to a complex array of factors, such as prevalent poverty, resistance of warlords, the high profitability of opium and coca, a lack of irrigation systems, massive unemployment, and political instability. Inexperience, insufficient equipment, and the corruption of drug-control agencies further exacerbated the efforts to curb coca and opium cultivation.

Despite the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the international community fails to put pressure on the producers of synthetic drugs. Until recently, barbiturates, tranquilizers, lysergic acid diethylamatic (LSD), benzodiazepine, ecstasy, and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) were mainly produced in the West.6 For instance, the Netherlands and Belgium have been the source of ecstasy in Europe, the Middle East, and North America.7 The international community neither considered implementing multilateral projects to stop the flood of Dutch ecstasy, nor placed sanctions against the government of the Netherlands. This brings the question of hypocrisy to the implementation of the drug-control regime. Many non-Westerners think that counternarcotics are used as a pretext by major powers to intervene in the domestic affairs of developing countries.8

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2.1.1. Ungoverned spaces: Transnational criminal networks and narco terrorists

Evidence indicates that drug production has gravitated towards the countries with lax state authority that have generated large ungoverned spaces. Currently, the lack of security both in Afghanistan and Colombia is the primary concern of the international community. Large portions of these countries are controlled by non-governmental forces. Afghan warlords, the Taliban, Colombian cartels, and FARC function as a state within a state. In these ungoverned spaces, well-armed anti-state forces resist the eradication campaigns. They clash with the police and military to stop interventions into drug-production sites. They assassinate government officials who are in charge of eradication campaigns. The UN-sponsored international projects have failed to curtail the resistance and influence of anti-government forces and drug lords.

Afghanistan faces enormous challenges from the narco-economy and drug-driven conflicts. Drug production and associated militancy became the primary impediment to governance and capacity building. Despite large-scale capacity-building programs under The UNODC Regional Programme, the Afghan Central Government has limited drug-enforcement capability over vast rural areas. A significant portion of the drug trade is controlled by warlords, who had been the principal allies of the US forces during the military intervention in 2001. Having fought against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the warlords have gained an immense political influence and prosecution immunity. They have taken over governmental posts such as ministers, governors, military commanders, and police chiefs. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the UNODC, and other international organizations are highly aware of the warlords-turned-drug-lords in this favorable environment. American military commanders took no serious actions against these strongmen, as they are dependent on warlords for intelligence collection and armed encounters with insurgents. The Afghan Central Government embraced a similar approach towards these shady figures. Reciprocal interpersonal networking between the warlords and government officials provided protection for trafficking schemes. The protection of these warlords prevents nationwide enforcement of the counternarcotics legislation. In this context, the Kabul administration fails to cope with the prolonged instability, sectarianism, and warlordism.

Similarly, large portions of Colombia had been under the control of massive cocaine cartels such as Medellin and Cali. Even after the dismantling of these notorious networks, smaller networks gained control of many cities and large rural areas. They cooperate with the FARC to maintain coca production. Eradication campaigns aggravate domestic conflicts and undermine the counterinsurgency programs of governments. Some of the drug networks have thousands of assassins and militants ready to kill anyone. The internal war in Colombia is mainly sustained by the narco-economy, which allows the cartels to exert an increasing influence on the government institutions. Many police and military officers covertly work for cartels, providing protection and sensitive information. Military and police officers resign from official duties due to “job offers” from the cartels that pay generous salaries.

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10 David Mansfield, A State Built on Sand (Oxford University Press, 2016).
11 Ted. G. Carpenter, “How the Drug War in Afghanistan Undermines America’s War on Terror” (Foreign Policy Briefing, No: 84, CATO Institute, 2004).
14 Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).
Drug cartels learn classified information from the infiltrated military and law-enforcement officers. This undermines the law-enforcement capability of the states.

2.1.2. Shadow of counterterrorism

Since 9/11, counternarcotics have been overshadowed by counterterrorism. The press coverage and academic literature on terrorism have been incomparably more voluminous than that on counternarcotics. In key transit and production states, the bulk of the law-enforcement and intelligence budgets are allocated for fighting terrorism, and the brightest staff members are deployed on terrorism investigations. International donors tend to finance anti-terrorism projects while cutting down the counternarcotics funds. Government-affiliated think tanks devote much higher attention to terrorism. Many of the think-tank analysts perceive counternarcotics as a secondary security issue. Indeed, some think-tank analysts claim that counternarcotics undermine the counterterrorism campaign of the American military against the Taliban. They believe that the eradication of drug production increases the anti-government sentiments while contributing to the increased political capital of the Taliban and warlords. This perception has been shared by many American ISAF commanders. The generals argue that the military should primarily be engaged in counterterrorism operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda rather than those against the drug traffickers. They strongly object to the use of American troops for poppy eradication. American generals also claim that carrying out extensive counternarcotics operations will undercut the process of intelligence collection against insurgents.

2.1.3. Prevalent corruption

International anti-corruption measures have dramatically failed in hotspots of drug trafficking. The worst-case scenario is a large-scale penetration and compromisation of law-enforcement and intelligence organizations by drug mafia. This has been experienced in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and West Africa. There is a complex interdependence among the drug producers, corrupt officials, and international mafia. Crooked government officials leak investigative information to shady organized-crime figures. It is very hard to run confidential organized-crime investigations in penetrated states. Government officers at every level protect drug traffickers. In Afghanistan, many ministers, governors, police chiefs, and military commanders have developed shady relations with the drug lords. In Colombia, cocaine cartels pay enormous bribes for critical information, and this prevents interception. Underpaid government officials are tempted by the easily won dirty money.

The intermingling of parochial and crooked interests erodes the power of state institutions. Drugs are seized when the traffickers fail to pay enough bribes to the officers on payroll. Transshipments of large networks remain intact, while weaker traffickers are arrested to convince the public that the state is fighting against drugs. Selective drug enforcement and eradication undermines the credibility of state policies. The high perception of state

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17 Carpenter, “Drug War”.
penetration and dishonest enforcement erodes the legitimacy of counternarcotics campaigns. Moreover, the corruption hinders the flow of information from the public, and the police have a hard time finding informants.

International organizations and Western governments have implemented various anti-corruption schemes at production sites. However, none of these programs were able to curtail the political patronage and favoritism directed towards the drug cartels. The projects fail to break down the complex network of interrelationships between government officials and drug mafia. The UN anti-corruption programs failed to evoke the immunity of local powerbrokers to prosecution. There is a drastic need for a strong investigative capacity and unselective punishment of corrupt officials.

2.1.3.1. Unsustainable eradication campaigns

The UNODC figures indicate that eradication of the coca and poppy fields has failed both in Afghanistan and the Andean region. In the current system, only a fraction of the fields are eradicated before the manufacturing process starts. For instance, only around 1 percent of poppy fields were eradicated in Afghanistan in 2014. Armed resistance both in Afghanistan and Colombia undermines the eradication efforts. Even if the coca eradication in Colombia has been curtailed in the last decade, cartels explored new methods to augment the total manufactured output. The international pressure on Colombian cartels had a short-term effect in curtailing coca production. Multilateral counternarcotics initiatives led to shrinking of the coca fields in Colombia, but the production in Peru and Bolivia increased dramatically. Basically, the cartels moved their operations to less controlled areas in neighboring states.

In Afghanistan the state eradicates poppy fields without inflicting deterrent penalties on the farmers. The benefits of cultivating opium outweigh the cost of eradication. Currently, poppy farmers face no credible or persistent threat of law enforcement. Eradication teams are often compromised or coerced. Even if their fields are eradicated, farmers cultivate opium on other fields in the following year to compensate for their losses. The lack of the government’s soft power increases the scale of resistance. Wealthy landowners, tribes, and warlords are not affected by the eradication campaigns, because the levels of corruption provide them with prosecution immunity. Eradication hits the poor farmers who live on the subsistence level. Selective eradication generates increasing hostility towards international institutions and the central government.

Manual eradication of the coca and poppy fields is labor intensive. Despite multilateral assistance programs, both Afghan and Colombian governments have failed to eradicate massive drug fields that are located in a harsh geographic environment. Aerial fumigation has long been discussed at international meetings as an alternative to manual eradication. However, it has never been widely implemented due to grave environmental consequences, political opposition, and legislative barriers. The resistance groups claim that biological control agents easily spread to neighboring fields, destroying forests, farmlands, and plantation. It takes decades for the polluted lands to recover. Toxic wastes affect the local

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22 Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine*.
citizens and animals. Spraying will instigate massive protests and further encourage people to ally with anti-government forces such as FARC, the Taliban, and drug cartels.

In Afghanistan, the myth that strong drug enforcement will drive the farmers into the hands of the Taliban is used as a pretext by the Afghan government, the United Nations, and ISAF. Many international experts claim that strong drug enforcement will alienate local communities and pit them against the central government. There is a fear that insurgents will be more involved in the drug trade if the government implements stricter law enforcement. It is also believed that strong enforcement will drive up the prices and heroin mafia will make higher profits. However, it has become obvious that without deploying large forces, it is impossible to have a defining eradication success.

2.1.4. Failure of alternative development programs

Various donor countries and international organizations such as the UNODC, the UNDP, the World Bank, and the European Union have implemented alternative development programs in drug-producing countries. Many of these programs are uncoordinated, unsustainable, and insufficient. They can only address a small aspect of alternative development and only for a limited time. As seen in the Nangarhar province of Afghanistan, there are some achievements when the international funds are flooding, but when the donors cut down the funding, the poppy production proliferates in the following season. Various studies have shown that alternative livelihood programs have no enduring impact on poppy and coca cultivations. The donors cannot subsidize Afghan or Colombian farmers forever. There is a drastic need for home-grown measures to handle the economic needs of the farmers.

The international counternarcotics agenda contradicts the immediate economic imperatives in Afghanistan and Colombia. Both states suffer from over-dependence on the narco-economy, and their extreme reliance on illicit drugs has turned into a development curse. Field surveys indicate that local people have lost their trust in international agencies, coalition forces, and central government officials who failed to keep their promises on providing livelihoods for local people. Reasons for the loss of trust are insufficient funds provided to the farmers and violent home searches by coalition forces searching for opium. The Minister of Finance, Ashraf Ghani, confessed that “today, many Afghans believe it is not drugs, but an ill-conceived war on drugs that threatens their economy and nascent democracy.”

