Aims and Scope

All Azimuth, journal of the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, is an English-language, international peer-reviewed journal, published biannually. It aims:

- to provide a forum for academic studies on foreign policy analysis, peace and development research,
- to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements in the dialogue between the “center” and the “periphery”;
- to encourage publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches.
- to transcend conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries,
- to highlight works of senior and promising young scholars,
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Vol. 6 No. 2 July 2017

### In This Issue

**ARTICLES**

- The Hegemony of Governmentality: Towards a Research Agenda
  *Jonathan Joseph*
  5

- Transcending Hegemonic International Relations Theorization: Nothingness, Re-Worlding, and Balance of Relationship
  *Chih-yu Shih*
  19

- On the Borders of Cultural Relativism, Nativism, and International Society: A Promotion of Islamist Democracy in the Middle East after the Arab Uprisings
  *Metin Koca*
  43

- Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East during the Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective
  *Nuri Yeşilyurt*
  65

### COMMENTARY

- Global Peaceful Change and Accommodation of Rising Powers: A Scholarly Perspective
  *T.V. Paul*
  85

### REVIEW ARTICLE

- Chinese School of International Relations: Myth or Reality?
  *Emre Demir*
  95

- Abstracts in Turkish
  105
In This Issue

Contributions to this edition of the journal come from several quarters, but they blend in together quite interestingly around common themes and issues. As per All Azimuth’s mission, they all deal with hegemony in international relations practice and International Relations Theory (IRT); and present alternatives to existing status quo in both domains. In the opening article of the issue, Jonathan Joseph takes up the discussion on hegemony initiated by Nicholas Onuf, Simon Reich and Ned Lebow in the previous issue and offers a new research agenda which combines theories of hegemony and governmentality. These two theories together, he claims, are better equipped to reveal the interplay between macro and micro, structure and agency, institution and practice. His argument is based on the observation that certain forms of governmentality are purposefully selected to become hegemonic strategies, which are in turn sometimes enhanced by techniques of governmentality. The theory of hegemony highlights the wider context in which strategic action takes place, but, looking from a governmentality approach, may be better at showing the micro level workings of the governing strategies.

In the second article of this issue, Chih-yu Shih introduces not one or two but three alternatives to contemporary approaches to hegemony. He presents three approaches from East Asia, i.e. World History Standpoint, post-Western Re-worlding, and Balance of Relationships. These approaches are best reflected, respectively, in Japan’s, Taiwan’s, and China’s attitudes in the dispute on the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands. Common to these three perspectives is an understanding based on fluid and adaptable identities. Nations with split identities, such as Japan, have cycles in their international relations. Each cycle is due to resurfacing of the identity that was previously deemed politically incorrect. Nations with an expansive scope of international relations (such as China) or declining hegemons will adopt varying identities with each different partner, whereas less influential nations like Taiwan will practically reinterpret hegemonic order to meet their motivations.

Our third and fourth articles combine theoretical sophistication and empirical relevance by providing intellectually-sophisticated accounts of a widely debated subject, i.e. Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. In his article, Metin Koca assesses the Turkish government’s calls for democratization in the Middle East during the Arab Uprisings. He contends that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) displayed a form of cultural relativism at the global level, because they argued that the West’s technocratic attempts to promote democracy were ineffective at best, if not altogether harmful. AKP governments also displayed nativism at a regional level, stressing the cultural similarity between AKP and the first democratically elected governments of Egypt and Tunisia. Combined, these strategies effectively turned the discourse on democracy into a discourse on “our democracy.” Relying on his analysis of AKP’s discourse and the constitution-making processes in Egypt and Tunisia, Koca manages to not only evaluate much debated strategies, but he also draws out some lessons for better conceptualization of culture. Some examples of these lessons are avoiding ad hoc blending of different levels of abstraction in cultural analyses and making more precise distinctions between various ideational and behavioral components of the concept of culture.

Our final article, by Nuri Yeşilyurt, explains the reasons for Turkish miscalculations while formulating foreign policy during the tumultuous time of Arab Uprisings and extends
the analysis to its failure to adapt to changing circumstances in its aftermath. Relying on a neoclassical realist perspective, Yeşilyurt highlights the prominence of domestic factors in foreign policy, and argues that miscalculations in Turkish foreign policy were due to distortive effects of the ruling AKP’s ideology and the relative lack of effective resistance to their policies due to their consolidation of domestic power. While ideology shaped their foreign policy during the Arab uprisings, their extensive manipulation of foreign policy for domestic purposes hindered Turkey’s adaptation to shifting balances in the regional power structure between 2013 and 2016. Although they approach from different perspectives, both Koca’s and Yeşilyurt’s articles highlight the dominance of ideational factors in shaping Turkish foreign policy in the past six years.

This issue’s commentary comes from T.V. Paul, the former President of International Studies Association (ISA) in 2016-17. The commentary is based on an interview conducted with him in March, 2017. In the commentary, Paul ponders major questions about how to manage the rise of new powers in the international system while avoiding major conflict. He argues that peaceful accommodation is feasible if established and status quo powers hold comprehensive strategies relying on institutions, economic diplomacy, and limited ententes as mechanisms for restraining aggressive behavior. Although there are some variations in the current US policies toward Russia and China, the alternative, i.e. non-accommodation of rising powers as well as regional/smaller powers, has grave consequences for both great powers and small powers. The commentary concludes with a more optimistic note on the greater prospects of China and India to rise peacefully than the previous era’s great powers, due to globalization. He also assigns the discipline of IR a special duty to develop strategies of peaceful transformation, rather than war, as the main mechanism of change, and he encourages students to take a look at the practices and ideas from the Global South for inspiration.

Our review article is by Emre Demir, who examines the development of Chinese IR studies from the field’s formation in the 1950s until today, focusing on the three main contributions of Chinese IR to the field: the Tsinghua approach under the leadership of Yan Xuetong, the relational theory of world politics of Qin Yaqing, and the Tianxia (All-Under-Heaven) approach of Zhao Tingyang. He then moves on to provide an overview of a recently published edited volume by Yongjin Zhang and Teng-chi Chang, *Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations: Ongoing debates and sociological realities*, which is the product of a workshop on the subject organized in 2013. Demir argues that the major strength of the book is the diversity of contributions reflecting the ways Chinese scholars are engaged in Western IR theories, the construction of Chinese IR theory, and the likelihood of developing a Chinese School(s) of IR as a challenge to the hegemony of Western-centric IR knowledge production. He concludes that there are several Chinese approaches to IR and world order, as the book suggests. On the other hand, he warns against the traps of parochialism and exceptionalism, which may override the well-deserved accomplishments.

We hope you enjoy the contributions in this rather extensive and interesting issue.
The Hegemony of Governmentality: Towards a Research Agenda

Jonathan Joseph
University of Sheffield

Abstract
This contribution sets out a research agenda that explores the promises of combining theories of hegemony and governmentality in the study of world politics. It is argued that certain forms of governmentality are ‘strategically selected’ and form part of hegemonic strategies while hegemonic strategies are enhanced by techniques of governmentality. It is also important to look at the underlying context that allows for micro practices to be ‘colonised’ by macro actors and which drives such actors to use such techniques. The theory of hegemony is seen as better at highlighting the context in which strategic action takes place, while governmentality is better at showing the workings of the technologies and techniques that are deployed by strategies of governing. Hegemony and governmentality therefore form part of the back and forth between macro and micro, structure and agency, institution and practice, highlighting different aspects of this constant interaction.

Keywords: Hegemony, governmentality, international relations theory, critical realism, Gramsci, Foucault

1. Introduction

The three contributions to the previous issue of this journal address the matter of hegemony in world politics and are united in their belief that IR scholars deserve a richer account of hegemony than the often asocial and ahistorical version that is provided by many realist accounts. Seeing hegemony as a process of domination, realist accounts fail to adequately ground this in human societies and their associated cultures, practices and beliefs. Nicholas Onuf and Simon Reich and Ned Lebow provide worthy alternatives to the realist view that emphasises dominance through force by virtue of a preponderance of material capabilities. In Onuf’s case, we have dominance through the use of rules. In the case of Reich and Lebow, capabilities are only one source of power and the realist account ignores what they call social power as a means of determining influence.

I could raise concerns about what exactly Reich and Lebow mean by the social by raising the question of whether there are such things as social structures – or perhaps more pertinent for IR, structural power – out there in the world? And I could raise similar questions for...
Onuf in wondering if there is more to the social than rules all the way down? But instead I will engage with some of these questions by raising a possible research agenda based around bringing together a social approach to hegemony and a view of contemporary global governance informed by arguments about governmentalism. In some senses my approach is more conventional insofar as I follow a number of well-known IR scholars in turning to the work on hegemony by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Indeed, I, like many Gramscians, would respond to Reich and Lebow with the argument that Gramsci already has a more social understanding of hegemony that takes into consideration the ability of social groups to exercise their influence. However, the purpose of this contribution is not to get into a discussion of who offers the better account of hegemony, or to engage in the more philosophical issue of just what we mean by the ‘social’, or ‘rules’, or ‘material capabilities’. Instead, I outline a research agenda that starts from an inclination that maybe the best way to explore the current exercise of hegemony in world politics is to see whether it operates as governmentality.

I start by outlining a conception of hegemony that is informed by Gramsci, but which also emphasises the notion of social structure. I then give an account of governmentality before looking at how governmentality and hegemony might combine. I cannot here show in any detail how this works, but in bringing hegemony and governmentality together I challenge Gramscian approaches to account for the development and exercise of contemporary techniques and technologies of governance, while challenging Foucauldians to account for why these techniques and technologies have risen to such prominence.

2. Hegemony in Gramsci

The concept of hegemony, as it is best understood in the work of Antonio Gramsci, is not straightforwardly defined but develops through various arguments about the relationship between force and consent, state and civil society and structure and superstructure. Gramsci talks of the need to balance force and consent through the support of the majority and the ‘contradictory and discordant ensemble’ of the political and cultural superstructures and the social relations of production. Hegemony draws attention to the ways that social conditions of production, coercion, consent and leadership must combine in specific strategies that project themselves across a range of social institutions and practices. This can be understood through what Gramsci terms a historical bloc. This has two components. First, it addresses the way that a dominant group is able to construct a ruling alliance through offering concessions and incentives and through the articulation of certain ideas and interests. Second, it addresses the relationship between the ruling group and the socio-historical conditions within which this bloc can develop.

The combination of these two components allows for hegemony, or hegemonic projects, to be seen as the missing strategic element or mediating position between structures and agents that helps explain why certain things happen in certain times and places, or within certain conditions and contexts. Hegemonic projects refer to the mobilisation of support around a programme of action based on the interests of the leading group while incorporating other groups and fractions and seeking the resolution of conflicts of interest in favour of the leading group. The notion of hegemony links such projects to the longer-term securing of

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social cohesion and consensus. Historical bloc sets this in the context of socio-historical relations. As Robert Cox notes, the historical bloc is a combination of ideas, institutions and material conditions. What a Gramscian approach offers is a clear view that different groups act according to particular interests, but that this is set in a wider context of the social relations with which they must engage. This can be ontologically grounded in the debates about structure and agency. Drawing on critical realist arguments about this relationship I suggest below that hegemony plays a crucial mediating role in the structure – agency relationship.

Bhaskar argues that while social structures do not exist independently of the activities that they govern, we must still distinguish between the conditions for human action and the activity itself rather than conflate them as might be said to occur in constructivist and structuration approaches. Societies pre-exist the agents who live in them as an ever-present condition or material cause. But the structures of society are also the continually reproduced outcome of these agents’ activities. This process of social reproduction is largely unconscious because it is inscribed into our routines and activities. Only in particular circumstances (usually crises) do agents act in a more conscious way to change or transform these conditions. Hegemony can usefully be introduced at this point because, seen in relation to both structure and agency, it can be said to play a mediating role between the reproduction of social structures and conscious efforts either to transform or prevent the transformation of these underlying conditions. As Gramsci himself writes, ‘incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome them’. Thus, in its agential sense hegemony relates to conscious, reflective, intentionality as is the case with hegemonic projects. However, our understanding of these must also recognise hegemony’s relation to structural properties of pre-existing and relatively enduring social relations that possess powers of enablement and constraint. Hegemony stands in relation to structures and underlying social conditions and the more conscious, intersubjective, political and manifold activities associated with actual hegemonic projects and practices.

While Gramsci’s own work does not contain a single, distinct approach, there are nevertheless some clear references to the underlying structural conditions that make hegemony possible. In defining the historical bloc, he talks of the ‘complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures’ in relation to ‘the ensemble of the social relations of production’. The relations between groups as manifested through institutions and practices are set within a structural context. In particular, Gramsci notes that hegemony ‘must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity’.

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Hegemony might also be seen as the problematisation of social structure insofar as it means recognising that deeper structural processes – most notably those concerned with economic production – do not automatically reproduce themselves, but need to be socially secured. Hegemony suggests that the relationship between such processes needs to be institutionally ‘fixed’. Capital accumulation can only occur through active state intervention while crisis tendencies can be offset by various forms of economic regulation. Hegemonic strategies, if they are effective, must try to root themselves in this ‘decisive sphere’ of economic activity, but this must also be related to broader issues of social cohesion. A Gramscian account of the postwar period thus uses the idea of historical bloc to account for the way that the realignment of the ruling bloc took place alongside deep-rooted changes in the economic system, the reorganisation of the labour process, the emergence of new forms of state intervention and new legitimating discourses. Consequently, as Cox notes:

Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of other international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries. World hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure.13

At this international level, a new institutional settlement was guaranteed by the economic dominance of the US, backed up by military superiority and the promise of a liberal international order. It should be remembered, however, that Gramsci clearly saw international relations as following social relations, arguing that changes in geopolitics are the result of changes in social structure.14 The postwar social hegemony was maintained through a combination of social contract and economic growth.15 Failure of interventionist policies to sustain economic growth in the 1970s and failure to deal with deeper structural contradictions in the economy led to domestic and international crises and the emergence of new neoliberal strategies of intervention which started to gain the support of those in power. These failures and subsequent thinking represent social dynamics rather than simply international ones. If we see a crisis of US hegemony at the global level, then we need to look into its social roots. Reich and Lebow’s critique of realism suggests this, yet they direct much of their argument towards making the case for US weakness and continuing decline, rather than exploring the social basis of hegemony. The question to ask of them is why, despite the all too evident weaknesses of the US, do we not find in China, the EU or some other emerging power, any sign of an alternative hegemon? The answer is surely that they lack the underlying social or structural power to put themselves forward as leading. The question of US weakness is only part of the picture because hegemony at the international level is not only an order among states. If hegemony really is social, then it is as much about things like changes in the economy, methods of economic production, the role of finance, understandings of the role of government and the state, cultural influence, and much else. The US might be declining as a hegemon, but changes in the global system cannot be understood separately from the social, economic and political changes that are taking place within the US. The neoliberal rethinking that now dominates global governance reflects ‘Americanism’

13 Cox and Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, 137.
15 Cox and Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, 247.
in the same way that Gramsci saw Fordism as representing ‘Americanism’. There may be a crisis of hegemony, but it remains America’s crisis of hegemony. And the rest of the world continues to pick up the tab.

3. Governmentality

In contrast to the Gramscian approach to hegemony, governmentality may not be a theory as such but perhaps what William Walters calls ‘a cluster of concepts’ that we can use to critically analyse various forms of governance. Indeed this definition itself reflects a certain way of thinking among many scholars who prefer to see governmentality as helping to make sense of the world through what Mitchell Dean calls an ‘analytics of government’. This relates governmentality to various ways of seeing and perceiving, distinctive ways of thinking and questioning, the various rationalities of acting and directing and specific ways in which subjects are formed.

This is in contrast to the more ontological arguments about structure and agency outlined above. While an analytics of government clearly has ontological implications, there is a preferred tendency in Foucauldian scholarship to take this down a genealogical path while emphasising the relationship between the changing shape of the world and different discursive productions. This leads to an understanding of governmentality in the broad sense, as a framework of analysis for understanding a wide range of power relations, albeit focussed on the idea that governing takes place through the ‘conduct of conduct’. Nevertheless, Foucault’s historical account of the emergence of governmentality does provide something of an ontological explanation with a focus on historical developments. In distinguishing this more specific focus from a general view of the shaping of conduct we can follow Walters in calling this liberal governmentality. Liberal governmentality, as Walters goes on to note, is the most frequent, if not the only, understanding in Foucault’s own work and clearly underpins Foucault’s best known definition of governmentality

By ‘governmentality’ I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.

The focus on population distinguishes this form of power from those more narrowly related to sovereignty and territorial control. It also clearly relates to what he calls biopower, as a set of mechanisms for the management of the human species and pastoral power as a beneficent power exercised over a multiplicity rather than a territory. Governmentality can also be distinguished from forms of disciplinary power as outlined in Foucault’s earlier works insofar as it operates in a less direct, less overtly coercive and more reflexive way. Like disciplinary power it is most effective when it is able to get us to govern ourselves, but does this through the ‘management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free’. It is not, though, that governmentality replaces these other forms of power, but works

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18 Walters, Governmentality, 3.
19 Walters, Governmentality, 30.
21 Foucault, Security, 1.
23 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2008), 63-4.
alongside them in a triangle of sovereignty-discipline-government, something that is clearly highly relevant for scholars of international politics.

The majority of Foucault’s arguments about governmentality are concentrated on a specifically liberal form of rule that works, in particular, through the encouragement of free conduct, self-awareness and more generally, an appeal to the freedom of the governed. As Busse says, modern governmentality is unthinkable without the freedom of the individual. This modern governmentality, in contrast to more directly coercive forms of power, works from a distance and seeks to create free and active subjects. It is thus always concerned with its own limits and follows a rationality of governance that aims to respect the freedom of the governed by allowing things to take their natural course. In particular, governing well comes to be understood as respecting the freedom of social and economic processes, that is the spheres of civil society and the market. Based on the \textit{laissez-faire} principles of political economy, liberal governance finds its expression in civil society and is legitimated through a concern not to ‘govern too much’. However, Foucault recognises freedom as a social construction that operates through a variety of social practices that reinforce rational, normalised conduct. Liberalism works ‘not through the imperative of freedom, but through the social production of freedom’. Foucault goes on to argue that: ‘Liberalism is not acceptance of freedom; it proposes to manufacture it constantly, to arouse it and produce it, with, of course, [the system] of constraints and problems’. Liberal governmentality requires political economy as its major form of knowledge and security as an essential technique for the protection of interests in the workings of freedom. Freedom, in other words, operates by means of an economic ‘regime of truth’ and through accompanying processes of policing and securing.

If we consider dominant forms of governmentality today as assuming a more neoliberal character, this is so in the sense of a reflexive critique of the postwar institutional settlement and the failures of socio-economic regulation – both national and international. Neoliberal governmentality is more reflexive and pragmatic about the socially situated and embedded character of human conduct. It strives to promote the norms and values of the market in ever more areas of social life. This is no mere economic doctrine, but a means of governing based on the dynamics of competition and enterprise. Models of competitive or entrepreneurial conduct must reach not just to institutions and social practices, but right down to the self-understanding and self-governance of individuals. These individuals are appealed to, or even (if a harder poststructuralist line is taken), constructed as, free but responsible for their actions. There are various new contrivances associated with this neoliberal form of rule – Rose’s analysis of ‘advanced liberalism’ points to new mechanisms of expertise, a pluralisation of social technologies and governance through quasi-autonomous bodies, and a new specification of the subject as consumer.

The question to be addressed to IR scholars is whether these features, described by Rose as ‘advanced liberalism’ can be applied to all societies? Do these mechanisms of rule operate on a global scale? Can they spread outwards from the ‘advanced liberal’ centre? These, I

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26 Foucault, \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics}, 319.
27 Foucault, \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics}, 65.
28 Foucault, \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics}, 65.
suggest, are crucial questions for applying governmentality to global politics.

4. Hegemonic Governmentality

The term hegemonic in realist parlance suggests full dominance. In a Gramscian sense, this dominance is not necessarily total but goes through a process of construction, reconstruction and contestation. The idea behind a Gramscian approach to governmentality is that it allows that certain forms of governmentality become hegemonic while also drawing attention to its far from stable character. This is to ask about the conditions under which governmentality itself comes into being, to look at its opportunities and limitations and the strategic issues these pose. This argument is premised on the view, articulated by a number of critics\(^\text{30}\) that while governmentality might be good at showing how contemporary forms of governance work, it cannot on its own explain why these work in the way that they do. A wider picture and deeper social ontology is needed if we are to understand variations in governmentality and why certain neoliberal forms of governmentality have become prominent within certain societies and within most international organisations. Interestingly, the critics all draw on Marxism and critical realist philosophy to make this point. Their deeper social ontology refers to the underlying social relations or structural context that enables and constrains the actions of various social groups. These social relations also enable and constrain the functioning of governmentality and help explain why it is that governmentality has an uneven and contested influence across the international domain. Underlying social relations also provide the context within which social groups act in a strategic way and it is in order to address this strategic element that the question of hegemony is brought into the picture.

Although the strength of a governmentality approach is its attention to fine detail, this should not lead to the study of such practices being given some sort of ontological primacy, or, to use Laura Zanotti’s more nuanced words, favouring, ‘modest’ relational ontologies over ‘substantialist’ ones.\(^\text{31}\) While much of his work is clearly focussed at the micro level, Foucault acknowledges that there is a back and forth between the micro and macro which we might interpret here as a back and forth between governmentality and hegemony. Micro powers, while having their own specificity, may be taken up and used by the state, or by ruling groups seeking to utilise them as part of a macro strategy of governing. He argues that ‘we have to analyse the way in which the phenomena, techniques and procedures of power come into play at the lowest levels; we have to show, obviously, how these procedures are displaced, extended, and modified and, above all, how they are invested or annexed by global phenomena’.\(^\text{32}\) Hence Foucault deliberately focusses on the ‘infinitesimal mechanisms of power’ while asking how these might be useful to the bourgeoisie. He argues that, in the case of madness, the bourgeoisie found a use for the techniques of exclusion, the surveillance apparatus and the mediacalisation of sexuality, madness and delinquency. The ‘micromechanics of power’, at a certain point in time, came to constitute the interest

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of the bourgeoisie.33 Because these methods of individualisation and normalisation were consistent with the generation of economic profit and political control they were colonised and supported by the macro mechanisms of the state apparatus. Contrary to what Gill claims,34 Foucault clearly does make macro level claims about how privatised power and new disciplinary techniques can be linked to the development of the capitalist mode of production as a means of exploiting labour power more effectively35 and he notes the close links between disciplinary techniques and the apparatus of production.36 This can be read as consistent with an understanding of hegemony insofar as, rather than starting with an abstract model of Leviathan, both approaches start with the actual techniques and mechanisms of domination.37

Foucault was obviously concerned to redress the balance regarding the macro and the micro. The micro level is important because power is emergent in a given place and time as an ill developed cluster of relations.38 What Foucault calls ‘great strategies of power’, exercised at the macro level, ‘depend for their conditions of exercise on this level of the micro-relations of power’.39 However, this process also moves in the other direction as macro powers seek to ‘produce new effects and advance into hitherto unaffected domains’.40 Similarly, Foucault has a two-way understanding of the state as both colonised and coloniser. It is both the terrain through which various micro practices find their rationality and that which spreads this rationality to new areas of the social. This has been picked up and developed in Bob Jessop’s work where state power is seen as both the contingent outcome of various practices and also the very means by which existing micro relations of power can be codified, fixed, consolidated and institutionalized.41 A similar point is made in Thomas Lemke’s argument for seeing the state as an effect of political strategies and social relations of power. On the one hand the state is to be understood as ‘an emergent and complex resultant of conflicting and contradictory governmental practices,42 on the other, the state occupies a strategic position of some primacy. Lemke points to Foucault’s own argument that in contemporary societies the state is not simply one of the forms of specific situations of the exercise of power - even if it is the most important - but that, in a certain way, all other forms of power relation must refer to it. But this is not because they are derived from it; rather, it is because power relations have become more and more under state control... Using here the restricted meaning of the word 'government', one could say that power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions.43

Rather than distinguish, as Zanotti does, between relational and substantive ontologies, Jessop and Lemke’s reading of Foucault shows that it is possible to develop a relational ontology (or at least a relational view of the state as a series of codified and institutionalised power relations, strategic interventions and social conflicts) alongside substantive ontological

33 Foucault, Society, 32.
36 Foucault, Discipline, 221.
37 Foucault, Society, 34.
39 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 199.
40 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 200.
claims about macro level processes and power relations, not least the development of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, their needs and requirements and the role of the state and other institutions in relation to these.

Macro powers like the state work, therefore, through the codification of a whole number of power relations that make their functioning possible.\textsuperscript{44} Understanding this as a two way movement helps explain something like the development of neoliberalism as a process by which a variety of micro-practices become ‘invested, colonized, used, inflected, transformed, displaced, extended and so on by increasingly general mechanisms and forms of overall domination’.\textsuperscript{45} Neoliberal governmentality becomes hegemonic governmentality when a specific set of micro practices are adopted by or coalesce into a particular macro strategy of governance. This is compatible with Nikolas Rose’s argument that neoliberalism emerged in the 1980s as a ‘contingent lash-up’ of thought and action.\textsuperscript{46} Here neoliberalism is regarded as an assemblage of various open-ended micro-practices and techniques, lacking an overall logic, but which could be gradually colonised at the macro level and given the coherence of a neoliberal rationality. Once ‘translated’, these practices could be redirected to a number of domains like the welfare system where free market logic had previously been considered inappropriate. However, to push this argument further does require a stronger strategic focus that examines the active role of different social agents with particular interests. These act through the state and other leading institutions and international bodies and in response to underlying socio-economic pressures and the ensuing failure of postwar regulation.

It is worth investigating, therefore, how certain forms of governmentality are strategically selected and are encouraged and promoted in particular ways. While Foucault, Rose and others might recognise that the state and social groups can take up existing tactics and techniques and use these strategically, they do not (or refuse to) provide adequate explanation of why they might do this (a strategic question relating to group interests), nor what it is about either the agents or the structures that allows them (or does not allow them) to do this (a structural or ontological question which, according to critical realism, is about how powers and liabilities are conferred). I would suggest that while Foucault’s account of power may be concerned with its exercise, there is something of a denial or avoidance – as there is among many of his proponents – of the ontological conditions that make this possible and which enable certain agents to utilise various powers in a strategic way. This is reflected in a weak theorisation of state power and group interests as causes of power. Both of these problems might be redressed through introducing hegemony as helping to orient, steer and conduct these otherwise isolated micro practices.

A successful hegemonic strategy is one that is able to find the right balance between economy, state and civil society (whose relations are sometimes understood through the Gramscian notion of ‘integral state’,\textsuperscript{47} intervening through a mixture of economic and extra-economic means. Although this focus on the economy has more prominence in Gramscian inspired scholarship, such a view is certainly not incompatible with the approach of Foucault’s later governmentality lectures and might in fact strike some common ground. Indeed, when Burchell discusses Foucault’s work on ordo-liberalism he speaks in similar

\textsuperscript{44} Foucault, \textit{Power/Knowledge}, 122.
\textsuperscript{45} Foucault, \textit{Society}, 30.
\textsuperscript{46} Nikolas Rose, \textit{Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 27.
\textsuperscript{47} Gramsci, \textit{The Prison Notebooks}, 267.
terms of an approach that sees the market as secured and supervised by the state, requiring certain institutional conditions and active government involvement. Jessop argues that these lectures indicate a growing interest in the complex and contingent relationship between problems of political economy and statecraft without reducing the state to either a capital-logic or a class-instrumental one. Bringing Foucault and Gramsci together would mean placing emphasis on the institutionalised nature of the economy as well as the strategic importance of the state which enjoys a privileged role in the codification of power relations through apparatuses of hegemony.

To what extent does the privileged role of the state extend to global politics? For a long time the key role of the state was obvious. But the rise of global governance has been accompanied by the common view that power has been shifting away from the states system in favour of local, regional or transnational actors and institutions. I would suggest instead, that it is worth looking into how dominant states – the states of the ‘advanced liberal’ centre – are using global governance to promote their own interests. Rather than power slipping away from states, global governmentality works to reinforce the power of the ‘core’ over the ‘periphery’ while seeking to disguise this fact. The concepts of hegemony and governmentality help explain this seeming paradox.

