Enabling ‘ambitious activism’: Davutoğlu’s vision of a new foreign policy identity for Turkey

Zeynep Arkan & Müge Kınacıoğlu

To cite this article: Zeynep Arkan & Müge Kınacıoğlu (2016) Enabling ‘ambitious activism’: Davutoğlu’s vision of a new foreign policy identity for Turkey, Turkish Studies, 17:3, 381-405, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2016.1185943

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2016.1185943

Published online: 30 May 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 240

View related articles

View Crossmark data
Enabling ‘ambitious activism’: Davutoğlu’s vision of a new foreign policy identity for Turkey

Zeynep Arkan and Müge Kinacioğlu

Department of International Relations, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey

ABSTRACT
Building on the argument that a state’s history and location in the world are inherent parts of its foreign policy narrative which constitutes its identity, this article analyzes the spatial and temporal representations of Turkey in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s articulation of foreign policy. It employs a critical constructivist perspective and explores how these representations have shaped the identity of the country. It contends that Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision for Turkey is an attempt to reconstruct the international role and responsibilities of Turkey through a transformed identity based on a reinterpretation of its historical heritage and geographic location. Further, it argues that Davutoğlu’s foreign policy discourse depicts Turkey as the global representative, speaker and leader of a specific community of peoples, which in turn has enabled an ‘ambitious activism’ in Turkish foreign policy, which is distinct from the previous period’s proactive foreign policy.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 9 July 2015; Revised 14 March 2016; Accepted 1 April 2016

KEYWORDS Turkey; foreign policy; Davutoğlu; identity; constructivism; discourse

Introduction

Turkish foreign policy has been going through a period of profound transformation since the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, [AKP]) came to power. One of the chief architects of this transformation is Ahmet Davutoğlu. Since his appointment to the post of chief advisor to the Prime Minister in 2002, Davutoğlu’s vision of Turkey in the world and its potential as a key regional actor has occupied an important position in the debates and literature on Turkish foreign policy. Particularly after he became the Foreign Minister in 2009, discussions have revolved around whether Davutoğlu’s vision pointed to a rupture in the traditional role and identity modeled for Turkey as a ‘bridge’ between continents with an inherently Western (or European) character, whose foundations were laid largely by the Turkish Revolution and the newly created Turkish Republic.1 It has
been argued that what the AKP heralded, under the intellectual leadership of Davutoğlu, was (at minimum) a symbolic return to the past, through stylized references to the glory days of the Ottoman Empire, during which ‘the Turks’ had played a central role in their region and beyond.2

Based on these discussions on variations and continuities in foreign policy, as well as the effects of leadership, there is a growing academic literature on the medium and long-term changes taking place in Turkish foreign policy under AKP rule. Within this literature, there are those that provide a rationalist account of the changes in foreign policy in connection with the transformations in the international structure as well as political and economic interests of Turkey.3 A number of studies approach the topic of change and the impact of leadership through Foreign Policy Analysis models that seek to explain the recent activism of the Turkish government and whether it represents a ‘shift of axis’ for Turkey on the basis of the conceptual frameworks developed mainly by James N. Rosenau, Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann and Kalevi J. Holsti.4 Some scholars focus on the interplay between foreign and domestic policy, and the effects of these on domestic social structures5 or the impact of the European Union accession process in explaining policy change.6 Departing from these accounts in terms of their epistemological and ontological foundations are reflective accounts of the changes in Turkish foreign policy that examine the impact of norms and values, geopolitical narratives and policy discourses.7 Based on similar theoretical foundations, this study explores instead the ontological link between foreign policy and identity through an analysis of the discursive structures that collectively render specific courses of action feasible.

The goal of this article is to analyze how Turkey’s identity is portrayed in its foreign policy and, building on this, examine the ‘legitimate’ courses of action pursued in Turkey’s relations with the wider world. The argument here is predicated on how meanings given to different subjects/objects allow for spaces for certain foreign policy practices, but not others. It also builds on the central role played by key decision-makers who speak on behalf of the state and influence its foreign policy. The main focus of this article is the overall identity construct that brings together the two key dimensions of the identity narrative – a specific reading of Turkey’s history and location in the world – and explore the responsibilities, hierarchies and foreign policy actions that it points toward. To this aim, the article examines the foreign policy narrative of the key authoritative speaker and intellectual architect of Turkey’s current foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who since 2014 has served as Prime Minister. Although Davutoğlu did not shape Turkey’s foreign policy singlehandedly and arguably other AKP leaders such as Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu also contributed to the government’s vision of Turkey, it is assumed here that Davutoğlu – as an international relations professor as well as a politician – was the one who provided a conceptual template of
action for the AKP through his interpretation of international politics and the role Turkey should play in the world. In this sense, the article does not claim to provide an exhaustive analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy and identity (re)construction process under the AKP; rather it aims to shed light on the building blocks of this process through a study of Davutoğlu’s writings, speeches and interviews.

The original contribution of this study lies in its analysis of the core themes and concepts that serve as the foundations of Turkey’s international identity from a critical constructivist perspective that render Turkey’s current foreign policy choices possible and legitimate, and the hierarchical relationships constructed between Turkey and its ‘others’ in this process. The article focuses on the texts originating from Davutoğlu in the form of speeches, articles, policy papers, published interviews and other published works. The time period included in the analysis starts with him assuming the post of Foreign Minister in 2009 and covers the foreign policy vision of Davutoğlu until the present day.

The following analysis first explains the theoretical and methodological foundations and framework of the study. The article then applies this framework to Davutoğlu’s texts to identify the ways in which these discursive practices have shaped his vision of Turkey’s global role and responsibilities. In this context, the article further investigates how such discursive practices construct a hierarchy between various subjects in which Turkey, as the bearer of a distinctive identity with a unique history and geography, holds a singular place as the global representative, speaker and leader of a specific community of peoples.

