

Personality or Role? Comparisons of Turkish Leaders Across Different Institutional Positions

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Personality approaches to politics are often criticized for not examining the effect that institutional role constraints have on individual beliefs and preferences. When leaders appear to change their stance when they change roles, it is assumed that roles have a determining influence. Modern personality theory and contemporary sociological role theory, however, view the effects of roles as interacting with agents' personalities. In this article, we investigate this question by comparing personality profiles of three Turkish leaders (Özal, Demirel, and Gül) during their tenure as prime minister and during their subsequent time as president. For Gül, we perform an additional comparison during his time as foreign minister. The personality profiles are in the form of quantitative scores generated from machine-coded content analysis of leaders' words using the Leadership Trait Analysis method. We hypothesize that different leaders will be more susceptible to changing role contexts, depending on core personality traits, and that different traits are more likely to change with new roles. Overall, our results suggest that leaders' traits are fairly resistant to changes across roles and that task orientation is the most likely trait to change as leaders adapt to different role demands and expectations. This study makes a contribution to our understanding of the interaction between personality and political contexts by offering specific theoretically derived hypotheses and by empirically and statistically examining a preliminary set of expectations that could be applied more broadly to other leaders.

KEY WORDS: personality, institutional role, Leadership Traits Analysis, Turkey

When leaders change their political and institutional position, many would expect them to adapt to that new position. Their expressed beliefs and style of engaging with others might change with different role demands, expectations of role-appropriate behavior, and the powers and incentives associated with the position. When leaders do adapt to new roles, this change in

expressed beliefs and behavior may be interpreted to support an institutional, structural, or situational perspective, contra a psychological perspective. If, the argument goes, leaders' actions and decisions are a product of their institutional role, then the effect of their own personality must be minimal.

For personality theorists, on the other hand, political leaders may approach their positions of power very differently. While some leaders choose to delegate power to their advisors, for example, others may prefer taking initiatives and become actively involved in the decision-making process. They argue, when two similarly positioned leaders face the same situations, they respond differently or an individual who occupies different political roles in his or her career will have the same set of beliefs and behave accordingly. For example, Jonathan Renshon, in his study of G.W. Bush's beliefs as governor and president, predicted that there would be little change in Bush's operational codes across roles. According to Renshon (2008), "In novel situations, actors are likely to use a familiar role until events either reinforce that role conception or a new role is learned. ... In the case of GWB [Bush], his new role as president of the United States was sufficiently novel that he was unlikely to have at his disposal a role conception appropriate to his new office and therefore likely to retain his old role conception (including his old beliefs) after taking office" (p. 829). Renshon argues that consistency theories as well as cognitive miser and limited information-processor perspectives support an expectation that beliefs are "sticky" and are more often confirmed than changed. Somewhat contrary to his hypothesis, however, Renshon finds some changes in Bush's beliefs upon taking office, although they are in the direction of reinforcing existing beliefs.¹ This conclusion begs important questions, which we address in this study: Do *all* political leaders change their personality characteristics when they occupy different institutional roles? And *which* aspects of personalities are most likely to change across role positions?

David Winter (2005), a prominent personality and leadership scholar, has defined the relationship between personality and social context (e.g., role) as a complex one. According to Winter (also Keller, 2009; Van Esch, 2014) personality interacts with the opportunities and obstacles of situational contexts; at the same time, personality can be defined as a series of embodied contexts—characteristics formed by environments and experiences that, once developed, are then resistant to alteration or are altered only with more effort than it took to form them (p. 574). According to psychologist David Funder (2001), "the person-situation debate, concerning whether consistencies in individuals' behavior are pervasive or broad enough to be meaningfully described in terms of personality traits...can at last be declared about 98% over. ... The long-standing and controversy-generating dichotomy between the effect of the situation versus the effect of the person on behavior...is and always was a false dichotomy" (pp. 199–200). Indeed, modern personality theory, as well as contemporary sociologically based role theory, do not see individuals as static across roles. Rather, the personality-role (or agent-structure) relationship is conceptualized as interactionist (Roberts, 2007; Wood & Roberts, 2006).

These personality approaches would expect individuals, and some personality types more than others, to develop their interactions with their role (and the institutional environment in which their role resides) over time. Hollis and Smith (1986) argued in their analysis of the Carter administration's 1980 attempt to rescue hostages in Iran that institutional roles sit "rather loosely on the actors" (p. 276) as roles and situations are generally ambiguous enough for actors' individual personalities to interpret their roles and role demands. In other words, individuals do not simply wear and change roles as they would clothes; their personalities shape both the degree to which they mold themselves to roles and the manner in which they play their role. Wood and Roberts (2006) and Roberts and

¹ Other works on personality changes across roles include Holsti's (1970) suggestion that John Foster Dulles's beliefs were partly a product of his role.

Table 1. Personality Characteristics in Leadership Trait Analysis

LTA Trait	Description
Belief in Ability to Control Events	Perception of own degree of control over political world
Need for Power	Interest in developing, preserving, or reinstituting own power
Conceptual Complexity	Ability to distinguish complexities of political life
Self-Confidence	Notion of self-importance, and of his/her capacity to take on the political environment.
Ingroup Bias	Belief that own group constitutes the center of political world
Distrust of Others	Suspensions, skepticism, worry of others than own group
Task Focus	Concentration on problem solving vs. building relationships

Source. Hermann (2003).