If we take current approaches to international interventions – peacebuilding, democratisation, humanitarian support, poverty reduction and development strategy – governmentality certainly helps explain the general trend of resposibilising subjects and governing through a liberal appeal to the freedom of the governed to behave in a responsible way. The mechanisms of global governance work through the use of a range of technologies and techniques that govern through appeals to free conduct while strictly monitoring, benchmarking and measuring such things as performance, capacity and competitiveness. This process can be described as increasingly governmentalized insofar as international interventions appear as less directly coercive and more indirectly supportive – governing at a distance through empowering local actors, incentivising good conduct and enhancing human, social and institutional capacities. The flip side of this intervention is however, the very discipline that it seeks to conceal. While these international interventions might still be seen to be concerned with populations as their main target, this is less as an end goal than the means by which the main governmentality effect is achieved – which is not necessarily to directly govern global populations, but to use such a concern as a means to govern the behaviour of states. The World Bank and other international organisations recognise that the most effective way to promote global governance is to target states and their governments, using the wellbeing of their populations as a means to legitimate this. Following Michael Merlingen, we might call this targeting of state policy by state dominated international organisations an international governmentality of states, or ‘the international conduct of the conduct of countries’.

His leads me to suggest that there are two, unequal, processes of governmentalisation going on simultaneously. In the ‘advanced liberal’ states we find the governmentalisation of

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49 Jessop, State Power; 153.
50 Jessop, State Power; 153.
the state from within. Here we find, not a weakening of state power, but what Nadine Voelkner calls an evolving process of governmentalisation that redefines the state’s competences and domains of operation. Then in global politics we find concerted efforts to governmentalize the poorer states and societies from without. Again, it is the state that is the main target, but the techniques of governance operate from a distance by incentivising local actors. How these two processes combine and how it is that in some countries governmentalisation of the state takes place from within, and in others from without requires, in my view, discussion of the nature of power politics and the operation of hegemony. It cannot be done by remaining solely within a governmentality perspective but requires an examination of the conditions of possibility of governmentalisation itself, or more precisely, from an IR perspective, why it is that in some parts of the world governmentalisation is occurring within states while in other parts of the world it is being forced upon weaker states, with varying results, by more powerful actors. Of course this is not to pretend that everything can be explained through a crude distinction between governmentalisation from within and from without. It is perfectly possible that alternative governmentalities and hybrid systems develop within a range of different societies. But what a theory of hegemony offers, that the concept of governmentality does not, is a means for identifying the dominant global dynamics and the socio-historical context that both gives rise to but also constrains the operation of governmentality in its various manifestations.

To summarise, hegemony points to the role of the dominant groups in the dominant states. This finds expression as ‘global governance’ in and through the leading international institutions. However, the dominant form of global governmentality is fragile, may be contested and there may also be a variety of forms of governmentality across different societies. This leads us to suggest further exploration of the relationship between hegemony and governmentality through two possible (and maybe interconnected) research agendas. First would be to expand the notion of governmentality beyond a purely liberal understanding in order to try and describe a range of different forms of governance. This article has questioned such an approach but does recognise that it has some validity. Whether it is useful to try and describe different varieties of governance as forms of governmentality or whether the dangers of conceptual stretching outweigh the benefits can be decided on a case by case basis. But insofar as we are primarily concerned here with global governmentality, then we might maintain our focus on dominant neoliberal forms while recognising that these might be forced to adapt to particular circumstances and to different local practices rationalities. Neumann and Sending capture this neatly in suggesting there are a variety of prototypes developing, where the limits of a neoliberal form of intervention may generate a diversity of combinations or even hybrid forms. But here again, to maintain such a position requires us to step aside from governmentality and examine the limits imposed by underlying social and material conditions and other – structural, cultural, institutional and agential – forms of selectivity.

The other research agenda would be to consider the relationship between hegemony and governmentality in the context of a broader understanding of liberalism that rejects the way it

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53 Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 44.
All Azimuth J. Joseph

has come to be identified with democratic and consensual politics. Indeed as Beate Jahn has demonstrated, liberal principles such as private property, individual freedom and government by consent require non-liberal practices and a conception of a non-liberal ‘other’, particularly in relation to the international sphere.\(^{54}\) Because governmentality emphasises governance from a distance, there might be a tendency to neglect the coercive aspect of this. Wanda Vrasti notes that governance through freedom might be combined with more imperial tactics and certainly today includes sanctions, coercion and military intervention.\(^{55}\) A Gramscian approach is clearly more open to this. And to put the matter in Gramscian terms, the issue for governmentality is whether to include this coercive element in our understanding along the lines of governmentality as liberalism plus coercion, or to understand liberalism as governmentality plus coercion. Such formulations might be somewhat schematic, but again they point to the need to step beyond governmentality and look at its wider context of operation.

5. Conclusion

The concept of governmentality, on its own, superbly highlights the combinations of techniques and technologies of governing but can it – does it even want to – explain why these have come into being or why they work in different ways in certain places? If our concern is with why neoliberal forms of governmentality come to dominate international organisations and various forms of global governance, then we need something like hegemony to explain how governmentality relates to macro strategies within a structured social context. Hegemony explains why certain techniques and technologies become dominant by linking these to strategic actions within a structured social and historical context. This should not, however, mean adopting a reductionist explanation that simply draws on a notion of economic rationality or mode of production to explain how governmentality works.

On the contrary, the adoption of a Gramscian view should mean that the underlying conditions upon which hegemony depends are at the same time thrown into question insofar as their continued reproduction through social activity is not automatically given, but needs to be socially secured and institutionally embedded. This makes the question of strategy much more prominent than it is in Foucauldian approaches. Hegemony is contested, hegemonic projects can be challenged. Hegemony is forced to operate across a complex social terrain. Indeed, by ‘bracketing out’ this wider social context there is a real danger that governmentality theorists in IR miss out on what is, after all, a fundamental feature of IR, the unevenness of this terrain and all the gaps, limits and failures that this produces. If we ignore the issue of wider social ontology, then there is a real danger that some notion of global governmentality itself becomes a social ontology and may delude us into thinking that governmentality is now universal and irreversible.

Types of hegemony and governmentality are both emergent social features insofar as they are dependent on underlying conditions of possibility like relations of production. However, they are not mechanically determined by such conditions and have their own irreducible properties and characteristics. The concept of hegemony is better at highlighting some of

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the wider social features – things like historical context, institutional setting, the role of social groups and processes of project construction. The reading offered here also challenges IR approaches to consider hegemonic projects in relation to deeper structural conditions. The concept of governmentality, meanwhile, covers much of the finer detail and can in turn be described as a condition of intelligibility for hegemony in the sense that it completes hegemony and explains the ‘how’ of governance without reducing it to the conditions from which it emerges. It provides a detailed account of the existing micro practices and other resources which have their own specificity and might pre-exist particular hegemonic projects, but which Foucault shows can be colonised and brought together through macro-level strategies. Indeed, hegemony and governmentality are part of the constant back and forth between macro and micro, between structure and agency and between institution and practice. Each has its merits in explaining different aspects of these. But when it comes to explaining the social whole, it is difficult to conceive of one without the other and equally difficult to understand the puzzle of why IR scholars have not made more use of their combination.

Bibliography


Transcending Hegemonic International Relations Theorization: Nothingness, Re-Worlding, and Balance of Relationship

Chih-yu Shih
National Taiwan University

Abstract
The manuscript compares the World History Standpoint promoted by the Kyoto School of Philosophy with two other competitors – post-Western re-worlding and the Chinese balance of relationships - in their shared campaign for alternative international relations theory. The World History Standpoint explains how nations influenced by major power politics judge their conditions and rely on combining existing cultural resources to make sense of their place in world politics. It predicts that international systemic stability cannot be maintained over a set of congruent identities because history's longevity allows for previous politically incorrect identities to return in due time with proper clues. It specifically predicts that nations caught between different identities will experience cycles in their international relations; nations with an expansive scope of international relations or declining from the hegemonic status will adopt balance of relationships; and less influential nations will practically reinterpret hegemonic order to meet their otherwise inexpressible motivations. Accordingly, Japan will be focused upon as an exemplary case for World History Standpoint; Taiwan for re-worlding; and China for balance of relationships. The paper touches upon theoretical implications of their conflicts.

Keywords: The Kyoto School of Philosophy, place of nothingness, Japan, China, Taiwan, balance of relationship

1. Introduction
The Kyoto School of Philosophy (KSP), which originated in Taisho, Japan (1912 - 1926) and obtained its name during the early Showa period (1926 - 1989), has received atavistic attention in the past two decades. While the KSP originated in Taisho Japan between 1912 and 1926, it obtained its name only during the Showa period, which went from 1926 to 1989. The founding father of the KSP was Nishida Kitaro, a philosopher who specifically stimulated curiosity on new possibilities of arranging alternative international relations for the 21st century primarily through his so-called Philosophy of Place (PoP). Nishida sought to overcome the Europeanization and Americanization of the world prior to World War II (WWII) through developing cultural sensitivity and anti-hegemonic thought. As such, the Kyoto School meets the current normative call for multiple voices in contemporary studies of international relations. Even though most revisits to Nishida exclusively perceive the
PoP as a normative theory on improving world politics, Nishida himself was explicit about his ontological appeal to pure experience. Together with his epistemological quest for universality, the two indicate a potential for scientific inquiry. Therefore, the literature owes him a scientific, rather than a normative, appreciation.

Other theoretical attempts to counter the perceived hegemony of Anglo-Saxon International Relations Theory (IRT) are typically both scientific and normative. An example of this is the emerging trend of re-Worlding subaltern subjectivities. This takes place through demonstrating that actual world politics differs from the understanding presented in mainstream IR literature. Scholarships on re-/Worlding thus explore normative versus actual world politics. Reflecting on the widely shared perception of China as a rising country, an additional nascent struggle against the mainstream arises from the anxious efforts to establish a Chinese School of IR. IR scholars propagating the Chinese School draw from Chinese cultural resources in an attempt to present a different ideal view of world politics. Scientific endeavors to explain the different manners of interaction of nation states in comparison with those explained in mainstream IRT, such as the practices of mutual relationships, can potentially lead to a Chinese perspective with universal implications. In brief, the current normative challenges to mainstream IRT typically offer scientific explanations of world politics, which render the revisit of Nishida incomplete without the simultaneous exploration of scientific implications of the PoP.

The succeeding discussion compares Nishida with two other competitors, namely, post-Western re-Worlding and the Chinese balance of relationships, (BoR) in their shared campaign for alternative IRTs, and does this within the epistemological frame provided by Nishida. For convenience, the country of historical practice for each alternative IRT is used to illustrate the plausibility of different IR theorizations. Accordingly, Japan provides a suitable example for PoP, Taiwan for re-Worlding, and China for the BoR. The remainder of the paper argues that the three alternatives complement each other within Nishida’s epistemological scheme and are illustrative of universal IRT of East Asian origin. In addition, the article particularly focuses on the scientific principles derived from PoP.

2. Three Anti-Hegemonic Attempts

The concept of "hegemonic IR" is used to refer to the nature of world politics as it is explained by a dominant single discourse. The current hegemonic view of the nature of world politics is that it is essentially state-centric, that it is undergirded by one superpower and other major powers, mainly the US and western European countries, and that the interaction in between the states consists either of peace or war. The current hegemonic IR contradicts with and transforms non-western world orders elsewhere, including the relevant cases of
Japan, Taiwan, and China, resulting in ambivalence toward their pasts. The PoP provides epistemological clarity on the identity puzzle of Japan and of other nations with a similar problem. It does so through providing the possibility of a nation to represent both East and West at the same time, leading to a non-western, non-territorial, or non-centrist position, though homed arguably exclusively by Japan in practice. The puzzle emphasizes the aim of Japan for normalcy of in-betweenness,\(^6\) which is a statement of alienation from hegemonic IR.

In contrast to hegemonic IR, Nishida perceived the idea of universalism as one of becoming others. Universalism according to the Nishida is constantly enhanced through accommodating or acquiring additional thoughts and identities into one’s own self-imagination. It sees conversion and synthesis as a bridge between civilizations as redundant, if not harmful.\(^7\) Whereas Western modernity demonstrates a strong need to convert others from a differing trajectory to a common, that is, universal, destiny, the KSP exhibits a strong need for self-conversion. Western modernity, regardless of being prolonged at any given time, is adopted and integrated in the permanent collection through self-conversion while the process of Japan’s universalism increased. Compared to Japan, Turkey, which is likewise in between almost all the dichotomized perspectives, could be another certain, albeit involuntary, site of world history. Nevertheless, the deliberate, abrupt, massive, and yet thorough learning and simulating required of Japanese consciousness by PoP presumably empowers Japan exclusively into world history. Under such a self-concept, Japan remains as the sole nation that is capable of constantly becoming others, through entering and withdrawing in accordance with the current identity’s success or failure, to eventually encompass all. In fact, the Pacific War that the Japanese military launched against the US proceeded exactly in the name of the universalist “World History Standpoint (WHS)”, with the aim of exposing the partial nature of Western modernity. The mission provided by the WHS was allegedly “to overcome modernity”. This mission was not to deny modernity in its entirety, but to transcend the provinciality of western modernity. The other side of the coin was to modernize the rest of “the Greater East Asia Sphere”, which the Japanese military considered as the entirety of the Japanese self. The double missions were therefore to defeat the partial West and to convert the backward portions of East Asia itself.

Accordingly, Japan’s in-between place is presumably a place of nothingness or a non-place where Nishida wished that differing nations could meet without mutual naming or judgment. Idealistically, Japan exemplifies a civilizational origin and bridge that enables the East to meet the West and vice versa. The assumption of the WHS is that neither the East nor the West should expand or conquer the other. Their commonality must not lie in teleological historiography because preservation of their difference is the spirit that guarantees their inclusion in a universal world, resulting in the multi-directionality of the WHS. The multi-directionality of the WHS implies the coexistence of East and West while they each flourish on their own conditions. To be able to move in between the two requires one to go deeper

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\(^7\) Kosuke Shimizu, “Nishida Kitaro and Japan’s Interwar Foreign Policy: War Involvement and Culturalist Political Discourse” (Working Paper Series 44, Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Kyoto, 2009).
than merely being conscious of their differences. This leads one to the place of nothingness. The WHS therefore does not propagate the same self-other concept as the one mentioned in the literature on identity.\textsuperscript{8} According to the WHS, both the self and its others are non-synthesized identities that are to be gathered in an ultimate being in nothingness without substituting one another.\textsuperscript{9} The formulation of the WHS, as a container of all possibilities in the past, present and future, can thus easily be connected with the imagined origin of the universe and is therefore practically coupled with Japanese Shinto, which likewise provides a metaphor of the origin and the evolution of Japan that is presumably all encompassing.

The difficulty that Japan encountered with the “backward” East Asia, particularly China, was its perceived incapacity for effective learning. From the past dynastic China to Communist China and then to the rise of capitalist China, the Chinese people have always practically accepted the co-existence of Western values, identities, and institutions in their political life. However, China has suffered (or perhaps enjoyed) false, insincere, and incompatible learning. For the Japanese, this suggests China’s incapacity for true learning. According to the classic Japanese explanation,\textsuperscript{10} which remains popular after the still ongoing reforms in China, China’s over-reliance on rituals to harmonize relationships with superior invaders has hindered the country from achieving authentic modernity. In this formulation, even though China appears to have the capability to accommodate differing values and identities by ritually relating them, China, however, does not learn at a level deeper than the instrumental use of the alien civilization. Therefore, according to the classic Japanese explanation, despite China’s similar capability to facilitate the coexistence of Western modernity and Chinese culture, the Chinese claim to universality is nominal, spurious, and lacks curiosity. As a result, Chinese learning is at best partial and eventually reduced to the harmonizing and stabilization of a relationship, which makes China, in the WHS perspective, unable to resist the West or engage in serious reform by itself.

To become more genuinely universal, Japan executes both entry into and withdrawal from any provincial identities that are not to be synthesized. Japan should exemplify for the West and East Asia the process of withdrawing from the site of their existential experiences to exercise re-entry elsewhere. One has to consider “place” as a metaphor of identity, along with the notion of “site” that is adopted in the post-Western literature. For Japan, in contrast to Western modernity, the exercise of withdrawing from a specific “place” to a “no place” allows the imagination of freedom from either one’s own past or Western modernity. This withdrawal, called self-denial, also allows further imagination of re-entry from nothingness into many potentially differing sites, including that of the intruder. Therefore, the metaphor of nothingness exclusively provides Japan with the capability to see the limitation of all sites, including the alleged hegemony and all strings of universalism, achieving the emergence of a world history that accommodates and transcends all sites.

Framing Western modernity, East Asian resistance, and Chinese management of relationships, along with Japan’s WHS, PoP categorizes “place” into four different types.\textsuperscript{11}
First, a place of being/identity is an absolute place trapped in false rationalism and universalism, such as Western modernity. This place constitutes contemporary hegemonic thought. Second, a place of relative being/identity is a relative place that resists hegemony. Examples are the East Asian quests for indigenous identities in Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, and so on. This is where post-Western re-Worlding belongs. A typical formulation of relative being/identity is postcolonial hybridity. Imagined nationalities, as well as aboriginality, are stronger versions of a relative identity. Third, a place of relative nothingness is a transcendental place that connects or permeates absolute places as well as relative places, such as the Chinese scheme of relating to each other in specific contexts, which includes the BoR. One example is Chinese Confucianism, while another can be non-alignment thought by Jawaharlal Nehru. Finally, a place of absolute nothingness is where time and space meet to render the other three places thinkable and seeable. Cultivating an archetypal subjectivity to transcend any mundane conditions, the WHS demonstrates this perspective. Below, the second, third, and last places are explained in more detail.

**Relative Identity:** The place of relative identity uses the non-Western or post-Western IR concept of “worldliness”. Creating worldliness in a site is done through essentially “Worlding” it. In the past, Worlding was a geo-cultural project of global capitalism/hegemony to monopolize meanings. Resisting this project is known as re-Worlding, a form of self-Worlding that emerges from a supposedly subaltern site for and by the self. Re-Worlding is a discursive reclaim of the lost soul by excavating, retrieving, reviving, and rejuvenating a narrative of the past. Sited re-Worlding results in a declaration that hegemonic power cannot monopolize either ontological or epistemological resources and critically assesses any hegemonic attempt to reproduce dominance over subalterns. Sited re-Worlding resists, undermines, or revises a hegemonic division of work through uncontrollable fluidity caused by the incongruent schemata of the subalterns, their ideological inconsistency, opportunism, self-denial, and self-assertion.

The methods of re-Worlding must be multiplied and improvised on as they recast memories of various forms. Through re-Worlding testimonies to differences are achieved, which are aimed at thinking back on hegemonic arrangements of lives at subaltern sites as well as writing back to provincialize hegemonic order. In other words, re-Worlding incurs site-centric methodology and aims at cultivating a counter perspective in the face of an overwhelming hegemony. In particular, re-Worlding seeks to identify alternatives for thinking about the "international" that are more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside the West. In this view, victimized people can reincarnate by looking back through an imagined subjectivity belonging exclusively to a particular site, which is not subject to false universalism.

**Relative Nothingness:** The place of relative nothingness also has a parallel in the nascent IR literature, that is, in the Chinese School. A number of Chinese schools invest in Chinese cultural resources that formulate general theories of IR; hence, Daoism, Confucianism, and

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Legalism are employed to examine the coexistence of differences, relational reciprocity, and hierarchical stability. Together, they indicate a shared longing for an order that can transcend the self-interests of individual nations. As a result, the quest for a relational order subscribes to no specific institution or value. Examples can be found in the arrangements between the Chinese dynastic court and its neighbors or between the late Qing court and various imperial powers, which were flexibly designed to meet the differing conditions of each tributary state or imperialist power. Aside from the distinctiveness of each bilateral relationship, the rules that have governed China over the generations are hardly ever the same. Thus, the Chinese consider an imagined cycle of “governability” (zhi) and “chaos” (luan) as typical. Indeed, it is so typical that it is still officially narrated in the present. If the spontaneity of cycles discontinues because of rationalist intervention, governability will lose its trajectory and may never resume, leaving brutal force as the only viable solution to anarchy. Therefore, the BoR in general, as well as in China in specific, pragmatically and patiently adopts a laissez-faire approach in handling the domestic chaos of a partner country.

According to the aforementioned Japanese criticism of the Chinese over-reliance on ritual and relationship, Chinese intellectual history is not particularly keen on the adoption of Western institutions or values. Chinese international relationships are therefore highly independent from values or institutional considerations. Chinese international relationship is likewise not particularly strong in ensuring defense against invaders. Both local gentries and the dynastic courts look for ways to coexist with invading powers. Achieving a balanced relationship is the quintessential philosophy of life that seeks to transcend the power difference by establishing reciprocal relationships. Specifically, BoR is the process of reciprocating in order to reproduce relationality that constitutes the actors. To maintain a balanced relationship, China should yield to the other side as long as the challenge to the existing relationship is not judged as malicious. By yielding, China exhibits sincerity toward the relationship. In addition, China must resist vehemently if the violation is anticipated to be detrimental to a long-term relationship, despite China’s relative weakness in power. This resistance shows China’s determination to restore the correct relationship. These two principles of a balanced relationship, namely, yielding and resistance to the perceived degree of challenge to a relationship, are essentially subversive to hegemonic IR that is founded on the concepts of power, interest, and value. From the WHS perspective though, both principles are inconsequential.

According to the BoR, both domestic cycles and the balance of power are dispensable considerations. Any multilateral arrangement to channel intervention or universal values to transform a so-called failing state would be redundant. If IR can be reduced to a combination of bilateral relations, other universal learning is no longer necessary both because the order is already existent in the process of reciprocating and because, after all, the source of good governance introduced at present may become the source of chaos in the next cycle and vice versa.

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15 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 5-18.
16 Qin, “Guanxi Benwei,” 69-86.
17 Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought.
19 See, for example, Zeming Jiang, “Gaodu zhongshi zhonghua minzu fazhan shi” [Highly stress Chinese national history of development], in Jianming zhongguo lishi duben [Easy readers for Chinese history] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 2012).
versa. What would be the excitement of forcing a conversion in a subaltern site when one knows that nothing will remain the same in the long run? Anything that fades at the present can return to consciousness given the right cue, which leads to a situation where, ultimately, only reciprocal relationships are practical and stable.\(^{21}\) If China cultivates positive long-term relationships, others will presumably reciprocate. Values and ideologies become dispensable once the relationship is stabilized, and domestic problems are subsequently not the duty of others to resolve. When given sufficient time, solutions can be obtained domestically. Patience, instead of forced transformation, is the main characteristic of the BoR in Chinese IRT and is known as the “Great Way” in Chinese discourse, upon which all strangers supposedly walk together harmoniously alongside the self-cultivating prince.\(^{22}\)

**Absolute Nothingness:** According to a KSP scholar, under the condition of nothingness, transcendence replaces resistance.\(^{23}\) The place of absolute nothingness is composed of pure experience, according to Nishida, prior to any acquisition of meaning. All of the encounters in the past, as well as those in the future co-exist in nothingness where one transcends one’s sited limitations. The place of absolute nothingness calms all conflicts, with or without justice. It contains all possibilities before they acquire any meaning, but they guarantee no single result or success. The lack of duty is even greater than in the place of relative nothingness because, while relative nothingness cultivates a small sense of duty toward a related other, one can do without the sense of duty toward one’s own life and or that of others in insensible and insensitive nothingness.\(^{24}\)

Practically, the freedom to act beyond the physical limit testifies the fearless spirit that is expected of a Japan possessing the WHS. This fearlessness manifests in self-becoming and self-disciplining on one hand and in overcoming the physical restraint imposed by the materialistic civilization of the West on the other hand. The constant self-becoming indicates the spirit of continuous self-denial required of Japan and East Asia to exercise withdrawal from one’s own limited place of relative identity. The place of absolute nothingness is most properly represented by the arrival of an international society centering on the principle of in-betweenness. To achieve this kind of international society, self-denial is the essential characteristic to show because Japan has to display to the rest of the world its transcendent capacity for being anyone else. Without extensive self-denial from its East-Asian qualities, Japan would not be able to become as good as or better than other civilizations by the standard of the latter. Thus, Japan would not be free or universal.

Each entry into a place is highly extreme in the sense that Japan endeavors to become more modern than the West or become more practiced in Sinology than China. Becoming Western or Chinese would request a withdrawal to nothingness first. Learning after entering a place does not stop until one is physically or socially exhausted and unable to reach further perfection. This quality is unavailable in the place of relative nothingness where learning is insincere and relational coupling is more important than learning. In fact, pre-WWII Japan considered itself as the best pupil of Sinology and as the genuine successor of the Chinese...
culture to sustain and improve its modern fate. Given the country’s Sinological spirit, Japan’s acquisition of modernity proceeded at a level much deeper than the materialistic civilization of the West, and provides the identity of in-betweenness that fully describes the international society.

Table 1 lists the categories of places of the PoP: 1) the place of absolute identity, 2) the place of relative identity, 3) the place of relative nothingness, and 4) the place of absolute nothingness. Synchronization should be considered to be an enactment of the place of absolute identity; synchronicity is defined as the derivative of rationalism and universalism and informs most general theories in IR. Synchronization refers to the simultaneous execution or promoted diffusion of a pattern of rational thinking embedded in an idea, an institution, a collective identity, or a perceived arrangement of material force. Synchronization is presumably a process in which unrelated national actors conjunctionally fulfill their self-assigned functions to interact rationally. Institutionally, synchronization under the hegemonic order, which requires conversion, is the exact opposite of absolute nothingness, which foregoes any duty of converting others.

Table 1 - The PoP Conditions of Identity

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<th>Synchronic</th>
<th>Yes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-sited</td>
<td>World History Standpoint as Absolute nothingness</td>
<td>Hegemonic Order as Absolute identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Re-Worlding as Relative identity</td>
<td>Balance of Relationships as Relative nothingness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
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A spatial sensibility runs through the conditions of relative identity and absolute nothingness and thus keeps the danger of being conquered as well as conquering alive. Regarding the conditions of relative identity, spatial multi-sitedness, Worldliness, place, sovereignty, agency, subjectivity, Asia, and China-centrism are popular yet estranging concepts that celebrate their sited subjectivities. These concepts defeated the WHS’s quest for nothingness before WWII, treating the role of local/national differences so seriously that their subscribers could not help but engage in expansion and colonialism. The claim of “otherness” by a local subaltern is potentially dangerous because sited identity of this sort provides a clearly demarcated scope to carry out internal cleansing or launch external expansion, as well as invited conquest. The more clearly demarcated the site of resistance, the more strongly motivated the hegemonic power to enforce intervention.

While re-Worlding is a path for the self-perceived subaltern to reclaim subjectivity, nothingness uses self-perceived in-betweenness to transcend the false universalism of hegemony and then to reach allegedly true universalism. The epistemological caveat lies in the shared spatial anxiety of the loss of sitedness under the sensed hegemonic intrusion. The notions of “post-White” order of the WHS and the “post-Western” claim of many post-Western projects coincide with the identification of an imagined self-site. Note that WHS disciples try thawing sensibilities toward space by claiming themselves to be all-encompassing. Nevertheless, Sun Ge, a Chinese admirer of Japanese modern thoughts, traces a string of obsessive adherence to a certain inexpressible, but invincible, sense of space that is similar to a shelter or an identity. This spatial sensibility reproduces the imagined and

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25 Tanaka, Japan’s Orient.
re-imagined possibility of being controlled, monopolized, brainwashed, invaded, intruded, suppressed, exploited, and so on. The claim of difference in an exclusive self-ontological site would lead to the desire to overtake and transform it.\textsuperscript{28} After all, only those who possess a different site can be the target of intervention.

3. From Normative Failures to Scientific Inquiries

If sitedness and identity are two sides of the same coin, thorough invasion of the site can only take place by annihilating the identity of the people. At these hegemonic moments, each invasion symbolizes the collection of another fresh trophy of universalism. Hence, the effort to construct sitedness embedded in its own historical, religious, and cultural trajectory may dangerously incur the label of fundamentalism. A worst case is multi-sitedness that challenges the hegemonic instinct to conquer as many as possible, while at the same time discourages united resistance because of consciously cherished differences. Therefore, the normative appeal of the re-Worlding project may practically backfire. A late veteran Sinologist thus called for a methodology in Sinology that stops the treatment of China as Japan’s object of study. Instead, Sinology should be the method for Japan to withdraw from the Japanese condition and become universal.\textsuperscript{29} Could nothingness, as a substitute, have any empirical relevance except its normative claim of transcendence?