**Critical constructivism and identity**

It should be noted at the outset that, as opposed to a conventional constructivist account, our reading of constructivism does not aim to explore the causal or semi-causal effects of identity constructs on Turkey’s foreign policy and predict what this implies for the future. Instead, this strand of constructivism focuses on the discursive structures upon which certain policy options are made possible and legitimized by the political elite.

The critical constructivist agenda, which serves as the framework of this study, emerged in the late 1990s. While agreeing with conventional constructivism on the matter of (intersubjective/social) ontology, critical constructivism distinguishes itself through its focus on the discursive construction of social reality. As such, the distinction between conventional and critical constructivism lies not in their assumptions regarding the existence of an objective world but the latter’s emphasis on language as an intermediary between the symbol and the symbolized, the word and the thing; material reality exists, yet its meaning is established through discourse. Accordingly, meaning is not
an individual or collective, but a social phenomenon: ‘it is not that everyone has the same “ideas” inside their heads, but rather that meaning inheres in the practices and categories through which people engage with each other and with the natural world.’

Critical constructivists argue that key concepts in international relations ‘are discursively constituted through representations (of countries, peoples, etc.) and linguistic elements (nouns, adjectives, metaphors and analogies).’ In order to explore how these concepts are constituted, critical constructivist scholars engage in detailed studies of texts in order to understand the systems of meaning and representation. In this pursuit, critical constructivists are more pluralistic than their conventional counterparts in terms of methodology, which includes the use of post-positivist methods such as discourse analysis.

With respect to identity, critical constructivism is more concerned with how people come to identify with a certain identity and its associated narratives, and focus on the role played by difference, practices of othering and the representation of these in discourse. Critical constructivists also explore how agents draw on these identities to justify certain (foreign) policies instead of identifying the effects of these identities as is the case with conventional constructivists. As such, critical constructivism ‘aims at exploding the myths associated with identity formation, whereas conventional constructivists wish to treat those identities as possible causes of action.’

Building on these foundations, it is argued in this study that there exists a close connection between the foreign policy and identity representations of Turkey. This connection is sealed by an overall need for security and a concern with ‘the general direction’ in which Turkey is heading as it is always necessary for policy makers to be able to present a convincing narrative of how the present trends (and thus one’s own present foreign policy orientation) point towards a future which is hospitable to an attractive vision of the self.

In this respect, Turkey’s identity and foreign policy are assumed to be ontologically linked for it is only through the discursive performances of foreign policy that identity comes into being, which in turn is ‘constructed as the legitimization for the policy proposed.’ Foreign policy issues, crises and problems that Turkey faces in the international arena are ‘political acts, not facts; they are social constructions forged by state officials in the course of producing and reproducing state identity.’

Within the framework of the political elite’s foreign policy discourse, two dimensions of the narrative on identity play a key role in shaping their vision of, and the responsibilities assigned to the state: the temporal and the spatial. It is contended that ‘space, time, and responsibility are the big concepts through which political communities – their boundaries, internal
constitution, and relationship with the outside world – are thought and argued.¹⁵ The temporal aspect of identity, that is, how the self’s identity is represented in relation to the past, the present and the future of the collectivity around the theme of progress, impacts on its foreign policy vision as the political subject is always constituted in time. In line with this, it can be argued that the way in which Turkey’s history and heritage were interpreted and portrayed in Davutoğlu’s discourse have not only shaped the way in which Turkey’s political elite viewed the country’s position and responsibilities toward its neighbors, but also influenced the broader foreign policy goals of Turkey with respect to the wider world.

The spatial aspect of identity focuses instead on the ties that bind the self to a specific space and geography, and involves delineating a space for existence through the construction of boundaries. In most cases, the geographic location of the actor is seen as providing a set of opportunities and/or constraints in foreign policy. The articulation of this dimension of identity is therefore imperative in determining the boundaries of the playing field for the actor, which, in the case of Turkey, defines the actors in and frontiers of its immediate neighborhood and beyond. Such discursive practices also locate Turkey in the world and establish the relationship between Turkey and its others in the form of neighbors, partners, allies, rivals and challengers.

The narratives on identity and foreign policy choices are articulated through the discursive practices of a number of authoritative speakers (or discursive agents) whose positions are defined in the political process that privileges some and marginalizes others. This process, which functions on the basis of existing discursive structures, determines whose voice deserves to be heard and valued on a certain issue. While it is true that a large number of discursive agents contribute to the dominant as well as marginalized debates and discourse, a few decision-makers usually have a louder and stronger voice by virtue of their institutional power.¹⁶ Among these, an assertive and authoritative former Foreign Minister and current Prime Minister such as Ahmet Davutoğlu with an academic background in international relations and a distinct vision of Turkey’s role in the global arena undoubtedly holds a special place. Often labeled as the ‘intellectual architect’ or the ideologue of the AKP’s foreign policy, Davutoğlu is widely accepted in both policy and academic circles as the person who shifted the traditional patterns and practices of Turkish foreign policy.¹⁷

To explore the vision and foreign policy goals that Davutoğlu envisaged for Turkey, the next section assesses the texts that originate from him through a discourse analysis perspective with a particular focus on the temporal and spatial dimensions of identity representations. The analysis also explores the core themes and concepts developed by Davutoğlu and the power relations that these imply. In addition, the following paragraphs evaluate how Davutoğlu, in his narrative on Turkey’s history and geographic location
in the world, has defined the responsibilities that Turkey ‘inherited’ from its past and, along these lines, constituted the country’s current foreign policy direction.