The leniency of the Afghan government is a key reason for the failure of alternative development programs. The government fears that an effective counter-narcotics campaign may undercut the economic revival of the country and the parochial interests of the corrupt officials. They claim that highly detested eradication campaigns may create a backlash against the already unpopular government. They believe that the Afghan people will starve

Ekici, “Why International Drug Control Failed in Afghanistan”.
Ekici, “Why International Drug Control Failed in Afghanistan”.
if a draconian poppy eradication campaign is implemented. However, the “starvation” argument is unsubstantiated. The people of Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos did not starve after the eradication of the poppy fields. It is not the starving Afghans who produce the bulk of the opium, but the greedy warlords, large landowners, and corrupt officials who developed a complex interdependence.

There are no effective micro-finance institutions run by state organizations or NGOs. Opium and coca serve as a credit for farmers who have no savings. Farmers turn to drug kingpins for high-interest credits. In case of emergency, farmers can sell their illicit products before the harvest and receive advance payments. Unless the governments and international organizations create efficient credit institutions, the informal system based on illicit drugs will exacerbate the dependency on drug economy.

2.1.5. Challenges of traditional drug use for the 1961 UN Single Convention

Traditional coca and poppy consumption undermines the supply-reduction efforts. Local communities in Latin America have been chewing coca leaves for medical and recreational purposes for centuries. They manufacture shampoos, teas, alcoholic drinks, and medicine from coca leaves. The 1961 Single Convention banned all coca production without differentiating its licit and illicit use. It also sought to abolish the quasi-medical chewing of coca leaves. However, the Convention is perceived as a significant blow to licit consumers. The governments of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru are expected to deal with the licit consumption. Bolivia, in particular, condemns the 1961 Convention for ruining the livelihood of millions of people. In his address at the 2013 Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) meeting, the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, declared that his country would not be a part of the global prohibitionist regime. Despite government assurances on licit production, criminal networks exploit all types of coca cultivation. Many farmers declare licit cultivation but they divert it to illicit channels because they can make much higher profits. The Bolivian government’s protection of coca farmers undermines global supply-reduction efforts.

Due to the prolonged failure of crop eradication, many scholars argue that poppy and coca production should be taken under control by means of certification. For instance, the Senlis Council proposed that the opium production should be certified in Afghanistan. Certification programs will not work for several reasons. The 1953 UN Opium Conference in New York set the standards of licit production and defined what countries can produce opium for medical purposes. Legal producers in Turkey, India, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and China supplied 480 tons of morphine in 2011 for global medical markets. According to the INCB, the licit production has been able to keep up with the demand in the medical industry. Due to advanced law enforcement, the current producers have been able to control the diversion into illicit channels. The Afghan government does not have the enforcement power on all of its territory. Indeed, many experts argue that the central government does not control any territory outside the capital. Under these circumstances, warlords, corrupt officers, and drug cartels will heavily exploit the licensing system. In an extremely corrupt institutional setting, the distribution of licenses involves favoritism. Wealthier farmers and shady organized-crime figures will get the licenses. Farmers will exploit both licit and illicit trade. Given these
concerns, the INCB, the UNODC, and other international organizations do not embrace a licensing system.

2.1.6. Discord of international initiatives

There has been a wide array of international counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan over the past 15 years. The UNODC, the UNDP, the World Bank, the EU, the Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA), the Paris Pact, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the US, the UK, Russia, Germany, France, and Turkey contribute to anti-drug programs. International projects are designed to help Afghan institutions with eradication, interdiction, demand reduction, precursor control, and capacity building. Even though project managers are generally aware of the ongoing initiatives, there is a lack of coordination among the foreign organizations. The US has been a principal contributor to counternarcotics efforts but there is a discord of interests, even among the American agencies. While the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) give the priority to eradication and interdiction programs, the US military strongly opposes engagement in drug-enforcement operations.\(^{33}\)

International efforts are plagued by a lenient approach towards the poppy farmers. Quite similar to the American approach, the UN agencies embrace an implicit non-interventionist stance against the drug problem. Indeed, the UN offices in Afghanistan cannot challenge the US posture, as their projects are primarily funded by the American government. Even though the UN crop-monitoring surveys systematically report the scaling up of production, these reports hardly instigate an adequate response to the growing opium epidemic. The laissez-faire approach of the coalition forces leaves the Afghan authorities alone in armed encounters with well-organized and well-equipped drug lords.

International efforts on controlling cocaine seem to be more coordinated. Under US leadership, the Plan Colombia is an ambitious, multilateral project that targets the largest cocaine producer in the world. On paper, the plan looks promising, as it deals with every aspect of eradication, interdiction, demand reduction, and harm reduction.\(^{34}\) The UNODC introduced control of precursors and anti-money-laundering projects to complement the US-led initiative. The large budget of the project allows for sustainable capacity-building initiatives targeting the Colombian police and the military. The plan seems to have had major success, because coca base production declined from 988 tons in 2005 to 358 tons 2013.\(^{35}\) However, the latest research indicates that the plan created a balloon effect. While dispersing the production in Colombia, it increased the coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia.\(^{36}\) The cartels simply moved to remote areas beyond governmental control and compensated for the eradication. Once the concerted state campaign ends, they return to Colombia.

2.1.7. Challenges related to intrinsic qualities of drugs

Cannabis has been the most widely used drug across the globe. For several reasons, controlling this substance is one of the most complicated issues in supply reduction. First, unlike heroin

\(^{33}\) Carpenter, “Drug War”; Wyler, “Drug Control”; Ekici, “International Drug”.


and cocaine, cannabis can be grown almost anywhere in the world. The UNODC surveys demonstrate cannabis production in most countries. Second, users can grow the substance in pots, attics, or basements without being spotted by law-enforcement agencies for decades. Growing marihuana does not require any skills or chemical processing. Basic agricultural know-how is enough for cannabis farming. Third, wild cannabis is grown without any agricultural efforts. It spreads quickly in favorable circumstances. Users and traffickers collect the wild cannabis in harvesting season. Fourth, trafficking of cannabis can be from any country to any other. It is really hard to make risk analysis and profiling of international cannabis trafficking. Fifth, many countries, such as Canada and the Netherlands, embrace a laissez-faire approach to cannabis consumption. Users and street dealers are hardly punished. This creates a favorable environment for drug networks while undermining the supply-reduction efforts. Thus, it is very difficult to implement international projects on cannabis control. The vast cannabis production in Afghanistan is hardly recognized by the international community. It has been overshadowed by control of opiates, cocaine, and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). There is no substantial project to deal with the increasing cannabis supply.

One of the most complicated issues in global supply reduction is controlling the manufacture and distribution of the amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). Law-enforcement agencies face multilayered difficulties. First, the ATS can be produced anywhere in the world without reliance on a certain plant. Second, production know-how is widely available on the internet. There is no need for a special education, a chemistry background, or an advanced laboratory. Simple heating, boiling, and distilling equipment is enough for small-scale production. Large drug networks, however, produce the substances in very advanced laboratories to increase purity and overall output. Fourth, a wide range of chemical precursors can be used in manufacturing. Phenyl 2 proponone (P2P), alpha-phenylacetoacetanitrite (APAAN), ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and many other substances have been found in ATS labs. Drug networks hire skilled chemists to produce the substances from alternate precursors when conventional materials are subject to international control.

2.2. Interdiction of trafficking schemes

Drug traffickers are highly aware of the vulnerabilities in the international drug-control system. Especially the larger networks develop highly sophisticated counterintelligence against drug-enforcement agencies. Cartels know almost every law-enforcement officer very well. They explore weak points, technical capabilities, vehicles, surveillance methods, and potential informants. They pay generous bribes to collect information on law-enforcement agencies and staff. Transnational drug networks respond to law-enforcement strategies by changing their routes and their concealment and transportation methods, and by recruiting couriers with different profiles.

Drug networks also exploit improved transportation infrastructure. Better roads mean easier access to production sites and warehouses. Transnational organized crime (TOC) groups constantly seek cheaper transportation methods as well as alternative routes and markets. They conceal drugs in numerous import and export goods in a creative manner. It is really difficult for law-enforcement agencies to control all trade schemes. The powerful business community wants an incessant flow of goods, and law-enforcement agencies need to
have reasonable doubt and a court order to intervene into licit trade schemes. The disruption of trade supply lines without a legal basis has negative consequences for government officials. Screening does not help with finding illicit products that are skillfully concealed in commercial products.

The international drug trade is under the control of large-scale criminal networks. Even if the supply-reduction efforts of one state achieve the curbing of production, cartels move their operations to another location. As the UNODC World Drug Report put it, efficient supply reduction in China diverted opium production to the Golden Triangle.\textsuperscript{38} Similarly, Turkish, Iranian, and Pakistani success in stemming illicit production relocated the poppy farming to Afghanistan. The dismantling of the Cali and Medellin cartels led to a rise of Mexican networks and a myriad of smaller drug trafficking organizations in Latin America.

Many drug-enforcement agencies in the developing world are underfunded, understaffed, and underequipped. Tajikistan constitutes the major transit corridor for Afghan heroin headed from Afghanistan to Russia, but the Drug Control Agency has only around 300 staff.\textsuperscript{39} The number of drug traffickers is much higher than the number of drug-control officers. In many states, drug networks are far better equipped than the state institutions. For instance, in Africa, drug cartels own private jets, speedboats, luxury vehicles, and satellite phones, while law-enforcement agencies often fail to allocate funds for fuel.\textsuperscript{40} Throughout the international operational cooperation projects, I witnessed that drug-control agencies in Central Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe do not have the technology to intercept satellite phones. This asymmetry of resources often leads to corruption among the law-enforcement officers.

Since 2000, I have been interacting with drug-enforcement agencies from every corner of the world. I have consistently observed that counternarcotics agencies in Central Asian, Eastern European, and African countries have evidencing problems against the upper echelons of cartels. They seize drugs from drivers, couriers, and warehouse guards. These people rarely give testimony about their relations with the key figures in drug networks. Unless there is professional physical and electronic surveillance, law-enforcement agencies fail to prove covert connections and end up jailing insignificant actors. Moreover, most of the national agencies do not give priority to carrying out international investigations that would lead to the dismantling of large networks. Law-enforcement executives are not always trained and experienced in interagency cooperation beyond borders. Western law-enforcement executives suspect that their counterparts in Latin America, Mexico, Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe will leak information to criminal networks. On some occasions, courts ban the sharing of information on certain files with other states.

During international meetings, I have observed that most states designed their electronic surveillance capabilities to intercept phone conversations. Drug-enforcement agencies face difficulties in intercepting satellite phones, Voice over Internet Protocols (VoIPs) and internet-based communications. It is extremely hard to intercept messages on “darknets” such as Freenet, I2P, and Tor. Western governments were alerted to the Silk Road website operated by the Tor network. Drug dealers freely marketed drugs through this alternative

\textsuperscript{39} DCA, Review of the Situation with Narcotic Drugs in the Republic of Tajikistan in 2014 (Dushanbe: The Drug Control Agency, 2014).
internet site. The substances were shipped via cargo, and payments were made via bitcoins. Drug syndicates were able to eliminate physical traces of the drug distribution. Even though the FBI arrested the operators of the website, it is always possible that similar websites can pop up in other parts of the world.