Normative failures of re-Worlding can be proven or disproven by empirical research, which may contribute to the improvement of the re-Worlding project. Both re-Worlding and the BoR have scientific potentials. Re-Worlding is a method of tracing how empirical learning and practice of hegemonic role assignments in the world political economy proceed at a particular site. Simply describing the enactment of the roles and their meaning to the subaltern site is a normative challenge to the hegemonic discourse. Despite the absence of a conscious attempt or capacity to resist, the sited understanding, which is rooted in sited knowledge, suggests how hegemonic order suffers revision, and hence subversion. The literature has noted abundant examples of this kind of resistance.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly, BoR can enlighten scientific research of IR by explaining how nations transcend power politics and maintain long-term, reciprocal stability. The literature on China’s relationships with Southeast Asian countries provides ample examples.\textsuperscript{31} The BoR does not have to be normatively preferred to be effective because it parallels the balance of power and influences IR where the balance of power is ambiguous or impossible to formulate. Also, balancing strategies alone are rarely successful.

I contend that the WHS can be scientific, similar to re-Worlding and the BoR, but a scientific mode of the WHS is rarely attempted. By generating scientifically hypothesized processes of transcendence, the WHS, along with BoR and re-Worlding, explains the capacity of a society to store suppressed or unwanted identities in a subconscious state of nothingness, which are awakened by the conditions ripened for their revival. This process also includes the capacity to acquire new perspectives in the future. The place of absolute nothingness is

\textsuperscript{28} Lily H.M. Ling, Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
\textsuperscript{29} Yuzo Mizoguchi, Zhongguo zuowei fangfa [China as method], trans. Lin You-chong (Taipei: National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 1999).
theoretically a site where all those alternatives temporarily are stored in oblivion. Amnesia is a plausible contingency in the aftermath of ideological, institutional, and identity conflicts, transforming societies of in-between civilizations into practiced adaptors to conditions—a threat of failure or an opportunity of success. As a result, no value, ideology, institution, or identity can be permanent. Cyclical and inconsistent self-understandings are the archetypical pattern in the long run in both re-Worlding and BoR research. They are able to partially predict cycles scientifically on the basis of the following three propositions:

1. The Nothingness Proposition: There is a high possibility for aborted identities to return in the future, and no identity can be permanent. International relations based on existing identities between nations are inherently unstable. This proposition is derived from the PoP ontology of the WHS that disregards space and temporality to accommodate various possibilities and to formulate a repertoire of identity strategies. Identities co-exist instead of undergoing synthesis. Identities aborted due to exhaustion of further improvements are not consciously accessible, but the thorough dominance of the current identity will eventually exhaust the country. The limit of the pursuit on the current track, once reached, will trigger the emergence of an alternative principle of IR. However, the systemic level does not determine exactly which one will return. Usually, this is determined by idiosyncratic factors such as family traditions, factional politics, and economic decline, etc. This proposition makes possible drastic turns to different IR principles by nations torn between incongruent identities. Their seeming incapacity to establish a compromise with rivaling identities is in line with their readiness for a drastic turn. Cooperation of the domestic constituency in support of such turns, once achieved, indirectly testifies the inexpressibility of absolute nothingness.

2. The Re-Worlding Proposition: Identities that can provide evaluative perspectives on dominant identities are more likely to stay or return over the course of time. International relations cannot proceed with one dominant identity in the long run. Derived from the re-Worlding epistemology, the re-Worlding proposition suggests that the recollection of an identity from the subconscious condition has a better chance as long as the present hegemonic circumstance can be critically assessed. This proposition is particularly germane to weak nations engrossed in an encountered hegemonic influence. Such nations reify the condition of relative identity by excavating and appropriating cultural resources not currently in use. The PoP epistemologically explains the possibility of these nations to resort to memories or utopia’s not shared by the encountered hegemony.

3. The BoR Proposition: To the extent that role-identity is contingent upon the context, identity switching would be easy and the synchronic rules of international society would be difficult to prevail. This proposition is derived from the BoR epistemology, which argues that nations live together more easily if they can settle on a way that disregards their differences in identities or values. Therefore, all cultural resources should be ready any time to comfort a particular target. Conscious transcendence over encountered differences reifies the condition of relative nothingness. The balance of relationships can be more likely attained by bilateral rather than multi-lateral negotiations. As a result, relative nothingness is particularly germane to nations that face an extensive and expanding scope of encounter that disallows enforcement of any synchronized value or institution. Likewise, a declining hegemony should engage in relative nothingness by jettisoning the extant synchronic values to appease allies. The condition of relative nothingness is illustrated by countries consciously avoiding specific positions in a multi-lateral setting or relying on different identity strategies in a variety of bilateral settings.
4. An Empirical PoP Pertaining to Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands

4.1. The three cases and the three propositions

The case of Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands illustrates the empirical relevance of the Philosophy of Place. In this case, hegemonic order may appear inapplicable because hegemonic power is ambivalent. In the 21st century, for example, with the US refusing to take a clear and consistent stand, all anti-hegemonic schemes in East Asia are competing over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands. The sources of confrontation and their resolutions emerge from both the implicit and powerful pressure of hegemony in synchronizing the mutually excluding sovereign order and the in/capacity to improvise of all the three nations. The dispute occurred between Japan, Taiwan, and China. Provided that they conform to the sovereign order, the three countries may not meet a resolution because the disputed island is intrinsic to their individual claim of sitedness. If they stick with the principle of nothingness, a resolution may eventually emerge under some version of Asianism, but may also disintegrate in the following cycle. Under the BoR, peace could be obtained through rituals allowing all to pretend ownership or war, but such pretentious rituals should be restored first. Each contender historically used a particular discursive weapon. Japan derived the WHS from the PoP. Taiwan applied the double-re-Worlding scheme. China adopted the balance of relationship. Nevertheless, these schemes were performed in cycles.

The scientists adhering to the PoP can specifically predict policy predisposition that has systemic consequences. In the first place, none of the three schemes is a direct respondent to power politics, nor to immediate or apparent national interest considerations. Rather, each scheme involves a cyclical drive to obtain the in-betweenness caused by co-existing yet non-synthesized identities. Japan’s return to the WHS Asianism, after experiencing exhaustion at having been the pupil of the West since 1950, shows the country’s indifference toward Chinese values or feelings and cultivates a degree of readiness to move beyond the US occupation. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s return to postcolonial aversion to China tolerates Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyutai, thus achieving Taiwan’s independence from China, with the support of the postcolonial identity left by its former colonizer Japan. China’s return to an ambiguous, pre-modern condition of sovereignty that relies on the ritual of joint venture or on a deliberately ambiguous rhetoric stabilizes bilateral relationships in a preferable state of no solution. According to the three propositions, Japan’s return is irrevocable until it is completely exhausted. Taiwan’s return is bifurcated into anti-China and pro-China. China’s return is to deliberately avoid positioning.

The place of absolute nothingness is expected to provide endless retrieval, recombination, and creativity that ensure the unstable nature of IR for any self-searching country caught between incongruent identities, such as Japan. Being positioned on the territorial dispute reveals the impossibility of being simultaneously Western, Asian, and Japanese. Once submerged in a particular identity, the nothingness proposition predicts that Japan will not yield until the continuation is no longer feasible physically (i.e. economically or militarily), and then yield quickly and thoroughly.

The place of relative identity remains based on the epistemological necessity of re-Worlding by a self-perceived subaltern nation in a rediscovered site, such as Taiwan. The desire for re-Worlding, in opposition to the hegemonic conquest, exposes Taiwan’s multiple subaltern positions regarding China, the US, and Japan, only to bring forth the impossibility
of self-becoming. In contrast to seeking independence from China, Taiwan cannot refuse any form of coalition with the hegemonic US. This coalition further leads to the inevitability of Taiwan allowing Japan’s unilateral nationalization of the disputed island. The re-Worlding proposition predicts that Taiwan will alternate between the three candidates of hegemony existing in its layered history as the target of resistance.

The place of relative nothingness mediates relative identity and absolute nothingness for a country experiencing a decline such as the late 19th century Qing court or a rise such as the early 21st century China. The resulting undecided roles for China to play pragmatically dissuade, accommodate, or urge its emerging identity to engage in various kinds of relationships. Territorial interests are inessential for China in stabilizing relationships under a changing international relations framework. A stabilized relationship should nevertheless include sovereign integrity if the opponent intends to deny China’s. The BoR proposition predicts that the Chinese pursuit of harmony and peaceful coexistence would be satisfied by Japan’s acknowledgement of the existence of a dispute and not by Chinese exclusive ownership of the disputed island. However, ambiguity is preferred to clarity in this case where a mutually agreed proper relationship is unlikely.

4.2. Japan and the nothingness principle

The Japanese modern history has been full of cycles. Each cycle has appeared irrevocable in the beginning. Consistently, the cycles were aborted upon the forced realization of exhaustion, but replaced with another seemingly irrevocable agenda. The key question is on the manner of coping with Japan’s Asian identity. Asia has alternatively exhibited its backward otherness under modernity, the base of world revolution under socialism, its backward self under the WHS, and a method of self-becoming under the pressure of modernity. The disciples of each theme always appear uncompromising but their causes necessarily come and go relative to whether the physical conditions of their continuous pursuit are obtainable or expiring. The complete involvement in a particular version of Asianism and the sudden subsequent switch strike the prototype of the nothingness proposition.

Aborted pre-WWII ideas of Asianism have returned to contemporary Japanese IR thinking in various versions. East Asia once had a crystal notion in support of Japan’s quest for worldliness before the war. As the place of absolute nothingness, Asia inspired a philosophy looking to overcome the compulsive Western modernity or the inevitable Asian backwardness. This perceived superior Western modernity returned after WWII with the arrival of American occupation forces in Japan. In addition, the image of a backward Asia lingered on in China’s estranging socialist identity. For some time, the Fukuzawa solution of “Leaving Asia, Joining Europe”, which was rendered politically incorrect by the Pacific War, reappeared, overshadowing Asianism. The literature has noted various other interpretations of Japan’s proper identity, such as liberal democracy, peacemaker, profitmaker, and development aider, which have arisen alongside nascent Asianism.32 In the aftermath of the Maoist Cultural Revolution in China, the silenced socialist and left-wing perspectives during the war once again lost their appeal, despite being revived in academic circles after the war.

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32 Guizhi Li, Jindia riben de dong yang gai nian: yi zhongguo yu ou mei wei jingwei [The concept of toyo in modern Japan: the two dimensions of China and Euro-America] (Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2008); Chia-ning Huang and Chih-yu Shih, No Longer Oriental: Self and European Characteristics in Japan’s Views on China (Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2009).
Each politically incorrect view had its turn in history and waited for another opportunity after being silenced by conditions. Cycles of political (in)correctness, which are frequent in subaltern societies,33 attest to the place of absolute nothingness as a depot of subconscious identities. The message for any hegemonic discourse of the time is that non-synthetic identities can never be quelled at the subconscious level.

The left wing yielded to suppressive authorities during the early Showa period, thus socialism was politically silenced. A significant portion of the left-wing supporters left Japan but their spirit remained in the remote but hopeful land of Manchukuo, the origin of civilization for Shiratori Kurakichi (1865 to 1942), a Shinto absolutist who founded the Tokyo School of Sinology. Manchukuo was tantamount to the place of nothingness in Shiratori’s narrative,34 being the common root of all civilizations, and was designed as the princely land of all nationalities. Therefore, Manchukuo is a reification of the place of absolute nothingness.35 Socialist intellectuals, after “giving in” their political correctness to Shinto under the Fascist condition, gathered at the Research Department of the Southern Manchurian Railway Company and embedded a left discourse in their class-related research on land property and conventions of village life in Northern China. Living under imperialism disallowed socialist intellectuals to engage in conscious politics of the subaltern. However, their anti-imperialist activism resumed atavistically after the American occupying troops liberated them from political incorrectness, which culminated in the 1960 mass demonstration against Japan’s signing of the Security Pact with the U.S. The views of these intellectuals on Socialist China were sanguine and hopeful, but the end of the Cultural Revolution silenced them again. While their place has always been opposite of that of the right wing, both left- and right-wing supporters share a career style of vicissitudes.36

The same career style has a wider scope of practice than Japan. A parallel vicissitude submerges Euro-Asianism in Russia, which first appeared in the 1920s and then acquiesced under the Communist Party rule for 70 years before finally re-emerging in the 1990s to assist in the pursuit of an integrated statehood of Russia.37 Similarly, the pursuit of statehood in 21st century Japan by the right wing, as supported by Premier Abe, was an attempt to move Japan beyond being an occupied territory of the U.S. or the West.38 To embark on a journey toward statehood, Japan cannot directly challenge U.S. leadership but must instead demonstrate its ability to face and overcome the rising China that disturbed the hegemonic order under the leadership of the U.S. As the U.S. fails to provide a civilizational model for neighboring China to emulate, a normalized Japan that is no longer under the U.S. protective umbrella would make a contemporary pledge to the WHS.

The nationalization of the Senkaku Islands of Japan in 2012 and the demonstration of Japanese military strength against China from 2013 onward have won the support of the Japanese general public, particularly the right-wing supporters. The pursuit of statehood, justified by the need to protect Japan’s claimed territory of the Senkaku Islands, parallels...
similar attempts to overcome modernity, which is prescribed for Japan by the lessons obtained from Europe since the Meiji Restoration. The Hegelian designation of the Orient as backward must be addressed. Japan used to believe that it could transcend its own Oriental backwardness by confronting China, and the return of the Senkaku Islands dispute has been the single and most significant confrontation between China and Japan in the 21st century.

The struggle began in 1876 when Japan kidnapped the king of Ryukyu, a Chinese protectorate that owned Senkaku. This incident is similar to the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands by Japan in 2012. In the first initiative, former U.S. President Ulysses Grant served as a mediator in 1875 between Japan and China to ensure peace. However, Japan was reluctant and did not accept the compromise indicated in Grant’s proposal to preserve Ryukyu as a Chinese protectorate. Japan defeated China 20 years later in 1895 and then Russia 30 years later in 1905, resulting in a successful Westernization of Japan that placed Japan on the world’s radar. However, Japan felt restrained by the West and decided, half a century after the Ryukyu kidnap, to exercise the WHS by grouping the entire East Asia together as a bloc to challenge the West. Japan’s dilemma of being indebted to both China and the West in its quest for national identity occurred in the Meiji period and in the 21st century. Modern statehood means that a state does not live under the protection or shadow of any Western country. In the 1920s, this independence to any Western country led to the refusal of Japan to succumb to the Washington Treaty system that downgraded Japan’s status to a secondary power in East Asia. As a result, in the 21st century, Japan should also display dissatisfaction as an occupied nation where U.S. troops are stationed.

With the demonstration of Japan as the only actor capable of modernizing Asia in the mid-20th century, transcendence of Western civilization was first enacted. In the 21st century, Japan is similarly exhibiting its exclusive capability to curb and transform China. Transforming China into a civilized nation is a task Japan feels confident it can accomplish. Hence, Japan must not represent the West or China, but both China and the West. This statement is true for Japan in the 2010s and the 1920s and embodies the spirit of the WHS rooted in the PoP and emerging from the KSP. Absolute nothingness is sufficiently embracive to the extent that other similar forms of Asianism in stock cannot remain idle in the long term. They will return to service after a long interlude. The metaphor of Manchukuo inspires different versions of Asianism to become a single method of self-denial and a method to transcend sovereign order. China, in general, additionally inspires a different form of Asianism in the Japanese intellectual circle, which is an Asianism that advocates peace, as exemplified by the liberal Asianist Akira Iriye.

Once into the cycle, the then incumbent Abe administration submerged completely into the revival of the same WHS spirit. The roadmap for Japan cannot be clearer. It has the goal of becoming a normal state in mind. The Senkaku Islands policy exemplifies Japan’s need and capacity to determine the use of a piece of Asian land. This policy does not reflect useful power politics because it ironically exposes Japan’s vulnerability, nor a calculated national interest as China has already provided consent to the joint access to natural gas.

39 Goto-Jones, Re-Politicising the Kyoto School.
Politically inadvertent, the escalation of the issue requires not only the resolve to discipline China but also the promise of US support. Ironically, the US is the last hurdle before Japan can normalize its statehood. Rising above both China and the West was exactly the goal of Abe’s grandfather Nobusuke Kishi (1896 to 1987) during the war. Both Nobusuke and Abe’s grand uncle Sato Eisaka (1901 to 1975) were right-wing prime ministers. The atavism of the Great East Asian Sphere reveals the aversion to China’s estrangement and anti-Japan sentiment, a parallel to the situation 150 years ago, as well as the present disapproval of Japan on Chinese nationalism. The rise of Japan in the early period was launched by a dispute over Korea’s jurisdiction. This dispute was much greater and more significant than that over Senkaku. Nevertheless, Senkaku symbolizes revival and hope for success in the 21st century.

The ideal state that Japan pursues for itself through the Senkaku Islands dispute is a Japan that possesses its own national defense troops. This militarily independent Japan would then deprive the American troops of any legitimacy to stay and Japan’s sovereign right to engage in war would then be legalized. The Senkaku Islands dispute thus registers an irrevocable agenda and a renewal of the WHS. Hence, the agenda Japan pursues through the Senkaku Islands is neither Chinese nor Western. The pursuit will not end until it succeeds or fails. This determination is illustrated by the fact that right-wing politicians have visited the Yasukuni Shrine where war criminals are honored. These and other incessant series of morale boosting campaigns virtually constrain the Abe government from any sign of retreat. A revoking move now would require very strong pressure from the U.S. or China. However, ironically, such pressure, especially from China, is probably exactly what constitutes the origin of Japan’s desire to restore its national defense. If either the current rise of China or the lingering US dominance can defeat the use of the metaphor of the initial rise of Japan in the beginning of the 20th century over the Korean issue to explain the Senkaku Islands dispute, opposite versions of Asianism will emerge in due time.

4.3. Taiwan and the adoption of a double-re-Worlding strategy

Taiwan is a representative site to practice the philosophy of nothingness because of the country’s uncertain and layered political history. Taiwan’s political regimes have constantly changed along with a population composed of generations of immigrants. Each regime has built upon the basis of another high-performing regime that was established originally outside of the island. As a result, where historical Japan consciously floats between having European and Chinese characteristics, contemporary Taiwan floats consciously between having Chinese, Japanese, and, after WWII, American characteristics. Early suspicions that Taiwan was in a position of in-betweenness arose during the conflict between China and Japan in the 1930s and the 1940s. To resolve such an inner confrontation, Confucian and colonial Taiwanese intellectual Tsai Peihuo adopted the notion of East Asia from Japan’s imperialism. In actuality, Taiwan in those days was a devout and sincere practitioner of KSP, more than Japan. Proclaimed as the “son of East Asia,” Tsai, still remaining loyal to the Japanese Emperor, imagined Taiwan belonging to neither just Japan nor just China. Tsai’s East Asian stance was by all means a mimicry of the WHS. Tsai was imprisoned by the Japanese authorities for the potential harm his thought could do to the combative morale of the Japanese military, with his self-surrender to an identity of a nobody.

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43 Shih, “Taiwan as East Asia in Formation”.

The political powerlessness of Tsai during WWII and the shaky regime in Taiwan that followed the war ironically confirmed the principles that a faithful following of the KSP is possible for the subaltern only. Subaltern people usually suffer from incapacity to change the world around them, but this incapacity can also stimulate deeper reflections that motivate learning. This motivation first requires withdrawal from one’s own condition and then entry into another condition to acquire different experiences or self-knowledge.

By contrast, developing a stronger power such as Japan, which practices the WHS, would be similar to constructing a civilizational bridge. When a strong disciple of the WHS preaches lessons to different parts of the world urging mutual learning, this may become a burden of nothingness. Both the partial West and backward China are legitimate targets of the transformation of the WHS. Japan undertook this imagined burden of teaching both sides during the war but did not find success in learning from different sides having already emerged in subaltern Taiwan, which first became a Japanese colony and later as an asylum for the defeated Chinese Civil War regime of the Kuomintang. Nevertheless, the intellectual capacity to deposit the inexpressible feeling of in-betweenness in the subconscious condition for the time being and then launch an atavistic revival many decades later validates the power of nothingness as a mode of self-identification.

The unavailing appeal to epistemological tranquility and ontological equality of Tsai’s East Asian childhood continued during the Kuomintang takeover after WWII and then was furthered by American intervention in East Asia where the containment of a Communist China imposed a strategic and ideological role for the Kuomintang regime. However, the Kuomintang had its own Civil War agenda/legacy, and, as a result, Taiwan did not become just another Vietnam or another base of containment. Chiang Ching-kuo, the last Civil War leader, struggled to establish his own platform on which the Cold War mentality and the preparation for a post-Civil War Taiwan could coexist. The Cold War mentality consisted of the idea of containing China under U.S. leadership, while the preparation for a post-Civil War Taiwan existed by reconnection with China in opposition to U.S. interests.

Similarly, post-colonial Taiwan had its own independent agenda that was different from the one of the ruling Kuomintang. Although the colonial worldview may have been suppressed under Kuomintang rule, in reality Lee Tenghui was able to capitalize on the decline of the Kuomintang in accordance with a retrieved colonial platform. Lee was ready to revive the colonial legacy when conditions matured to the appropriate point. His alienation from China awaited its turn to replace his Chinese qualities influenced by the Kuomintang. While the first hidden agenda was the attempt by Chiang Ching-kuo to bypass the hegemonic Cold War, the second agenda that carried post-colonial alienation from the Kuomintang was hidden from the ruling Kuomintang. The second agenda was self-suppressed by Lee for four decades because of the strategic silencing of the anti-Chinese identity, which was powerfully bred by Japanese colonialism.

The unique double hidden agenda displayed compromises of hiding between the Kuomintang’s post-Civil War and the U.S. Cold War, and between the post-colonials of Taiwan and Kuomintang’s Civil War. These double hidden agendas empirically demonstrated the philosophy of nothingness. Re-Worlding is the proper method to excavate these hidden
Transcending Hegemonic International...

agendas to recognize the agency that resists the consecutive rising powers of the ruling regimes that have arrived in Taiwan. The first hidden agenda utilized U.S. Cold War resources for the purposes of Chiang Ching-kuo to reconnect with China, in addition to the role assigned by the U.S. to contain China. The second hidden agenda was no more than an affective memory, completely unattended and without utterance, ensuring no indication of alienation from China. Therefore, in post-colonial Taiwan, becoming related to the incumbent power is always more imminent than any platform of rationalism. Each hidden agenda empowers the subaltern in question with a ready subjectivity to act incompatibly with the hegemonic expectation, regardless of a positive judgment toward their hegemonic leader, such as in the case of the Kuomintang toward the U.S., or a negative judgment, such as in the case of post-colonial Taiwan toward the Kuomintang. By critically reflecting on the hegemonic discourse, the hidden agenda is ultimately impacting the world agenda, hence worldliness.

Taiwan’s uncertain and layered political history prepares its residents efficiently to accept incoming regimes. Thus, the society does not intend to recollect politically incorrect history for its present time. Double-re-Worlding serves two different generations of PoP, namely, one that arrived before the Japanese colonial rule and the other after the end of it. The self-suppressed conditions of each of the two generations can usually persevere in the sub-consciousness and can be retrieved only when the condition has matured for re-emergence. PoP articulates the condition of layered sub-consciousness in a consistent rationality of hidden resistance. Taiwan’s condition of double re-Worlding also provides a more sophisticated case of re-Worlding. The post-colonial agenda, which came to power suddenly upon the demise of the Civil War generation, thrives on a pro-Taiwan independence discourse. Re-Worlding is no longer a mere resistance to hegemony. Instead, re-Worlding comprises cycles of hidden agendas, recalled to service from a long-term, albeit subconscious, memory to resist a substituting, albeit imagined, hegemony. Taiwan’s bifurcated populations, each in support of a particular scheme of re-Worlding, are conscious of the existence of each other. The decision is about whether or not China is the hegemony to resist. The double-re-Worlding strategy is contingent upon the identity that is more functional in providing Taiwan’s global representation. This case is different from Japan where the population is not constantly divided.

The coexistence of contradicting positions toward the Diaoyutai Islands should not be surprising under this layered circumstance. The Kuomintang changed its position from being the true representative of China that would regain the islands to a non-Chinese nation that only cares for a peaceful resolution. The pro-independence force supports Japan’s claim of sovereignty. Partially plagued by the Chinese image of Chiang Ching-kuo, the U.S. is continuously worried that a pro-independent Taiwan would desire cooperation with China. With China’s expectations to support Taiwan’s position on the Diaoyutai Islands, Taiwan’s quiet attitude toward the nationalization issue is apparently most serviceable to the acquisition of negative evaluation on China. Likewise, as Sino-Japanese relations become extremely weak, Taiwan’s post-colonial link with Japan contributes best to the representation of an non-Chinese Taiwan. This re-Worlding strategy is effectively revealed in Taiwan's agenda focusing exclusive on fishing rights. The agenda dissolved the political demand for action to confront Japan's unilateral nationalization of the Diaoyutai Islands and crashed any lingering speculation of Taiwan-China cooperation for the time being.
4.4. China and BoR Proposition: relationship as a conscious place

When the self-perception of China was at the center of the world during the dynastic period, the application of its tributary system was hardly synchronic. The Qing court, for example, arranged tributary relationships with its neighbors, each according to their own conditions. The Qing followed no single formula, and exemption from a rigid model was the only formula that was applicable in all cases. This arrangement explained why the kidnapping of the king of Ryukyu did not immediately incur a military reaction from the presumably stronger China at that time. For the Qing court, examining President Grant’s proposal was far more rational if the purpose was no more than saving China’s nominal suzerainty over Ryukyu. Subsequent abortion of Grant’s mediation only led to the Qing court’s decision not to take any action with the hope that such inaction would, first, avoid the embarrassment of the Chinese fighting with a small neighbor over a much smaller land and, second, camouflage the embarrassment that China was completely uninterested in its own suzerainty.

The relative negligence of the BoR toward principles or values is in contrast with re-Worlding in the sense that the re-Worlding philosophy seeks to overcome the heavy dependence of the subaltern on hegemonic sanctioning of economic, political, and ideological partnerships that enforce hegemonic principles or values. By presenting Taiwan’s maneuvering of the U.S. partnership in its own battle with China, a re-Worlding method for Taiwan brings to surface the subaltern’s agency hidden in its mimicry of hegemonic discourse. Re-Worlding is not in China’s favor. Rather, the BoR is the rationality for China to bypass the containment of a rising China contrived by the hegemonic forces. By stabilizing reciprocal relationships on a bilateral basis, with as many neighboring countries as possible, China can offset the challenge of containment. This means that China has to disregard the domestic institutional, ideological, and religious characteristics of its neighboring countries. The BoR is valuable for any newly emerging nation, any rising power in the face of an increasingly expanding and complicated encounter of the world, and any declining hegemony with a relaxed synchronizing imposition to appease allies. The declining hegemonies can include both the late 19th century Chinese dynasty and the 21st century US. All of them face an IR full of contradictions. To survive or to proceed, the nation should manage its uncertain environment by avoiding synchronizing relationships that proliferate in its expanding or shrinking scope of negotiation.

As China rises, the country precisely faces the challenge of proliferated relationships. The influence of these relationships expands to exert a strong presence in all its neighbors and reaches far into Africa and Latin America. As a result, the existing hegemonic U.S. and its allies sense the threat of the newcomer in being able to transcend boundaries that previously restrained the sphere of influence. Defending the rise in world politics from the rebalance of power by the hegemonic U.S. and soothing anxious neighbors are apparently very different tasks. In addition, a watching Europe that is composed of the self-regarded moral superpower in West Europe, a post- but anti-communist East Europe, and a competitive and yet occasionally conveniently allied Russia requires soothing as well. These tasks are not the most complicated, however, when compared with those in anti-unification Taiwan, recalcitrant North Korea, and assertive right-wing Japan, not to mention potentially rebellious Hong Kong.