**Davutoğlu’s vision of global politics and Turkey**

During the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by its strategic role and geopolitical position as the southern bastion of NATO and its traditional Western orientation. This static posture gradually evolved into a multifaceted and proactive foreign policy that matured under the Özal administration since the mid-1980s. This went hand in hand with a new reading of Turkey’s geopolitical location, cultural affinities and responsibilities in the aftermath of the Cold War, which necessitated a redefinition of Turkey’s position and role in the international structure. Parallel to this, the initial adaptation in Turkey’s foreign policy discourse came in the form of a slight shift toward the theme of Turkey as a hybrid state between Europe and Asia/the Middle East, or Christianity and Islam. This narrative on Turkey’s position identified the two sides as self-contained and mutually exclusive entities and Turkey in the middle as a ‘window’ which simultaneously belonged to and contained the geographical, cultural and ultimately civilizational qualities of both. As such, it was argued that Turkey had a unique contribution to make in the interaction between the East and the West, and was assigned the responsibility of promoting a dialogue between them. As one of the most vocal proponents of this Janus-faced identity, the then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem noted,

> Turkey is a country that has much to gain from her historical role and cultural particularities [...] Given that we are a people who participated in the formation of several great civilizations and that we have a huge historical geography, which endured centuries, I believe this advantage should be put in practice in our present endeavours [...] I have always argued that Turkey, given her historical and civilizational realities, should have an encompassing approach towards her identity. It seems totally wrong to define our identity solely on the basis of one particular culture, as “Western”, or “Islamic” or whatever. And, not many nations have the advantage of having a “multi-civilizational” characteristic. This, again, is what I try to put in use in our foreign policy formulation.

Within the framework of this ‘multi-civilizational’ identity, Turkey was represented as a key actor in its neighborhood, with which it had strong historical ties, as well as in the wider world on the basis of not only its ‘bridge-like’ geographic location, but also its acquired European characteristics in the form of the norms and values that the Republic was based upon. This approach, which dominated the foreign policy discourse of the coalition government in power between 1999 and 2002 (and Cem’s term as Foreign Minister between 1997 and 2002) – the AKP’s immediate predecessor – aimed to
transform Turkey’s ‘peripheral position in Europe to a pivotal actor in Eurasia’ and was, in many ways, a response to the vacuum Turkey found itself in at the end of the Cold War.21

While echoing similar themes along the lines of Turkey’s ‘historical geography’ and ‘historical realities/role,’ and the repercussions of these in the formulation of foreign policy, the vision that Ahmet Davutoğlu has put forward represented a considerable break from the former role ascribed to Turkey, particularly in terms of the hierarchical manner in which its relations with others are viewed by the AKP leaders in Turkey’s neighborhood and beyond. In a number of his foreign policy statements, Davutoğlu asserted that Turkey needed to assume a new identity and position in the world to achieve its full potential for the first time as a regional and global actor on the basis of its historical experience and responsibilities. Within this framework, he remarked that Turkey has been provided with a grand opportunity to increase its ‘agency,’ owing to the structural changes taking place in the international system. As an international relations scholar, the central idea that he has often repeated in this context concerned his diagnosis and conclusions about the general direction of world politics in the last two decades and the implications of these on Turkey’s international role. Davutoğlu has argued that the changes and transformations taking place in the world and the reflections of these on international affairs provided greater room for maneuver for Turkey in its foreign policy.

In Davutoğlu’s terms, the world has witnessed ‘three major earthquakes all of which had enormous regional and global ramifications.’22 The first one was the end of the Cold War in 1991, which he termed a ‘geopolitical earthquake’ that gave way to the emergence of new states within the parameters of geo-identity and geo-economics. Davutoğlu associated this transformation with the rise of freedom and democracy. The ‘security earthquake’ was the 9/11 attacks in 2001 whereby the conceptual framework shifted from freedom and democracy to security, and resulted in a quasi-global martial law.23 In his opinion, the third and the last ‘earthquake’ that is still ongoing is a politi-cal-economic one, marked mainly by the European financial crisis and the Arab uprisings. According to him, these three ‘earthquakes’ have amalgamated, and as such are not independent and/or simply consecutive events.24

This particular analysis of world politics has continued to underline Davutoğlu’s assessment of Turkey’s role and position in the world after he became Prime Minister in August 2014. In this framework, Davutoğlu has consistently argued that Turkey came out strong in the face of the first two ‘earthquakes’ and is a key actor that is deeply involved in the current ‘political-economic earthquake.’ According to him, these three ‘earthquakes’ together illustrated that, Turkey, like other international actors, is in the midst of a ‘new global order’ in the making. This ongoing process, he has maintained, provided Turkey with an opportunity for greater actorness (or active agency) and a
greater room for maneuver in its neighboring regions and the world to contribute to the establishment of a ‘new global order.’ In Davutoğlu’s terms, this order should be:

- legitimate, just, transparent and democratic;
- representative and fully open to participation;
- in full regard to resolve dormant or active disputes that have an impact on world stability;
- result-oriented in terms of eliminating disparities;
- based on the precept of security and reform for all.26

In the materialization of the new order, he believes that Turkey is capable of playing a major role by combining the necessary elements of soft and hard power and using its ‘comparative advantages’ in the form of its ‘geostrategic location, booming economy, ability to understand different social and cultural dynamics in a vast geography, and commitment to advance democracy domestically and internationally.’ In his attempt to shift the existing outlook of Turkish foreign policy, the Prime Minister has explicitly outlined his unique and new vision for Turkey as an international actor and defined the core principles and priorities of the country’s new foreign policy outlook along these lines.

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey’s success as a key player in its region and the world would ultimately be founded upon its domestic achievements in the spheres of freedom, democracy and economy. By directly linking the domestic processes of democratization and foreign policy performance of Turkey, Davutoğlu once argued that ‘Turkey’s most important soft power is its democracy.’ Building on a ‘healthy balance’ achieved in the domestic sphere between security and democracy, and sustainable economic growth, he stated that the time had come for Turkey to assume a proactive foreign policy and project this success to its external realm. Speaking as Prime Minister in December 2014, Davutoğlu maintained that:

Turkey is too big a country to be trapped in its geography. Turkey is a mighty country which is powerful enough to project its peace and stability to its neighboring regions. Turkey is a global actor that has the capacity, conscience and legitimacy to bring together the most developed and the least developed countries.29