Imprisoning major drug cartel leaders has been problematic in most developing states. Even if the *mafiosos* are captured, corrupt correction officers make prison conditions more than favorable for them. They hire the most expensive lawyers and find loopholes in the legislation. They coerce or bribe the judges to change the verdict in federal courts. They kill many judges, prosecutors, and investigators to discourage further probing of their network. Moreover, they only serve a symbolic time period in prison, or they escape with the assistance of network members. This is especially true for Latin America and Mexico. For instance, Mexican cartel leader “El Chapo” Guzman escaped from prison three times. Extradition to the US is one option to deal with this problem. However, extradition of fellow citizens to foreign states is an unacceptable tool for many governments due to sovereignty concerns. Cartels strongly object to extradition due to unfavorable prison circumstances in the United States. As in the case of Medellin cartel, they terrorize the entire country to prevent the enacting of extradition laws.

Despite the various UNODC, INL, UNDP, and BOMCA projects, drug traffickers skillfully exploit the weak points of border-control agencies in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Large coastal lines of Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador have been used by Latin American drug cartels. Private jets, submarines, semisubmersibles, and speedboats are loaded with tons of cocaine. Border-control agencies are mostly understaffed, underequipped, and undertrained. They are hardly trained or equipped for advanced risk analysis. Prevalent corruption makes it easier to transport illicit drugs across the borders. Generous payments to customs and border-control officers ensure smooth transactions at border gates. The UNODC has developed the Container Control Programme (CCP) to enhance the interdiction level at seaports. However, only a limited number of states have joined this program. Strategically and operationally, important states such as Pakistan, Iran, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Mexico have not joined the program. Thus, the CCP can make only an insignificant contribution to global drug seizures on maritime vessels.

International supply reduction involves several key institutions. The UNODC, the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC), the Interpol, the Europol, and the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC) seek to coordinate the anti-drug crusade. Given their dramatic failures, however, it has become evident that none of these institutions has a recipe for effective drug control. There are several reasons for the inadequacy of these international institutions. First, the communication channels are much slower than those of national agencies. The clumsiness of the international organizations (IO) cannot handle the speed of transnational drug traffickers who transport the substances by the fastest means. Second, there are many diplomatic and bureaucratic procedures to engage IOs in international investigations. Third, there are millions of international drug cases every year. A limited number of staff at IO headquarters means that they can only deal with less than 1 percent of the cases. Fourth, national counternarcotics agencies do not trust IOs, especially in sensitive investigations. Advanced institutions prefer direct contact with their foreign counterparts to make sure that the intelligence is delivered without any leaks.
Several strong states make significant contributions to the international supply reduction. The United States is the most prominent actor in global drug control, and American institutions provide training and technical assistance to 70 countries to enhance interdiction capabilities. The INL and the DEA are major contributors to counternarcotics capacity-building programs in Latin America, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. The main assistance of the American government has been directed towards the Caribbean and Central American states. Under the Merida Initiative, the American government rendered $1.5 billion in aid to Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic to build counternarcotics capacity. Critics, however, argue that the US exploits the drug wars and sells large sums of arms in Mexico and Latin America. They attest that American companies sell weapons and ammunition to both government agencies and drug cartels. On the other hand, Mexican and Colombian cartels invest into the American economy with drug money. Thus, the end of the drug war will undercut American economic interests.

International organizations and developed states provide training programs to the drug-enforcement agencies of source and transit states. As a lecturer at the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC), I have been observing that international training-assistance programs are not significantly contributing to capacity building for several reasons. First, training and capacity-building programs by different international organizations overlap and this wastes enormous amounts of resources. When the same staff receives the same training for the second time, participant attention and marginal utility of such assistance get eroded. Second, most developing countries select the trainees with favoritism and donors have no oversight mechanism. Many governments do not keep a systematic record of the officers who underwent training programs. A small group of favored officers may attend the training programs all over the world, while the vast majority of them remain undertrained.

2.3. Control of precursors

There is a need for a chemical precursor for every manufactured drug and psychotropic substance. Heroin needs acetic anhydride and cocaine requires potassium permanganate. ATS can be manufactured from a wide array of substances such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, P2P, APAAN, and amphetamine. Theoretically, psychotropic substances can be manufactured from thousands of variations of chemical reactions. Production, consumption, and diversification patterns are significantly different for each precursor. This complicates the international control system.

The bedrock of the international precursor control system was laid by the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The convention requested setting up state institutions and enacting national legislations to monitor the precursor trade. The INCB assumed the role of coordinator of the global precursor control initiatives. The UN Political Declaration and Plan of Action followed the footsteps of the 1988 UN Convention and recommended enacting effective legislations, building the capacity of state institutions on precursor control, collaborating closely with the industry, exchanging information via the PEN Online (Pre-Export Notification) system, and developing an early-warning system about the new precursors.

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42 Wyler, “Drug Control”.
The INCB and the UNODC run various projects such as the Prism surveillance program, Project Cohesion, and Operation TARCE. The main goal of the UNODC-coordinated Container Control Programme (CCP) is assisting state institutions with risk analysis and interdiction of chemical precursors. The INCB conducts many multi-agency coordination meetings to enhance operational information exchange. Despite massive investments into precursor control, only a limited amount of precursors is seized each year. For instance, a total of 175 tons of acetic anhydride and 57 tons of potassium permanganate were seized in 2013.\(^4\) A total of 526 tons of heroin and 662–902 tons of cocaine were produced in the same year.\(^4\) This means that the bulk of the precursor trafficking schemes are able to deliver the substance to the final destination. There are several reasons for this failure.

First, precursors are widely used in the licit industry. Acetic anhydride (AA) is employed in the painting, textile, and medical industries. Every industrialized and developing state consumes enormous amounts of precursors. According to Research and Markets, global demand for AA was 12.14 million metric tons (MMT) in 2014 and it is expected to reach 16.03 MMT by 2020.\(^5\) Thousands of small and large companies buy and sell AA internationally. For the states and international organizations, it is extremely difficult to control and run risk analysis on the voluminous licit trade.

Second, most states do not have efficient precursor control systems. In counternarcotics agencies only a limited number of staff is deployed in precursor control units. For instance, the Turkish Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department (KOM) had only three people in charge of precursor controls at the headquarters. For drug-enforcement agencies, precursor control is of secondary importance. Because the operational award system is geared towards hard drugs, skilled drug investigators do not want to work in precursor units. In many states, these units do not have online access to import and export schemes of companies. They even don’t have a working registry system of company profiles and trade flows. Thus, they fail to run risk analysis on the ongoing imports and exports of precursors. The units start working if there is intelligence about diversion or drug production. Law-enforcement units rarely get insider information from the business communities, who rarely report to police due to a lack of trust.

Third, intensive control of precursor trade necessitates a political devotion. Law-enforcement agencies cannot develop an effective oversight mechanism over powerful multinational corporations without political support. Companies do not willingly cooperate with the state institutions in reporting precursor trade. There should be an effective i) institution, ii) legislation, and iii) political commitment. However, governments mostly favor the large companies that pay taxes and employ the workforce. Politicians do not want to have a conflict with the business community. Unless there is strong evidence, governments do not want to intervene into trade schemes. Even if the companies fail to report precursor imports and exports, governments rarely opt for penalization. In corrupt states, companies easily buy out government officials with generous bribes.

Fourth, both states and international organizations face many problems with the implementation of the 1988 UN Convention and the recommendations of the Political

\(^{44}\) UNODC, 2015.
Declaration. Many of the chemical precursors of psychotropic substances are out of the control of the 1988 UN Convention. Drug cartels hire highly skillful chemists to manufacture the substances from a wide array of alternative precursors. It takes long deliberations for the INCB and the CND to take certain precursors under international control. Liberal economies and large companies object to the global control initiatives. They hire professionals to lobby against the INCB listing efforts.

The INCB developed the PEN Online (Pre-Import Notification) system to run risk analysis on suspicious shipments. The INCB delegates have been introducing the system at international meetings since its inception. PEN Online requires data entry from state institutions about every precursor import and export. The states are required to enter company names, representatives, the volume of the substance, and the area of use. The INCB officials run risk analysis on the ongoing shipments and carry out background investigations. They have the authority to stop suspicious shipments in cooperation with the state governments. The INCB authorized 150 states for data entry into the PEN Online system.\(^46\) In practice, however, only a limited number of states regularly enter precursor trade information. According to the INCB, 40 percent of the countries never input data into the system.\(^47\) Most other states provide information about some shipments while overlooking large portions of trade details. Another common mistake is a late entry of the information. Once the substance is delivered, it is very difficult to run a backtracking investigation on diversion schemes.

Project Prism was launched by the INCB to coordinate international efforts against acetic anhydride destined for the heroin labs in Afghanistan. The project aims to identify suspicious orders and diversification schemes and stop transshipment of the substance before it reaches the final manufacturing sites. Project participants use the PEN Online and Precursors Incident Communication (PICS) systems to coordinate their efforts. When states seize illicit AA, the INCB makes contact with the competent national authority to obtain information. The seizure information may provide enlightening clues in the follow-up backtracking investigation. The INCB helps national governments to explore where the AA is diverted and where it is destined for. The INCB brings relevant institutions and investigators from different countries to facilitate intelligence exchange.

Project Cohesion targets the trafficking of potassium permanganate, the main precursor used in cocaine manufacturing. Cohesion exerts an operational methodology similar to the Project Prism. It exploits the PEN Online and PICS systems to identify suspicious transactions and carry out post-seizure investigations. The INCB reported seizure of 58 tons of potassium permanganate in 2013.\(^48\) Most of the seizures were the result of investigations by Colombian (22 tons), Brazilian (15 tons), Spanish (5.9 tons), Paraguayan (3.7 tons), Chinese (3.5 tons), Bolivian (3.1 tons), and Peruvian (2.8 tons) governments. The INCB-coordinated projects had an insignificant impact on global potassium permanganate seizures.

Controlling the precursors of psychotropic substances is the most difficult task, both for national governments and international institutions. Transnational drug networks produce these substances from a wide array of chemical substances, such as \textit{alpha}-Phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN), 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P), ephedrine, and pseudoephedrine. Most of these precursors are widely available on licit markets. Often, the larger drug networks run front

\(^{47}\) INCB, \textit{International Narcotics}.
\(^{48}\) INCB, \textit{International Narcotics}.
companies that produce licit products such as cleaning materials, paints, and medicine. They use official documents to import or purchase necessary precursors.