Exemplifying relative nothingness, China’s difficulty in handing very complicated relationships does not arise from its own confused identity, but from the various incongruent
roles expected by countries worldwide to be performed by China. In the case of Japan, its international environment has not undergone significant change except during the rise of China that resulted in an identity puzzle forcing Japan to choose aligning either to the West or to the East. This idiosyncratic, internal puzzle compels the Abe government into the conservative side that may send the less conservative sides of national identity into acquiescence, thus repeating a familiar cycle. In comparison, the rise of China proceeds with the art of relationship. In East Asia, relationship management means that China has to cope simultaneously with a Taiwan that intensively asserts its worldliness, a U.S. that anxiously applies some synchronic values/institutions to co-opt China, and a Japan that ambivalently switches from being a member of Asia, to a junior ally of the U.S., and to a normal state in the world.

The cycles of right-wing identity in Japan are drawn from the depot of all historical identities. The cycles likewise come from the re-Worlding strategy of Taiwan to distance itself from Chinese identification and to answer primarily to the call for a clear self-identity under globalization that is embedded in the hegemonic order and has multicultural sensibilities. This quest for difference brings Taiwan and Japan closer in portraying an estranging China that rises on illiberal politics, which the two former countries oppose. Taiwan’s quest for independence requires no more than a statement of difference, while Japan’s adherence to Western synchronic values imposes a duty to transform China. In line with its relational sensibilities, China has to concede to Taiwan’s liberal arrangement, demonstrating that Taiwan’s return to China would not cause any serious adaptive problems. However, China would resist any liberalization proposed by either Japan or the US. The BoR is alienated from such an interventionary policy. Therefore, BoR requires China to treat liberalism inconsistently, depending on who promotes it.

BoR serves as a bridge between the WHS and re-Worlding because the purpose of BoR in relating strives to bypass sited identities and pushes for alternative sited identities to be recollected from memory. Confronting China’s BoR, for example, Taiwan recollects a dormant colonial identity to support re-Worlding of an exclusively non-Chinese Taiwan. Nevertheless, China’s BoR can also support a pro-China identity in Taiwan. For example, China can concord to the sovereignty of Diaoyutai Islands with Taiwan’s pledge, given that Taiwan willingly continues to represent China and bypass the colonial identity.

To distinguish China’s intended, albeit unsuccessful, compromise to Taiwan and Japan, China has to avoid providing the impression to the US or to other potential parties of territorial conflict, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and India, that China is ready to yield in the latter cases. China resorts to relationship management. Basically, China proposes joint ventures over disputed territorial seas or islands, with other parties of conflict being able to make their own claim internally. As long as the internal claim is not brought to the bilateral relationship, the claim should not cause concerns from other parties. Before any consensus can be achieved, China resorts to symbolic as well as mixed sanctions to simultaneously show the country’s determination to defend sovereign rights and its willingness to compromise. In the case of the Diaoyudao Islands, China has engaged Japan’s nationalization by patrolling the air and the sea around the islands, by announcing an air defense zone, and by occasional approaching without landing on the islands as if the dispute requires no immediate resolution. China actually demands no more than a statement from Japan that nationalization does not affect the disputed status of the island. The rationale behind the mix of unilateral compromise
and the subsequent demand of the other side to yield is to cut cross-positions. Along with China’s proposal of conflict resolution is the unfailing reiteration that the dispute is bilateral. Hence, any hegemonic intervention can be considered as ill intended and counter-productive.

In short, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai/Diaoyu Islands has limited national interest implications regarding natural gas, which no one has actualized yet. In avoiding the reoccurrence of disputes, joint ventures have been attempted and agreed upon. Therefore, no significant national interests are involved in the dispute. Consider that China has not shown any interest in obtaining the islands from the current occupier Japan. Maneuvering for more power on the islands can be considered disadvantageous to Japan. Strategically, no one is ready or can force a solution. In brief, Japan’s nationalization is apparently premature from the balance of power perspective. However, Japan’s nationalization reflects the desire to recount the rise of the country at the turn of the 20th century. The ability to determine the fate of the islands is critical to the transcendence of international relations, which is dominated by China and the US. Taiwan’s acquiescence over the process of nationalization reflects the quest for the independent representation of an anti-China identity, which was ironically initially planted by Japanese colonialism. Finally, China’s resort to ambiguity reflects the substitution of relationship for territorial sovereignty.

A note on the role of the US as a representative example of “absolute being,” along with the plausible routes of retreat currently unrecognized, can implicate upon the scope of applicability of scientific PoP. To begin, the US’ reiteration of its adherence to freedom of navigation concerning the dispute attests to its subscription of synchronizing IR. With that said, the US could support, or restrain, both Japan and Taiwan depending on the bilateral “BoR”, which could demand the two allies to compromise in order to please the US, or alternatively oblige to the US for it to back them up in the struggle against China indiscriminately despite the effect on the freedom of navigation. This BoR consideration could likewise apply to the US-China relationship so that the two allies serve primarily as strategic dependents to help facilitate China’s proper response expected by the US. Moreover, given China’s continuous rise, it is likely that the US would reduce the freedom of navigation to a peculiar kind of Monroe Doctrine on behalf of Japan to assert the “re-Worlding” of the islands. All the incidents might play into effect for fast rising China to potentially switch to the place of “absolute being” in the presently unlikely case where the tributary system could re-emerge with prescribed rules and procedures for other nations to follow.

5. Conclusion: Systemic Transcendence over Interest and Power

The PoP propositions do not predict the actual foreign policy or the necessity of nations to behave in certain patterns, given the context of the international structure. The PoP propositions also do not even formulate predictions on how nations will generally behave. However, all three PoP propositions do make predictions about how the system behaves in the long run as well as how asymmetric relationships proceed. Other similar theoretical attempts that are familiar to IR disciples all focus on major power behavior. One noticeable realist example includes the prediction of John Mearsheimer on confrontation during hegemonic transitions, as one of the most discussed systemic theories that anticipate the inevitability of confrontation between existing and rising powers. Liberal IR scholar Robert Keohane

theorized on institutional functionalism that continuously support the hegemonic order after the hegemonic power loses the capacity to cover the free-riders of its order.46 A similar string of constructivist IR exists, as presented by Alexander Wendt who predicts that the system will move toward a world government from where major powers learn rationally together.47 In comparison, the PoP theorization examines the stability of the system.

PoP theorization has three specific features that are different from mainstream IR theorization. First, PoP theorization is not a study on how the order between major powers can be established or explained, but instead, the study cares about how nations adapt to major power politics by joining, resisting, appropriating, reconciling, avoiding, transcending, or even defeating them. PoP theorization predicts that the order is never orderly. Second, PoP theorization specifically allows nations to make judgments that will affect systemic behavior. Unlike the majority of IR theories with a structural argument, PoP theorization demonstrates how the structural explanation can accommodate judgmental factors and how nations are capable of thinking and choosing under undecidable circumstances. Third, PoP theorization confronts both purposes and their systemic consequences for all varied nations, while other theories focus primarily on major powers.

In summary, the IR theorization, in accordance with PoP, relativizes major power politics and their quest for order that is composed of synchronic values or institutions. By contrast, PoP is premised on non-synthetic identities in layered or multi-layered histories. There is no pretension of either a destiny or a destined fate. PoP IRT explains how nations under the influence of major power politics judge their conditions and rely on combined existing cultural resources to determine their place in world politics. PoP predicts that IR’s systemic stability cannot be maintained over a set of congruent identities because history’s longevity allows for previous politically incorrect identities to either return in due time with proper clues or emerge from creative recombinations of old and extant cultural resources. The PoP specifically predicts that nations caught between different identities will experience cycles in their IR, while those with an expansive scope of IR or experiencing a decline from the hegemonic status will adopt the BoR. Less influential nations will practically reinterpret hegemonic order to meet their otherwise inexpressible motivations.

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On the Borders of Cultural Relativism, Nativism, and International Society:
A Promotion of Islamist Democracy in the Middle East after the Arab Uprisings*

Metin Koca
European University Institute

Abstract
This article focuses on post-Arab-uprising calls for democratization in the Middle East. Scrutinizing the then-Turkish government’s coupling of a cultural relativist norm-promotion discourse in the global arena with a nativist discourse in the Middle East, the paper examines how much our current conceptual tools can explain successes and failures in this process. The article focuses on two schools of thought that pay considerable attention to the role of culture in institution-building: the English School of International Relations (ES) and the nativist strand of post-colonialism. It touches upon two problems in the ES literature and offers two solutions: (1) It reinforces attention on Buzan’s conception of interhuman society compared to the ad hoc blending of different levels of abstraction in cultural analyses. (2) It aims to initiate a dialogue for a more precise distinction between various ideational and behavioral components of the concept of culture, since these components do not necessarily fit well together. Considering these two caveats, the article operationalizes culture in the given case to examine some limitations of the nativist ideological perception of cultural zones and its concurrent claims over true nativity. The paper seeks these limitations, first, by analyzing the extent of cultural commonalities between three sub-regional Islamist movements that shared a strong common identity, and second, by examining the dialogue between ideological mismatches in the constitution-making processes of Egypt and Tunisia.

Keywords: Relativism, culture, English School, identity, democracy

1. Introduction
Although social scientists do not necessarily enjoy following the agenda of popular debates,¹ this sharing may be the constitutive element of a field of academic inquiry. One such field is the study of culture, which is the chicken-or-egg debate in a centuries-old transmission of public discourse, due at least in part to the constant sharing of a large vocabulary (e.g. civilization, culture, tradition, identity).

A stark illustration of this transmission is the popular topic in Europe as to whether Turkey, as a candidate country, or Muslim, as a usually stereotyped religious identity, can internalize democratic values with characteristics other than the self-defined Western identity,

¹ This paper is a revised version of the author’s Master’s Dissertation at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The author is grateful to the members of the English School Section of International Studies Association for their valuable feedback of an earlier draft.

ideals, and ways of thinking and behaving. Another reflection of these identity politics is no less contemporary: how much culture matters in post-Arab-uprising institution-building processes. Starting in 2010, some military regimes in the Middle East began to disintegrate in the face of popular uprisings. During this process, Turkey’s self-proclaimed conservative democratic government purported to help some rising self-proclaimed Islamist governments construct a set of regional norms that the former deemed a functional equivalent of the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria, albeit in a different spirit—a cultural relativist manifesto in the global arena and a highly nativist one in the regional arena.

By examining the uses of culture in these simultaneous processes, this study aims to problematize the analytical frameworks of two schools of thought that pay considerable attention to culture in IR: the English School of International Relations (ES) and the nativist strand of post-colonialism (hereafter, nativism). I address two specific questions that relate to these highly broad literatures: (1) How did Turkey attempt to relativize the concept of democracy in the international arena during the Arab uprisings? (2) To what extent did the perceived common culture of Turkey and its interlocutors in the Middle East help initiate an institution-building process in the region after the Arab uprisings?

“We look for a Middle East in which people, goods, capital and ideas move freely,” said Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish foreign minister at the time. This thinking reflects what the EU has been struggling to facilitate in Europe since the Treaty of Rome. Davutoğlu, one of the top figures in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, further clarified his country’s regional goals as well as his perception of the ordinary Middle Eastern citizen:

> The values that we support in the Middle East are those that the EU accepts as [the] Copenhagen Criteria. They are the same […] from fighting against corruption, democratic governance, and fair and transparent elections, to human rights and freedoms. The demands of any young Arab in Benghazi, Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus and San’a are the things that the European societies naturally enjoy in their countries.

He argued that the region should gradually institutionalize a democratic system of its own. In international forums, he defended a form of cultural relativism echoed by then-President Abdullah Güл, and then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as a must for a sustainable consensus between “the Middle East” and “the West”, as they construed the geopolitics of these terms. On the flip side of this relativist position was a nativist regional imagination; that a foundational common culture would be the building block of institutionalizing anything in and of a space (e.g. the Middle East). This ambitious regional imagination has not materialized...
due to the intersection of many systemic, regional, and domestic developments that I do not extensively question in this paper. Specifically, I argue that the uses of *culture* throughout this process not only have policy implications but also sociological implications for cultural relativism, nativism, and conceptions of culture—in general in IR and in particular in the ES.

My argument is in line with Yosef Lapid’s critique that “cultural wholeness superstitions” in our analytical frameworks lead to essentialist readings of cultural zones and inter-cultural relativities. My normative position throughout the article is in line with the efforts to develop new approaches so as to study the differences between seemingly identical units, as well as the similarities between seemingly counterposed units. More specifically, first I touch upon two problems from the ES literature, which extensively question the role of culture in institution-building processes. The first of these problems is the *ad hoc* blending of different levels of abstraction in analyzing culture (*e.g.* sub-state, state, systemic). In this regard, I argue that the interaction between cultures at the sub-state and state levels can be more accurately traced with the relatively new conception of *interhuman and transnational domains*, in addition to the interstate domain. Second, by examining the ES’ conceptualization of culture, I claim that the literature overlooks how different ideational and behavioral components (*e.g.* beliefs, values, ideologies, identities, habits) may vary under the umbrella term of culture. Within this context, I specifically problematize the common usage of *Islam* in the ES literature as the embodiment of a single culture.

Having recognized modern Islamism as the product of a particular ideological relationship with Islam, I initially argue that its claim over Islam and cultural relativism should be recognized as an ideological processing of culture. This processing explicitly contests several practices that are habitualized, hence culturalized, in the regions that Islamists address. Based on the two abovementioned caveats, the second half of the article analyzes the nativist call for institution-building in Egypt and Tunisia—the two countries that experienced deep contestations over the institutionalization of democracy in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. I first focus on the extent of cultural commonalities between Turkey’s AKP, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and Tunisia’s Ennahda. Then, I examine the ideological mismatches over what is native, and therefore acceptable in nativist terms, in the constitution-making processes of Tunisia and Egypt. I conclude that isolating an ideological reading of culture suggests little about the totality of a cultural system. Instead, as polarized but interlinked components, the mismatches should be examined together.

2. Revisiting Culture in the English School of IR

Defining culture is a multidisciplinary challenge. The concept is at odds with mainstream social sciences, especially when it is construed under the epistemological relativist traditions of anthropology, which go against universalist and objectivist concept-formations. Whereas anthropological definitions of culture⁷ are based on strong interpretivist grounds, political science and IR scholarship generally favor more outcome-oriented definitions, which see culture as an explanatory causal condition, among others.⁸ The English School is outside the

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mainstream theoretical positions in IR, and arguably more in line with cultural studies, with its rejection of “scientistic” methodology and many of its core assumptions.9

However, the operationalization of culture in the ES has seldom been challenged, although it is a highly important concept in its analytical framework. Culture in the ES is commonly associated with a combination of ideational and behavioral elements, such as “norm-setting beliefs and linguistic guidelines [that spawn, support, or eject] a given society’s political system, art styles, social structures and dispositions to the outside world.”10 For Adam Watson, the limit of a culture is hidden in the limits of assumptions, theories, and values in a given society.11 Whereas Martin Wight assumes that common culture is necessary for an international society to come into existence (i.e. the *gemeinschaft* notion12), both Watson and Hedley Bull do not mention culture as a building block of international society (i.e. the *gesellschaf* notion). Bull more broadly focuses on culture’s role, not so much in the social construction of institutions during their foundation, but in enhancing normative cohesion afterwards.13 Mark Hoffman defines what the ES often outlines as political culture: “the norms, rules, values and language of discourse and action.”14

One major contribution of the ES to IR is its defense of the relevance of the sub-state level of analysis to international politics. However, the ways through which different levels of abstraction interact with each other is seldom questioned beyond some *ad hoc* illustrations in historical accounts of European international society. This is an important question, since values, rules, and norms at one level of abstraction are not simply reflected on another level. For instance, a state’s pronounced values do not necessarily amount to an aggregation of its people’s values. And its people’s relationship with religion does not necessarily reflect the religiosity of state behavior.

With an *ad hoc* coupling, cultural analyses in the ES often tend to fluctuate between sub-state and state—even more radically, these are occasionally blended with civilizational abstractions: sometimes the people are taken as the mirror of a state, sometimes state behavior is assumed to reflect the people’s behavior, and sometimes a timeless religious text is labelled as the embodiment of a civilization, with states and the people carrying this text for centuries. This totalizing approach underestimates the cultural complexity beneath each perceived cultural zone. Wight quoting Edmund Burke *inter alia* is one clear example of this jumping between different levels of abstraction: “[Turks] consider themselves as wholly Asiatic […] they despised and condemned all Christian Princes […]. What had these worse than savages do with the powers of Europe, but to spread war, destruction and pestilence amongst them.”15

A more critical part of the ES literature convincingly demonstrates how constructing ‘the other’ in the abovementioned way depicts monolithic imaginations of the other and the self,16 while another part reproduces similar identifications under a notion of cultural wholes.

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12 A core fault line in ES is between *gemeinschaft* (civilizational) and *gesellschaf* (functional) notions of international society, which results in different interpretations of the role culture plays in the formation and expansion of international society. Despite these clashing perspectives, the classical texts of ES overlap in finding that a degree of common culture is a precondition in the emergence of, or a facilitator in, the maintenance of an international society.
Given that the abovementioned cultural attributes the ES literature questions necessitate going below the state level, I aim to offer an illustration of the way to seek such connections between sub-state and state levels. Within this context, I argue that Buzan’s introduction of interhuman and transnational domains is useful in identifying the symbolic systems of meanings that operate between sub-state actors, which may transcend, challenge or underpin the interstate system. Buzan defines interhuman societies as “sub-systemic communities with large-scale collective identities”—these may be civilizational, religious or ideological. Based on their self-declared commonalities, I hereby take the leaderships of Turkey’s AKP, Tunisia’s Ennahda, and Egypt’s MB as the claimants of an interhuman society with a strong collective identity. Although the leaders express commonalities that might otherwise have been a mixture of vague thoughts, their claims over societal formations are grounded in the social bases of these movements. However, what makes a society interhuman rather than transnational is the lack of a single network with an actor quality. In other words, both the leadership and social bases remain too fragmented to form a clearly delimitable transnational society. In this sense, interhuman societies have “shared identities, with networks posing the main ambiguity about classification.” Although the question of categorization remains open, I prefer calling the self-declared society between AKP, MB, and Ennahda as a claim of being one interhuman society.

This claim over interhuman society was relevant to the state level partially because their leaderships simultaneously ruled in Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt with common aspirations but varying degrees of control over state apparatuses and social structures. It is necessary to examine these movements below the state level because they do not fully share the components of the interstate system, such as given nation-state borders that they occasionally criticized. Despite this collective identity, I claim that these societies do not necessarily share a uniform culture. This point brings me to the intermingled terms of culture and identity.

As the abovementioned definitions of culture in the ES literature suggest, the concept is used by ES thinkers in a way to integrate diverse symbolic systems, such as consciously made ideologies, hard-to-pin-down belief systems such as religiosities, their individual or collective expressions such as identities, and the routinized and mostly unconscious patterns of behavior such as habits—all under the rubric of culture. Scott Thomas’ examination of Wight’s work exemplifies this blending of symbolic systems. For instance, in this article, almost all emphases on culture are followed by a complementary concept such as religion, ideology, or civilizational identity, since Wight’s writings assume these are axiomatically in line. Connectedly, there are several references to a religion [i.e. Islam, Christendom] simply as a culture. However, it has been convincingly argued in recent multidisciplinary endeavors that ‘Islam’ per se cannot be analyzed as a single cultural system, since it is clear that Muslims do not carry out identical practices with a uniform mode of Islamic perception. Sketching a similar distinction between culture as practice and religion as belief, the opposite

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18 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 207-12.
19 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 135.
21 These multidisciplinary endeavors question the anthropological roots of conceptualizing religions as cultures. See footnotes 23 and 24.
was recently argued for Catholicism: many have recently claimed that Catholicism survives solely as a culture in today’s Western Europe, but no longer as a strong belief system.²³ Whereas religion is a matter of community and biological descent for Jews, it is a matter of personal belief for American Protestants.²⁴

Although these symbolic systems are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they are not necessarily cohesive. Not only might beliefs and practices de-couple, but also a common identity may not necessarily be a marker of cultural cohesion. A society may have a strong sense of common identity, with little consensus over the meaning of its cultural symbols: many anthropologists have demonstrated that societies that consider themselves to be well-integrated tend to have surprisingly little agreement on the content of their cultural commonalities.²⁵ In the same vein, habits and values might contradict one another. People’s habitual practices do not necessarily reflect what they say they value as the order of their moral systems (always a critique from Islamists toward traditional Muslims). Connectedly, a religious ideology does not necessarily call for the re-embracement of historical cultural baggage. For instance, Islamism, as a modern ideology, calls for the purification of religion from other cultural artefacts. However, although Islam is a world religion for Islamists, their way of construing Islam is informed by distinct local structures that they are tied to.²⁶ This distinction between the particular and the universal is further questioned in the following section.

2.1. Cultural relativisms, nativisms, and the territory

The totalizing conceptions of culture necessarily result in a perception of monolithic cultural spaces—counter-posed against one another, wary of dialogue, and mostly uniform within themselves. New approaches²⁷ in the ES aim to challenge this conventional understanding with stronger “syncretic”²⁸ accounts of history that prioritize the communicative evolution of cultures, as opposed to the reproduction of essentializing labels in the literature.

Essentializing labels extend far beyond the literature mentioned above. A notion of almost-impermeable cultural borders is shared in parts of global history²⁹ and political and social sciences.³⁰ A common feature is the rendering of the originally theoretical debate of cultural relativism into a matter of territorial factionalism, through which each culture is reified as a delimited territory. Within this context, cultural relativism no more marks a claim over how cultures communicate but turns into an argument over how the centers of power that talk in the name of cultural zones ought to interact with one another. This form of cultural relativism goes beyond the empirical recognition of cultural variability.³¹

³¹ See, on the empirical recognition of cultural variability: Melford E. Spiro, “Cultural Relativism and the Future of
A strong illustration of this intermingling of cultural relativism, power, and territory is nativism, which denotes a desire to return to the indigenous, pre-colonial cultures. Although many post-colonialists agree that it is impossible to return to a cultural essence, some of them justified nativism for other reasons.32 Taken together, these schools of thought present nativism either as a defense of a particular understanding of the true native, or a defense of inventing one against colonial forces. One key argument in post-colonialism is that colonial forces have their carriers in post-colonial societies: these carriers may not simply be residual institutional structures, but also people, who are claimed to lack a moral agency—they are “captive minds.”34 In this sense, nativism was occasionally used to describe Islamism as a revival of indigenous forces against modernity and Westernization: “Of course, the real people could never be banished.”35 To the contrary, many students of Islamism note that Islamism has itself appeared as a modern ideology in multiple forms, with the projection of a particular relationship between modern politics, social secularization, and religion. By introducing the temporal dimension, this opposite argument underlines that Islamist nativism ignores the historical trajectory of Islamism.

Nativist claims are not necessarily about a native itself, however, but about the ideological efforts to form one relative to others. One major response to this form of cultural relativism is that its defenders never come from non-dominant social classes: in the ‘West,’ they are “white male intellectuals,”37 and in the ‘rest,’ they are ruling classes that negotiate their power.38 Within this context, Gayatri Spivak questioned how nativism in itself implies its own “permission to narrate,” by offering “phantasmatic hegemonic counternarratives” against the narratives of colonialism.39 In a similar vein, Terry Eagleton points out that “cultural relativism can come to ratify the most virulent forms of cultural absolutism.”40

The second half of this paper aims to demonstrate that the nativist discourse refuses to recognize many other natives as they could be, as many may not fit into a particular ideological imagination of the true native. This exclusion has its limitations in an institution-building process, especially in diverse societies in terms of their cultural attributes. Given that nativism is intended to foster easier dialogue for an autonomous democratization process, it is essential to question the extent to which Turkey’s reference to a common culture has contributed to its ties with its Egyptian and Tunisian interlocutors. In addition, the consequences of the cultural relativist discourse should be examined by seeking its characteristic features in the post-uprising constitution-making processes of Tunisia and Egypt. Although I think that the

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33 Nativism is not the only post-colonialist position that may undermine moral agency of actors: see the critique of Joseph Massad by Katerina Dalacoura, “Homosexuality as Cultural Battleground in the Middle East: Culture and Postcolonial International Theory,” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 7 (2014): 1290-306.
process in Turkey should also be analyzed on the same ground, I believe it suffices within the scope of this article to take Turkey only as a norm-promoter. With the abovementioned aims, I ask three questions, and the answer for each cumulatively addresses the following: (1) What did the claim over common culture consist of for the norm-promoter, the Turkish government? As a sub-question, How did this usage of culture differ from a more objectivist representation [e.g. that of the EU Neighborhood Policy] of the democratic norms? (2) How have the interlocutors, that is, the Tunisian Ennahda and Egyptian MB governments, reacted in response to this discourse of common culture? (3) Could the references to nativity pave the way for the initiation of a re-making of democracy?

After describing the main tenets of this particular cultural relativist political imagination of democracy, I argue that the Tunisian and the Egyptian governments responded positively to Turkey’s cultural relativist norm-promotion discourse. Although these ties did not necessarily mean a total sharing of cultural attributes, they often implied a strong common identity. However, it follows that the nativist discourse did not operate as intended, which was to be a facilitator of dialogue in the region. Instead, its consolidative effect was limited to the self-conception of an interhuman society, which consisted of a mainstream political Islamist ideological current shared by at least three organizations with strong grassroots bases: Turkey’s AKP, Egypt’s MB, and Tunisia’s Ennahda. Although the relativist international and nativist regional perspectives proved highly influential and well-represented, it is difficult to claim that the characteristic features of this discourse underpinned a constructive dialogue beyond its own ideological circle. I trace where it reproduced exclusion, marginalization, and cultural-moral monism against numerous sub-regional elements.

Given the outcome of constitution-making processes, it may be argued that the social polarization at the sub-state level did not allow the attempt of institution-building to mature at the interstate society. In Egypt, the military leadership exploited this social polarization to legitimize the coup. In Tunisia, arguably with a historic lesson-drawing, the Ennahda eventually managed to contribute to a widely supported constitution. The relationship between the compromises the Ennahda made in this process and its abandonment of exclusionary narratives is briefly questioned in the final section.

3. Norm-Promotion in the Middle East: Relativism versus Objectivism

A couple of studies specifically address the characteristic features of the EU’s objectivist norm-promotion discourse. These researches process the relevant data in distinct ways—they touch on a double-speak between ideals and security, an efficiency-centered technocratic and depoliticizing norm-promotion language, and connectedly, an indifference to the possibility of political and cultural divergences. By contrast, I set forward that Turkey has recently used a nativist discourse that is based on its perception of common culture with the region. Having further deepened the self-exceptionalism of previous governments, the AKP’s aim

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was at least twofold: (1) telling the West that the Western concepts of norm-promotion are alien to the region and (2) telling the peoples of the Middle East that they should localize democratic norms in order to be strong enough against ‘the enemies of the region.’

3.1. Turkey’s AKP: normative relativism at a global level, nativism at a regional level

In this section, I analyze all official foreign policy declarations of the Republic of Turkey in relation to Europe and the Middle East between 2010 and 2014, including most speeches and some interviews with the AKP leadership, primarily Davutoğlu, Erdoğan, and Gül. Whereas relying on older sources may have been beneficial in questioning the changes actors went through, they would not help me understand how actors situated their claims into the specific social context of the Arab uprisings. Within this specific context, I scrutinized the data by prioritizing frequent repetitions of certain markers of identity in consideration with the wider social context behind their usage (e.g. when and for whom something is told, and what it meant for the interlocutors). These markers, such as “Westerners,” “orientalists,” “we,” “they,” “our civilization/culture,” and “our democracy” were of representational importance in my analyses of the actors’ relational senses of the world. In light of this framework, I argue that the Turkish government aimed to sketch a collective transnational identity that highlights the distinction between ‘natives and ‘others.’

First, the government used a highly political discourse that labelled technocratic Western attempts of norm-promotion as ineffective, if not harmful. Instead, the government repeatedly underlined its self-perceived cultural proximity with the uprising countries. For instance, Davutoğlu touched several times upon his government’s unprecedentedly close relations with the first democratically elected governments of Tunisia and Egypt, stating that the three governments interacted as though they were the cabinet of a single country. This relationship was often backed by a religious repertoire with strong post-colonialist connotations. According to this framework, the reasons for the underdevelopment of the Middle East were worthy of addressing, but not from an “orientalist” viewpoint: “[W]e will ask this question not from outside, but from inside.” Opinions about outsiders have occasionally been more clearly expressed. For instance, then-President Gül mentioned “apartheid and intolerance towards different cultures” as “the West’s chronic illness.” Davutoğlu further stated: “the producers of [fear scenarios against our regional unity] are the orientalists. [According to them,] Westerners, Europeans, Americans can experience democracy but Middle Eastern societies cannot.”