Most recently, Davutoğlu toned down his emphasis on Turkey’s democratic performance and instead shifted his focus to Turkey’s economic successes. This was arguably in response to the latest developments in Turkey which highlighted the deteriorating situation with respect to core democratic norms and principles including freedom of expression, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights. In many of his current foreign policy
Davutoğlu noted that ‘economic power is shifting from transatlantic to other regions.’ Within the framework of this shift in economic power, he emphasized the part to be played by alternative formations such as regional integration initiatives), new power centers such as the D8, and ‘the Muslim world’ in which Turkey would assume a leadership role. The shift of power from the transatlantic region to these various other formations, he has argued, would lay the foundations of more egalitarian, just and sustainable international economic order. As an important actor in this process, Turkey is then assigned the role of the voice of the under-privileged, under-represented and the least developed, and ultimately a moral actor that draws attention to and helps fight the unjust and unequal qualities of the global order. In fact, in issues of global justice and equality, Davutoğlu has intriguingly appointed himself as what he termed ‘the interior minister of humanity,’ who, on certain issues that affected the ‘common destiny of humanity’, had ‘to speak in the name of all humanity because there is no ontological existence that cannot be political existence.’ In this respect, he drew attention to the events taking place not only in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood, such as the conflict between Israel and Palestine and the situation in Syria, but also to Turkey’s involvement in Africa and particularly Somalia, and stated that these events serve as an ‘ethical test’ for those concerned in terms of acting responsibly.

It can be argued that in the making of the ‘new legitimate and just global order,’ the ambitious set of responsibilities attributed to Turkey by the Prime Minister, particularly those concerning Turkey’s leadership role within the community of ‘under-privileged’ and ‘under-represented,’ symbolize Davutoğlu’s desire to transform Turkey into a legitimate alternative power center as the leader and ultimate representative of a distinct ‘civilization.’ In this respect, Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision differs considerably from the previous government’s who had a more encompassing foreign policy vision in line with the hybrid ‘civilizational realities’ and identity of Turkey. In contrast, this new identity and set of responsibilities envisaged for Turkey rested on a hierarchical view of Turkey’s allies – those Turkey should represent and speak on behalf of in the international arena – based on its unique historical experience. Hence, Davutoğlu’s articulation of the exclusive (Islamic) civilization to which Turkey belongs in fact stands in stark contrast to Cem’s vision of Turkey as having a ‘multi-civilizational’ identity that is derived from its ‘historical geography.’ While Davutoğlu has a more restricted take on this legacy, for Cem, the historical heritage of Turkey’s identity was not limited to the Ottoman past, but covered ‘the expression of all cultures, which have thrived in our land: as the possessor of a great cultural heritage that can be traced to Ion, Byzantium, Central Asia, the Seljuks and the Ottomans.’

The reflections of Davutoğlu’s ambitious foreign policy vision on the overall policy direction of Turkey can explicitly be seen in the principles of
Turkish foreign policy that Davutoğlu developed early on and has kept referencing in his latter speeches and works. These five principles are identified in his 2008 article as:

1. Establishing an area of influence in its environs through exporting security and democracy (Turkey as an order-instituting actor).
2. Zero problem policy toward neighbors.
3. Developing relations with the neighboring regions and beyond.
5. Rhythmic Diplomacy.33

Davutoğlu further elaborated and modified these core principles over the years to include the role of a ‘wise country,’ a value-based foreign policy, an autonomous foreign policy, a vision-oriented foreign policy and a principled foreign policy. What can be inferred from the references to his new vision and principles of Turkish foreign policy is that, given the unique identity that Turkey is assumed to have in relation to its neighboring regions, and the geopolitical, historical and cultural connotations and foundations of this identity, it is expected to increase its international agency in the regional sphere and on a global level to play a more active and influential role. Therefore, it is seen as crucial for Turkey to embark on the task of materializing this vision for it to utilize the opportunity provided by the third and the last ‘political-economic earthquake.’

Redefining Turkey’s foreign policy identity: history and geography revisited

In many of his writings as well as speeches, Davutoğlu has elaborated on Turkey’s unchanging and previously under-utilized strengths and sources of foreign policy (what he labeled as fixed factors in his book entitled Strategic Depth), which he identified as ‘its historical depth, geographical positioning and rich legacy in international affairs.’34 With regard to the temporal and spatial dimensions of identity and their linkages to foreign policy, it can be observed that Davutoğlu’s foreign policy discourse in fact reflected a unique reading of Turkey’s position in the world based on the pillars of geography and history, and the responsibilities that these entailed.

Davutoğlu has argued that Turkey had a unique historical depth and legacy owing to its Ottoman past which displayed certain tendencies that still impact on its identity, societal composition and foreign policy. According to him, as a former center of attraction, Turkey needed to redefine its perception of history and identity, and acknowledge the continuities that exist throughout the history of the Turks ‘as a nation.’
One strength of our foreign policy [...] is the ongoing process of reconnecting with the people in our region with whom we shared a common history and are poised to have a common destiny [...] This objective also means that we will seek to reconcile our differences with neighboring countries by engaging in a soul-searching effort and moving beyond the disputes that have divided us. Through increasing ties with neighbors, Turkey will be better positioned to play its role as a responsible country at the global level.  

This historical representation of the Turkish nation also had a cultural aspect. In a number of his speeches in the international fora, the then Foreign Minister argued that Turks are part of a cultural/civilizational ‘basin’ and community whose values and heritage they share. Although he has never explicitly articulated the lineage and heirs of this historical and cultural heritage, what can be inferred from his statements is that he is in fact referring to an Islamic heritage shared by the Muslim community (or ummah) and the Turkish nation as a leading group within this ummah. There are various examples of Davutoğlu’s conception of this cultural and civilizational heritage. Among these, a clear example is his frequent and somewhat sectarian use of the expression ‘Brothers and Sisters’ when he is addressing a predominantly (Sunni) Muslim audience. In such instances, he also frequently gives references from the Qur’an and Islamic thinkers in order to highlight the ties that bind a civilization and culture together.

