2 May\u0131s 2018’de D\u0131\u015f Politika ve Bar\u0131\u015f Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 Merkezi “21. Y\u00fczy\u0131lda Savunma Sanayii: Kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131rmal\u0131 Analiz” \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc E-\u00c7al\u0131\u015ftay\u2019\u0131n\u0131n d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc oturumuna ev sahipli\u011fi yapt\u0131. Bu oturumda, iki sunum yap\u0131ld\u0131. Kiel \u00dcniversitesi\u2019nde G\u00fcvenlik Politikas\u0131 Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc,\u00a0Asya-Pasifik Strateji ve G\u00fcvenlik Merkezi Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Sarah Kirchberger, \u2018\u2019Kar\u0131\u015f\u0131k bir web: \u00c7in\u2019in mil-teknoloji modernizasyonu ve Rusya-Ukrayna ile savunma-sanayi i\u015fbirli\u011finin etkisi\u2019\u2019. Cranfield \u00dcniversitesi Savunma Ekonomisi ve \u0130ngiltere Savunma Akademisi Ba\u015fkan\u0131\u00a0Ron Matthews ve S.Rajaratnam Uluslararas\u0131 \u00c7al\u0131\u015fmalar Okulu\u2019da ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131 olarak \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan Collin Koh, \u2018\u2019 G\u00fcney Afrika Savunmas\u0131n\u0131n Y\u00fckseli\u015fi ve D\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u2019\u2019 sunmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n
\u2018\u2019Kar\u0131\u015f\u0131k bir web: \u00c7in\u2019in mil-teknoloji modernizasyonu ve Rusya-Ukrayna ile savunma-sanayi i\u015fbirli\u011finin etkisi\u2019\u2019<\/p>\n
\u00a0\u00c7in, \u201cMade in China 2025\u201d ve Sivil-Askeri Entegrasyon giri\u015fimleriyle, teknolojik s\u0131n\u0131rda yerli bir inovasyona sahip, d\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131nda bir askeri-sanayi \u00fcss\u00fc in\u015fa etme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131ndad\u0131r. Bu, askeri modernle\u015fmenin platform merkezli bir g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc geride b\u0131rakma ihtiyac\u0131n\u0131 ve alan, siber, yapay zekal\u0131 sistemler, insans\u0131z sistemler ve di\u011fer son teknoloji alanlar\u0131ndaki yenilikleri i\u00e7eren yetenek odakl\u0131, \u00e7ok alanl\u0131 bir y\u00f6nelimi gerektirdi\u011fini ima ediyor.\u00a0Onlarca y\u0131ld\u0131r, \u00c7in askeri modernizasyonu \u00e7abalar\u0131, 1989’da Bat\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lerin empoze etti\u011fi uzun s\u00fcredir devam eden silah ambargolar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan engellenmi\u015ftir. Bu, \u00c7in’in \u00e7ift kullan\u0131ml\u0131 alanlar d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda Sovyet sonras\u0131 \u00fclkelere silah tedarik\u00e7ileri se\u00e7imini etkin bir \u015fekilde s\u0131n\u0131rlad\u0131. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, \u00c7in\u2019in eski stratejik rakibi olan Rusya, geli\u015fmi\u015f silahlar\u0131n ana kayna\u011f\u0131 haline geldi. 2014 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n K\u0131r\u0131m krizinden sonra \u00c7in-Rusya savunma-sanayi i\u015fbirli\u011fi, \u00c7in\u2019in Rusya ve Ukrayna aras\u0131ndaki simbiyotik silah \u00fcreten bir ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnden faydalanabilmesi ile \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde yo\u011funla\u015ft\u0131. 2014’ten bu yana Rusya’ya uygulanan Bat\u0131 ve Ukrayna yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n bir yan \u00fcr\u00fcn\u00fc olarak, \u00c7in daha \u00f6nce hi\u00e7 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 kadar Rus silah teknoloji ithalat\u0131 i\u00e7in daha elveri\u015fli ko\u015fullar elde etmeyi ba\u015far\u0131rken, Ukraynal\u0131 sekt\u00f6rlere olan ba\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 da derinle\u015ftirdi. Bu arada, Rusya ve \u00c7in s\u0131ras\u0131yla d\u00fcnyan\u0131n ikinci ve \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc en b\u00fcy\u00fck silah ihracat\u00e7\u0131s\u0131 \u00fclkeler haline geldi ve gelecekte geli\u015fmekte olan \u00fclkelerde pazar paylar\u0131 \u00fczerinde giderek daha fazla rekabet edebilirler. Bu makale, Rus-\u00c7in savunma-sanayi ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n son yirmi y\u0131lda nas\u0131l geli\u015fti\u011fini ve \u00c7in’in askeri modernizasyonunun genel h\u0131z\u0131na nas\u0131l katk\u0131da bulundu\u011funu incelemeyi ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