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49 “Dışişleri bakanı sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun V. Büyükelçiler Konferansında yaptığı konuşması, 2 Ocak 2013” [Foreign
This boundary delimitation was also occasionally apparent as an instrumental tool during Turkey’s accession process to the EU. For instance, in his article in the Austrian newspaper *Die Presse*, Davutoğlu claimed that any obstacle to Turkey’s accession would resonate not only within the boundaries of Turkey but also in surrounding areas, “primarily in Muslim countries and Turkic Republics.”50 The central argument behind this discourse is that Turkey was speaking to the West as the voice of a region that exceeds its nation-state boundaries.

Furthermore, the government justified its mission of norm-promotion with a civilizational political imagination. Davutoğlu repeatedly sketched a roadmap for the “Islamic Civilization”:

We have two forthcoming challenges: theoretical and practical. The theoretical challenge is rebuilding the values of the Islamic civilization in accordance with the essence of the basic notion of human rights. Without this, the realization of a thought revolution, it is very difficult for us to find solutions to our practical problems.51

Having embraced a civilizational level of argument, Davutoğlu called for the members of the civilization to find solutions to problems that “others” exploit, expressing that only a deep intellectual change will prove to the world that “our culture is one in which freedom of religion and conscience is enjoyed”. 52 Similarly, Erdoğan repeatedly called for a change in the region’s structure as a necessary precaution against increasing Islamophobia globally.

This norm-promotion is efficiency-centered; nevertheless, it somewhat prioritizes relative gains over absolute gains; in other words, a call for the region to be strong against “the enemies of its unity.”53 Davutoğlu described Turkey’s regional vision not only as one with cultural solidarity but also one that is economically and geopolitically integrated, through visa exemptions, free trade agreements, power transmission lines, and transportation networks. He regarded Turkey’s relationship with Egypt as strategically most important to accomplish these aims. He also warned against “those who support the status quo and instigate conflicts in the region to prevent this solidarity.”54 Lastly, the nation-state borders were often contested by Turkish leadership, although a re-configurative plan has never been brought to the interstate level as a challenge to the current international system. Davutoğlu repeatedly labelled the Sykes-Picot agreement as a wall between Turkey and the region.

The Turkish government’s normative cultural relativism made room for a contestation of universalist definitions of democracy. The discourse recognized varying definitions of democracy, emanating from subjective formulations of each society with its specific

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52 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, August 27, 2012, par44.


54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, December 27, 2012, par56.
historical experience. For instance, then-President Gül criticized the imposition of Western-centric blueprints to modernize the Middle East.55 For this reason, Turkey officially avoided using coercive connotations of the particular ‘Turkish model’. Davutoğlu told the French newspaper Le Monde that Turkey never desired to be a model because every country has unique features, although he noted that Turkey is willing to share its experience.56

This cultural relativist position empirically claimed that value judgements are relative to cultures, and that normatively there is a value in preserving different cultural zones as they are. Davutoğlu made this nativism explicit in many of his speeches, one of which was a panel that he sat on with Morocco’s Foreign Minister Saâdeddine El-Othmani: “If we take heart from a common civilization, […] we internalize modernity differently when we face it.”57 In these civilizational claims, the call for cultural relativism is combined with a strong regional nativism, which puts its own spatial and ideational limits on relativism. This concept is explored in the final part—the following part discusses the ties facilitated by sharing a common identity.

3.2. Claimants of a common identity: AKP, MB, and Ennahda

I claim that the Islamist governments of Tunisia and Egypt at the time considered the AKP government an extension of their identity, and partly of their ideology. They regarded the AKP’s knowledge production as a source to share, especially when they needed external legitimation, strategic advice, economic assistance, and cultural dialogue. The MB and Ennahda justified their privileged connections with the AKP by referring to “the common culture.” This section discusses the period before the Egyptian coup in 2013, in the aftermath of which the close relations between AKP and MB became much more apparent.

3.2.1. International legitimacy

First, both the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and Tunisia’s Ennahda Party aimed to take advantage of the AKP’s international image in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. The AKP was the reference point for the MB and the Ennahda, who were in need of an ideologically similar example in the international arena. For some time, modernists in the MB have been claiming that Islamist parties can be compatible with parliamentary systems. The appreciated position of the AKP in the MB dates back to mid-2007; the year the AKP swept the Turkish elections. After the elections, Mahdi Akef, then-Supreme Guide of the MB, defined this win as an evidential moment, in the sense that an Islamist party achieved “constitutional, political and economic development and social reform when operating in a democratic, free and fair environment.”58 Similarly, during leader Rachid Ghannouchi’s early descriptive presentations of the Ennahda Party to foreign news agencies, he repeatedly emphasized that the Ennahda took the AKP as a model. For example, in an interview with Euronews, he noted the two countries’ similar levels of proximity to the West and their similar

58 “Egypt’s brotherhood ‘project’ said boosted after Turkish elections,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 30, 2007.
historical conditions and social structural developments as among the key reasons for the flourishing of “Moderate Islam” in both countries.\(^a\) In short, both the MB and the Ennahda often referred to AKP as their ideological twins, especially when they needed to describe themselves to various circles that were suspicious of the two parties’ political stances.

### 3.2.2. Strategic advice

The MB and the Ennahda also requested strategic advice from the AKP. Both parties welcomed AKP experts in their election campaigns. Whereas MB hired the AKP’s propaganda team,\(^b\) Ghannouchi’s Ennahda also benefited from the experience of Erol Olçok, a top figure in the AKP team.\(^c\) One can easily see rhetorical similarities between MB and Ennahda propaganda and AKP slogans, from their almost-identical TV advertisements,\(^d\) to the MB’s definition of its voter base as “the silent majority,” to the Ennahda’s claim of being “the real sufferers of the former regime” rather than the “leftists.”\(^e\) The AKP’s advice was not limited to election campaigns. Joe Parkinson wrote that the AKP periodically sent its officials and businessmen “to help President Morsi reform the country’s secular-dominated institutions.”\(^f\)

### 3.2.3. Economic assistance

With confidence in the countries’ exceptional ties, Turkish businessmen also invested in Egypt and Tunisia. Jamel Eddine Gharbi, Tunisia’s minister of planning and regional development, called for deeper economic ties during an international fair organized by MUSIAD, one of the largest businessmen’s associations in Turkey, and which ideologically represents the AKP’s business base. Gharbi noted in his speech that Europeans’ investments in Tunisia have been closely related to the ports and railways that Westerners built in accordance with their colonial interests.\(^g\) He invited Turkish businessmen to invest in the country by underlining that the problems Tunisia has been facing emanate from this “dependency of the country on the Europeans.” Similarly, a week before the first Tunisian-Turkish-Libyan Economic Forum, hosted in Tunisia under the auspices of that government, the chairman of the Turkish-Arab Association for Science, Culture and the Arts (TASCA), advised Turkish businessmen to consider these countries as “Tunisians are bored of the French, just as Libyans are bored of Italians.”\(^h\)

In relation to Egypt, the AKP was even more ambitious. Then-Minister of Finance Mehmet Şimşek and then-Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan announced Turkey’s decision to grant Egypt a loan of two billion USD in return for accelerating Turkish business projects in Egypt. The first visit of the Turkish Entrepreneurs Businessmen Association to Egypt was

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\(^a\) “Post-revolution politics in Tunisia,” Euronews, January 13, 2012.


full of references to a common history. Although the Mohamed Morsi regime continued negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), these negotiations were always a matter of internal contestation within the MB. Since many MB members dismissed IMF and WB projects as tools of American hegemony in the Middle East, the party prioritized more-secure alternatives, among which were relations with Qatar and Turkey. To conclude, the Egyptian and Tunisian governments regarded the AKP government and Turkish businesses as safe partners from which to request economic cooperation.

3.2.4. Cultural dialogue

The MB, Ennahda, and AKP have shared a strong cultural network as well. First and foremost, the theology-based political readings of the MB have been one of the major sources of knowledge for the current AKP leadership. For instance, Hayrettin Karaman, a professor of Islamic law and highly respected by Erdoğan, often reads key MB sources, *inter alia*, around vital political issues that necessitate sketching the borders of Islamism. In a similar vein, having described the MB as one of the most significant realities in the history of Islam, Yasin Aktay, the AKP’s former vice chairman in charge of foreign affairs, complained about “the academic indifference” in Turkey towards the MB: “[As of] today, there should have been tens of doctoral dissertations submitted about the MB.” Similarly, Abdurrahman Dilipak, a seasoned writer on Islamism in Turkey, recently criticized members of AKP for not paying enough attention to top MB figures, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Although it is difficult within the current AKP leadership to find explicit disagreement with the MB’s readings of Islam, the history of Islamism in Turkey includes long-term controversy over the role that the MB plays for Turkish Islamists.

The second example of this cultural sharing includes Ghannouchi’s early political doctrine, which he wrote during his exile in London and which is often argued to have been one of the inspirations for the Islamist parties’ re-interpretation of parliamentarian systems. Similarly, the Ennahda and MB governments have welcomed technical support from Turkey in culturally sensitive areas. For instance, the High Egyptian Islamic Council concluded an agreement with the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) to protect historical documents about Sufism, Islamic mysticism, Islamic jurisprudence, and the archives of Arabic literature in Egypt. The Egyptian authorities also asked TIKA to update the sound and electrical systems of several mosques in Cairo.

When both Morsi and Ghannouchi attended the AKP’s fourth Party Congress, they touched upon commonalities. Morsi stated that “there are common goals […] and a common

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71 See the debate on page 15-16.
72 These ties were reinforced in May 2015 in Malatya, Turkey, at a signing for Ghannouchi’s new book with the participation of then-Prime Minister Davutoğlu and Ghannouchi.
history among the common denominators." Ghannouchi was even clearer about the content of these commonalities:

Turkey represents a soft power in the Islamic World [...]. In the nineteenth century [in] Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt, there was a search [...] for ways to rise in the civilization by adhering to Islamic values. Our dreams were postponed by colonial powers, [but we] say from Tunisia now [...] that all revolutions can take Turkey as a guide. They have made a very pleasant marriage between modernity and tradition.

These statements demonstrated, on the part of MB and Ennahda leaderships, selectivity regarding identity issues; for a long time, Islamists elsewhere explained the AKP’s electoral success through “its founders’ overtly religious posturing rather than hard socioeconomic facts.”

### 3.3. Nativism under contestation: “the others inside us”

In this part, I question whether the results of the nativist discourse have met its stated aim, which was to facilitate dialogue within each society through common assumptions and theories. In reality, nativism’s characteristics meant certain limitations to the participation of opposing views into the constitution-making processes in Tunisia and Egypt. Here, I do not claim that Turkey’s norm-promotion per se has led to as strong a nativist discourse in Egypt and Tunisia as it appeared in the constitution-making processes. My starting point is rather that nativism’s abovementioned features were shared by the three movements in a manner that generated controversies over true nativity in the two constitution-making processes. Nativist claims were almost always operationalized in domestic politics as markers of exclusion, marginalization, and cultural-moral monism. This argument relies on the period before the Egyptian coup and the historic compromise on the new constitution in Tunisia. Given the aim of this article, I make an outcome-oriented analysis of the process rather than presenting an ethnographic account of how nativism’s characteristics were created, sustained, spread, and contested.

The constitution-making processes witnessed thorny controversies with respect to the guiding principles of Islam, freedom of expression and belief, and women’s rights. The debates on the content of Egypt’s 2012 constitution were concentrated on certain issues: the definition of Islam as the official religion of the state, as well as one article that guaranteed freedom of belief while another prohibited “the abuse of all religious messengers and prophets.” Similarly, in the draft constitutions of Tunisia, the most-contested issues were the constitutional place of Islam, the extent of freedom of expression, anti-blasphemy laws, and the ‘principle of complementarity’ between men and women, as opposed to ‘gender equality.’

The absence of an environment of dialogue was apparent in many ways, from secularists’ withdrawal from Egypt’s constituent assembly to the mismanagement of the chaos in Tunisia after the assassination of opposition leaders, Mohamed Brahmi and Chokri Belaid.

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Consequently, the processes triggered bloody street fights simultaneously in Tunisia and Egypt. These events resulted in a coup d’etat in Egypt and were a turning point for Tunisia and the Ennahda. Amidst this chaos, nativism was often operationalized as exclusion, marginalization, and cultural-moral monism.

Exclusion was twofold. One aspect was against the West (both as historical narrative and as contemporary Western organizations) with its insistence on certain norms; the second was against parts of the Egyptian and Tunisian societies that were claimed, by the governments, to espouse Western, hence alien, ideas. When the former was to be excluded, the principle of non-intervention was invoked.77 When opposition was raised from within, leading figures of the MB and Ennahda often tended to exclude these voices from the range of legitimate arguments.

Next came marginalization, which is closely tied to exclusion. Opposition ideas were denigrated on accusations of supporting norms irreconcilably in contradiction with the dominant values of society. Marginalized critics were often depicted as nothing more than an inconsiderable minority. For instance, in Tunisia, anti-blasphemy laws were initially proposed in the name of public security. The Ennahda’s Human Rights Minister Samir Dilou explicitly stated that the party was initially reluctant to introduce this law, but “secularist-driven provocations” compelled them to protect “the dominant values of the majority.”78 In the same vein, the MB’s General Secretary Mahmoud Hussein called on the opposition to persuade people to join the majority instead of behaving like “thugs.”79 The Egyptian National Women’s Council was one of the MB’s ideological targets due to its allegedly un-Islamic nature. Criticisms by Egypt’s National Salvation Front, consisting of more than 30 liberal and leftist political movements, were not deemed legitimate by the MB. In a party statement, the MB declared that the National Women’s Council should be redesigned so as not to reproduce “the Western plans for which it was established.”80

This monopoly over the content of culture led to staunch cultural-moral monism. The given relativist discourse, on the one hand, defended inter-cultural relativity on value judgements; on the other, it assumed intra-cultural monism. However, this assumption is problematic even between these three movements. To begin with a historical view (ignoring for the moment the Salafist strands in both countries), it would be a mistake to regard the Ennahda and MB as monolithically defined within themselves and in relation to each other. Although the Ghannouchi-led Ennahda movement was historically inspired by the Egyptian MB, Ennahda cadres were reportedly more eager to make “democratizing moves” compared to the MB after the regime changes.81 More recently, the Ennahda’s self-declared departure from political Islam was not welcome in all MB and AKP circles—some claim that the Ennahda left the MB, and some argue that the Ennahda lost the battle to the elites of the former regime. Some also claimed that Ghannouchi refused to implement AKP advice to “stay stronger against secularists” in Tunisia.82 This turn in the Ennahda’s discourse was partly the reason for a

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widely supported constitution in Tunisia. Sayida Ounissi of the Ennahda declared the driving force behind the party’s change: “Exclusion could not be the solution if we wanted to sustain the health and stability of the transitional process.”83 In terms of the politics of culture in Tunisia, the consequences of this current rebranding of the Ennahda have yet to be seen. However, Ghannouchi argued that the monopoly of the state over religion is done, and the Ennahda does not want to create another monopoly over morality.

Furthermore, the AKP and the MB do not necessarily share a common culture in all aspects of their organizational structures. For instance, the two organizations have very different ways of following their members: whereas MB leadership gives high importance to the ‘Islamic-ness’ of its cadres’ private lives, the AKP, following the Refah tradition, has been more easy-going about different lifestyles among its members—and it is not uncommon for party members to openly express these differences.84 The two movements’ policies have also differed in some key respects: when Erdoğan suggested secularism for Egypt, Turkey’s positive image was replaced in the MB with fears of “Turkish interventionism”—at this critical juncture, MB leaders mentioned how different the Turkish experience of democracy has been.85 It is also not clear whether the two parties attach the same meanings to their shared political symbols, such as “Rüşba.” Whereas the symbol was originally used by the MB in Egypt in the wake of Morsi’s overthrow, it has been frequently used in Turkey by Erdoğan. However, the meanings of its four pillars have been re-invented by Erdoğan: “one nation, one flag, one homeland, and one state.” It may be argued that Erdoğan has made the shared symbol more meaningful for the highly ethnocentric Turkish public opinion, however, this interpretation questions whether this sharing of meanings extends beyond the leaderships into the parties’ social bases. This simple example reflects a long-term debate among leading Turkish scholars of Islam, some of whom reject the MB’s symbols on account that they are “foreign” to Turkey.86

Still, among some historical commonalities, for a time the three movements embraced a popularly asserted but vaguely operationalized terms, such as ‘Islamic Democracy’.87 The term often meant confidence that divine rule would never be threatened by the people,88 however, its content was hardly disputable without falling into the borders of immorality. Those who contested the term often found themselves outside the moral borders of public culture. The MB’s Freedom and Justice Party program defined Egyptian public culture as follows: “The culture of a society is based on its moral identity, to which the people belong. Islamic culture is the main factor in shaping the human mind and conscience in Egypt.”89 Sobhi Saleh, who was among the top leaders in the MB, made a comparison between the notions of Western and Islamic democracies: “Islam is against spreading unethical behaviour

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86 İsmail Kara, “Müslüman Kardeşler Türkçe’ye tercüme edildi mi?” [Has the Muslim Brethren been translated into Turkish?], Dergiş 2, no. 21 (1991): 14-5.
87 The AKP leadership rejected this specific term by departing from the Refah tradition in 2002, and the Ennahda leadership dismissed it right after the new constitution. However, the claims over morality continued through alternative terms with similar implications.
On the Borders...

and this is the difference […]Westerners] selectively ban behavior. We are only against those who are against religion and try to diminish it.”90 When during the same interview he was asked about possible contestations of these particular visions of democracy and Islam, Saleh was straightforward: “I do not care about the opinions of secularists who are against their own religion.” This frequently reproduced monist discourse contributed to the dismissal of opponents’ views in constitution-making processes. Opponents did not always feel a need to tie the validity of their arguments to some kind of nativism. And when they were pushed to test the nativity, they came up with very different understandings of native, one being references to pre-Islamic Egypt.

4. Conclusion

This article has two broad aims. The first is to examine the conceptual means through which we analyze the depth of cultural commonalities between social groups. In connection, the second aim is to question the extent to which strong references to a shared culture can render an institution-building building process smoother.

More specifically, as the title of the paper suggests, I touch upon several concepts that may be of theoretical or practical relevance. I argue that in the ES, analyses of culture as a concept, and analyses of cultures as objects of study must be further scrutinized in two ways. First, I argue that we must distinguish more analytically between cultures at different levels of abstraction. Culture at one level does not necessarily represent culture at another, although we often use the same markers of, for example, religion or identity to describe them. I try to illustrate that the relatively new concept of interhuman society is useful for scrutinizing sub-state agency and its connections with higher structures.

The second major point of the article is its call for a conceptual revision of culture, specifically in the ES, but also more broadly in IR. Here, I refer to a revision in favor of the development of more-nuanced approaches towards the interaction between different ideational and behavioral attributes under this umbrella concept. In the literature, the identity aspect of culture is often prioritized; but sometimes the concept means religiosity, sometimes habitual practices, and sometimes it is construed as ideology. For each of these attributes, the concept of culture is used as though they necessarily complement each other. The main problem with that thinking, in my opinion, is that it results in an arbitrary jumping between the different processes of culture. Within that context, the article aims to initiate further discussion on the conditions that compel us to begin examining each of these attributes, or the interactions between them.

Last, I argue that this revision can help us go beyond the monolithic notion of cultural zones to question assumed cultural commonalities and challenge our understanding of opposition. With this aim, I have tried to explore the limitations of a dominant form of nativism. In this case, an Islamist ideological perception of the true native faced opposing narratives within the region, the totality of which mutually constituted the formation of the regional cultural system. Whereas the nativist discourse was underpinned by the shared identity of the AKP, MB, and Ennahda governments, this thinking not only hides the groups’ own cultural mismatches, but also undermines their relations with other narratives that do not share their nativist discourse. The discourse promoted relativism in the global arena: the

connotation of the West often came into play as a synonym of the other, with alien norms. However, this discourse not only alienates Western geography from the Middle East, but also excludes any perspective that is associated with the West—regardless of their locality, they are not Middle Eastern. One fundamental feature of this particular nativism is its rejection of the moral agency behind opposing narratives. Eventually, the attempt to institutionalize ‘a native democracy’ must claim ideological hegemony, which often marks exclusion, marginalization, and cultural-moral monism at the sub-state level.

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Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East during the Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective

Nuri Yeşilyurt
Ankara University

Abstract

This article seeks to test the relevance of neoclassical realism in explaining the foreign policy behavior of a regional power in an era of turbulent change in the regional system. Taking Turkey’s policy response to the Arab Uprisings as a case study, it tries to explain, from a neoclassical realist perspective, the causes of Ankara’s miscalculations while formulating an ambitious policy in 2011, as well as its failure to adapt to the new realities on the ground between 2013 and 2016. Overall, it argues that neoclassical realism provides a satisfying explanation for Turkey’s policy failure in this period, and that the problems of miscalculation and maladaptation in Turkish foreign policy were caused by distortive effects of certain unit-level factors. In this sense, while ideological tendencies of the ruling Justice and Development Party, as well as its consolidation of domestic power, shaped the content and styling of Ankara’s policy response after 2011, the extensive utilization of foreign policy for domestic purposes by the ruling party hindered Turkey’s adaptation to shifting balances in the regional power structure between 2013 and 2016.

Keywords: Neoclassical realism, Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle East, Arab Spring

1. Introduction

As “an emerging school of foreign policy [theory],”1 neoclassical realism (NCR) is a relatively young branch of realism that provokes very fruitful theoretical debates within the discipline of International Relations (IR). Though still not considered a full-fledged theory of IR, it provides a satisfactory explanation about the foreign policy behaviour of particular states in particular cases. The main advantage of NCR is that it allows foreign policy researchers to integrate variables at the (sub)unit-level, such as decision makers’ perceptions, strategic culture, domestic political constraints, and state-society relations, to the structural perspective of neorealism in order to better explain states’ foreign policy behaviours. Yet, NCR still shares the core assumption of structural realism that states rely on themselves in order to survive in an anarchic international system. Additionally, like structural realism, NCR gives causal primacy to systemic material factors in constraining foreign policy behavior. Thus, it can be said that NCR “is a direct descendant of structural realism and is consistent with the underlying principles of realism.”2 However, unlike other structural realist approaches, it

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treats unit-level factors as an imperfect transmission belt between systemic constraints and foreign policy outcomes, and as a potential source of dysfunctional and non-optimal behavior of some states in the face of structural constraints. And unlike neorealism, NCR aims to explain the foreign policy behaviors of specific states rather than international outcomes at large.

Taking Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East during and after the Arab Uprisings as a case study, this article aims to test the relevance of NCR in explaining a regional power’s foreign policy behavior in an era of rapid changes in the regional system. The Arab Uprisings upended the power structures in the Middle East and North Africa, which had been relatively stable since the start of the Second Iraq War in 2003. Turkey, as an aspirant regional player that had acquired enormous power and prestige in the region during the preceding decade, hastened to fill this vacuum by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its affiliates in post-revolution Arab countries. Contrary to the soft-power oriented and accommodationist approach of the previous decade, Ankara adopted an ambitious and interventionist policy after 2011, aiming to increase Turkish influence in the Arab world. Therefore, the first aim of this article is to explain why the content and the style of Turkish foreign policy towards the region after 2011 changed in this way, and what the major (mis)calculation was behind it.

The ambitious policy of the post-2011 period proved somewhat successful, with electoral victories for the MB-affiliated parties in the first post-revolution elections in Tunisia and Egypt that led to the presidency of MB candidate Mohammed Morsi in Egypt in 2012. However, the turn of events in the following years swiftly altered regional balances. A number of domestic, regional, and global developments after 2013 substantially hampered Turkey’s power projections in the post-Arab Spring era, and it became clear that Turkish policymakers had greatly miscalculated the domestic and regional balance of power while formulating their ambitious and interventionist policy towards the Arab Uprisings. At this point, Turkish policymakers were expected to revise their policy calculations and reformulate the Turkish policy response in order to adapt to the new status quo, which voided Ankara’s previous calculations. Yet, it was not until 2016 that Ankara started to adjust its position to the regional imperatives by changing some basic policy preferences. As a result of this delay, Ankara was isolated from many states in the region between 2013 and 2016. Hence, the second aim of this article is to explain why it took so long for Turkish policymakers to adapt to the new realities on the ground.

The article aims to answer these research questions from a neoclassical realist perspective. In the first section, it begins with an analysis of the power structure in the Middle East before and during the Arab Uprisings and the opportunities that arrangement provided for Turkey as an aspiring regional power. Neoclassical realism treats the material structure of a system as an independent variable, and thus it takes it as a starting point for its analysis. Yet, although systemic factors have primacy, they have indirect causal links to state behavior. In contrast,
unit-level factors, which are secondarily important, have direct causal links to state foreign policy. Therefore, at the end of this section, the main unit-level factors that shaped the actual policy response of Turkey to the Arab Uprisings are analyzed as intervening variables between the systemic stimuli and the foreign policy outcome. The second section of the article examines the main elements of Turkey’s ambitious policy towards the Arab Uprisings. In the third section, the major setbacks that Ankara’s policy faced after 2013 are examined in detail at the domestic, regional, and global levels. The final section analyzes Ankara’s maladaptation to the changing balance of power in the region by focusing on certain unit-level factors as the main cause.

This article argues that NCR provides a convincing explanation for Turkey’s miscalculations while formulating an ambitious policy towards the Arab Uprisings in 2011, as well as its failure to adapt to the new realities on the ground until 2016. Turkey’s miscalculations in its initial policy response to the Arab Uprisings were caused, firstly, by the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) ideological tendencies, which favored the MB as a potential partner in the region, and secondly, by its consolidation of domestic power by various means, which eventually enabled it to pursue an ambitious policy. Turkish policymakers’ maladaptive behavior between 2013 and 2016 was mainly caused by the AKP’s excessive internalization of foreign policy issues as a mobilization strategy to consolidate its powerbase in Turkey and strengthen its legitimacy at a time when it faced serious challenges from within. The first signs of Turkish foreign policy adaptation were observed only when the structural constraints made themselves seriously felt in mid-2016, seven months after the crisis began in Turkey’s relations with Russia.

2. The Arab Uprisings: An Opportunity for Turkish Dominance in the Middle East?

In order to analyze Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab Uprisings from a neoclassical realist perspective, the relative distribution of power in the global and regional system, as well as the threats and opportunities it provided for Turkey, should be examined carefully. Before the outbreak of the Uprisings, the Iraq War, beginning in 2003, had been the last major event to shape the balance of power in the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies proved the political and military weakness of the Arab world once again vis-à-vis Western penetration. The rapid fall of the Baath regime in Baghdad and the ensuing instability in post-invasion Iraq resulted in an enormous power vacuum in the Middle East. Meanwhile, all of the region’s Arab states were in a state of stagnation that rendered them too weak to take any serious initiative with regard to international relations. In this environment, two non-Arab countries saw an opportunity to increase their influence in the Arab World: Turkey and Iran. On the one hand, Iran fortified the axis of resistance in the region by gaining new proxies among Iraqi Shiites, which also provided it with direct territorial access to its other regional country and organizational allies: Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Turkey, on the other hand, adopted a different approach. Under the single-party rule of the Islamist AKP since 2002, Turkey had been experiencing a serious transformation leading to relative political stability and economic development. Meanwhile, Ankara had exhibited unprecedented activism in

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7 Samir Kassir, Arab talihsişidi [Arab malaise], trans. Özgür Gökmen (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011), 27-40.
the Middle East and developed very favorable relations with nearly all regional actors. This activism, combined with the AKP’s achievements in domestic politics, considerably raised Turkey’s prestige in the region, and as a result, Ankara began to be considered a “soft power” in the Middle East. The main goal behind this policy of activism was to embrace Turkey’s Ottoman and Islamic legacy and accordingly cultivate Turkish dominance in post-Ottoman countries through soft and peaceful measures. Many analysts labeled this policy vision as “neo-Ottomanism.”