In addition, Davutoğlu has talked about the civilization and culture of which Turks are part as one based on understanding and peace, in refutation of attempts to associate Islam with terrorism and extremism in the period that followed the 9/11 attacks. In this respect, he has assigned the Turkish nation a leading role as a current representative of this ‘ancient’ (kadim) civilization and as the power that once ruled over this ummah, reiterating a hierarchical view of the community in which Turkey belonged. He has noted that by reminding itself of its strong and rooted traditions and through a proactive foreign policy, the Turkish Republic can affect ‘the flow of history’ and not just follow it.

There are certain phases in history during which particular nations, in the name of humanity’s ancient values, take action to address humanity. In such phases, those nations rise as they praise these values. They lead new civilizations together and hand-in-hand with other nations. We are currently going through such phase.

In a similar vein, the emphasis on such a moral role envisaged for Turkey in world politics was highlighted in his latest address to the Turkish ambassadors’ annual conference, whereby he, as Prime Minister, stated that as the representatives of a state with a strong historical tradition and of a nation which has embraced this historical tradition, they needed to give a lesson of humaneness to the rest of the world.
As a text never constructs one thing but rather ‘in implicit and explicit parallels’ construct other subjects, which are depicted with certain qualities, Davutoğlu’s temporal construction of Turkey’s international role reveals a number of subjects that are distinguished from, yet related to each another. A clear example of this is the narrative on Turkey’s co-sponsoring the Alliance of Civilizations formed together with Spain under the United Nations (UN), whose chief aim was to improve understanding among peoples across cultures and religions. Davutoğlu’s continued emphasis on Turkey’s leadership role in the initiative and the associated narrative explicitly portrayed Turkey as the spearhead and principal representative of the Muslim world. As part of the Muslim world/civilization, the Turkish identity/position in relation to the rest of the Muslim world is thus represented in asymmetrical terms, according to which Turkey is portrayed as the natural leader of that civilization (owing to its historical and geographical depth).

Davutoğlu noted that while Turks had the experience of merging and mingling with other nations over which they once ruled, for the first time in history, they are experiencing this merging and mingling without the authority over or ownership of these other states/nations. He explained that, from Somalia to Baghdad and Kirkuk, from Srebrenica to Pakistan, Turkey had a ring of friends, a group of ‘fellow partners in history’ (tarihdaş) with whom it shared a common culture and civilization. These fellow partners in history, particularly in the Balkans, felt closer to and relied on Turkey ‘because they knew that if the state in Anatolia is mighty, they too would feel safe where they were.’ In a similar vein, Davutoğlu, in his talk at a meeting organized by the Religious Affairs Administration, underlined that states in what he often refers to as Turkey’s ‘heart and soul geography’ (gönül coğrafyası) had high expectations from Turkey. He noted that ‘Turkey is the center in geographical and cultural terms and it is the state that all take as reference.’ Thus, he argued, Turkey needed to be mighty and extend its hand of compassion to those living in this geography where Turkey’s heart and soul lie. Indeed, this depiction of Turkey’s ‘heart and soul geography’ has been a recurrent theme in Davutoğlu’s most recent talks. Speaking after the June 2015 general elections, Davutoğlu identified this particular geography in very broad terms as ‘Skopje, Sarajevo, the Balkans, Central Asia, Samarkand, Africa, Somalia, Tunisia, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, Iraq’ and claimed that all living there had had sent messages to Davutoğlu to the effect that the AKP had looked after them for 12 years and that the AKP’s presence was their biggest guarantee. He also noted that as the Turkish government, they would always stand by them. Similarly, following his attendance at the world leaders’ rally in Paris, in response to the recent Charlie Hebdo shootings, Prime Minister Davutoğlu stated that he was speaking on behalf of not only Turkey, but also the Islamic world when he declared that Islam cannot be identified with terrorism. Moreover, he maintained that
the French Muslim Council viewed Turkey’s presence at the occasion as a source of strength to them, thereby implicitly reiterating Turkey’s inherent right to lead and inspire the Muslims living in other countries.

Accordingly, Davutoğlu’s foreign policy discourse constructed a hierarchical relational distinction between Turkey and the members of the Islamic civilization, whereby the latter are represented as subordinate subjects (in a parallel manner that existed in the Ottoman state), in need of Turkey acting as a wise and responsible state. In this respect, Davutoğlu’s policy discourse is structured mainly on a binary opposition in that it establishes a relation of power whereby one component in this duality is privileged over the other. This particular regime of truth which runs through his discourse and establishes Turkey as the leader of a civilization, disqualifies other subjects from being autonomous by leaving out other modes of identity and action. A clear example of this notion of hierarchical superiority on the part of Turkey would be Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision toward the Balkans. The active diplomacy pursued and increased economic relations established with the Balkan countries, it is argued, is structured on the basis of an all-encompassing vision based on the principles of inclusiveness and regional custodianship (bölgesel sahiplenme) that is founded upon the argument that in the Balkans, ‘our history, our destiny and our future is intertwined.’ Such a vision of and identity attributed to the Balkans requires Turkey to actively engage with all the actors in the region, particularly those that were closely connected to Turkey ‘with history and by heart’ to increase its diplomatic leverage and role in the region, and create a zone of peace and stability in its broader neighborhood. This implies that, Turkey – as the experienced custodian of the Balkan peoples – has a special responsibility toward the region to ensure peace and order, just like in the old days. The fact that these efforts had a strong ‘civilizational’ (i.e. Islamic) tone and implied a strengthening of the religious identity particularly among the Bosnians and Albanians illustrated that the theme of all-inclusiveness in Turkey’s Balkan policy is in fact an illusion and that, once again, Turkey positioned itself in a hierarchically superior position with respect to not only the states in the region but also the other actors involved, by virtue of its ‘historical depth.’