\u2018\u2019G\u00fcney Afrika Savunmas\u0131n\u0131n Y\u00fckseli\u015fi ve D\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u2019\u2019<\/p>\n
G\u00fcney Afrika’n\u0131n savunma sanayisinin kar\u0131\u015f\u0131k bir geli\u015fim profili var. \u0130kinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nem boyunca, savunma sanayisinin geni\u015flemesi Apartheid, BM yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 ve Afrika tehdidinin do\u011fas\u0131ndan etkilenmi\u015ftir. Bu, hibridizasyon da dahil olmak \u00fczere, sermaye tasarrufu sa\u011flayan, evde yeti\u015ftirilen teknoloji ve silah tasar\u0131m\u0131 etraf\u0131nda in\u015fa edilen olduk\u00e7a ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 bir savunma sanayi modelinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131na neden oldu. Bir\u00e7ok bak\u0131mdan, 2000 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki \u201cy\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n sat\u0131\u015f\u0131\u201d, G\u00fcney Afrika’daki savunma sanayile\u015fmesinin en \u00f6nemli noktas\u0131yd\u0131 ve etkileyici s\u0131n\u0131r silah sistemlerinin ve yerel \u00fcretimin ofset programlar\u0131yla elde edilmesini yans\u0131tt\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi ayn\u0131 zamanda savunma k\u00fcreselle\u015fmesinin yerli sanayinin ve i\u015flerin kayb\u0131na neden oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in yerli savunma kapasitesinin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn ba\u015flang\u0131c\u0131n\u0131 da yans\u0131t\u0131yor. So\u011fuk Sava\u015f\u0131n sona ermesi, 1994’te silah ambargosunun kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n bile durduramad\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc \u015fiddetlendirdi. O zamandan beri G\u00fcney Afrika’n\u0131n savunma sanayii, savunma harcamalar\u0131 ve sat\u0131n almalar\u0131ndaki azalmalardan b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde ac\u0131 \u00e7ekti. Silah ihracat\u0131 baz\u0131 umutlar sunuyor, ancak rekabet g\u00fcc\u00fc y\u00fcksek bir uluslararas\u0131 savunma pazar\u0131nda rekabet ediyorlar ve bu anlamda gelecek zorlu g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
2 May\u0131s 2018’de D\u0131\u015f Politika ve Bar\u0131\u015f Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 Merkezi “21. Y\u00fczy\u0131lda Savunma Sanayii: Kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131rmal\u0131 Analiz” \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc E-\u00c7al\u0131\u015ftay\u2019\u0131n\u0131n d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc oturumuna ev sahipli\u011fi yapt\u0131. Bu oturumda, iki sunum yap\u0131ld\u0131. Kiel \u00dcniversitesi\u2019nde G\u00fcvenlik […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1645,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[55,36],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1838","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-calistay-ve-konferanslar","category-etkinlikler"],"post_mailing_queue_ids":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1838","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1838"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1838\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1645"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1838"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1838"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1838"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}