Post-2003, there was strong systemic incentive for Turkey’s growing presence in Middle Eastern politics: the support and encouragement of the United States. As the US occupation of Iraq created a hegemonic overlay in the region, Turkey emerged as the most suitable partner because it possessed an advantageous combination of certain attributes that the US and its local allies were lacking: 1) an Islamist government with a charismatic (though in no way anti-systemic) leader; 2) a growing economy in tune with the principles of neoliberalism; 3) considerable armed forces, yet a member of NATO; and 4) a relatively stable and democratic political environment that preempted the growth of extremist movements. From the outset, Turkey seemed to be a perfect match for combating Iran’s growing influence in the region, as well as a very suitable partner for the Bush administration’s “Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative,” which aimed at initiating political and economic transformations in regional countries and facilitating their integration into the global system. Hence, the US government strongly supported Turkey’s diplomatic and economic activism and benefited considerably from its good offices in the Middle East.

However, starting in 2009, there were some signs of discord between Turkish foreign policy and US policy preferences in the Middle East. This strain was most visible in the deterioration of relations between Turkey and Israel after the former’s Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), as well as Turkey’s growing solidarity with Iran with regard to the nuclear crisis during Turkey’s non-permanent membership at the UN Security Council (2009-2010). From a structural realist point of view, it can be argued that the main systemic factor causing this situation was the gradual disengagement of the US from the Middle East under the Obama administration, a result of the new “pivot to Asia” strategy. With the US military pullback from Afghanistan and Iraq, regional powers such as Turkey and Iran found opportunities to manifest themselves in the region. Meanwhile, the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011 substantially changed the regional balance of power. When combined with the US’ disengagement from the region starting in 2009, the sudden collapse of once-stable Arab regimes beginning in 2011 created an enormous power vacuum in the Middle East. This situation gave Turkey a considerable structural incentive to engage more actively in regional affairs and fill the gap that was created with the unfolding revolutions.

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According to Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, the neoclassical realist approach is most useful for explaining foreign policy choices when the system provides clear information on threats and opportunities but little guidance about the best policy response. The first three months of the Arab Spring created exactly this kind of environment. The sudden turn of events demonstrated that the authoritarian stability model had come to an end and that change was inevitable in the Arab world, either by will or by force. Although systemic constraints were forcing global and regional powers to step in and fill the vacuum, there was little certainty about the content and style of the best policy response. Hence, it is no surprise that unit-level factors affected the nature and style of the Turkish foreign policy response to the extraordinary developments in its neighborhood.

It was during the Libyan Crisis (2011) that Turkish policymakers learned more clearly about the structural constraints and opportunities created by the Arab Uprisings. After the quick and (relatively) bloodless revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, it was Turkey’s first serious encounter with the Arab Spring. As the uprising in Libya quickly evolved into an armed conflict between the regime forces and the rebels, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s initial policy was strictly against any kind of military intervention; instead, he encouraged a dialogue between the two sides. However, there was not much support for this approach in either the Arab World or the West, and eventually it alienated the rebels. Unable to prevent the Arab League’s and the UN Security Council’s resolutions to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, Turkey was forced in March 2011 to change its position and join the non-combat components of NATO operations under UNSC Resolution No. 1973.

Thus, it was mainly systemic factors that forced Ankara to change its soft-power oriented policy of the previous decade towards the Middle East at the beginning of the Arab Uprisings. In particular, the Libyan experience helped Turkish policymakers recognize the following structural conditions of the day: 1) the pervasiveness of revolution in the Arab world; 2) the immense power vacuum it creates; and 3) the readiness of other regional and global powers to fill this vacuum. After this experience, a cautious wait-and-see approach did not seem to be a viable option for Turkish policymakers, since it would risk Turkey being isolated and alienated while other global and regional powers hastened to step in. For instance, France and Britain were leading an interventionist policy in Libya, Iran was framing the events as an Islamic Spring, and Saudi Arabia was striving to maintain the status quo with friendly regimes while adopting an interventionist policy towards unfriendly ones. In the end, Turkey opted for an ambitious and interventionist policy that sided with “people’s demands” and favored “peaceful democratic change” in authoritarian Arab states. In practice, this policy resulted in growing Turkish support and guardianship for MB movements in certain Arab countries.

Although the structural conditions were responsible for this dramatic change in Turkish
foreign policy at the beginning of the Arab Uprisings, the formulation of the new policy response needs further explanation. When analyzing the content and style of this ambitious policy, two unit-level factors can be singled out as intervening variables between the structural constraints and opportunities caused by the unfolding Arab revolutions and Ankara’s actual policy response: the ruling party’s ideological tendencies and its domestic power consolidation.

The AKP’s ideological tendencies were responsible for the content of the new policy response which was overtly pro-MB. The AKP is a populist Islamist party that emerged from the Sunni Islamist National Outlook Movement (Millî Görüş Hareketi; NOM). Necmettin Erbakan, the late leader of the NOM, had a close relationship with Islamist movements in the region, including the Egyptian, Syrian, and Tunisian branches of the MB. Since coming to power through free elections in 2002, the AKP has been a powerful source of inspiration for Islamist movements in the Arab world, especially the MB, which shares similar – though not identical – ideological and social roots with the AKP. Now that the authoritarian regimes had been toppled, the MB (as the most organized opposition movement in most Arab states) benefited from a historical opportunity to prevail in post-revolutionary elections and eventually dominate the upended governments during their transition periods. And in fact, the AKP’s guidance for the Egyptian, Tunisian, and Libyan MB started even before the elections took place in these countries. During Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo in September 2011, the Egyptian MB asked for support from the AKP with their policies. Two months later, an AKP delegation visited the MB-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) headquarters in Cairo. Similarly, a delegation from the MB-affiliated Justice and Construction Party (JCP) in Libya visited AKP headquarters in Ankara in 2012 for consultations on the eve of the Libyan elections. Last but not least, Rachid Gannouchi, the leader of the Ennahda (the Tunisian branch of the MB), likened his movement to the AKP’s, and praised his relationship with AKP leaders at an interview in February 2011. Therefore, there were strong indications to suggest that once in power, MB-affiliated parties would turn to their more experienced Islamist fellows in Turkey for further guidance and assistance. Hence, in this atmosphere, the AKP considered the MB as a powerful and promising proxy in the Arab world and supported elections in post-revolution countries that would eventually bring its Islamist fellows to government. So in a sense, the AKP instrumentalized the ideological affinity between itself and the MB in order to establish its dominance in the region.

The AKP’s consolidation of domestic political power was the other unit-level factor responsible for the ambitious style of Turkey’s policy response to the Arab Uprisings. Between 2002 and 2011, the AKP gradually built its domestic powerbase and curbed the political

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aspirations of the Army, which had previously been quite influential in Turkish politics. In the 2011 general elections, the AKP secured a single-party rule for the third consecutive time since 2002 by gaining 49 per cent of the votes. For the AKP, it was a landslide victory that fortified its hegemony in Turkish politics and proved that opposition parties were still too weak to offer alternatives. This victory fed into the AKP’s self-aggrandizement, and convinced its officials that they were ideologically and politically on the right path. In the following years, for instance, some senior AKP officials went so far as to propose that Turkey’s successes under the AKP rule inspired the revolution and reform processes in the Arab world.26 Turkey vigorously promoted the Turkish and the AKP model to Arab countries experiencing a period of regime change and political transition.27 These activities included political intervention in these countries’ internal affairs, and in some cases military intervention as well. The AKP’s 2011 electoral victory provided the party with enough self-confidence and public support to implement an ambitious and interventionist foreign policy in the region.28


Erdoğan’s first visit to post-revolution Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in September 2011, during which he was accompanied by a large delegation of bureaucrats and businesspersons, clearly illustrates the content and implementation of Turkey’s policy towards the Arab Uprisings. During the visits, Turkey’s eagerness for an active role in the reconstruction of these countries was underlined, and the merits of the Turkish/AKP model were introduced to transition governments and MB-affiliated Islamic movements.29 Consequently, Turkey sought to increase its influence in the region through MB-affiliated parties, which did quite well in Egypt and Tunisia’s post-revolution elections in 2011 and became dominant in their post-revolution parliaments.30 These results fell completely in line with Ankara’s wishes and expectations. With Morsi’s election in June 2012, relations between Egypt and Turkey reached a historical peak. Ankara provided two billion USD in aid and loans to Cairo, which was experiencing serious problems with reaching an agreement with the International Monetary Fund; additionally, during Erdoğan’s second visit to post-revolution Egypt in November 2012, 27 agreements were signed between the two parties.31 In a speech at Cairo
University, Erdoğan stressed the growing alliance and solidarity between the two countries by using strong Islamic references. Shortly afterwards, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu underlined the emergence of a new axis between Turkey and Egypt since Morsi’s election and deemed this axis “extremely important in order to maintain order and stability in the Middle East.”

Turkey showed similar solidarity with the Ennahda, which had been leading the transition government in Tunisia since 2011. During Erdoğan’s second visit to post-revolution Tunisia in June 2013, a High Level Strategic Council was established and 21 agreements were signed. Moreover, Ennahda leader Rachid Gannouchi and Morsi were among the special invitees to the AKP’s Fourth Congress in September 2012. The list of other prominent invitees to the Congress gives an idea about the structure of the new regional bloc Turkey was trying to establish: Hamas leader Khaled Meshal, President of Iraqi Kurdistan Mesud Barzani, and former Iraqi Vice-President Tariq al Hashimi.

In post-revolution Libya, although the MB-affiliated JCP was generously supported by Turkey, it performed very weakly against the liberal National Forces Alliance led by Mahmoud Jibril in the General National Congress elections in 2012, winning only 10 per cent of the votes. Thus, Ankara was forced to temper its policy. It supported the reconstruction of country by training Libyan security forces and helped to develop economic infrastructure and services and kept its ties with the JCP.

Ankara applied its new policy most vigorously in Syria, which had been the success story of the AKP’s soft-power-based “zero-problems with neighbors” policy and which had served as the AKP’s gateway to the Arab world during the preceding decade. Shortly after the onset of anti-regime protests in March 2011, Erdoğan stated on numerous occasions that Turkey could not stay silent regarding developments in Syria, and that Syria was Turkey’s “internal affair.” In the busy diplomatic traffic of the ensuing weeks, Turkey tried to convince Syrian president Bashar al Assad to pursue certain reforms, legalize the Syrian MB (which had been banned since 1982), and hold free elections. Although these initiatives were not well-received by Damascus, and did not prove successful, Turkey demonstrated that it would not repeat the mistakes it had encountered in Libya; it would intervene more proactively on the issue in accordance with its ambitious policy, which aimed to form MB-dominated governments in post-revolution Arab countries.

As the armed conflict in Syria intensified, and as Erdoğan’s political leverage in Damascus reached its limits, Turkey hardened its position by openly supporting the rebels and by breaking all contact with the Syrian regime. The Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) were formed in Turkey in 2011 and became Turkey’s main proxies in the unfolding civil war in Syria. The SNC, which was dominated by exiled MB figures, joined the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF)

36 Altunışık, “Turkey as an ‘Emerging Donor’,” 343.
39 Fehim Taştekin, Suriye: Yıkıl git, diren kal! [Syria: Break down, stay and resist] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), 107-09.
in November 2012. The MB managed to influence this new organization just as it had done with the SNC.\textsuperscript{40} Due to its weak presence on the ground, however, the MB’s influence on the FSA was more limited. Yet, the latter was mainly composed of Sunni Arabs, and was affiliated with the SNC and later with the NCSROF. Therefore, Turkey’s sponsorship of these organizations was in full accordance, in a more aggressive way, with its grand strategy towards the Arab Spring.

Turkey’s other concern regarding the developments in Syria was the armament and mobilization of Kurds in northern Syria and the possible repercussions for Turkey. These concerns intensified after the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), gained power and declared autonomy without much fighting in three regions bordering Turkey (Afrin, Kobane, and Jazira) in 2012. Considering that the AKP’s first Kurdish initiative of 2009 had failed, and that deadly clashes were taking place between Turkey and the PKK throughout 2012, Ankara’s impatient and intolerant attitude towards the Syrian Kurds was not surprising. Yet Turkey’s efforts to control Syrian Kurdistan with the help of the Kurdistan National Council, an affiliate of Mesud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraqi Kurdistan, did not succeed, and the YPG remained the sole armed Kurdish movement in Syria.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore, it declined to join both the SNC and the NCSROF because of both organizations’ intimate relations with Turkey and their denial of Kurdish autonomy in Syria.\textsuperscript{42}

4. Major Setbacks and Isolation

Since 2013, several crucial domestic and regional developments have demonstrated the limits of Turkey’s power, influence, and attraction in the Arab world, and have clearly revealed that there was a serious miscalculation in Ankara’s policy projections regarding the Arab Spring. To begin with, after 2013, certain prominent domestic developments began to erode the AKP’s hegemony in Turkish politics. Firstly, the Gezi Protests of June 2013 revealed the growing discontent among liberal and secular segments of Turkish society against the AKP’s authoritarian tendencies. Secondly, with Turkey’s sensational corruption investigations of December 2013, a serious power struggle between the AKP and the Gülen movement (formerly allies) came to light within the ruling coalition, which climaxed during the failed coup attempt of Gülenist military officers in July 2016. Thirdly, in October 2014, deadly protests erupted around the country against Ankara’s reluctance to help the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobane, which was facing heavy assault from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Finally, the results of the June 2015 general elections were disappointing for the AKP, as it lost its majority and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) passed the 10 per cent national threshold, a historical first for a pro-Kurdish party. As a result, the AKP’s single-party rule was endangered for the first time since 2002. Although the AKP regained its majority in November 2015’s early elections, intensifying deadly clashes between Turkish security forces and the PKK, along with increasing terrorist attacks by ISIL and TAK (a PKK offshoot) in Turkish urban centers, seriously jeopardized the country’s security and stability.


\textsuperscript{41} Taştekin, \textit{Suriye}, 202-6.

These domestic developments indicated growing challenges to AKP rule and revealed the rising polarization among different social and political communities in Turkey. Accordingly, it became increasingly difficult for the AKP to govern with smooth and soft measures as before, and authoritarian tendencies prevailed. Since the AKP’s Arab Spring policy was mainly legitimized by the AKP’s democratic achievements in Turkey and its desire to export its “success story” to the Arab world, these developments and challenges curtailed Turkey’s quest to be a model democracy for the Arab Middle East in the post-Arab Spring era.

There were also important regional developments after 2013 that shifted the regional balance away from Turkey. Firstly, in July 2013, a military coup in Egypt toppled President Morsi. The new government eventually banned the MB and jailed many of its members, including Morsi himself. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan were the main backers of the coup, and the US and the EU reacted weakly. This was a serious blow to Turkey’s power projections and the new alliance it was forging with MB-led Egypt. Secondly, the Ennahda-led government was unable to provide security and stability in post-revolution Tunisia, and was forced out in 2014. It lost the ensuing parliamentary and presidential elections to its secularist rival, Nidaa Tounis. These two developments completely went against the AKP’s predictions of high performance from MB-affiliated parties in free elections. Finally, the growing chaos in Syria ran counter to the AKP’s policy projections and started to destabilize and isolate Turkey at the same time. The resilience of the Syrian regime and the weakness of the opposition foiled Turkey’s designs. It was soon evident that Bashar al Assad still enjoyed considerable support nationally, regionally, and globally. Moreover, the US disappointed the rebels in 2013 by reaching a deal with Russia on the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. The US gradually understood that under these circumstances, the removal of Assad without a viable alternative could only produce devastating consequences for the security and stability of the region. As ISIL consolidated its power in Syria’s north and east with a new offensive in 2014, the fight against jihadist groups became Washington’s new priority, which benefited the Assad regime. Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition remained weak and fragmented – except the PYD, which emerged as the most effective force fighting against ISIL in the eyes of Western nations.

As these developments rendered Turkey’s position more and more precarious, some global and regional actors started to show greater unease about Ankara’s role in Middle Eastern conflicts. Turkey’s ambitious policy based on supporting Sunni Islamist groups was interpreted as a sectarian approach, and hence provoked a harsh reaction from Shiite actors. In actuality, Turkey had carefully avoided sectarianism in its foreign policy until 2010. Yet, during the 2010 general elections in Iraq, Ankara angered Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki by supporting the secularist al Iraqiyya Bloc against its Shiite rivals. The next year, in the wake of the US pullback from Iraq, Turkey more openly became part of the sectarian conflict by giving refuge to Iraqi Vice President Tariq al Hashimi – a prominent Sunni Arab figure and former head of the MB-affiliated Iraqi Islamic Party – after an arrest warrant was issued against

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him for bombing and murder charges.\textsuperscript{47} Turkey’s relative silence towards the repression of mainly Shiite protests in Bahrain by a Saudi-led military intervention in 2011 also called Ankara’s intentions into doubt. With regard to the Syrian civil war, by emphasizing the “Nusayri” (Alawite – a branch of Shiite Islam) character of the Syrian regime\textsuperscript{48} and openly supporting Sunni Islamist fighters (who are aligned with the Syrian MB) against Damascus (which is backed by Iran, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shiite militias), Ankara clearly became part of a sectarian proxy war in Syria. Consequently, all these actions raised allegations of sectarianism against Turkish foreign policy and harmed Ankara’s once-amicable relations with Shiite actors in the region: Iran, Iraq, and Hezbollah.

Ankara’s activism in the region was not welcomed by all Sunni actors, mainly because Turkey was supporting a certain type of Sunni movement in the region: the Muslim Brotherhood. The rise of MB-type populist Islamist movements posed a serious threat to some Arab monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan. Therefore, these regimes were never at ease with Ankara’s growing support to the MB in the Arab world, and in response, they supported secularist groups and figures against the MB in Egypt and Libya. For this reason, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi generously supported the military coup of Abdulfettah el Sisi in Egypt and later joined him in declaring the MB as a terrorist organization. Similarly, after the emergence of political division in post-revolution Libya in 2014, the abovementioned countries, along with Egypt, emerged as the main backers of the Tobruk-based, secularist Chamber of Deputies against the Tripoli-based General Nationalist Congress, which contained Islamist factions such as the JCP, and which was backed by Turkey and Qatar.\textsuperscript{49} Saudi and Emirati discontent with Turkish foreign policy was also reflected in their efforts to prevent Turkey’s campaign for a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council in 2014.\textsuperscript{50} The reaction of these Sunni states to Turkey’s MB-focused policy had not been expected by Turkish policymakers and seriously hampered the effectiveness of Turkish foreign policy. Consequently, Qatar turned out to be the only Arab Gulf country that sided with Turkey in its MB-focused regional policy. Yet, in November 2014, Qatar was pressured by other Gulf States to step back from Turkey to a certain extent and normalize its relations with Egypt.\textsuperscript{51}

While facing these challenges from the international community, Turkey was confronted by yet another setback in its foreign policy, this time with regard to the Syrian crisis. As the US and many EU countries prioritized the fight against ISIL and Al Nusra in Syria (and Iraq), and downgraded their campaigns against Assad after 2014, they repeatedly implied Turkey’s responsibility in the rise of ISIL and put heavy pressure on Ankara to tighten border controls in order to cut off the organization’s supply lines.\textsuperscript{52} Although Turkey strongly denies any direct tie with these organizations and declares them to be terrorist groups, it is

\textsuperscript{48} Taştekin, \textit{Suriye}, 298-99.
an observable fact that the Turkish border has served as the main supply line of ISIL and Al Nusra. Additionally, it has been observed that Turkey-backed armed groups in Syria (such as the FSA and some Islamic Front units) are cooperating with Al Nusra in Northern Syria.\textsuperscript{53} Turkey is also at odds with the West regarding the status of the PYD, which is considered to be a terrorist organization by Ankara due to its ties with the PKK. However, the EU and the US prefer to treat the two organizations separately.\textsuperscript{54} All of these facts and allegations have damaged Turkey’s image in the international arena, as the country has been frequently depicted as the main sponsor of jihadist groups in Syria.\textsuperscript{55}

These problems indicate that Ankara seriously miscalculated its foreign policy towards the Arab Spring, eventually facing major setbacks and receiving negative feedback on the ground. Neoclassical realism underlines that misperception and miscalculation of relative powers by policymakers can cause serious assessment errors, and thus, may inhibit effective policy response.\textsuperscript{56} As already indicated, the AKP’s foreign policy formulation was largely affected by its ideological tendencies and domestic power consolidation, rather than a rational and realistic assessment of relative powers and possible reactions of major actors in the region. As a result, Turkish policymakers miscalculated the MB’s political chances in Arab politics, over-assessed Turkey’s power and influence, and did not predict the reactions of other regional and global actors to Turkey’s MB-focused policy. Additionally, they did not predict the growing challenges against AKP rule in Turkey. Accordingly, the AKP’s policy became ineffective and unwelcome for many in the region and in Turkey.

5. Maladaptation

These developments clearly demonstrate that since 2013, the balance of power in the region has been shifting at the expense of Turkey. Ankara’s policy projections regarding the Arab Spring did not play out as expected. Instead of revising its foreign policy and adapting to the new status quo, the AKP stuck to its previous policy preferences until 2016. Its policies were met with suspicion in nearly all other Middle Eastern capitals, and this situation eventually caused Turkey’s isolation from the region. This turn of events was in sharp contrast to Turkey’s prestige and soft power in the region prior to 2011. It was only after the appointment of Binali Yıldırım as Prime Minister in May 2016 that Ankara started to revise its foreign


policy in order to restore ties with regional countries.\textsuperscript{57} By then, however, Ankara had already lost much ground in Middle Eastern politics.

From a systemic perspective, the shifting structural conditions were expected to force Turkey to revise its foreign policy, make a strategic readjustment, and adapt to the new status quo in the region. This, however, did not happen until 2016. Ankara’s only political maneuver up to that time was to intensify cooperation with Saudi Arabia after the ascension of King Salman to the throne in January 2015. Though still in separate camps with regard to the Egyptian and Libyan crises, the two countries began to work together in Yemen and Syria from 2015 onwards.\textsuperscript{58} However, these actions failed to considerably change the balance of power in the region, as Russia involved its military in the conflict on the side of Damascus in September 2015. Meanwhile, relations with Russia dramatically deteriorated after the downing of a Russian bomber jet by Turkish F-16s over the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2015, and this rift put Turkey in a more precarious position. For example, while the PYD continued its territorial expansion along the Turkish-Syrian border with the help of US and Russian airstrikes against ISIL, Turkey was unable to even fly its jets over Syria because of the threat posed by Russian anti-aircraft missiles deployed in Syria.

It was only after the negative effects of the rift with Russia were seriously felt in political, economic, and military terms in mid-2016 that Turkish policymakers initiated a revision process in foreign policy by taking steps to ease the tensions with Russia and Israel.\textsuperscript{59} Until that time, they generally depicted the country’s isolation from the region as a “worthy solitude” and explained Turkey’s insistence on its initial policy as a consequence of its normative and honorable foreign policy approach based on defending “democratic principles” and the “will of people” against autocratic regimes in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{60} This, however, does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation, considering numerous examples that contradict these very principles. Ankara’s delayed condemnation of the atrocities committed by the Qaddafi regime against the Libyan rebels, its loose reaction to the suppression of civilian protests by force in Bahrain, its total disregard of the repression of the Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia, and its major contributions to the intensification of the civil war in Syria all contradict Turkey’s “principled,” “normative,” and “peaceful” foreign policy approach. In fact, this normative approach has been very selective, and it was generally used as a \textit{realpolitik} instrument in Turkish foreign policy during the Arab Uprisings.\textsuperscript{61}


\textsuperscript{61} Ayşegül Sever, \textit{Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu iliskileri: Karıncalı ve olguşal bir analiz} [Turkey’s relations with the Middle East: A conceptual and factual analysis] (Istanbul: Derin Yayıncılık, 2012), 49-53; Emel Parlar Dal, “Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power
Neoclassical realism can provide an explanation for states’ maladaptive and dysfunctional behavior when the regional system provides concrete and unambiguous information both on threats and on necessary policy responses. According to the theory, focus should be placed on the distortive effect of unit-level factors in order to explain maladaptive behavior. In the case of Turkey’s dysfunctional behavior between 2013 and 2016, focusing on the changing parameters of domestic politics in Turkey can provide a satisfying explanation. Some prominent neoclassical realist works had already underlined state strength and state-society relations as intervening variables between great powers’ systemic constraints and foreign policy behaviors. Similarly, successive crises that the AKP faced in domestic politics and its attempts to consolidate power in a confrontational manner functioned as an intervening variable between changing regional conditions and Turkish foreign policy behavior between 2013 and 2016.

As already indicated, the AKP’s domestic power has been diminishing since 2013. Slowly but steadily, it has been losing its hegemony in Turkish politics and relies more on coercion than consent to conduct its affairs. In order to consolidate its own powerbase and maintain its single-party rule, the AKP has sought to deepen the polarization within society through a strategy of internalization. This strategy comprises internalizing foreign policy issues and extensively utilizing them for domestic purposes. Referring to Hagan’s study on alternative political strategies adopted by governments and their divergent foreign policy effects, this approach can also be conceived as a strategy of mobilization, which is “most often associated with the game of retaining power in which a leadership manipulates foreign policy issues,” and which includes building “coalitions by aggressively selling foreign policy, often to audiences outside the regime, and thereby increase support for their initiative while discrediting their opponents.” During the busy elections schedule between 2014 and 2015, which included one local, one presidential, and two general elections, foreign policy was extensively utilized for the AKP’s domestic concerns, and thus, it eventually became too rigid to adapt to structural constraints in a rational manner.

It is obvious that the ongoing transformations in the Arab world are excessively internalized by the AKP government and used extensively to legitimize its own rule in Turkey, so much so that it is almost impossible not to hear on any given day a Turkish leader speaking to the public about the atrocities of the Assad regime against civilians or the heavy prosecution and injustice that the MB has faced since the military coup in Egypt. Through this process, the AKP has strongly identified itself with the MB and its affiliates by drawing parallels between each other’s role as the representative of the people’s will against military tutelage.

After the Egyptian coup, the four-finger salute of the MB (“R4abia”) was widely...
used by Erdoğan as a domestic political tool during his election campaigns throughout 2014 and 2015. Moreover, the Anatolian Agency (Turkey’s semi-official news agency) played a critical role in the dissemination of R4abia pictures to world media. Hence, by supporting the MB and identifying closely with it, the AKP has sought to present itself as the guardian of the oppressed against the authoritarian regimes of the Arab world. The AKP has always claimed to be the representative of the oppressed in Turkey, but now it extends this vision by claiming to represent all oppressed peoples in the region. In this way, it seeks to fortify its domestic legitimacy. This is exactly what former Prime Minister Davutoğlu meant when he described Turkey as the last fortress where all oppressed people can take refuge and the AKP as the last line of defense for this fortress.

While the AKP identifies itself with the MB and presents itself as guardian of the oppressed, it simultaneously equates its Turkish and Kurdish opponents with authoritarian regimes and the forces of counter-revolution in the region, and as major enemies of the MB. Thus, Turkish opposition parties and movements are continuously presented by the government as being “Baathist,” “Assadist,” or “supporters of coups d’état.” In this way, the political cleavages within regional countries are systematically used and intentionally internalized by the AKP in order to reproduce and deepen the ongoing political cleavages and polarization within Turkey. This strategy has become a critical way for the AKP in order to hold onto power against the growing discontent it has been facing at home since 2013. However, this internalization process has rendered Turkish foreign policy too rigid both in discourse and in practice, and the ruling party was unable to re-formulate it in a realistic and rational manner until 2016. This thinking also explains Turkey’s maladaptation to the shifting balance of powers in the region between 2013 and 2016.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this article is to illustrate the relevance of neoclassical realism in explaining a regional power’s foreign policy failure during an era of turbulent change in the regional system. Focusing on the case of Turkish foreign policy during the Arab Spring, it firstly illustrated that structural changes in the regional and international system throughout the Arab Spring did not directly determine the foreign policy response of Turkish policymakers. At the beginning of the Arab Uprisings, the system provided clear information on threats and opportunities but unclear information on policy responses. Thus, the political milieu was very suitable for unit-level factors to shape the nature, style, and timing of Turkey’s policy response. More specifically, it was the AKP’s ideological tendencies and its domestic power consolidation that greatly affected Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab world during this turbulent era. Yet, since 2013, the regional balance of power has evolved contrary to Turkey’s expectations. Although the system was providing clear information both on threats

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and on suitable policy responses, Ankara’s policy response did not smoothly adapt to the
new conditions. It is again the unit-level factors that explain this dysfunctional behavior. The
excessive use of foreign policy issues in reproducing domestic political cleavages within
Turkey during the busy election schedule of 2014-2015 prevented the government from
pursuing a flexible foreign policy.