In terms of its geographical depth and the spatial dimension of Turkey’s identity, Davutoğlu argued that Turkey is at once a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country. This quality of Turkey, according to him, served as a source of strength and provided Turkey with a wide area of influence. Building on this, Davutoğlu redefined Turkey’s international position as such: ‘Turkey should make its role as a peripheral country a part of its past, and appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighboring regions.’ To this end, he argued, Turkey needs to follow a foreign policy that fuses its ancient cultural and civilizational
values and those of the modern world, and to protect humanitarian values and human dignity in a geography that spans from the Balkans to the Caucasus and the Middle East. This organic neighborhood, which coincidentally overlaps with the Ottoman geography, is identified as the main playing field for Turkey, which is in a unique position to play an effective role owing to its historical accumulation and heritage, and its dynamic human dimension despite the erection of what Davutoğlu identified as ‘artificial borders’ following World War II. In a more recent example, he articulated that Turkey was not just one of those newly formed states that emerged in the post-World War II context, but has displayed a strong historical continuity from the Seljuk Empire onwards. This is why, Davutoğlu asserted, during times of crises people turn to Turkey, as recently exemplified in the case of Syria.

An important dimension of Turkey’s geopolitical position and foreign policy identity that Davutoğlu has referred to in his statements concerns the metaphorical conception of Turkey as a ‘bridge country’ that connects the East and the West, or Europe and Asia. In a number of contradictory statements about the ‘bridge identity’ of Turkey, Davutoğlu at times has denounced and rejected this passive role of a ‘bridge’ assigned to Turkey by previous governments:

[...] for many decades that was my main critique towards Turkish policy when I wrote my book. Turkey was neutral, was a bridge. I don’t like the term bridge. A bridge is a passive entity between two sides. There are two sides and you are [sic] bridge. No, we are part of both of the sides. We are part of all the events.

At the same time, however, he has also embraced the heritage of being a ‘bridge country’ in determining Turkey’s role in foreign policy throughout history as a conduit that conveyed ideas and progress from one side to the other. In this respect, it can be inferred that though this ‘bridge identity’ is seen as a valuable heritage in terms of Turkish foreign policy, it is removed from the center stage by the Prime Minister. While Davutoğlu has not totally dropped references to Turkey’s ‘bridge identity,’ he nevertheless has replaced it with a new understanding according to which Turkey is no longer limited to the passive role it displayed during the Cold War years. In fact, the Prime Minister has consistently maintained that it is time for Turkey to transform itself into a key regional and global actor with a special role in the making of a new and just global order.

These historical and geographical qualities (or depths) together form the two pillars of Davutoğlu’s conception of strategic depth, and grant Turkey the status of a ‘central country,’ capable of influencing ‘the flow of history’ and making a difference in the world. In this regard, he has argued that if Turkey succeeds in combining its historical and geographical depth through a rational strategic planning perspective, it can use this as a potential
strength to positively influence its neighboring regions and lay the foundations of regional and global peace.59

This conception of Turkey as a ‘central country’ with ‘multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified category’ is a key representation of Turkey’s identity that dominated many of the texts analyzed.60 Recently, during his visit to Azerbaijan in December 2015, Davutoğlu affirmed that having absorbed both European and Asian identities, Turkey had demonstrated its power by transforming its bridge role (between Europe and Asia) to the role of ‘central state.’61 In fact, as a major country in the Afro-Eurasian landmass, Turkey is assumed to have a special position, as a central state, to project stability and peace in the region building on its optimal geographic location, and unique cultural and historical heritage. By pursuing a proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy in its environs to project and export its domestic strengths, Davutoğlu has repeatedly noted that Turkey should aim to create a zone of mutual peaceful coexistence based on economic interdependency. Despite the apparent shortcomings of the country in terms of its domestic democratic and security performance and disappointments in foreign policy, he continued to assert that Turkey enjoys the image of a ‘responsible state,’ ‘which provides order and security to the region, one that prioritizes democracy and liberties, while dealing competently with security problems at home.’62

According to Davutoğlu, it is this image of Turkey, as well as its unique geographical and historical qualities, that grant it the responsibility to play a more active and effective role in international mediation. In the words of the then Foreign Minister, ‘effective mediation requires a good analysis of the situation, the trust of the parties in the mediator, a clear and positive vision for the future, and a firm dedication to peace and stability’ – qualities that Davutoğlu has claimed Turkey enjoyed in its region ‘due its shared history and a common future.’63 He maintained that Turkey is fit to undertake mediation, because of its ‘cultural–civilizational background’ together with its unique access to both the global North and the global South.64 As a concerned insider rather than a neutral outsider, Turkey therefore is encouraged to take on its new role as a mediator and build on its ability to form consensus guided by the values that form the core of its identity.65 Thus far, such mediation attempts, many of which failed to produce tangible long-term results, comprised of efforts to bring internal reconciliation in Iraq, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan; initiatives of trilateral cooperation processes in the Balkans with the participation of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Asia between Afghanistan and Pakistan; endeavors to contribute in resolving the Iranian nuclear program issue in a peaceful way; as well as projects for resolution of the conflict in Somalia. Turkey also launched the ‘Mediation for Peace’ initiative in the UN together with Finland, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in June 2010. Further, together with Finland,
Turkey set up ‘Friends of Mediation Group’ in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2014.66

In terms of the responsibilities associated with the role of a mediator, Davutoğlu, in his article on Turkey’s mediation efforts, explained how Turkey’s mediation succeeded in persuading Sunni resistance groups to participate in the 2005 Iraqi elections:

I described the choice before them: “Either you will reestablish Baghdad as a center of civilization or you will be part of the destruction of Baghdad, as the Mongols were” […] One of the leaders, the oldest one […] stood up and said, “Look, my sons […] we have to listen to this brother, because he speaks like a Baghdadi.” He doesn’t speak like someone from the outside.67

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey’s success – or rather his personal success in this particular case – stemmed from being able to sound like one of the locals and have others relate to him. By implication, convincing the Sunni groups in Iraq to participate in the elections was thus made possible due to Turkey’s common civilizational background with the groups concerned. His account of the situation and quote appears to point to a sense of ‘wisdom of the eldest in the family’ – a rather superior role performed by the assumed leader of an ancient civilization.