3. Why Do the Attempts at Demand Reduction Fail?

Since the Shanghai opium conventions, the international drug-control system has been predominantly built upon supply reduction. The 1961, 1971, and 1988 conventions also predominantly dealt with supply reduction issues. As Martin Jelsma put it succinctly, “the whole system built around the conventions was directed at suppressing illicit supply, while demand side policies were basically seen as a domestic issue.” The INCB recommended that demand-reduction programs should be implemented at national and local levels instead of creating an international system. Even though the Political Declaration and the Plan of Action called for a “balanced approach,” demand reduction has been overshadowed by supply reduction in international drug control. Indeed, the international institutions do not seek to promote a global demand-reduction regime. The UNODC and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) seek to assist capacity building in developing states. The international cooperation is limited to training, strategy development, and capacity building. Each state is anticipated to deal with its own drug addicts.

The latest UNODC and INCB figures clearly indicate that worldwide demand-reduction efforts have failed dramatically. According to the UN sources, globally 246 million people consumed drugs in 2013. This indicates a 37 percent increase over 1998, when the Political Declaration put a strong emphasis on the necessity of enhancing demand-reduction efforts. Apart from the conventional drugs listed in the 1961, 1971, and 1988 conventions, the consumption of new psychoactive substances (NPS) has proliferated over the last decade. Every year a significant number of new NPS appears on the global drug markets. In 2012 alone, the EMCDDA Early Warning System detected 73 new substances.

Despite global investments in demand reduction, the drug consumption in major markets such as the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation has not declined. The UNODC acknowledges that “the overall magnitude of drug demand has not substantially changed at the global level.” The control of plant-based substances leads to consumption of alternative synthetic drugs that have similar effects. Even though there were some declines in cocaine consumption in the US and a downward trend in heroin consumption in the EU, the number of global ATS and NPS users has grown significantly. The number of drug-related deaths has been steadily increasing in all three markets. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 197,383 deaths were attributed to drugs in 2000. The number of drug-related deaths increased to 231,400 in 2013. The sharpest rise in dangerous drug

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51 Jelsma, “Drugs in the UN System”.
52 UNODC, 2015.
54 Gomis, “Illicit Drugs”.
addiction has been observed in Russia. According to the UNODC, Russia consumes as much heroin as the entire European Union.58

At the international meetings, it is observed that Western officials and delegates present Latin America and Afghanistan as the source of the global drug problem. They ignore the fact that Andean cocaine or Afghan heroin would not flourish without the massive demand in Western markets. They disregard the demand side of the international drug markets. In reality, however, demand constitutes the origins of the problem. Supply-and-demand dimensions are inextricably intertwined. Poor farmers in Afghanistan and Colombia will not cultivate drugs without the prospect of profits that is mainly driven by the demand in major consumption markets. Producer states rightfully anticipate sharing the burden with consumer states. The existing global demand compels massive scales of drug production and trafficking. The international crusade against drugs will be meaningless unless consumer states run effective prevention and demand-reduction programs.

The 1988 UN Convention asserts that possession, purchase, or cultivation for “personal consumption” should be criminalized. The UN conventions are legally binding. Indeed, many states enacted the 1961, 1971, and 1988 conventions with national legislations. For instance, the US enacted the Controlled Substances Act to meet the standards of the Single Convention.59 In practice, however, there is a growing tendency not to penalize the consumers, and possession of less than five grams of cannabis has been decriminalized. In reality this policy has been widely abused by street dealers. An increasing number of professionals tend to perceive drug users as “patients” or “victims.” They believe that addicts have to be treated rather than imprisoned. Even if the law-enforcement agencies arrest drug users, courts rarely give penalties due to this lenient approach. In practice, however, most drug consumers are also dealers and sell drugs to maintain their addiction. When police arrest the dealers with small amounts of drugs, they claim possession of the substance for their own addiction. If police do not have extra evidence from electronic or physical surveillance, the judges are predisposed to release the dealers. After they leave the court, they act more professionally, because they have learned about police investigation and surveillance methods.

There is a wide variety of opinions about the global drug-control regime. The prohibitionist regime is often confronted with calls for decriminalization. Many advocates claim that global prohibition exacerbates the global drug scourge.60 They believe that the prohibitionist regime sparks massive clashes in Mexico, Latin America, Afghanistan, Iran, Africa, and many other parts of the world. The anti-prohibitionist states have legalized the use of marihuana. Liberal marihuana laws in Denmark, the UK, Spain, Uruguay, and the Netherlands have stimulated consumption, and cannabis is widely used in these countries. The legalization of medical marihuana is followed by defacto legalization of consumption of all drugs. States with a laissez-faire approach to drug use constitute a grave challenge to the global prohibitionist regime. According to many experts, cannabis is a gateway drug towards more serious substances such as heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine.61 The defacto legalization of marihuana contributes to the spread of all narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

International meetings on demand reduction often fail to produce action plans. In most meetings, states and international organizations discuss the latest developments, trends, and best practices and finally agree to cooperate on demand-related matters. In the aftermath of the meetings, states are left to their own destiny. Because drug addicts constitute no transnational problems, foreign governments are hardly compelled to take action. There are, however, some exemptions to this phenomenon. The UNODC, the EMCDDA, and the WHO run several capacity-building programs. The UNODC organizes training programs for national demand-reduction experts in developing regions such as Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Central Asia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The UNODC consults with the donor governments and defines the targets of the training programs.

Despite the inefficiency of the global demand-reduction system, several organizations have attempted to overturn this grim scenario. The American INL is a major contributor to capacity-building projects on demand reduction. The INL assists and funds the UNODC training programs on demand reduction. In addition to these multilateral efforts, the INL runs capacity-building programs in Mexico, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Afghanistan. These programs consist of prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and raising awareness. Most of these states, however, do not perceive demand reduction as a priority. Their counternarcotics policy is designed to tackle large criminal networks that control massive trafficking schemes and challenge the state authority. Trained demand-reduction experts are often appointed to irrelevant positions.

The EMCDDA runs various programs to increase the capacity of member states and EU candidates on demand reduction. National Contact Points (NCPs) collect data on countrywide drug-consumption patterns. The EMCDDA releases an annual report based on the annual questionnaires received from the competent state institutions. The EMCDDA runs specialized training programs on demand reduction, prevention, treatment, harm reduction, and rehabilitation. These programs are designed to enhance the capacities of NCPs. For instance, the EMCDDA assisted the Turkish government to establish the Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBIM). The new institution made a significant contribution to the increased national capacity on demand-related matters. The EMCDDA also runs an effective Early Warning System on new drugs. When a member state discovers a new substance, it reports to the EMCDDA headquarters. If there are consistent reports on the availability of a particular substance on the European markets, the institution starts the process of taking it under control. However, due to the highly bureaucratic nature of the European policy-making process, the listing of new substances is time consuming. Drug networks develop other NPS before the previous substances are taken under control. Most EU states do not have the interdiction capacity to enforce new substance controls.

4. Why Does the Drug Money Remain Intact?

The drug trade generates enormous amounts of income for transnational criminal groups. The high profits of trans-border trade have been the catalyst for the salience of trafficking ventures and bloody clashes among the cartels. The UNODC estimates that the global annual

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64 EMCDDA, Drug Report 2014.
The turnover of the drug trade is around $320 billion. Some researchers estimate the volume of illicit drug money to be as high as $1 trillion. This money is used by shady figures such as terrorists, organized crime groups, assassins, and corrupt government officers, who pose enormous challenges to global peace and prosperity.

There is a reverse money flow for every drug shipment. Transferring money is much easier and faster than drug transportation. It takes around a year for Afghan heroin to reach end users in West Europe. Similarly, from coca fields to street deliveries in the US or Europe, the journey of cocaine may take over a year. However, money can be transferred in a few seconds via contemporary online banking systems. Internet users do not even need to go to the bank offices. This lack of necessity for physical presence at bank offices reduces the likelihood of arrest by law-enforcement agencies.

The confiscation of the financial proceeds of drugs is a sine qua non for concrete results in counternarcotics campaigns. Even if a law-enforcement agency seizes significant amounts of drugs, drug cartels reimburse the money with consistent shipments to profitable final markets. According to UN experts, only 10 percent of the drugs are seized globally, and 90 percent of the drugs reach the users. Drug networks make more than 10 times the profit for each transshipment. Thus, seizures do not really hurt the criminals unless their properties are confiscated.

Fighting against drug money is one of the thorniest issues in the global counternarcotics system. States face enormous difficulties in the investigation of the financial proceeds of the drug trade, as the burden of proof is rendered to the state for freezing and forfeiture of the proceeds of trafficking schemes. Drug cartels make investments in many countries that have favorable conditions for illicit money-laundering schemes. They register the properties using other people’s names. This complicates the evidencing process. Organized crime groups dynamically respond to law-enforcement measures. They hire money-laundering and investment specialists to spend the money wisely. Lawyers of crime networks constantly explore the gaps in national legislation. They invest in hotels, casinos, gas stations, exchange offices, car dealerships, and many other businesses.

It is impossible to dismantle these large networks unless drug investigations go hand in hand with scrutiny of financial proceeds. The 1988 UN Convention enabled confiscations of the properties of the drug networks. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime calls on states to establish financial intelligence units, enact effective legislations, and enhance international cooperation against money-laundering states. The Political Declaration and the Plan of Action devoted a special chapter to global anti-money-laundering efforts. It called on the states to build the capacity of national institutions, establish specialized units, enact strong legislations concerning the banking systems, and allow extradition of money launderers. However, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations laid the real working standards for the global anti-money-laundering regime.

The UN conventions, the UN declarations, and the FATF recommendations seem to be perfect blueprints for the global anti-money-laundering regime. In practice, however, there are no effective penalties for non-compliant states. The FATF initially embraced a blacklisting policy and announced a list of problematic states in 1999. However, due to

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65 UNODC, *Afghan Opium.*

strong opposition from the IMF and the World Bank, the FATF had to give up the “name and shame” campaign. Currently, there is no system that actually sanctions the money-laundering heavens. The Clinton Administration proposed to create a blacklist of states that engage in money-laundering schemes. This proposal has been implemented for individuals under the Kingpin Act. However, blacklisting countries has never been implemented by Washington.

