{"id":3582,"date":"2025-12-25T10:42:27","date_gmt":"2025-12-25T07:42:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/?p=3582"},"modified":"2025-12-25T10:47:56","modified_gmt":"2025-12-25T07:47:56","slug":"arastirma-direktorumuz-doc-dr-efe-tokdemir-counster-projesi-ile-erc-consolidator-grantini-almaya-hak-kazandi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/tr\/2025\/12\/arastirma-direktorumuz-doc-dr-efe-tokdemir-counster-projesi-ile-erc-consolidator-grantini-almaya-hak-kazandi\/","title":{"rendered":"Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Direkt\u00f6r\u00fcm\u00fcz Do\u00e7. Dr. Efe Tokdemir COUNSTER Projesi ile ERC Consolidator Grant\u2019ini Almaya Hak Kazand\u0131"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Direkt\u00f6r\u00fcm\u00fcz Do\u00e7. Dr. Efe Tokdemir COUNSTER adl\u0131 projesiyle son derece rekabet\u00e7i ERC-2025 Consolidator Grant\u2019ini kazanmaya hak kazanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Proje, devletlerin devlet d\u0131\u015f\u0131 silahl\u0131 akt\u00f6rlerin (DDSA) destek\u00e7i kitlelerini neden, nas\u0131l ve ne zaman hedef ald\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 ve bu devlet\u2013kitle ili\u015fkilerinin kar\u015f\u0131-ayaklanma stratejisinde bir ara\u00e7 olarak ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 ya da ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 belirleyen etkenlerin neler oldu\u011funu a\u00e7\u0131klamay\u0131 ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Direkt\u00f6r\u00fcm\u00fcz Do\u00e7. Dr. Efe Tokdemir COUNSTER adl\u0131 projesiyle son derece rekabet\u00e7i ERC-2025 Consolidator Grant\u2019ini kazanmaya hak kazanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Proje, devletlerin devlet d\u0131\u015f\u0131 silahl\u0131 akt\u00f6rlerin (DDSA) destek\u00e7i kitlelerini neden, nas\u0131l ve [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":3581,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3582","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-guncel"],"post_mailing_queue_ids":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3582","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3582"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3582\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3585,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3582\/revisions\/3585"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3581"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3582"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3582"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3582"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}