In this vein, the role of a mediator assigned to Turkey overlaps with Davutoğlu’s depiction of Turkey as a ‘wise country’ that has a special responsibility ‘to shape the course of developments’ in its region ‘and make a valuable contribution to the resolution of regional and international issues.’68 This also goes hand in hand with his vision of Turkey as a ‘dialogue facilitator’ between the developed and the underdeveloped, the privileged and the under-privileged, or the represented and the under-represented. In the context of the belief that ‘(i)t is only by standing by the most needy among us that we will be able to achieve the high ideal of a better, more just and prosperous world,’ Davutoğlu argued, Turkey has carved itself a special role in the world and had the potential to transform relations between developed and developing countries through active diplomacy, opening up channels of communication and facilitating dialogue between the parties.69

In addition to these various roles cut out for Turkey as a key actor in international affairs, Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision also contains moral, religious and humanitarian elements. In fact, his frequent references to core values, human dignity, humanitarian policies and principles can be linked to his conception of a ‘value-based foreign policy,’ or what can be termed as the moral power of Turkey. As a consequence, he has asserted that as a promoter of universal values and norms such as democracy, the rule of law, justice and equality, as well as humanitarian and moral values, Turkey’s new foreign policy vision aims not only to affect ‘the flow of history,’ but also come out on ‘the right side of history’ from a moral standpoint.70
In light of these various depictions of the country as a responsible power, a wise country, a facilitator of dialogue, an international mediator and a central state, Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s explicitly argues that his vision of Turkey as an actor is quite different from those of the past. According to him, in contrast to Turkey’s former status as a middle power whose role was defined by other powers and the international structure, and a peripheral country (he associates this earlier period with a psychological sense of inferiority and a lack of self-confidence on Turkey’s part), Turkey is now a major actor in its region, which has the capacity to make a difference in the world in line with its vision of how the new global order should be structured and how Turkey should position itself in it. Davutoğlu’s perspective on Turkish identity highlights the need to recognize how powerful and influential Turks had once been as an imperial power and learn from the experiences of this empire in its dealings with the world as a morally and hierarchically superior force for good. The identity that is constructed for Turkey is, therefore, novel and builds on the history of Turkey in the form of the Ottoman Empire and its experiences as a former global power and a center of attraction. It is in this framework that Davutoğlu lays the foundations of a new, confident and ambitious vision of Turkey and explains how these new roles shape the future dimension of Turkish foreign policy.

While the analysis of the success or failures of specific foreign policy initiatives is beyond the scope of this study, it can be argued that the accomplishment of Turkey’s foreign policy roles and goals as envisaged by the Prime Minister has thus far proved to be difficult. Turkey’s foreign policy toward Syria is a good case in point. From the onset of the Syrian conflict, Turkey adopted a very strong stance against the Assad regime, and, in stark contrast to both the traditional Republican policy of non-involvement in the internal affairs of another country and Davutoğlu’s principle policy of ‘zero problems with neighbors,’ the Turkish government actively engaged in attempts to change the regime in Syria by supporting opposition groups and the founding of a Free Syrian Army. In addition to this open political support, there have been claims that the Turkish government has provided economic assistance as well as military aid and training to the Syrian opposition forces, which eventually fell apart. What further complicated the Syrian quagmire for Turkey are the deterioration of relations with Russia after the downing of a Russian warplane, the implicit Syrian support to the PKK (the Kurdish separatist terrorist organization in Turkey, Kurdistan Workers’ Party), the Syrian regime’s unspoken cooperation with PKK’s Syrian partner – the PYD (Democratic Union Party), and Russian military assistance to the Assad regime. Currently, incapable of even flying reconnaissance flights along its 822 km Syrian border, Turkey is far from being an order-instituting central country and a proactive actor in its region. While the overthrow of the Assad regime has remained the principal aim of the government, over time Turkey’s foreign policy
evolved into a ‘reactive’ (as opposed to a proactive) one in the face of its own policy failures and in the context of the new political environment created beyond its influence and by other actors. Thus, the new civilizational identity articulated largely in relation to Turkey’s geographic location and historical legacy has not only failed to achieve the ambitious foreign policy goals of the AKP government, but also severely undermined Turkey’s credibility as an actor capable of contributing to and/or projecting order and security in its region.

**Conclusion**

This article aimed to demonstrate that Davutoğlu’s foreign policy discourse represents an attempt to challenge and alter the traditional foundations of Turkey’s position and role in the world as well as its foreign policy outlook. In this respect, it can be concluded that the Prime Minister’s vision is not just an endeavor to overturn the traditional tendencies in Turkish foreign policy, but is in many ways a project of identity transformation. What is sometimes portrayed as a ‘paradigm shift’ in Turkish foreign policy can therefore be best characterized as a period of ‘ambitious activism,’ distinct from the multifaceted foreign policy pursued by the previous governments. Such activism was enabled through the construction of an identity articulated on the basis of a reinterpretation of Turkey’s historical heritage and geographic location. In this respect, while some argued that Davutoğlu’s vision of a new and just global order and emphasis on ‘civilization’ as a new political unit represented a dissident or an anti-hegemonic attempt to dequalify the West as the epitome of civilization and the center of world politics, his foreign policy discourse in fact contains elements of yet another hegemonic premise to the extend that it creates power hierarchies within the particular civilization Davutoğlu embraces.