At the international meetings, representatives of the Western states appear to be strong advocates of global anti-money-laundering initiatives. They criticize Afghanistan, Colombia, and offshore countries as the hotspots of drug money. In reality, however, the bulk of the money goes into American and European banks. According to Bagley, drug cartels launder over $150 billion in the United States, which is much higher than in Afghanistan, Colombia, or any offshore countries.67 The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that almost half of the global drug money enters the American economy.68 It is undeniable that every state and bank wants more money regardless of the source. Almost all states, including the major Western powers, do not want to interrupt the inflow of money. There is no problem as long as the traffickers invest in their markets and deposit money into their banks. Drug money functions as a lifesaver to stagnant American, Dutch, and English economies. The scrutiny begins when the drug networks transfer large sums of money out of the financial system.

The notorious Afghanistan gets only a small fraction of the drug money. According to the UNODC, only $2–3 billion remains in Afghanistan.69 This money is distributed among the drug barons, corrupt government officers, the Taliban, warlords, and farmers. Afghan people live at bare subsistence level while cartel leaders in Europe and America live the most luxurious lifestyle. Organized crime leaders do not invest in Afghanistan. The country has poor banking systems and financial institutions. Local people use traditional transfer methods instead of regular banking systems. The warlords and drug traffickers take advantage of this unregistered and uncontrolled money-transfer system, which provides immunity to money-laundering investigations.

Despite the recommendations of the FATF and the UN, banks rarely cooperate with the law-enforcement agencies and financial intelligence units about drug money. Bank managers do not voluntarily engage in anti-money-laundering schemes. In reality, banks want neither a diminishing drug market nor a loss of wealthy customers. Due to constant cash deposits, drug barons become “respected customers” for bankers. The privacy of these “businessmen” is carefully protected. At official meetings, representatives of the banks promise close cooperation with the state institutions, but in practice, they rarely report the suspicious transactions of drug traffickers.70 Bank managers are well aware that other shady customers will withdraw their money if they cooperate with the state. Even though the governments are highly aware of this fact, they fail to penalize bank administrations for failing to cooperate on money-laundering schemes.

Drug cartels exploit alternative money-transmitting methods. Apart from the regular banks, drug money is transferred through the havala system. The unregistered nature of the

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69 UNODC, Afghan Opium.
havala makes it extremely difficult to trace the financial flows. Havaladars mostly do not use computerized registry systems and they record the transfers on notebooks. Law-enforcement agencies have to carry out intensive electronic surveillance and access the physical records of havaladars to explore the money transfers. Even in this case it is really hard to prove the identities of senders and receivers of the financial transactions. Drug traffickers use nicknames and their real identities are not known to the havaladars.

The real challenge today is the money transfers by electronic means. Bitcoin, Altcoins, Zerocoin, and Zerocash are popular types of cryptocurrencies. PayPal is another method of payment used by drug traffickers, dealers, and users. Most of the states do not have the interception capability for both crypto currencies and PayPal-type electronic money remittance systems. It is really hard to find sound evidence of the encrypted electronic transfers.

5. Policy Implications

The international drug-control system was promoted by the West throughout the Cold War. The UN institutions were developed under the leadership of the American government. It is obvious that the international drug-control system is in crisis five decades after the signature of the UN Single Convention. The drug trade persists as an international security conundrum because current policies have been ineffective and counterproductive. The system is not coherent and international policy is fragmented. International efforts are plagued with a lack of sustainability and coordination. Eliminating drugs seems to be an unrealistic goal within the existing international system. There are serious attempts to dismantle the entire prohibitionist regime.

The global fight against drugs is a lengthy and quixotic process. The global community needs effective measures to turn the tide. Rather than giving up the battle against this apparently insurmountable conundrum, states and international organizations should scale up their commitments. The states should engage in a rigorous and concerted battle instead of a blame shifting approach.

5.1. International system

The states implement the UN drug-control conventions in a flexible manner. There are no serious consequences for deviations from the fundamental tenets of the regime. The punitive power of the system is limited, especially when major powers do not reach consensus on the sanctions. In the current international political system, it is highly unlikely to implement effective economic sanctions against drug-producing states. Even if the West agrees upon cutting down aid, Russia, China, or other non-Western states may contradict these sanctions. The US may withdraw counternarcotics assistance but this will not be a significant blow against the noncompliant states. Sanctioning the misbehaving states in a coherent manner is sine qua non for an effective drug-control system. There should be stiffer sanctions for uncooperative countries that covertly facilitate drug production, trafficking, and money laundering.

The drug-control machinery lacks the supranational coercive power to enforce the UN conventions. Cooperation on international investigations utterly depends on the willingness of the states. International drug-control agencies are granted neither operational nor
executive powers. They are totally dependent on host governments to run operations. The INCB cannot compel the national governments to implement certain policies in line with the UN conventions. The institution can launch a “name and shame” campaign if states disregard the conventions. The INCB functions as a “guardian” rather than an “enforcer” of the international drug-control treaties. The UNODC and other international drug-control institutions are under heavy influence of donors, mainly the United States, Russia, and the European Union. The international system should be reinforced via stronger institutions, a larger budget, and better coordination.

Every year the CND participants issue several resolutions. Before each meeting, the CND secretariat sends a questionnaire to national governments about implementation of the previous resolutions. Most states fill in these questionnaires without presenting any evidence to substantiate their arguments. Execution of the CND recommendations necessitates better monitoring and evaluation. Self-reporting by the states on CND questionnaires may be misleading. Monitoring of the CND resolutions needs a broader institution.

As McAllister put it succinctly, the CND embraced double standards in the handling of drugs and psychotropic substances. The Commission adopted a harsher control mechanism for plant-based drugs, while approaching the psychotropic substances with a laissez-faire posture. Pharmaceutical companies in Western states created roadblocks to international control efforts. The INCB and the CND should pay equal attention to control of psychotropic substances along with the concerted actions on Afghanistan and Colombia.

### 5.2. Supply reduction

It is time for a zero-tolerance approach both in Afghanistan and the Andean region. Governments should demonstrate their commitment to massive eradication and interdiction. In the absence of viable economic activity, farmers will strongly oppose massive eradication, but governments and international organizations should adamantly pursue this policy. Counternarcotics law should be implemented throughout the country without exemptions and tolerance for warlords, tribal leaders, and other strongmen. The defacto immunity of the rich and powerful traffickers should be evoked.

In Afghanistan and Colombia there is a need for a stronger policy that combines capacity building, intelligence collection, planned investigations, interdiction, and effective prosecution. The primary goal of international campaigns should be building the capacity of state institutions to carry out these tasks. A functioning state that has enforcement power in all provinces is the key element of viable counternarcotics. The state needs to control national territories. Instead of spending money on ostentatious projects, the international community should coordinate efforts to build effective institutions. Capacity building in Afghanistan and Latin America should focus on the development of human capital in counternarcotics institutions. These countries are in drastic need of uncorrupt officers who do their job with professionalism. Police officers, prosecutors, and judges working on drug cases should be carefully selected. They should undergo rigorous training programs. These officials should specialize in drug crimes and remain in the counternarcotics units. They should be well protected to prevent coercion and assassination. Donors should promote a performance-based reward system. Individuals should receive monetary rewards and bonuses in accordance with the investigations they have participated in.

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71 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy.
It is obvious that foreign governments and international organizations cannot train every single police and military officer in Afghanistan or Colombia. International training programs should be designed to increase the effectiveness of the law-enforcement elite. These elite groups should also undergo “training of the trainers” programs. This will allow them to access all individuals in national police forces and armies. The international trainers should be sent to Afghanistan or Colombia for at least one year of field observation to gain a deep understanding of the investigation environment.

Currently, police agencies are overwhelmed by the armed resistance of drug cartels and warlords in both Afghanistan and the Andean region. The firepower of the law-enforcement agencies is not sufficient enough to confront the rich drug networks that have thousands of armed assassins. The military should assume a greater role in counternarcotics in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and West Africa. Eradication programs should be backed up by strong military battalions. Counternarcotics should be the backbone of military counterinsurgency programs.

Rather than giving the money to farmers, governments and international institutions should directly invest in irrigation and transportation infrastructure projects. Chronic poverty of the local people should be eliminated through integrated long-term alternative development programs. Unfair distribution of foreign aid should be prevented by means of an effective monitoring system. The international community should assist the Afghan government with the launch of micro-credit institutions that provide long-term and low-interest credit.

Currently, drug kingpins are rarely prosecuted and sentenced in problematic regions such as Mexico and Colombia. Even if convicted, they either escape or bribe state officials to have favorable conditions inside the prisons. Extradition and trial of major drug criminals in the US is an option but most states reject this idea due to political concerns. Thus, states need to develop effective correctional systems for major drug criminals. Special high-security prison facilities should be built on islands or in remote locations to prevent escape. The UN should appoint monitoring officials to oversee the correctional systems in critical regions.

Drug traffickers heavily exploit the porous borders. In most countries there are no specialized border security institutions. The military is in charge of controlling thousands of kilometers. The UNODC, the WCO, and the BOMCA run various projects to enhance the capacities of border-control institutions. However, most border-control units do not have modern surveillance equipment or trained professional staff. International projects fail to cover all regions. There should be better coordination of international initiatives to identify the priority areas. The projects should target the most problematic borders, such as Afghanistan–Iran, Afghanistan–Tajikistan, and Mexico–United States. After the implementation of the projects, international experts should keep in touch with the national border authorities regarding maintenance of the modern equipment and training of the staff.

Counternarcotics agencies in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East lack the experience and capacity to find incriminating evidence on the masterminds of trafficking schemes. They basically arrest the drivers and couriers, who will never testify against their employers. The burden of proof is on the drug-enforcement agencies. To overcome this challenge, drug-enforcement agents should undergo rigorous training based on best practices in advanced countries. They should receive training on electronic surveillance, physical surveillance, the handling of undercovers/informants, interrogation, and investigation administration from advanced international institutions such as the DEA,
the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the National Crime Agency (NCA), and the Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department (KOM). Intelligence collection and data entry should be professionalized. Investigators, surveillance teams, and analysts should work in close collaboration while targeting the trafficking syndicates.

5.3. Precursor control

Despite the 1988 UN Convention, the Political Declaration, and the INCB campaigns, precursor control has never been a priority for the counternarcotics agencies. An abundant supply of chemical precursors arrives in drug labs across the world. Precursor seizures remain limited in comparison with the manufactured drugs. The rapid increase in the number of precursor exporting countries and companies complicates the international precursor control. The main responsibility of precursor control should be assumed by the developed nations that produce precursors. Governments of exporting countries should implement a more effective monitoring system against diversion of chemical precursors into illicit trade. The PEN Online system should be effectively used by drug-control agencies. State agencies should report the details of seizures to the INCB analysts via the PICS system to explore the bigger picture in precursor trafficking schemes. State institutions and the INCB should carry out rigorous backtracking investigations to find out the organizations involved in diversification, trafficking, and manufacturing.