Overall, it is very clear that unit-level factors are driving the miscalculation and
maladaptation in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The contentious character
of domestic politics, the AKP’s centralization of power, and the growing polarization among
different segments of society make it almost impossible for the government to make rational
calculations about regional developments and formulate reasonable policy responses. Since
all developments in the region are read through the lens of domestic cleavages within Turkey,
it becomes increasingly difficult to define the region’s situation in a realistic manner and
rationally determine Turkey’s interests. Ankara considered a revision in its foreign policy
only when political, economic, and strategic consequences of the crisis with Russia became
unsustainable for the country in mid-2016. Thus, it was the short-term negative effects of the
rift with a great power that forced Turkish policymakers to adapt to the structural constraints
of the day in a more realistic manner. Meanwhile, the attempted coup of July 15, 2016,
and the state of emergency that was declared shortly afterwards created a novel political
atmosphere in Turkey, which has the potential to disrupt Turkish policymakers’ ability to
respond to structural constraints in a realistic manner, and cause new foreign policy failures
in the short run. Turkey’s recent military campaigns in Syria and Iraq may be an example
of this new situation, though it is still early to talk about their long-term effects on Turkey’s
position in the region.

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Explaining Miscalculation and...
Global Peaceful Change and Accommodation of Rising Powers: A Scholarly Perspective*

T.V. Paul

McGill University

Abstract

Can the accommodation of rising powers in the international system be accomplished peacefully? Prof. Paul, in his recent publication, argued that if the established and status quo powers hold grand strategies which allow for peaceful accommodation, this is feasible. He clarifies the differences between accommodation and appeasement and the value of soft balancing, relying on institutions, economic diplomacy, and limited ententes as mechanisms for restraining the aggressive behavior of major powers. Variations in current US policies toward Russia and China are discussed. Non-accommodation of major powers as well as minor powers has major internal and external consequences. He concludes by arguing that contemporary rising powers, such as China and India, have much greater prospects of rising peacefully than previous era great powers, partially due to the opportunities offered by the globalization process. However, these states must initiate economic and developmental programs for other states, without neocolonial overtones, in order to increase global development and their own status. The discipline of IR has a special duty to encourage students and policy makers to develop strategies of peaceful transformation, rather than war, as the main mechanism of change.

Keywords: Rising powers, peaceful change, US, China, India, Russia

One way of defining peace is to treat it as ‘stability,’ i.e. a condition in which major states are not fighting each other. Based on that, we can argue that if a rising power is given certain benefits and is fairly happy with them, then you have a peaceful adjustment or accommodation. The quintessential example that comes to mind when thinking about peaceful change is the replacement of the UK as the hegemonic power by the US in the Americas in the 1890s-early 1900s without any war between the two. But even that example was actually less peaceful than it appears. For example, in their chapter in Accommodating Rising Powers, Ali Zeren and John Hall argue that the US actually pushed its way into the British order.1 One may call pushing one’s way into something “peaceful” but it is obviously very different from the US being genuinely accepted by Britain as the rising power. Therefore, there is some difference of opinion about even the quintessential example of global peaceful change. Other cases of accommodation are either a product of war or a post-war settlement. For example, after Japan and Germany were defeated in World War II, they were accommodated as secondary allies.

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1 Editor’s Note: This commentary is based on an interview which Sęçkin Köstem and Gonca Biltekin conducted in March, 2017 with Prof. T.V. Paul of McGill University. He is the past president of International Studies Association (ISA).

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T.V. Paul, James McGill Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. Email: t.paul@mcgill.ca.

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but not as great powers. The US has provided them with considerable benefits, including economic market access and concessional aid. Their relations since then have been peaceful, but they came as a consequence of defeat in the war.

In *Accommodating Rising Powers*, Paul talks about different strategies of accommodation. Ideological /normative accommodation takes place when both established and rising powers agree on the core ideological and normative frameworks of the international order. Territorial accommodation is when both major and rising powers agree on the territorial status quo, including the spheres of influence. There are also economic accommodation and institutional accommodation, where rising powers are given a place and voice in the economic and institutional frameworks of the emerging international order. The question is whether these can all be accomplished at the same time. For example, ‘spheres of influence’ is a much-contested term and recently has caused some concern. Russia is expanding into the Arctic, whereas China is pushing into the South China Sea. Both are claiming that these are legitimate areas of their spheres of influence, but they are also infringing upon the rights of smaller states.

1. Accommodation versus Replacement and Appeasement

One big mistake people make when discussing peaceful accommodation is to confuse the term with replacement. Peaceful accommodation does not necessarily include replacement of the great power with another one. The US’s peaceful accommodation of, and replacement by, China in the emerging system are very different events. Moreover, unlike replacement, accommodation is a continuous process. Today, China is quite generously accommodated in economic terms, but there is no certainty as to what will happen if China’s demands exceed the limits acceptable to the US.

Another mistake would be to confuse accommodation with appeasement. Appeasement usually takes place when the country making demands does not stop where it is supposed to. For example, when Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia, Britain would have been willing to accept that situation if Germany had stopped there. Appeasement is also sometimes beyond one’s control. Countries appease others all the time. Right now, it is almost impossible to directly confront US policy in many parts of the world. Sometimes, appeasement is the only option because there are limitations on what even the great powers can do. Unless a country has extraordinary military power or diplomatic skill, countries choose to appease rather than adopt other options such as war. Appeasement can also be used as a way to delay, frustrate, or gain support domestically. For example, Chamberlain was not getting the domestic support he needed to fight a war against Germany. He had a very difficult time convincing the British population of the necessity to fight a war. The British were hoping that Hitler would be just like any other great power and that giving some concessions would make him happy and content. European history has many cases in which great powers would contest up to a point, and then they would be appeased and give up the more extraordinary demands. That was the historical pattern, so it was natural for the British to think that Hitler would follow suit. Hitler, of course, had a very large agenda which was not well-understood at the time. So, the question is, how far will the agenda of the revolutionary state or the challenger go, and at what point will they escalate? Let’s take China and its land acquisition policies in the South

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China Sea as a case. Examining it from the point of view that one should not appease at all, then the only remaining option is war. That option would entail the US penetrating China’s air defense zones and naval areas, and contesting the country’s demands openly which would probably elicit a very negative response from the Chinese. They would eventually shoot back, which would mean substantial disorder. But there are other ways -normative and institutional methods- to challenge the status quo. In his forthcoming book, Paul deals with this form of restraint, i.e. soft-balancing.

Soft-balancing is probably a better route than direct confrontation. But like other strategic approaches, it does not always guarantee success. It has failed in the past. Italy was soft-balanced during its war with Ethiopia in 1935 through the use of League of Nations-mandated sanctions. Japan was also soft-balanced prior to the Second World War. Unfortunately, neither of these attempts stopped their pursuit of wider ambitions. Sometimes soft-balancing can be used by target states, for their own benefit. Russia, for instance, considers sanctions (a soft balancing tool) directed against it as being almost equal to a declaration of war. On the other hand, Russia has not changed its policies or taken other actions, hoping that over time, the status quo will become entrenched. They rely on the contested notion in international law that if a state holds onto a territory for a long period of time, then it becomes theirs. China seems to be relying on this notion as well; if it can hold onto its claims in the South China Sea for another 50-100 years, it will become overwhelmingly powerful and the international community will acquiesce. In occupied places in the world, one may expect that the local population will resist the occupation, as they do in Palestine. But who is going to fight to resist the occupation of artificially-made islets in the South China Sea? There are no human beings in the vicinity, so a local uprising is out of question.

2. Accommodating Russia and China

The current US record in accommodating Russia and China seems to depend both on their demands and their domestic politics. If China demands complete control over the South China Sea, such demands are unlikely to be accommodated by the US. On the other hand, it would be a total blunder if President Trump plays the protectionism card against China and tries to make China’s economy suffer. The rising populism in the US may lead to some level of protectionism, but if a sudden change of policy seriously hurts the Chinese economy, the outcome will be increasing nationalism in China. Therefore, such a push for protectionism needs to be restrained and dramatic gestures which would make the Chinese very uncomfortable should be avoided. China has been accommodated quite a bit since 1972 when it obtained a seat at the United Nations Security Council. It has also been gradually accommodated in the World Trade Organization and other forums. Because China does not have a big stakeholder position in the World Bank and IMF, it is cleverly creating parallel institutions. This strategy has some value for the peaceful transitioning that the world hopes for, as long as they don’t become instruments for security competition or dominance.

What should we expect with respect to the great powers’ accommodation of Chinese claims on the South China Sea? I believe that the major powers will accommodate China when it comes to the territories that are beyond the 200-mile limit for smaller states or they

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4 President Trump seemed to favor this option, at least initially, but he appears to have backed down recently in order to gain Chinese support for the North Korean nuclear issue.

may agree to joint operations in some contested areas. Joint exploration, especially if it is done under international authority, seems to be a reasonable solution. The Chinese already have some joint operations with other countries in some parts of the larger Pacific. Similar arrangements could be made regarding the Arctic. Deciding who will get most of the benefits will still be a challenge, but it is likely that whoever has more capability will have more rights. That is the situation in Antarctica. A few countries, the ones with the ability to go there and establish their naval facilities early on, have already divided it up.

The current US record in accommodating Russia does not seem to be very good. Russia was a somewhat pacified state when Putin came to power. It was a period when NATO and the US could have attempted a better policy to accommodate Russia. By asking the Ukrainians and the Georgians to join NATO and the EU, the Western powers completely disregarded Russian sensitivity when it comes to its surrounding regions. This can be seen as a policy blunder; since they knew that Russia was very paranoid about its security. The country’s anxiety is understandable since Russian history is filled with examples of Westerners, such as Napoleon and Hitler, coming in and attacking them through the surrounding countries. The European states, including the EU, also made a mistake by encouraging Ukrainians to trade with them exclusively. Trying to isolate Russia demonstrated a lack of political sensitivity on the part of the West and, unfortunately, calling on Obama for help was an even bigger mistake. Although its material power is in decline, Russia is still a great power and it wants to remain a great power. It was assumed that since the Soviet Union lost the Cold War, former Soviet Republics would join in the great democratic alliance. This demonstrates a serious failure to design a successful grand strategy of accommodation. We can partially blame liberal institutionalism, i.e. thinking that everyone will join because liberalism is always “correct” or that the future prospects of liberalism are better. However, by doing so, Western countries missed a great opportunity to accommodate Russia. Russia’s subsequent military responses are part of the challenge created by the country’s ongoing quest for higher status in the international system.

3. Accommodation and Small Powers

The great powers’ accommodation of rising powers has serious implications for smaller powers. For instance, if the US decides to accommodate China, giving it control over the waters and resources within the Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea, the consequences will be grave for the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. All of these smaller countries claim parts of the same area and China is infringing upon the 200-mile zone that the law of the sea gives to them. It is increasingly hard to accommodate all of these countries and one cannot easily ignore them as the major powers did in the past. For example, during the second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935, the British and the French were ready to give one third of Ethiopia to Italian dictator Mussolini in return for joining an alliance with them against Hitler. Mussolini’s fascism was not a concern for the British at the outset. But once the secret agreement was leaked by a French newspaper, British Foreign Secretary, Samuel Hoare, had to resign because of the public outcry over the concessions they were willing to make. In the past, the great powers had a tendency to make decisions for the weaker states without their approval, even though the outcomes were not always successful. However, war in the decolonized world is a very different phenomenon. If major powers try to run over weaker states, there will be lot more opposition and resistance from the smaller states.
The smaller states also have some responsibilities when it comes to accommodation of rising powers. They should be careful when confronting great powers, and should be cautious when considering their sovereign equality. Ukraine and Georgia should definitely have been careful with Russia. Similarly, some of the Baltic states’ policies regarding their Russian minorities are pushing that group into some kind of second-class status. These policies may evoke Russian hostility. A similar situation exists in South Asia. The smaller states sometimes push India too much. Considering the material power differential, the smaller states should refrain from taking unilateral actions and throwing themselves at the front line. Alternatively, they could use diplomacy and institutions to change the policies of the bigger state. Therefore, it is very important for small states to become active members of international and regional institutions, even if they are dominated by the rising powers. Bargaining through the institutional process is much more efficient than waging war or sustaining hostility.

4. Consequences of Non-Accommodation

Non-accommodation of a rising power has multiple consequences. The first one is internal unhappiness or resentment in such a state. For instance, there was a period when sanctions were placed on India because of its nuclear policies which generated hostility towards America, or the West in general. The general domestic perception in India was that it deserved more because it was a big democratic state and it have endured huge difficulties because of colonial powers. Similarly, the Chinese had the notion of “the century of humiliation.” Non-accommodation does not necessarily lead to war, but it creates the conditions for ultra-nationalism and resentment. Moreover, lack of economic accommodation, for instance, would create a lot of poverty in these countries. Accommodation of China by Nixon and Kissinger in the 1970s laid the groundwork for China’s opening to the world and helped the country’s development. Without that accommodation, China would still be a very poor country and we might have had more cultural revolutions. More importantly, the idea of “peaceful rise” that Deng Xiaoping and successors brought forward would not have been possible if China had not been accommodated and still remained an isolated state. Therefore, viewing the consequences of China’s accommodation through an economic lens is a very narrow way of looking at it. Despite the fact that almost every country now has a trade deficit with China, far more important values have been generated.

A second consequence of non-accommodation would be to shut off large segments of populations to the spread of global values. If China had been completely shut off, like North Korea today, there would be no lines of communication through which to get the message across. Therefore, accommodation is also providing opportunities for greater interaction and longer-term peace. Finally, non-accommodation may lead to spoilership by rising powers on a global scale. The disenfranchised or less accommodated great powers can provide support to regional states or they can offer assistance to domestic insurgencies and secessionist or irredentist groups, which disrupt regional order. China previously supported many Maoist insurgencies in different corners of the world such as South East Asia and South Asia. China and Russia currently spoil others’ plans in the Middle East. A non-accommodated China can do a lot of harm and could also be a spoiler in global politics in other issue areas, such as climate change. Therefore, accommodation can help achieve not only strategic goals but also those related to maintaining order.
The first question to ask when thinking about accommodation is “what will satisfy a challenger state?” The meaning of satisfaction changes from one actor to another, especially when it comes to notions like status. Some regional/smaller countries, like North Korea or Iran, have been regarded as having no limits to their ambitions, but this may not be the case. In my opinion, their primary goals are regime survival, which requires an accommodation strategy that is different from what is required for a great power. Mr. Putin also wants to survive, but Russia has often been driven by great power goals, too. The drastic policies enacted by these lesser powers, such as North Korea’s nuclear acquisition, have primarily been undertaken to support regime survival. The non-proliferation literature has completely ignored this dimension, and has focused primarily on deterrence, treating North Korea as a power which has to be constrained at all costs. Looking at it from an accommodation perspective, we can see that the North Korean regime thought they could secure their survival only by obtaining nuclear weapons. Since we do not hear about war with North Korea as a feasible option, their thinking must have been accurate. However, it has now created a difficult situation because there are increasing costs, new boundaries have been drawn, and it will take a much greater effort to accommodate North Korea. It has also signaled to other regional states that they can get away with nuclear proliferation if they push hard enough. North Korea will potentially acquire an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which at some point will be able to reach California. Pacifying North Korea’s behavior now would require getting the genuine support of other great powers, like China. Nuclear weapons can be a great equalizer in the hands of a small state which feels cornered.

In contrast to using discourse on North Korea, we see Mr. Trump taking a more belligerent stance against Iran. If he pushes too hard, Iran will likely end up having nuclear weapons. The regime will feel the need to take active measures for its own survival. Missile tests are intended to demonstrate their resolve to fight back. If they fail to do that, they will be looked down upon by their domestic population, which will damage the regime’s survival. Creating a new rivalry situation with Iran is counterproductive. The nuclear proposal should be given a chance even if it does not guarantee that Iran will not try to gain nuclear weapons in 15 years. Therefore, short of war, any strategy to topple well-entrenched regimes in regional contexts will not work. Their accommodation can actually be called status accommodation, i.e. accepting them as normal states and giving them certain opportunities to prove themselves as such. The India-US nuclear deal was a case of successful status accommodation. In a chapter in Status in World Politics, Paul and Shankar consider this agreement as having great symbolic value, because it not only removed India from the sanctions regime, but it also gave India the status it sought. Such targeted accommodation, tailored to the needs of the state in question, can be very useful. The hope is that these agreements will slowly accommodate the state over a period of time, so that it has time to adjust its behavior. The Obama administration’s expectation with the Cuban deal, for example, was that once the Cubans realized the benefit of trade and human interaction, it would change the way they behave. Of course, such policy requires examination of Cuban and North Korean perceptions and needs.

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5. Opportunities for Change

The definition of great power status is changing. Look at the Concert of Europe, for example. Once upon a time, five great powers could sit in Vienna and determine the fate of the world. They could decide the frontiers and divide the countries. Someone sitting in London could decide on the border between India and Pakistan, India and China, or Kuwait and Iraq. They did not need the approval of any other parties, including the populations living in the respective territories. That era no longer exists. The great powers of today do not have such complete control over the destinies of non-great power states. They face institutional, economic, and ideational challenges and it is not easy for any state to force its way into hegemony. Although great powers still have a big voice in the way regional and international orders are maintained, the world has multiple centers of power. There is potential for US decline looming on the horizon. Mr. Trump is trying to arrest that possibility, using techniques with which the US power elites are comfortable. The problem is, however, that those techniques may not work in the much more globalized world of today. Even if they do, they create a lot of dissonance and potential violence. Therefore, whichever country wants to become a great power, will have to craft a better strategy of peaceful rise.

The rising powers have a great opportunity today for peacefully achieving their goals. Despite the challenges, they could start new programs that benefit the rest of the world. We must not forget that events like the 2008 financial crisis were breeding grounds for innovation for the rising powers. Brazil is in deep economic trouble right now, but India and China, for instance, could lead the way in creating more opportunities for the less privileged and help build a new world order, without neo-colonial overtones. They can do it at least in the ideational/normative realm by providing alternative perspectives to challenge Trump’s outdated idea of imposing American hegemony or Putin’s militarist solutions.

On the other hand, such attempts should not have to stop at the normative level. At the institutional level, China is already expanding its influence through infrastructure support in developing countries, including its friends in Africa, South Asia, Latin America, and Central Asia. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) program offers much hope but also some dangers. If China securitizes the project and uses its economic clout to dominate or exploit its clients, conflict could occur. Pakistan has recently become a recipient of huge Chinese investment. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a big transportation and communication connectivity project. China built a port city in Gwadar, Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea, which has great potential if China builds industries there and establishes economic free zones. But, it may pose challenges as well. China appears to deploy its navy in the Gwadar Port. Once the Chinese navy comes in, the Indians and the Americans will not be able to remain aloof; and they will send their navies to the Arabian Sea to compete. This has been the pattern in the past. Colonialism began with entities like the British East India Company starting as a trading company and setting up little trading posts in Kolkata, Madras, and Bombay. After a while it “needed” an army to go into the interiors of the country and it then managed to penetrate the entire subcontinent. There is somewhat the same risk of colonialism from China, despite their subtlety compared to earlier British and contemporary Russian approaches. One cannot be sure about how far they will succeed. Since Pakistani workers with higher technical skills are few, Pakistan does not benefit very much from the employment opportunities. Chinese workers, who are willing to work long hours for meagre compensation, are coming in to
work. Much local resentment is building up. Combined with the insurgent tendencies in Balochistan, there is a fear of sabotage. Moreover, China provides loans, not grants. If these projects fail to generate the income they are supposed to provide, China may have to write off the debt or Pakistan will have to borrow money to pay off the debts. Despite these risks, Chinese development and infrastructure strategy appears to be better than its alternatives, especially those provided by Western countries.

India is following a somewhat similar course. It wants to spread its economic activities to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries by building a North-East Corridor and is involved in developing the Iranian port of Chabahar and a highway to Central Asia. Nevertheless, China and India need not compete all the time. They have successfully cooperated in oil exploration in Central Asia. Rather than splitting the continent into two distinct spheres of influence, both countries can cooperate by creating economic, institutional, and other mechanisms.

However, whether such schemes can turn the game into a mutually useful, non zero-sum one, depends very much on the statesmanship of the ruling elite. In the past, many opportunities were missed because of a lack of such statesmanship and global leadership. Today, there are few global leaders whom the world can look up to. Obama was the closest, but it is questionable whether he succeeded in creating that kind of synergy in every part of the world. Some of his policies were very contradictory, especially in the Middle East. I believe it was a total failure in Libya and Syria. The so-called liberal interventions did a lot of harm, and several countries, including Turkey, are suffering because of them. Angela Merkel is probably the most influential European leader with a level-headed vision, but she is challenged by many others. The recent French election creates some hope that a young dynamic leader with a progressive vision will emerge in Europe. However, statesmanship is not confined to the top leaders alone. Middle level diplomats are also very important players. The European Union, for example, was born out of, and has been sustained through, the efforts of such mid-level diplomats and bureaucrats. Part of the challenge is to find the right people, ones who have broad perspectives for solving the problems of the world. Unfortunately, both the current liberal and the increasingly conservative/populist elite in the West have rather limited understandings based on their ideologies. As someone who has engaged some of them, I must say that liberals are as much prone to nativism as are conservatives, and that is alarming.

The Chinese did a better job in devising a workable strategy by way of the so-called Peaceful Rise. Unfortunately, under Xi Jinping, China’s foreign policy has moved into an assertive phase, which is probably going to hurt both China and others. On the other hand, Jinping is emerging as the biggest supporter of globalization. At the Davos meeting in 2017, he described globalization as a double-edged sword; and reiterated the Chinese proverb, “Honey melons hang on bitter vines; sweet dates grow on thistles and thorns.” It was a very interesting analogy, highlighting the opportunities globalization presents. His support is all the more important when we think about the opposite trend, i.e. the rise of populist and isolationist leaders in the democratic West.

A world dominated by China will resemble the tributary system, which has some followers. The tributary system is an international order where smaller countries receive trade benefits,

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market access, and protection in return for paying tributes and not questioning the empire’s hegemony. In some ways, it resembles the United States’ arrangement in the Americas. Its working is made clear by the fact that while Canada can make occasional objections to a given trade policy, it will not seriously question the US primacy. This is true for Mexico to a greater extent. The Monroe Doctrine itself is very much like a tributary system, a fact not quite understood by Mr. Trump.

6. Peaceful Change and the Southern Perspectives

Unfortunately, IR has been particularly lacking in understanding and explaining some of these processes. When we look at the mainstream journals and books in the field, we see that, as a distinct topic, peaceful change at the global level receives little attention. There are very few publications on the issue and apart from the Chinese discussion on Peaceful Rise, most of them are written from a Western liberal view. The accounts about European historical experience, Cold War experience, or post-Cold War era, keep growing but there is little input from elsewhere. There are only a few IR scholars who look at history beyond the 500-years of European hegemony. The study of civilizations also has great potential in enriching IR. It can help us understand why we have such conflict in the Middle East. I think we should move beyond Huntington’s idea of civilizational conflict, since there are also intra-Islamic tensions. When does the Sunni-Shia divide get accelerated? How is it related to different pathways of nation building, nationalism, international, and regional order? The political elite in some countries, like China, seems to have contributed to novel forms of International Relations thinking more than the IR scholars themselves. An interesting research question would be why globalization is so appreciated by rising powers like China and India, even when the so-called established states want to move in the other direction.

In the ISA 2016 Presidential Address, I looked at the issue of peaceful change and explored non-Western contributions. Gorbachev’s contribution in ending the Cold War, the Chinese policy of peaceful rise, India’s non-alignment, and the Bandung spirit were important cases in point. Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia have developed their own versions of a similar non-hegemonic attitude of peaceful co-existence. Whereas there have been such contributions in the policy realm, the intellectual and scholarly works on those ideas remain inadequate. Non-alignment, for instance, could have inspired a theoretical account as to how those small states managed to challenge the two super powers. In a book chapter I am currently writing, I call it a very rare example of soft balancing by weaker states. Another example of innovative theorizing was dependency theory from Latin America, but I think the world has moved beyond dependency. Therefore, the International Relations discipline was not particularly successful in coming up with alternatives to mainstream theories. The existing alternatives such as post-modern or post-colonial theory also have limitations. They need to have greater interactions with different perspectives, especially those from the Global South. At ISA, we have a Global South Caucus. In 2016, I initiated a presidential task force on the Global South in collaboration with the Caucus. The primary motive was to start talking about the issues that we face in the Global South in particular. Take, for instance, the current crisis on the US travel ban on citizens of some Muslim countries. A lot of Western liberals in the ISA have also supported the campaigns against the ban, but the problem is that we usually treat

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8 For a refreshing IR take on East Asian history, see David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
these policies in isolation. Such policies have been implemented since 9/11. For example, a popular Indian Muslim actor Shahrukh Khan, whose 2010 film “My Name Is Khan” dealt with racial profiling in the United States, has been detained in US airports several times over the past years. A former President of India, Abdul Kalam Azad, was a Muslim and he was body searched once at a US airport.

Those who are fighting the travel ban should take into account the broader context and the process of which the ban is a part. If we want change, we need to move beyond talking about national policies only, and focus on the micro-level. We need to think about educating security and customs officials working at Borders to become more sensitive to racial diversity. Such training should incorporate comprehensive understanding of the cultural differences, tolerance, and an appreciation of different people. At ISA, we have the opportunity to be more global and bring in more ideas, perspectives, and resources. Many people from the Global South cannot attend conferences, because of lack of resources. We need to address that reality by raising resources in different countries like Turkey and India, and then strive to redistribute them in an equitable manner. This is one micro-level effort which directly contributes to the exchange of ideas, development of joint resource projects to study long-term historical processes and comparative regional experiences.

We need to look into strategies to confront the most hard-pressing problems of the world in our research. The IR scholars in the North should be sensitive and have an appreciation of the historical experiences in other places. South Asia is a great theatre for all the processes from balance of power to civilizational peace. Some of the Mughal emperors managed to develop very eclectic ideas on governance and social order. For instance, Akbar the Great, highlighted the need and suggested ways to be tolerant. The great Indian mystic poet, Kabir Das, was brought up as a Muslim yet he influenced Hinduism's Bhakti movement and Sikhism's scripture (Adi Granth). One can also encounter eclectic religions such as Sikhism, which is a combination of Islam and Hinduism. Sufism is also an interesting innovation, which moved beyond a binary worldview. The scholars from the Global South should study these ideas from other parts of the world using the same methods. We need to think through why such studies do not receive much attention. What are the major mechanisms that can incorporate these regional ideas into acknowledged scholarship? That’s the challenge in creating a more global IR.

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The Chinese School of International Relations: Myth or Reality?

Emre Demir
TED University

Review article of:

Mainstream theories of International Relations (IR) claim to be universally valid, neutral, and value-free in their scientific endeavours to explain the way the world operates. In contrast to these claims, there is a close relationship between power and knowledge production, as is demonstrated by Robert W. Cox’s famous dictum: “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”1 Cox’s words ring so true that scholarly works produced in social sciences throughout the world reflect the core-periphery structure of the world order. While IR studies in the United States can be classified as ‘core social sciences,’ European IR schools represent the semi-periphery, and finally, scholarly works from the rest of the world represent the periphery.2 With their claim to universal validity, studies in the core intellectually dominate the field of IR in the Gramscian sense. Most scholarly works in the semi-periphery and periphery try to integrate into the ‘global IR’ represented by US academia, whereas others question and try to overcome this core-periphery structure of social sciences by challenging the Western-centric mainstream IR theory.3

Theoretical and scholarly debates on the Western-centric nature of IR theories and the need to overcome this nature have been an enduring issue in the field of IR. Early attempts at questioning the Eurocentrism of IR theories can be found in the writings of the Latin American Dependency School and the World Systems Analysis. Immanuel Wallerstein identifies the notions of “the right of those who believe they hold universal values to intervene against the barbarians; the essential particularism of Orientalism; and scientific universalism”4 as three forms of European universalism that are used to legitimize the dominance of the powerful. For Wallerstein, a possible way of overcoming the era of European universalism is to create a multiplicity of universalisms by historicising our intellectual analyses.5

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4 Wallerstein, European Universalism, 82-4.
5 Wallerstein, European Universalism, 82-4.
In a similar manner, Amitav Acharya asks the question: “Does the discipline of International Relations truly reflect the global society we live in today?” in an article focusing on a new agenda for international studies for establishing a global IR. After criticising the non-inclusive, Eurocentric nature of the discipline he calls on academia to construct a truly global IR that recognizes the diversity of thoughts in the world and the multiple ways of overcoming conflicts and finding common ground.6

Since the end of the Cold War, several attempts have been made by IR scholars from Brazil to India and Turkey to China to criticize and challenge the Western-centric nature of IR theory building. Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations is an example of such efforts, and tries to reveal both the ongoing debates on the construction of a Chinese School of IR and the achievements of such attempts so far.