Along the lines of this new vision, Davutoğlu embarked on a proactive foreign policy on multiple fronts including the Middle East, Europe, Central Asia and the Balkans, to transform Turkey into a key regional and global power, whose successes remain very much questionable. In this respect, it is noteworthy that despite the setbacks along the way, such as major difficulties with Iraq; confrontation with Syria; deterioration of relations with major powers in the region such as Russia, Iran and Israel; and the breakdown of diplomatic relations with five states in the region (Israel, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria) that have demonstrated the limits of this new and ambitious foreign policy vision, Davutoğlu has been quite consistent in his articulation of Turkey’s identity and the responsibilities that this entail in line with Turkey’s ascribed role as a central and wise country.
On the other hand, it has to be noted that the construction of a specific identity and a new vision for foreign policy outlook, particularly one based on closer relations with neighbors and other powers, and including such responsibilities as an international mediator or facilitator, ultimately relies on the acknowledgement of Turkey as a credible and influential actor by the other actors concerned. While the bold and ambitious identity that Davutoğlu helped construct for Turkey is seen as a positive development and a source of pride for his country in the domestic front (at least on the part of a certain percentage of the Turkish population as there exists a considerable opposition to the foreign policy choices of the AKP government), its success in foreign policy depends on not only tangible outputs but also others’ perceptions of Turkey, its identity and aims in their interactions. This is particularly the case when one takes into consideration the rigid hierarchies created and reproduced in the foreign policy discourse of the Prime Minister (and for that matter other representatives of the governing party, particularly the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) between Turkey and other members of the so-called Islamic civilization. At the end of the day, as appealing and ambitious this new vision is, if Turkey’s others do not agree with the aims and means of Turkey’s new foreign policy (and also identify with its neo-Ottoman/imperialistic tone at times), then it is doomed to fail. It is ultimately the external perception and acceptance of Turkey among not only the other members of this ‘civilization,’ but also other major actors in the global system, that would determine the success of Turkey’s new foreign policy vision and identity. This positive external perception and acceptance has proven difficult until now, particularly in light of the recent developments in Syria, Iraq and the wider region. Consequently, it can be concluded that this new and ambitious identity and foreign policy outlook proved to be a step too far for the AKP government and Davutoğlu as their ultimate architect, and that the recourses and references to the imperial history and geography of Turkey did not have the desired impact on Turkey’s current foreign policy.

**Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

**Notes**

1. The newly established Turkish Republic embarked upon a transformation in Turkey’s identity involving almost all aspects of social and cultural life and a strict separation from the country’s Ottoman past. In this period, the Ottoman other became a, if not the, other of the new state, and was usually identified with “ignorance, corruption, backwardness and dogmas” as the Turkish elite resorted instead to a mythical past in search for a new sense of belonging and pride in its achievements. Aydin, “Turkish Foreign Policy,”
To this aim, the political elite undertook a project of “mental change” and “(i)n the pursuit for the unique Turkish nationalism (Milliyetçilik), different from the cultures and civilisation in its proximity, Turkey severed ties with basic features of the Arab, Persian and Islamic worlds, emphasising instead the modern and Western alternatives, as well as the pre-Islamic past.” Nachmani, *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium*, 86–87.

2. See, for example Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea.”

3. See, for example Tezcur and Grigorescu, “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”; Öniş, “Multiple Faces”; Balcı and Mış, “Turkey’s Role.”


5. See, for example Kirdiş, “The Role of Foreign Policy”; Ciftci, “Social Identity.”

6. Öniş and Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism”; Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, “Is There a Europeanization?”


24. Timeturk, “VII. Büyükelçiler Konferansı.”


26. Davutoğlu, “Interview Published in AUC Cairo Review.”

27. Ibid.


29. Davutoğlu, “Yeni Türkiye Yolunda.”

30. Davutoğlu, “Speech Delivered in the University of London School of Economics and Political Science.”

31. Ibid.


33. Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision.”

34. Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 1.

35. Ibid., 2.
36. Davutoğlu, “Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma.”
37. Davutoğlu, “Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı.”
38. Ibid.
39. Davutoğlu, “V. Büyükelçiler Konferansında Yaptığı Konuşma.”
40. See note 37 above.
41. See note 24 above.
43. Davutoğlu, “Address by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu.”
44. See note 36 above.
45. Ibid.
46. Davutoğlu, “Yurt dışındaki tarihi.”
47. Ibid.
49. See note 29 above.
51. Davutoğlu, “Gelinen nokta.”
52. Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision,” 79.
54. Ibid.
55. See note 24 above.
56. See note 30 above.
57. See note 53 above.
58. See, for example Davutoğlu, “Zero Problems in the New Era.”
59. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, 11; Davutoğlu, see “Strategic Thinking.”
60. Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision,” 77.
63. Davutoğlu, “Speech Delivered at the Informal High Level UN General Assembly Meeting.”
64. Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Mediation,” 90.
65. See note 63 above.
66. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Resolution of Conflicts and Mediation”; Aras, Turkey’s Mediation; and Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Mediation.”
68. Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 3.
69. Davutoğlu, “Speech Delivered at the Least Developed Countries (LCD) High-Level Event.”
70. Davutoğlu, “Stratejik Düşünce Vakfı’nın.”
71. Ayhan, Arap Bahartı, 441.
72. BBC News, “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Warplane.”
73. Özkök, “Halep Yolu Düşlerken.”

Note on contributors

Zeynep Arkan is a Lecturer in International Relations at Hacettepe University. She holds a B.Sc. in Political Science and Public Administration from Middle East Technical University. She has an MA in European Studies from the University of Exeter and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Kent at Canterbury. Dr Arkan has published in journals such as Federal Governance and Tijdschrift
voor economische en sociale geografie, and is the co-editor of *The EU and Member State Building: European Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans* (Routledge).

*Müge Kinacioğlu* is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Hacettepe University. She received her B.Sc. from Middle East Technical University, Ankara. She completed two MA programs at Marquette University, USA as a Fulbright scholar. She received her Ph.D. from Bilkent University, Ankara. She was a visiting fellow at the European Institute and at the Centre for International Studies of the London School of Economics from 2004 to 2007. She has published in numerous journals, including Turkish Studies, International Relations, Uluslararası İlişkiler, and Global Governance.

**References**


Aras, Bülent. Turkey’s Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative. SAM Papers, no. 4 (December 2012).


Görener, Aylin, and Meltem Ş. Ucal. “The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy.” Turkish Studies 12, no. 3 (2011): 357–381.