5.4. Demand reduction

Despite the diplomatic rhetoric of a “balanced approach” in the CND meetings, the international system hardly deals with the demand side of the problem. Predominant portions of international drug-control budgets have been allocated to the supply-reduction programs. This creates underinvestment into the source of the problem. There is a pressing demand for an effective demand-reduction system. Developed states should collaborate to build up the best practices of prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation. They should exchange experts to share experience on the existing programs. The best practices should be applied to developing states under the auspices of the UN organizations. The UNODC should devote more staff and more of their budget to coordinate the sharing of experiences on demand reduction on a global scale.

States should adamantly resist legalization campaigns. Anti-control advocates will undercut the commitment to international counternarcotics partnerships. Legalization violates the decrees of international treaties. Legalization is especially dangerous while we are experiencing an onslaught of new psychoactive substances. There is no way to control “legal” consumption while drugs are widely available on the market. The international community should start sanctioning states with a laissez-faire approach to drug consumption.

5.5. Control of money laundering

Anti-money laundering is the weakest point in international drug control and poses a grave challenge for the states and international organizations. Most states do not have the institutions, legislation, and expert staff to run money-laundering investigations. Money-laundering investigators are often held back by legislative and bureaucratic barriers. There is a vast asymmetry between the global annual turnover of drugs and properties confiscated
from drug traffickers. States drastically need to run money-laundering investigations along with drug prosecutions. The UNODC should devote more attention to the capacity building of organized-crime units in money-laundering investigations. The states should enhance cooperation without hiding behind political and economic pretexts. They should establish efficient institutions and contact points to respond to the demands of foreign counterparts.

6. Conclusion

Implementing effective counternarcotics policy is a prerequisite for stability and development in the world. At this point, the international community should seriously think about the reasons for its failure. There is a strong need for integrating the international, regional, and provincial counternarcotics initiatives. Capacity building should be the centerpiece of international programs targeting problematic areas. Coherence of the efforts of national drug-enforcement agencies, donors, and international agencies is \textit{sine qua non} for a more efficient international system.

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Hard Power versus Soft Power or a Balance between the Two?*

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Abstract

Many things have changed in Turkey within the last decade, but also in Brussels as to the political practises. This commentary seeks to answer whether Turkey and the EU can find and maintain a sensible balance between toughness and empathy, between considerations of hard power and soft power. Turkey is obviously an essential, regional player both economically and militarily. Geopolitics may not appear high on the agenda of the EU, but the situation in the Middle-East simply could not and cannot be ignored as a geopolitical challenge, one that might beg for acting in concert with Turkey. On the other side, Europe represents an attraction and example based on a long history and struggle for material wealth, technological and scientific progress as well as for the accomplished degree of democracy and the rule of law. More recently, however, EU soft power suffers a number of setbacks. We disown our most basic values of soft power and will lose impact in promoting a just, democratic order in the world. If the EU and its member states fail to recover from this set-back, we risk to fall back in the hard power game, also with potential and aspiring states.

Keywords: Turkey, European Union, soft power, hard power, European enlargement

Just over ten years ago my Centre for European Security Studies started a programme in Turkey concerning democratisation of security and defence policy. The Dutch government hold the Presidency of the European Union and considered such a programme a positive contribution to the Turkish efforts to become a member state and a positive response to the reforms of the ruling and, indeed, stable government. The Hague sponsored us and we ran the programme nine years trying to further democratic decision-making in defence matters, political oversight by the ministry of Defence and parliament, defence budgeting and auditing and the role of the military in politics was supposed to change. The message from Brussels was that civil-military relations in Turkey needed to be further aligned to practises in the EU.

Well, since then many things have changed in Turkey including the role of the military, but also in Brussels as to the political practises. Ten years later one might ask and even doubt whether the relations between Turkey and the EU have changed for the better as envisaged by, for example, the Dutch government and Ankara at the time. Some – individuals of governments - argued that Turkey could join the EU somewhere during the 2020s and the Turkish government enjoyed the support of a vast majority of the people. Over the years this kind of optimistic mood has not been maintained. Relations became more complex; the tone
Politics always deals with power, but it makes a big difference whether power is a tool in a Hobbesian or Kantian manner and whether power relations exist in a Hobbesian or Kantian political culture. Allies can be tough for each other, but as long as they share insights, strategies, values and expectations, the face of hard power may become more friendly and non-material considerations may carry the day. But there is no guarantee and we have to fight hard for maintaining a common course. This is a major question for the EU and Turkey as well as for the relations between the two. Can we find and maintain a sensible balance between toughness and empathy, between considerations of hard power and soft power?

I start with hard power and can be relatively brief since it is a familiar concept in international relations. Economic relations can be tough, even between friends, but they represent in principle a win-win solution. The EU wins by enlarging the internal market and Turkey wins by considerably opening up Turkey’s market for further expansion. The economic performance of Turkey during the past 10-15 years has been truly impressive, certainly when compared with EU growth since 2008.

As to the significance of military power, the views within the EU – with the exception of France and the UK, perhaps – and Turkey are probably not as close as in the economic-financial case. National defence is a subject that in most EU countries is met with disinterest. Even the willingness to defend the West in the context of NATO and/or EU allies is shockingly low in some countries. Defence expenditure of most EU member states is down to around 1 per cent of GDP, a horrendously low security insurance. Nonetheless, the EU spends almost $300 billion on defence, but its organisation is so inefficient that no country can field a robust force of sorts for a longer period of time. This fragmentation of capabilities seriously hampers the output of defence efforts. But nobody really does something about it, often in name of keeping so-called national sovereignty. Sovereignty in an interdependent world is a moot concept, though, and if sovereignty leads to military powerlessness, what is the purpose of the defence effort? Indeed, military operations have been disappointing like the interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Without support on the ground – political and/or military – interventions and proxy wars are hazardous and defeat always looms large. As we see in Syria today, terrorism has become part of the answer against bombing IS; a challenge that cannot be meet with conventional forces of the allies. Moreover, without their own boots on the ground, the Western powers are dangerously dependent on a range of unwieldy rebels and fighters as well as on some dubious allies.

Turkey is obviously an essential, regional player vulnerable to the fighting on its borders. Military power is a crucial tool in directly providing territorial integrity and security for its population. For these reasons the EU and its member states should have shown greater interest in Turkey’s membership in the past. Geopolitics may not appear high on the agenda of the EU, but the situation in the Middle-East simply could not and cannot be ignored as a geopolitical challenge, one that might beg for acting in concert with Turkey. Military solutions seem to be elusive; yet the proximity of Turkey and its military capabilities together with political-diplomatic leverage of Europe should have figured prominently in considering closer cooperation and potential membership. Yet, geopolitical sense was pretty weak in the EU, even in traditionally Realist France where Sarkozy since 2005 explicitly ruled out these options.
If then the Europeans are not the hard power players like followers of Mars, how well are the Europeans coming from Venus according to Robert Kagan, playing the soft power game? Soft power is primarily based on non-material capacities like culture, values, historical record or policies. Unlike hard power like strength, you do not have soft power, but it is granted by someone else in a relationship with you. The other sees the kind of power as attractive, something to acquire for oneself. The European experiment since 1957 proved to be a tremendous success and it readily expanded throughout the European continent. Of course, economic growth and prosperity were also reasons for expansion. Yet, the ‘Idea of Europe’ went further than material wealth, notably in the Soviet dominated countries where people like Vaclav Havel and members of Charter 77 aspired to the way of living under democratic rule and the rule of law as practiced in Western-Europe. These former communist countries were willing to accept conditionality put forward by the EU and even considered this as a means to speed up the process of transformation. In that sense, conditionality was not a traditional power game of coercion; but rather a form of assistance to enter unchartered waters. On the other side, the EU appeared to be a credible player loyal to its values and declared policies. It extended the prospect of membership to all (five) Central-European countries plus the (three) Baltic states; not just two or three. Membership is in principle eligible for all European states and there was no valid reason for preferential selection of presumably better candidates. How could you say that, for example, Romania or Bulgaria had not suffered as much as Poland and did not deserve an equal chance for a different life?

So, attraction, willingness to work hard on reform, fairness and credibility were all essential ingredients for cooperation and integration in Europe rather than another round of continental power politics. The post-war practice of negotiation on the basis of agreement and desire for inclusiveness was respected. However, there is more than this institutionalised habit under the auspices of the European Communities/Union. Europe represents an attraction and example based on a long history and struggle for material wealth, technological and scientific progress as well as for the accomplished degree of democracy and the rule of law. Centuries have gone by before the state of art of liberalism, individual responsibility, prosperity, freedom and equality had taken root and could (start to) flourish. Enlightenment did not come overnight; nor did physics or technology. Huge obstacles, like repression or intolerance, had to be cleared; unparalleled drama’s, like nationalism, fascism and communism, two world wars and one Cold War had to be overcome. The liberal victories over evil movements have been won the hard way. Evidently, success of the EU goes well beyond its seventy year existence. Soft power has a long history and slowly become an asset of strength.

A similar experience with soft power has not been part of Turkish history. Military prowess, pride and power characterize the Ottoman empire and the establishment of the Republic after WW I. The liberation of men and individual responsibility as treasures of the Enlightenment and the growing consensual power about democratic and constitutional/legal institutions at home are not characteristic of modern history in Turkey. Nor is soft power prominent in its external relations. Ten years ago, some sympathetic observers of EU-Turkey rapprochement were disappointed that there were not many outspoken European diplomat/advocates for the Turkish case in Brussels at the time that Ankara was serious about reforming democratic and constitutional rule. Developments since then have not particularly strengthened the hands of these advocates. In brief, there is a discrepancy between the views on the usefulness of hard power, in particular military power, in Ankara and Europe, but
there is a considerable gap between the two sides regarding the substance of soft power and the utility and benefits of soft power in our interdependent world. In such a world, relational power has becomes infinitely more important than during the days of the East-West divide. The shrinking, interdependent world forces us to seek inclusiveness rather than nationalist, inward-looking views and exclusiveness. This may be Putin’s wish, at least his behaviour, but he and his system are unlikely to play a significant role in shaping the international order. Putin is unable to balance hard and soft power; as such he resembles the 19th century tsar, both at home and abroad. We always have to guard democracy against its enemies. It is never a done deal.