This review essay is composed of three parts. First, it briefly examines the development of Chinese IR studies from the field’s formation in the 1950s until today, as well as the three main contributions of Chinese IR to the field: the Tsinghua Approach under the leadership of Yan Xuetong, the Relational Theory of World Politics of Qin Yaqing, and the Tianxia (All-Under-Heaven) Approach of Zhao Tingyang. Then it moves on to provide an overview of the book, which is the product of a workshop, The Chinese School of IR and Its Critics, organized in 2013 by the future editors of the book. Finally, it briefly discusses the existing situation of the Chinese School of IR and evaluates the place the book occupies in building a distinctive IR theory.

1. Chinese IR Theory Pathway

Endeavours in creating a Chinese School of IR are some of the leading attempts at challenging the US-centric knowledge production and thus, diversifying and localizing IR theory. The history of Chinese IR studies dates back to the early 1950s, but studies in the Western sense only started in the post-Mao period. Following Qin’s periodization, scholarly Chinese IR endeavours can be classified into three phases: pre-theory, theory-learning, and theory-building.7 During the ‘action-oriented’ pre-theory period from 1949 to 1979, the main task of scholarly works was to provide information for the foreign policies and strategies being developed by Chinese political leaders. In other words, IR theory building was an action-oriented business that could only be realised by the leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC).8

The second phase, theory-learning, started with the opening-up and reform period, which Deng Xiaoping initiated after the death of Mao Zedong and continued until the mid-2000s. This was a period of IR knowledge accumulation from the West, especially the US. In this phase, the intense inflow of trans-Atlantic IR studies dominated Chinese IR thinking and studies, and almost blocked the flow of critical and non-mainstream IR theories. One of the most important features of this period was the rising awareness in Chinese IR academia of the distinction between action-oriented policy interpretation and knowledge-oriented academic

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research. This awareness was so prevalent that the first conference about establishing a Chinese IR theory (which can be considered the starting point of Chinese IR theory-building efforts) was held in 1987 in Shanghai by Chinese academia. Another feature is the consciousness of ‘schools of thought’ in IR theory debates. During this phase, according to Qin, three debates emerged among Chinese IR scholars. The first debate began in the 1980s and lasted until the early 1990s, and concerned the issue of China’s relations with the outside world. The main issue of the debate was whether China should stay as a proletarian revolutionary state that isolates itself from the rest of the world, or whether it should become an open, ‘normal’ state with links to the international community. In other words, the debating parties were proponents of Marxism and realism, respectively. The end result of the debate was the emergence of realism as the first established Western IR theory in Chinese IR academia. 

The 1990s witnessed the second debate, which resembled the first great debate in IR discipline that took place in the 1930s and 1940s. Two main questions about China’s national interest constituted this second debate: ‘What was China’s most important national interest, and how China should realise it?’ The parties joining the debate were realists and liberals who stressed, respectively, the importance of the accumulation of power and of integration into international institutions. In the end, the two sides agreed that these arguments reinforced each other and that a continued policy of opening-up was the best policy choice for fulfilling China’s national interests. Put differently, for the Chinese realists and liberals, China should simultaneously become a Hobbesian nation-state and a rational Lockean actor. The end result of this debate was (institutional) liberalism’s establishment as an IR theory in Chinese academia on equal footing with realism.

The third and final debate, which concerns the issue of China’s rise, stemmed from the response to the China-threat theory in the US and followed the same question debated there: ‘Is China a peaceful status quo power, or a revisionist challenger?’ The most significant development of this phase has been the emergence of Wendtian constructivism and thus, the tripartite division of Chinese IR theory studies. While realists argue that the relationship between a rising state and a hegemon cannot be peaceful, liberals reject this deterministic approach and state that if China follows a policy of integration into the international system it will find an opportunity to rise peacefully. Constructivists have joined the debate in the liberal camp, yet with a different approach. They argue that as China integrates with international society it not only benefits from this process materially, but also accepts international norms and institutions that shift its identity and transforms it into a responsible member of international society, or namely, a status quo power. This debate is still ongoing among the three leading schools of thought and is closely related to the third phase of Chinese IR theory endeavours – theory-building – which is still in its initial stages.

Since the start of the third phase in the mid-2000s, IR theoretical knowledge production in China made important progress, with a number of innovative initiatives launched by Chinese scholars. Three of these contributions, which can be categorised into two methods, are worth noting. The first method is an integrative approach that combines both Western and Chinese styles of knowledge and theory building. Qin’s Relational Theory of World

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9 Zhang also makes a similar classification. See “The Tsinghua Approach,” 77-8.
11 Qin, “Development of International,” 240-44.
Politics, as well as the works of the Tsinghua Team, including Yan, are part of this integrative approach. The other method is the traditional approach, which examines the thoughts of Chinese philosophers, mainly Confucius. Zhao’s reinterpretation of the ancient Tianxia (All-Under-Heaven) system for analysing the world order and global governance is a pioneering study of the traditional approach. Indeed, all three contributors to the Chinese School base their theories on traditional Chinese thinking and philosophy, but what makes Zhao’s works distinct is his rejection of the ontology and epistemology of Western thought and the overwhelming reliance on Chinese ontology and epistemology.

In his attempt to combine Western theories with Chinese culture and ideas, Qin, who identifies himself as a constructivist, brings social constructivism and Chinese traditional philosophy together. In this endeavour, as a counterpart to the concept of rationality as the metaphysical core of mainstream IR theories, Qin proposes to put the concept of relationality, which is pivotal to Confucian cultural communities, in the centre of IR theory research. He bases his theory on three underlying assumptions of the interrelatedness of the IR world: socially constructed roles, identities of social actors, and processes defined in terms of relations in motions. Following these assumptions, Qin suggests redefining the research orientations and key concepts of IR by taking relations as the basic unit of analysis. However, this does not mean replacing rationality with relationality, as those concepts are complementary and a successful synthesis of them may be useful in analysing and understanding world politics.

Yan (who identifies himself as a political realist) and other members of the Tsinghua Team focus on and examine Chinese interstate philosophy in the pre-Qin period to find valuable intellectual sources for their innovative theoretical studies. However, it must be pointed out that Yan rejects the possibility of creating a distinctively Chinese School of IR theory. He believes that scientific theory must be universal and thus establishing a Chinese School is unnecessary. Still, he argues that it is possible to enrich current IR theory by studying Chinese political thought of the pre-Qin era. A new theory can then be created by combining pre-Qin thinking with modern IR theory. Such a study may also be helpful in understanding contemporary international political realities and drawing lessons for policy today. In other words, pre-Qin political thought may be useful in formulating strategies for a rising China.

As a philosopher, Zhao’s approach to the world order is different than Qin’s and Yan’s. As a firm critic of Western thought, he argues that due to lack of a universally accepted worldwide political institution to govern a truly coherent world society, today’s world is a non- or failed world. In a failed world, attempts to unify the world are useless. Such an attempt must be based on a global political philosophy “which speaks on the behalf of the world,” not the nation-state. Thus, to achieve the goal of establishing a world theory, world politics must be understood under the framework of ‘world-ness,’ not internationality. For Zhao, the Chinese concept of Tianxia, which he compares with the concept of the United Nations, provides such a framework. While Tianxia presupposes the ‘Oneness’ of the world as acceptance of its diversity, the UN pattern presumes it as a mission to accomplish Western universalism. In other words, whereas Tianxia presupposes harmony, the UN model presumes sameness.
2. Overview of the Book

The possibility of building a non-Western IR theory in general and a Chinese IR theory in particular is a hotly-debated issue in Chinese, Western, and non-Western IR academia. *Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations* is about ongoing debates on and contestations to the development of a Chinese School of IR theory. Contributions to the book from different nationalities, each with distinct viewpoints, pay tribute to the diversity of existing views. These contributions reflect the ways Chinese scholars are engaged in Western IR theories, the construction of Chinese IR theory, and the likelihood of developing a Chinese School(s) of IR as a challenge to the hegemony of Western-centric IR knowledge production, thereby diversifying and localizing IR theory construction. By gathering a number of scholarly works from both inside and outside of mainland China, the book helps to further the efforts exerted by Chinese scholars in constructing a Chinese IR School(s). Through an in-depth evaluation, the book both criticises and contributes to distinctive Chinese IR theory building endeavours.

*Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations* is composed of two parts. The first part evaluates the ongoing debates on the construction of a Chinese School of IR, and the second part investigates whether the development of such a school has turned into a sociological reality. Among a number of issues debated throughout the chapters, three are worth focusing on: naming the school, Chinese-ness and Chinese exceptionalism, and the power-knowledge relationship. L.H.M. Ling, in Chapter 1, and Ren Xiao, in Chapter 2, take on the issue of naming the school from opposite directions. Ling argues that “the acting [sic] of naming not only defines an object of inquiry but also how we study it,”18 and rejects the claim that a Chinese school of IR, as it stands, offers a distinct perspective in the study of IR. She argues that the concepts of ‘Chinese’ and ‘IR’ are reflections of Westphalian legacy and thus, a Chinese school of IR creates another form of Western-centrism. To overcome the hegemony of Western IR thinking, Ling argues, the territoriality of Westphalia must be transcended. Ren, on the other hand, is one of the leading proponents of the ‘Chinese School of IR,’ as well as the scholar who coined this term. He provides two reasons for coining such a term. The first is the dissatisfaction with the dominance of Western IR thinking in forming and addressing theoretical questions in the Chinese academia. However, challenging its dominance is not enough for non-US communities to counter the US intellectual hegemony; they also need to produce ‘innovative and meaningful scholarship’. Ren argues that this is what Chinese scholars have been doing in the last 15 to 20 years. So, the emergence of a Chinese school, though a long and toilsome process, is inevitable. Ren’s second reason is to gain academic autonomy from the dominant political discourse of the CPC. He rejects naming the school as ‘IR with Chinese characteristics’ because it invokes the political discourse on ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Ren further states that products of social science become more cosmopolitan as they become more national. Chinese-ness of IR theory building is an important aspect of his argument, but he makes a narrow and thus controversial definition of the Chinese School one which includes only Chinese scholars living in China.

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On the other hand, in Chapter 5 Teng-chi Chang claims that “naming debates of the Chinese IRT still went ahead of its substantive content.”\(^{19}\) For him, the central problematic of the Chinese School is how to present itself to the outside world and show that China is a peace-loving country. The question ‘Does China’s rise threaten the existence of the post-war peace settlement?’ has been one of the most debated issues both in the West and in China, but mainly from opposite standpoints. Chinese scholars try to reformulate the question and overcome the China Threat Theory. However, as they try to accomplish this goal, their studies serve the foreign policy needs of the state and thus, the Chinese ruling elite. In other words, the Chinese School becomes “a national IR theory only intending to deliver a ‘China voice’.”\(^{20}\) According to Teng-chi, to prevent such a position the Chinese School needs to enlarge its scope in time and space and bring East Asia back in the picture through a dynamic dialogue with both the East and the West.

By providing cultural explanations for the lack of a Chinese IR theory Wang Yiwei and Han Xuqing, in Chapter 3, weigh in on the Chinese-ness debate, taking the side of the proponents of Chinese exceptionalism. They claim that even though Chinese culture prevents Chinese scholars from developing Western-paradigm-based IR theories, it can contribute to building a culture-based Chinese-paradigm IR theory by focusing on the Chinese cosmopolitanism, ethical idealism, and harmony that are rooted in the Chinese culture. However, Chinese exceptionalism should not be understood as an exclusionist approach as in the case of Western universalism. On the contrary, Wang and Han argue, Chinese IR theory “will seek to share the very theory of cultural inclusiveness, of recognition, respect, and coexistence among theories and civilizations”\(^{21}\). On the other hand, in Chapter 4, Weixing Hu opposes both the possibility and the desirability of ‘Sinicizing’ or nationalising IR theories. Furthermore, in his analysis of the relationship between practice and theory-building, which is based on the distinction made by Qin between action-oriented theory and knowledge-oriented theory, Hu argues that it is not possible to construct knowledge-oriented theory isolated from social actions and the logic of practicality. If ‘a theory is for someone and for some purpose,’ as Cox claims, then in a rapidly changing world order, contrary to the claims for exceptionalist theories, Hu maintains that China, as a rising power, needs theories that strengthen its links with the outside world, including ones that are based on experience and historical and cultural traditions.

This point takes us to the relationship between knowledge and power. As stated above, Ren opposes the label of IR with Chinese characteristics because it resembles the political project of the CPC. However, the above-mentioned second and third IR debates among Chinese IR scholars are precisely about the link between power and knowledge. Indeed, even issues of naming and Chinese exceptionalism are also closely related to the relationship between power and knowledge as shown in the first five chapters of the book. Nele Noesselt, in Chapter 6, analyses this relationship and argues that despite the search for autonomy, debates among Chinese scholars and the official political discourse are closely related to each other. Debates on constructing a Chinese IR theory serve mainly two purposes. On the one


\(^{20}\) Teng-chi, “Debating the Chinese School of IR,” 85.

hand, it “contributes to national identity building and symbolically stabilizes political rule” and on the other hand, “it reveals itself as part of China’s global positioning ambitions.”

After addressing the ongoing debates about the construction of the Chinese School(s) of IR, five chapters in Part II analyse whether these attempts have become reality. In Chapter 7, Wang Jiangli and Barry Buzan compare the Chinese School with the English School in six dimensions: origins, founders and organization; naming; context; aims/intentions; theoretical sources; and historical projects from which to draw lessons for the development of the school. While in the first four dimensions there are significant differences between the schools, in the final two dimensions the two schools show similarities. These comparisons provide three lessons for building a Chinese School of IR. First, the English School does not argue for national approaches to IR theory. Second, it avoids parochial interests and focuses on global-level theory building. Finally, it redisCOVERS the importance of historical knowledge and analysis. By looking to the English School as a model, Chinese IR can avoid parochialism, build its theory at the global level, and use historical knowledge and analysis as a source for theory building. In other words, rather than following US-centred approaches only, Chinese IR should enrich its sources of knowledge production. However, constructing an IR theory and gaining recognition from the international IR society is not an easy endeavour, especially when the stratified structure of the IR community is taken into account. Peter Marcus Kristensen, in Chapter 8, examines the core-periphery structures of IR and the place the Chinese School occupies in this structure by focusing on its relations with the core, semi-periphery, and periphery. This way, Kristensen shows that “the Chinese theory debate is still mainly an internal Chinese debate and when seeking to enter ‘global IR’ it has mostly focused on one particular audience: the United States…The Chinese School may…benefit from a broadening of audiences.”

In Chapter 9, Xu Jin and Sun Xuefeng, as members of the so-called Tsinghua Approach (one of the main theoretical contributions of Chinese IR to the discipline), provide a review of the achievements, criticisms, limitations, key challenges, and future directions of the Tsinghua Team. Chih-yu Shih and Chiung-chiu Huang present another innovative Chinese knowledge product in Chapter 10, the Balance of Relationship (BoR) theory. The BoR theory is, in their claim, simultaneously Confucian, post-Western, and post-hegemonic. Rather than a substitute, BoR is a complementary theory to the widely used IR concepts of balance of power (BoP), balance of interests, and balance of threat. By integrating a geo-culturally distinct theory of BoR into familiar concepts like BoP, Chih-yu and Chiung-chiu reintroduce the issue of Chinese-ness.

Yongjin Zhang, in Chapter 11, examines the history of Chinese intellectual engagement with trans-Atlantic IR since the opening up of China to the world. Based on Wang Yiwei’s categorisation of the history of Chinese IR studies into four phases of ‘starting-Marxism’ (1960s-1980s), ‘learning and copying’ of Western IR theories (1980s), ‘stimulus and response’ (1990s), and ‘reflecting-constructing’ (2000s), Zhang identifies three main turning

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24 Kristensen, “Navigating the Core-Periphery Structures of “Global IR”,” 160.

points that are affected and facilitated by the diffusion of trans-Atlantic IR into Chinese IR academia: epistemic optimism, epistemic scepticism, and epistemic reflexivity. These epistemic turns have been influential in moving Chinese IR from the phase of learning and copying to reflecting and constructing. Thus, “the diffusion of ideas is no longer a one-way street; but a two-way process.”

In the final chapter, Hun Joon Kim and Yongjin Zhang critically evaluate the Chinese School of IR as an intellectual project by focusing on the timing of the emergence of the Chinese School of IR, the features that make the Chinese School ‘differently different,’ the intellectual hazards of the project, and the intellectual discontent of the Chinese School, and the obstacles it needs to overcome. Kim and Chang criticise several aspects of the Chinese School project. To start, they claim that this project is too ‘Chinese’ and driven by parochial concerns. Since the English School is a theoretical construction at the global level, the Chinese project can take it as an example to follow. Second, they criticise the strong link between instrumental knowledge and reflexive knowledge and the domination of the former over the latter. Finally, Kim and Zhang claim that this project is still mainly an internal dialogue and for it to become more innovative and productive, it must make knowledge journeys through space and time.

3. Conclusion

Theories are cumulative products of a long and challenging process. Due to the intellectual hegemony of Western political thought, creating non-Western theories is even harder to accomplish. Since the 1960s there have been various attempts to fulfil this goal. However, many of these efforts fell into the trap of echoing the Western-centrism of core social sciences. As shown above, Chinese attempts to establish Chinese Schools of IR involve the same risk.

Though a fledgling project, in the last 15 to 20 years Chinese project of IR theory building is off to a good start. It is a many-sided endeavour. Rather than creating one Chinese School, several Chinese approaches to IR and world order have emerged. It is therefore more appropriate to speak of building Chinese Schools of IR. While the majority of these approaches, such as the Relational Theory, the Tsinghua Approach and the BoR Theory try to enter into the ‘global IR’ represented by US academia by combining Western and Chinese political thought, others, like Zhao’s Tianxia Approach, focus solely on ancient Chinese philosophy. Despite this difference, the theories share a common ground: drawing lessons from historical Chinese texts for formulating strategies for a rising China. This understanding leads to the question of whether or not instrumental knowledge dominates reflexive theory-building efforts in Chinese academia. In other words, as was the case in Maoist China: Are intellectual studies in the service of politics and the CPC? This is a question to be answered by Chinese scholars.

While as Wallerstein suggests, historicising intellectual analysis is important in overcoming Western universalism and creating a multiplicity of universalisms, non-Western – and in this case Chinese – intellectual contributions should not fall into the trap of becoming another form of parochialism, exceptionalism, or Western-centrism. To overcome such a risk,

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Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever (New York: Routledge, 2009), 104-08.

Chinese IR should engage with non-mainstream and critical approaches to IR studies and base its theory construction on critical thinking.

*Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations* is an important contribution for analysing and evaluating the development of Chinese IR in the last four decades. Discussions about ongoing debates on and contestations to the development of a Chinese School of IR included in the book mirror the diversity of approaches and views from different nationalities. These contributions reflect the ways Chinese scholars are engaged in Western IR theories, the construction of Chinese IR theory, and the likelihood of developing a Chinese School(s) of IR as a challenge to the hegemony of Western-centric IR knowledge production, and thus diversifying and localizing IR theory construction.

Through its focus on the Chinese-ness debate and theoretical contributions from within and outside of China, and by providing examples from Western and non-Western IR theories and approaches, the book tries to overcome the nationalizing or Sinicizing tendency of China-centred IR approaches. It also attempts to overcome the Western-centrism that is predominant in Chinese IR academia. In other words, it tries to avoid trapping the Chinese School(s) of IR in Western-centrism, parochialism, and exceptionalism. By emphasizing the strong link between instrumental knowledge and reflexive knowledge, the book offers ways of overcoming the dominance of the former over the latter, and thus the power of the CPC over the Chinese academia.

Notwithstanding its contributions to Chinese IR theory construction efforts, there are two important elements missing from this book that would both enrich and corroborate it. First, two major Chinese IR theory contributions are left out. Even though Zhang, in his chapter, mentions the theoretical contributions of Zhao and Qin, the original contributions of these scholars on the *Tianxia* Approach and the Relational Theory of World Politics, would corroborate the aim of the book. An analysis of Chinese foreign policy from various Chinese perspectives could also be included, enabling Readers to compare how different Chinese approaches view and analyse Chinese foreign policy. Nevertheless, despite these deficiencies, *Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations* is an important contribution to the ongoing debates in Chinese IR academia. As the book offers a number of alternative approaches to IR theory knowledge production, it contributes to the efforts to link local and global knowledge accumulation and thus empowers the attempts to create a distinctive Chinese IR theory, encouraging it to make knowledge journeys through space and time.

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Kristensen, Peter Marcus. “Navigating the Core-Periphery Structures of “Global IR”: Dialogues and Audiences


Abstracts in Turkish

Yönetimsellikten Hegemonya: Yeni Bir Araştırma Gündemine Doğru

Jonathan Joseph
Sheffield Üniversitesi

Öz

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hegemonya, yönetimsellik, uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi, eleştirel gerçekçilik, Gramsci, Foucault

Hegemonik Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisini Aşmak: Hiçlik, Re-Worlding ve İlişkiler Dengesi

Chih-yu Shih
Ulusal Tayvan Üniversitesi

Öz
Bu makale, Kyoto Felsefe Okulu tarafından ortaya atılan Dünya Tarihi Yaklaşımı ile iki rakibini - Battı-sonrası Re-Worlding ve Çinli ilişkiler dengesini - alternatif bir uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi oluşturma çabalarını yönünden karşılaştırmaktadır. Dünya Tarihi Yaklaşımı, büyük güç siyasetinden etkilenen ulusalın içinde bulundukları koşulları nasıl değerlendirdiklerini ve dünya siyasetindeki yerlerini anlamlandırmak için mevcut kültür kaynaklarının biraraya getirilmesini nasıl bel bel bağlamaklarını açıklar. Bu görüş, uluslararası sistem inşaatının bir diizi birbirine uyumu yoluyla korunamayacağı tahmininde bulunur, çünkü tarih daha önceki “siyaseten hatalı” kimliklerin belli bir süre sonunda tüm gereklikleriyle beraber geri dönmesine izin vermek kadar uzundur. Bu yaklaşım özellikle, farklı kimlikler arasında kalan ulusalın uluslararası ilişkilerde farklı döngüler yaşamacağlarını; genişleyen uluslararası ilişkilere sahip ulusalın ya da hegemonya statüsünden düşmekte olanların...
İlişkiler dengesini benimseyeceklerini; daha az nüfuzlu ulusalın ise aksi halde ifade edemedikleri motivasyonlarını karşılamanın için hegemonya düzenini pratik olarak yeniden yorumlayacaklarını öngörür. Bu anlamda, birer vaka çalışma olarak Dünya Tarihi Yaklaşımı için Japonya; re-worlding için Tayvan ve ilişkiler dengesi için de Çin ele alınacaktır. Makalede bu ülkeler arasındaki çatışmaların kuramsal sonuçlarına değinilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kyoto Felsefe Okulu, hiclık yerli, Japonya, Çin, Tayvan, ilişkiler dengesi

Kültürel Görelilik, Yerlicilik ve Uluslararası Toplumun Sınırları Üzerine: Arap Ayaklanmalarından Sonra Ortadoğu'da İslamcı Demokrasinin Teşvik Edilmesi

Metin Koca
Avrupa Üniversitesi Enstitüsü

Öz

Anahtar Kelimeler: Görelilik, kültür, İngiliz Okulu, kimlik, demokrasi
Orta Doğu’da Arap Ayaklanması Süreci ve Türk Dış Politikasındaki Yanlış Hesaplar ve Uyumsuzluk: Neoklasik Realist Bir Perspektif

Nuri Yeşilyurt
Ankara Üniversitesi

Öz
Bu makale, neoklasik gerçekçiliğin bölgesel sistemin çalkantılı bir değişimden geçtiği bir dönemde bölgesel bir gücün dış politika davranışı açıklamaktaki uygunluğu test etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Türkiye’nin Arap Ayaklanmalarına karşı izlediği siyaseti bir vaka çalışması olarak ele alarak, 2011 yılında iddialı bir politika izleyen Ankara’nın hatalı hesaplamalarının nedenlerini ve 2013-2016 yılları arasında yeni gerçeklere uyum sağlamak için neoklasik gerçekçilik bir perspektilden açıklamaktadır. Genel olarak, bu makale, neoklasik gerçekçiliğin Türkiye’nin bu dönemde uyguladığı politikanın başarısızlığına tatmin edici bir açıklama getirdiğini ve Türk dış politikasındaki yanlış hesaplamaların neoklasik gerçekçiliğin)}.}

Anahtar Kelimeler: Neoklasik gerçekçilik, Türk dış politikası, Orta Doğu, Arap Baharı

Barışçıl Küresel Değişim ve Yükselen Güçlerin Uyuşlandırılması: Akademik Bir Bakış

T.V. Paul
McGill Üniversitesi

Öz
Tartışmanın ana odaklı, yükselen güçlerin uluslararası siyaseti sistemde uyuşlandırılması ve bunun barışçıl yollarla gerçekleştirilebileceğini belirtmektedir. Prof. Paul, aynı konudaki son çalışmış olduğu yerlerde ve statüko yanlıs güçlerin barışçıl bir uyuşlandırma meydan verecek bir temel strateji benimsemeleri halinde bunun mümkün olduğunu savunmaktadır. Uyuşlandırma ve yaratılma politikaları arasındaki farka değinirken, büyük güçlerin saldırgan davranışlarını kısıtlayıcı mekanizmalar olan kurumlara, iktisadi diplomasiye, ve sınırlı sözleşmelerde dayanan yuvaşak dengelenmenin önemini vurgulamaktadır. ABD’nin Rusya ve Çin’e yönelik politikalardaki değişmeler tartışılmaktadır. Büyük güçlerin ve küçük güçlerin uyuşlandırılmaları, hem içerde hem dışarda önemli sonuçlar doğurur. Makale, Çin ve Hindistan gibi çağdaş yükselen güçlerin, kısmen küreselleşme sürecinin...
sunduğu fırsatlar nedeniyle, barışçıl bir şekilde yükselme ihtimallerinin önceki dönemin büyük güçlerinden daha fazla olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, bu devletler hem küresel kalkınmayı hem kendi statülerini neo-sömürgecilikten uzak bir biçimde geliştirmek için diğer devletlere yönelik iktisadi ve kalkınma programları başlatmalıdır. Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini de temel değişim mekanizması olarak savaş yerine barışçıl dönüşüm stratejileri geliştirmek yönünde öğrencileri ve politika yapıcıları teşvik etmekte yükümlüdür.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Yükselen güçler, barışçıl değişim, ABD, Çin, Hindistan, Rusya
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In This Issue 3

ARTICLES

The Hegemony of Governmentality: Towards a Research Agenda 5
Jonathan Joseph

Transcending Hegemonic International Relations Theorization: Nothingness, Re-Worlding, and Balance of Relationship 19
Chih-yu Shih

On the Borders of Cultural Relativism, Nativism, and International Society: A Promotion of Islamist Democracy in the Middle East after the Arab Uprisings 43
Metin Koca

Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East during the Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective 65
Nuri Yeşilyurt

COMMENTARY

Global Peaceful Change and Accommodation of Rising Powers: A Scholarly Perspective 85
T.V. Paul

REVIEW ARTICLE

Chinese School of International Relations: Myth or Reality? 95
Emre Demir

Abstracts in Turkish 105