Europeans must fear an ill-fated slippage of standards for the good life as Aristotle described the moral objective of the state. Again, it is never a done deal. Today, fear for globalisation; fear for loss of national identity; fear for emerging economic powers and so on are factors that crudely interfere with exemplary behaviour and Western soft power. Worse, these are easy themes to explore by populists. Still worse, governments have no answers and are reluctant to formulate some. Leaders fear the public polls and often follow them rather challenge popular views. They seek solutions in vague compromises or even in referenda laying responsibility back on the voters. It is a dubious tool certainly for resolving complex issues, not to mention international questions. For example, a mere 32 percent of the Dutch electorate voted in the case of the EU agreement with Ukraine. Sixty per cent opposed the agreement. That means that twenty per cent of the total electorate represented the majority. The organisers, who are against the EU, simply used the public mood against expansion of the EU against the EU itself. They do not care a bit about Ukraine. Meanwhile, they claimed that ‘the people’-and thus, democracy- have clearly indicated what the government should do: renounce the agreement. Poor Ukraine and poor people who believed in Europe’s soft power and in the Dutch democracy. We actually renounced our values and undermined their credibility.

This example does not stand alone: what about Brexit? What about Hungary that claims to be protestant/catholic and refuses Muslim immigrants? What about Poland changes its constitution unconstitutionally? How can it criticise Germany for showing moral leadership in the refugees drama? What about the lack of a refugee policy, to begin with? I can go on, but the point should be clear. Our soft power suffers a number of setbacks. We disown our most basic values of soft power and will lose impact in promoting a just, democratic order in the world.

This is not just an ephemeral problem. The European societies at large suffer from a lack of responsibility for maintaining the accomplishments. People talk about rights including freedom of speech, social security, 50 per cent plus one as democratic, your view as layman-citizen is as important as the one of experts, criterion to judge truth is measurement, not quality and so on. These people are not fighting for what they inherited in order to retain it. They assume the good life as a concern of the state, not theirs. Nationalists exclude others and do not unite societies, they disunite. They do not support the rules of pluralism and the truth of EU beauty, namely unity in diversity. This is the more profound problem of the EU soft power. If we lose this asset what can we hope for in world politics? There is no-one else to do this job as a non-threatening power. If the EU and its member states fail to recover from this set-back, we risk falling back in the hard power game, also with potential and aspiring states. A prospect we should resist.
In the last decade, scholars working within Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and more generally Science, Technology, and Society (STS) have made significant contributions in many social science disciplines, including International Relations (IR). The defining features of ANT are many, such as the disruption of traditional binaries, exploration of the relevance and significance of infrastructures to world politics, and implications of technological agency. Arguably, however, the most important aspect of ANT has been its emphasis on the political agency of non-human objects and organisms. On an empirical level, IR students have drawn on insights from ANT to study the agency of objects ranging from drones to garbage. Emanating from increasing recognition of the need to move beyond the individual human subject as the only form of political agency, ANT explores the circumstances under which non-human objects and organisms exert their own agencies. See, for example, Timothy Mitchell’s work on Egyptian politics, wherein he explains how malaria-carrying mosquitos, sugar cane, and mechanized instruments of war help shape the course of modern Egyptian politics and economics as much as any minister or diplomat. Mitchell argues that established modes of thinking such as Cartesian binarism, and the anthropocentrism of even the most materialist approaches often fail to capture the dynamism of machines, diseases, and even agricultural crops themselves. Mitchell looks at how extra-economic forces, such as malarial outbreaks, the subsequent development of DDT, and shifting supplies of irrigation

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and monocrop agriculture, have molded and shaped what is and what is not labelled as an economic activity in Egypt (and elsewhere). In turn, these extra-economic forces are also important in creating corresponding agencies for economic activities, which have typically been seen as the results or effects of human activity only. Mitchell shows his readers how these forces not only determine and define human activities, but how they do the same for non-human activities or forces.

The scope of Mitchell’s argument can easily be extended to other contexts. The narrative of the Egyptian economy as an unintended site of ‘techno-politics’ is very much global, and weaves together the effects of mechanized warfare, capitalism, and colonialism. Indeed, Mitchell’s thinking represents the latest paradigm shift in the thinking about the Middle East, as a new form of materialism begins to trump discourse analysis as the latest corpus of theory to storm through academia, along with ANT. As Michele Acuto and Maximilian Mayer remind us, the role “large technical systems” have played in the realm of IR theory has always been there, if not always at the forefront. If the seeds of its becoming are already surfacing in IR, one problem that Andrew Barry cautions us on is the tendency of ANT scholars to “over-expand” agency, which may then clash with the already well-defined categories of political actors in IR. The goal, then, of this engagement between STS, ANT, and IR is one of refining and specifying the contours of political action on a global level. In this sense, how certain objects—or what Acuto and Mayer call Large Technical Systems (LTSs)—act in a certain manner is increasingly relevant and meaningful in IR.

One recent work that contributes to the discussion of lifting STS into the realm of global politics is Christopher J. Sneddon’s Concrete Revolution: Large Dams, Cold War Geopolitics, and the US Bureau of Reclamation. Sneddon claims that dams are “thick with politics,” a phrase coined by Wiebe Bijiker to describe the social and political relations embedded within massive hydraulic structures. Unpacking these various layers, which cut across international politics as much as ecology does, Sneddon demonstrates the often tense but accommodating interplay between technical knowledge and American geopolitical aims. Through encounters between the engineers of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau hereafter) and operatives within the U.S. State Department, American hegemony expands as the concrete revolution begins to solidify, resist, and transform the river basins of the developing world.

The first chapter of Sneddon’s book brings together theories and insights from political geography, political ecology and STS. Sneddon raises two main themes: the first is the intertwined nature of “geopolitics, technologies, and large-scale environmental transformations,” and the second is how the idea of the river basin became an important site in the ongoing conquest and control of nature by developing countries. His account is mainly centered on the activities of Bureau engineers and how their technical knowledge transforms into techno-politics. This process is materially constituted in the spread of large dams as hybrid agents, or what Sneddon prefers to call “dam assemblage[s].” He first defines

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8 See the articles in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41, no. 3 (2013).
12 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 2.
13 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 4.
assemblage as a “collection of things, places, and processes brought together by a central idea or material entity.” Dam assemblages, then, specify the overlapping and interpenetrating layers of technical expertise and geopolitics, in conjunction with the built environment of the river basin. Yet as concrete and sediment begin to pour into rivers, so does a series of unintended results flow in turn; events and actions that ANT scholars would identify as the agency of nature. Abstracting from each of these layers—the local from the global, and vice-versa—shows just how interdependent these relations are, and why a dam is never just a dam, but a material as well as a political reality. The rest of Concrete Revolution is divided into several chapters, each dealing with the major projects undertaken globally by the Bureau.

President Theodore Roosevelt established the Bureau in 1902 as the country’s foremost authority on water resource development and management. Its initial aims were to support agriculture for settler farmers as they began to penetrate deeper into the arid states of the American West. The book’s second chapter takes the reader into the internationalization of the Bureau and its activities, particularly highlighting the exploits of one of its most skilled engineers, John L. Savage. As the Bureau’s top design engineer, Savage’s talents significantly shaped the hydrology of the American West in addition to aiding the efforts to dam rivers in Chiang Kai-shek’s China. Savage was but one of many engineers whose achievements the U.S. would deploy as an exportable point of pride to lesser-developed nations. Despite the global accolades these projects would give the Bureau, the organization’s authority outside the U.S. would often falter under the overarching political and economic sensitivities of the international order.

The Chinese nationalist regime commissioned the Bureau and Savage to conduct feasibility reports for a dam in the Yangtze Gorges in Central China in the 1940s. The main purposes of the dam would have been to provide irrigation and flood control. However, Savage’s team quickly found itself at loggerheads with the U.S. State Department, revealing how much the scale and proposed capacity of the dam would be scrutinized under the rubric of U.S. foreign policy. State Department officials were concerned that the Bureau’s initial project design was so immense and capital intensive that then-present levels of Chinese industrialization would be unable to absorb the proposed capacity. Moreover, the exorbitant cost of the project, which amounted to billions of dollars, as well as the growing instability between the Nationalist government and the Maoist insurgency, cast doubt that the project would ever be completed. Allies of the Bureau argued that such a project would provide ample opportunities for American firms to supply the necessary technical equipment, and that the cost would not incur too great of a burden.

In the end, the project was partially realized, and then abandoned. Sneddon argues that the different levels of conflict are illustrative of how the confrontation between technical arguments from Savage and his allies in both the Department of the Interior and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation must be seen in the context of American hegemony. The core of these discussions was fraught with the U.S. organizations’ “imagined geographies” of the Yangtze Valley, as Sneddon puts it, the land and river being implicated on a variety of politicized

14 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 7.
15 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 7.
16 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 44.
17 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 42.
18 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 43.
19 Since then, however, the dam has been built, starting in 1994 and with the final turbine installed in 2012.
For Savage and the Bureau, the underdeveloped nature of China’s economy was ripe for the Yangtze Dam. As Sneddon points out, however, both the Bureau and Savage failed to factor in the problems of the country’s enormous political instability. Thus, internationalist ambitions of spreading American technical know-how was bound up in the geopolitical modifications and concerns of the U.S. State Department, which sought to strategically preserve American interests in China.

The third chapter of *Concrete Revolution* discusses the development of the Litani River basin in Lebanon throughout the 1950s, and how it was transformed into a site of contentious politics. Similar to the problems between Savage and the State Department, in Lebanon, the U.S. government, the Bureau and the State Department clashed over how the Litani river basin would be used. The announcement of a TVA-style plan for the Litani basin came on the heels of U.S. President Harry S. Truman’s “Point Four Program,” which provided financial assistance to countries deemed politically susceptible to a communist agenda. Lebanese water resources were thus targeted as the focus of a U.S. foreign policy agenda to combat Soviet influence in the Middle East. Throughout its planning and construction phases, the Litani program encountered numerous material and strategic revisions. There were three primary elements that unexpectedly disrupted the intended plans of the engineers and the U.S. At the regional level, the so-called “Johnston Plan,” supported by the Eisenhower administration, sought to conjoin the riparian states of the Jordan and Litani Rivers as a way to shape the destinies of Israeli and Lebanese water resource management. By linking the Litani basin to the needs of the Israeli state, it was assumed that the latter would enjoy a more politically stable relationship with a neighboring Arab state, which turned out to be too optimistic. A second aspect was the somewhat high-handed attitude of the Bureau engineers in their assumptions while assessing the social and economic needs of the Lebanese people. This naturally caused some tension, and was only exacerbated as engineering failures came to light with the contentious Bisri Tunnels. Finally, a combination of poor feasibility planning and disagreeable geological factors colluded to convert unplanned disasters into advantageous political opportunities to redirect the course of water supplies from its anticipated recipients in South Lebanon to the residents of Beirut. This trifecta of challenges—the geological, the regional, and the overarching American focus of staving off the spread of Stalinism in the Middle East—ultimately led to the collapse of a viable TVA-style program for Lebanon. In its wake, Sneddon remarks that despite its failure, the concept of multi-purpose river basin development as a technical model became even more notable to developing countries as “mandatory elements of a universalized approach to the exploitation of water resources.”

In his fourth chapter, Sneddon lays out the dynamics of the Blue Nile program, located in the central highlands of Ethiopia. Under President Eisenhower’s administration, a more market-based approach to American foreign aid was introduced to alleviate government.

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22 TVA-style refers to the organization and functions of the Tennessee Valley Authority, a federally owned corporation in the U.S. created by congressional charter in May 1933 to provide navigation, flood control, electricity generation, fertilizer manufacturing, and economic development to the Tennessee Valley, which was severely affected by the Great Depression. The TVA was designed not only as a corporation, but also as a regional economic development agency that would use federal experts and electricity to rapidly modernize the region’s economy and society.
23 Sneddon, *The Concrete Revolution*, 68.
spending. As the enthusiasm towards foreign aid as procured by the state began to wane, the Bureau began to struggle with keeping its program relevant. Bureau Commissioner Floyd Dominy would attempt to preserve the Bureau’s foreign activities by arguing that its missions abroad would provide ample opportunities for American corporations to offer their services and products to a growing list of markets. Banking on the combined experience and expertise offered by the Bureau, it was hoped that the organization would continue to stay relevant to U.S. foreign aims by setting up water resource management programs in host countries.27

In the 1950s, in Ethiopia, as in Lebanon, major development projects, especially imposing ones like dams, were symbols of industrial might that would translate into significant political clout. Americans well understood the advantages of building Ethiopia’s hydrological infrastructure and its overall strategic importance because of the latter’s access to both the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. Ethiopia’s location on the Horn of Africa, an important commercial route, dovetailed with the fact that any project tapping into the Nile River’s capabilities could serve as leverage to Nasserite Egypt. Bureau engineers entered Ethiopia in 1952 to assess the hydrology of the Awash river basin and started working on the Blue Nile program. Yet their mission was repeatedly interrupted by actors both human and non-human. The persistent threat of malarial outbreaks in the region, disagreeable weather conditions, as well as tribes hostile to the government conspired to delay progress. Further, the unwillingness of Ethiopian authorities to share previous hydrological studies conducted by the Italians stalled an already slow-moving venture. By the end, the project seemed to be in a constant state of becoming, or unbecoming, as it were. What persisted, however, was a “technopolitical network” into the country that continued to promote efforts to encourage river basin planning, which endure today.

In the last empirical chapter, Sneddon turns his attention on the “greatest dam never built”—the Pa Mong Dam in Thailand. Arguably the most detailed of the case studies, the “Mekong project” involved not just dams and attendant substations, but nearly most developed aspects of river basin planning, including “irrigation works, advanced agricultural production, [and] agro-industrial development.”28 When planning started in the 1960s, it was clear that an American foothold in Southeast Asia would require a major project in order to secure the former’s presence, and so the political priorities of the project came first, with technical considerations often second. Sneddon argues that by the mid-1960s, “the technical work and water resource expertise…became so deeply intertwined with the Pa Mong dam’s geopolitical origins and ends that the technopolitical project gained momentum that was partially, if not wholly, divorced from its technological and economic feasibility.”29 One aspect that was somewhat different from the rest of the Bureau’s projects was U.S. President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s insistence that the Mekong project would bring peace to the region as an “alternative strategy”30 to military involvement. However, under Johnson, enthusiasm for foreign aid and development was waning in policy circles and certain academic groups, as well as in the nascent environmentalist movement. In addition to the above factors, the high cost of maintaining multiple project sites and feasibility reports, and persistent fighting between the State Department and Bureau engineers eventually sunk the project. The Bureau

27 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 79-80
28 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 105.
29 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 111.
30 Sneddon, The Concrete Revolution, 115.
increasingly adopted a political line, couched in technical terms, to support U.S. strategic aims as well as provide an open door for American business opportunities to continue in the region. Yet in spite of the project’s overall failure, what American involvement did leave behind was an ingrained sense of the Mekong as one of many “working rivers” and its potential for development today.31

In Chapter Six, Sneddon welcomes the arguably more critical scholarship about and perspectives on dams that has recently emerged, particularly around the ecological threat they pose. Yet he also criticizes such works because they point fingers only at the dams, fetishizing their structures while leaving the kinds of technopolitical networks that nurture them untouched. Dams, for Sneddon, are the material glue that contain the above networks, which hum through their concrete foundation. Sneddon revisits those early projects—on the Litani, the Blue Nile, the Mekong—from the golden age of the Cold War, and notes that many parts of them are still regarded with fascination by the engineers of today. Newer actors are now involved in dam creation, such as Iran in Lebanon or China in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia, and dams continue to be built; methods in marketing have rebranded “hydropower” as clean alternative to dirty fossil fuels.32 Billed as part of the current preoccupation with green energy, much of the old-new spin on dams conveniently leaves out any reference to the effects dams have on their surrounding regions (displacement, pollution, climate change)—although some ecological consciousness does seem to resonate among their new proponents.33

Lastly, Sneddon introduces his conclusion. There are two general points he insists on: first, that the formation of technical expertise helped foster and became a part of American geopolitical aims in the developing world, and second, that river basin development has begun to be seen as a homogenous model, which could be implemented any time, anywhere in the world. Technopolitical networks have helped sustain the effort of damming the planet’s river basin systems, yet in the process also have produced an enormous amount of “friction”—which happens when models or generalized experiences from a given context encounter resistance from local arrangements and conditions.34 In this regard, Sneddon’s work will remain an invaluable resource for understanding the how and why of globalized development projects such as financing and building of large dams.

Literature on large dams is generally not a major focus in ANT literature. Irrigation, on the other hand, is much debated, especially in relation to colonial projects. Sara Pritchard’s seminal work on French-occupied Algeria sheds light on how hydrologists and engineers reclaimed arable lands in North Africa, developing important techniques and insight from their engagement with the land and people. This method puts into question the typical metropole-to-colony transmission of knowledge and politics that is characteristic of works on colonialism or imperialism. Creole engineers often brought back new methods of irrigation to Paris, thereby becoming an important source of knowledge.35 John Broich likewise looks at how the process of translating Victorian-era irrigation designs from England to India ultimately backfired, creating local resistance that could neither see the relevance nor benefit

32 Sneddon, *The Concrete Revolution*, 133.
of “Western” hydrology. 36 Sneddon introduces the ways in which these encounters fuse and mesh to become political networks, whether or not such projects like dams or other irrigation schemes actually materialize. In doing so, he allows us to see not just how dams become “actors” but how technology and concerns with spreading technical knowledge undergird and highlight actors that would otherwise not be visible.

Bibliography


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Güç Asimetrisi Paradoksu: Daha Zayıf Devletler ABD Hegemonyasına Ne Zaman ve Nasıl Meydan Okur?

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Özet

Daha zayıf devletleri statükoya meydan okumaya teşvik eden sebepler ile sistemin hegemon gücü ABD’nin vereceği yanıt arasındaki ilişkiye dair çok az şey bilinmektedir. Askeri müdahalenin meydan okuyanları caydıracağı genel kanısının aksine, güçsüz ama meydan okumaya oldukça istekli bu devletlerin, hegemonun hasımlarına karşı giriştiği askeri müdahaleyi kendi eylemlerini başlatmak için bir fırsat olarak yorumlayabildikleri ileri sürülmektedir. Genelleştirilmiş tahmin denklemleri (GEE) ve ikili çapraz kesit zaman serisi (BTSCS) modelleri kullanılarak elde edilen ampirik sonuçlar, hegemonin önceki dış politika yükümlülükleri ile özellikle de savaşla mesgul olmasının zayıf devletleri uluslararası statükoya meydan okumak konusunda teşvik ettiği ortaya koymaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, hegemon önceki askeri taahhütler ile mesgul iken statükodan şikayetçi zayıf devletlerin hegemonla baş kaldırması daha olasıdır. Bunun sebebi, savaşın hegemonun dikkatini dağıtması, kapasitesini zorlaması ve zayıf devletlerin tehdit oluşturması için bir fırsat penceresi açmasıdır. Ayrıca, hegemon'dan farklı bir ittifak portföyü olan zayıf devletlerin askerileşmiş uluslararası uyuşmazlıklar (Militarized Interstate Disputes) başlatması daha muhtemeldir. Kuramsal anlamda ise bu makale, zayıf devletlerin irrasyonel görünebilen durumlarda neden asimetrik savaş başlatıkları sorusuna verilecek cevaplar için bazı mikrotatemeller ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Asimetri, değişim, çatışma, hegemon, güç
Uzlaşma Odaklı Liderlik: Nelson Mandela ve Güney Afrika

Havva Kök Arslan
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Özet

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uzlaşma, liderlik, Uyuşmazlık Üçgeni, Mandela, uyuşmazlık çözümü

Çatışma Sonrası Kuzey İrlanda’da Şiddet ve Güvenlik Kaygıları

İmren Borsuk
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Özet
Hayırlı Cuma Anlaşması’ndan onsekiz yıl sonra, Kuzey İrlanda hala geçmek bilmeyen bir güvenszizlik duygusu ile mücadele etmektedir. Bu makalede, Kuzey İrlanda’da çatışma sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan bu güvenszizlik ve korunmasızlık duygusunun altında yatan nedenler tartışmaktadır. İlk, aralıklı olarak sürelen şiddetin toplumsal bölünmeleri harekete geçirmesi ve “The Troubles” adı verilen Kuzey İrlanda meselesinin yaratığı psikolojik sıktınları hortlattıktadır. Bozguna karartan paramiliter grupların aktiviteleri ve yer yer yaşanan toplumsal problemler halkı yeni bir şiddet başlayacak korkusu ile doldurmaktadır -ki siyasal şiddet tarihi de bu etkilerin toplumlar arası ilişkilerdeki istikrari nasıl bozduğu ortaya koymuştur. İkinci neden, sendikacılık ve milliyetçilik arasındaki tarihsel ayrıma dayanan
Uluslararası Uyuşturucu Kontrol Sistemi Neden Başarısız Oldu?

Behsat Ekici
Müllkiye İktisadi ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi

Özet

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çatışma-sonrası, Kuzey İrlanda, şiddet, güvenlik, bozguncular
Yumuşak Güce Karşılık Sert Güç mü Yoksa İkisi arasında Denge mi?

Peter Volten
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**Özet**


**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, yumuşak güç, Avrupa genişlemesi
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