Mroczek (2008) argue that personality traits may change even into adulthood and in old age, following a role-learning process.² As Roberts (2007) suggests, roles are unique situational levers because they provide both enough “context” to capture its impact and are not too narrow of a focus to prevent researchers from missing the impact of personality traits in return.

Taking an interactionist perspective, Margaret Hermann (1980; Hermann, Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001) has argued that the permanence of a trait across roles (or situations) is itself a personality characteristic and varies across leaders. According to Dille and Young (2000), “such an argument would need to be supported by further inquiry into trait variability under more controlled circumstances” (p. 594). We seek to provide this in this study. Drawing on previous research on the personalities of political leaders, we develop specific expectations about role adaptation. We are interested in what types of leaders are most likely to change their expressed political personality when they come into a new political position.

With several leaders holding different institutional roles in Turkish politics, Turkey provides a natural quasi-experimental design and opportunity for this theoretical investigation. Thus, as a first step, we investigate and compare the personality profiles of three Turkish leaders—Süleyman Demirel, Abdullah Gül, and Turgut Özal—and examine any changes in their leadership traits across roles. Our study of three leaders must be considered preliminary and suggestive of future research to develop our understanding of agents’ interactions with institutional structures.

Characterizing Leaders’ Personalities: The LTA Conceptual Framework

Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is one of the most prominent approaches to the study of political leaders. This framework was developed by Margaret Hermann and integrates her decades of research on the role of personality characteristics in foreign policy (Hermann, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1987, 2003). In this approach, personality is conceptualized as a combination of seven traits: belief in an ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, ingroup bias, self-confidence, and task orientation (see Table 1).

² A similar interactionist perspective can be found in recent work on role theory in international relations and other research that has made strong claims about the co-constitutive nature of structural and institutional constraints and the characteristics of agents (e.g., Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003; Carlsnaes, 1992; Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Giddens, 1984; Shannon & Kowert, 2012; Thies, 2010). Studies on national role conceptions, for example, see egos interacting with others and with normative structures to identify appropriate patterns of behavior (e.g., Harnisch, Frank, & Maull, 2011; McCourt, 2011). Strong empirical evidence, however, about how the co-constitution between agent and structure influence the decision-making process or the outcome, however, has been lacking (e.g., Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Dessler, 1989). In addition, role theory approaches to foreign policy often neglect the importance of personality and individuals as agents (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012). On role learning in foreign policy, see Harnisch (2012), Malici (2006b), and Malici and Malici (2005).

Table 2. LTA Trait Combinations

Leader Composite Characteristic	Leader Types	Component Traits
Responsiveness to Constraints	Challenger/Respecter	Belief in Ability to Control Events + Need for Power
Openness to Information	Closed/Open	Complexity + Self-Confidence
Leadership Style	Active Independent, Collegial, Evangelical, Directive, Expansionist, Incremental, Influential, Opportunistic	Responsiveness to Constraints + Openness to Information + Task Motivation

Source. Hermann (2003).

LTA has been used to study the personalities of many leaders, including U.S. presidents, British Prime Ministers, sub-Saharan African leaders, Iranian leaders, Soviet Politburo members, and heads of international organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations (Dyson, 2006; Hermann, 1984, 1987; Kille & Scully, 2003; Mastors, 2000; Preston, 2001; Taysi & Preston, 2001). This research has shown that leaders’ personality traits do indeed vary. What does LTA explain? LTA research has demonstrated that its seven personality traits systematically link to a leader’s propensity to challenge or respect constraints in their environments, their openness to information and advice, the structure of their advisory systems, the quality of the decision-making process, and the policies leaders choose for their country or organization (e.g., Dyson, 2006; Hermann, 2003; Kille & Scully, 2003; Schafer & Crichlow, 2010).

According to Hermann (2003), the seven traits combine in particular ways to produce specific behaviors by leaders (see Table 2). Leaders who have a high belief in their ability to control events and a high need for power, for example, are expected to challenge constraints; leaders low in need for power and/or who do not believe they can control events are expected to respect constraints. Conceptual complexity and self-confidence are related to and predict leaders’ openness to information. Leaders with high scores on both traits and leaders who have high complexity and low self-confidence are expected to be open to information, whereas leaders with low scores on both traits and leaders with high self-confidence and low complexity are expected to be closed to information. These two composite traits combine with a leader’s motivation for leading to produce a typology of eight different leadership styles, which Hermann (2003) argues, provide a profile of how “leaders relate to those around them and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions” (p. 181).

In addition to the methodological rigor of the content-analysis scheme associated with LTA (described below), the advantage of using the LTA framework for investigating the relationship between personalities and roles is that it provides specific expectations regarding which characteristics of leaders matter and how. In other words, leaders with different traits are expected to relate to their context, institutional setting, costs and benefits of various policy options, and other political actors in theoretically meaningful and predictable ways. One purpose of this study is to make these expectations more specific than they have been in previous research.

Role Adaptation: What Types of Leaders Are Most Likely to Change With New Roles and Which Personality Characteristics Are Most Likely to Change?

In this section, we review the extent of research on the personalities of political leaders with the aim of developing expectations on the effects of role change on personality characteristics. Although we offer some specific hypotheses, these must be considered preliminary. Given the dearth of research on change in LTA traits, our aim is to start a conversation regarding these relationships. Our empirical analysis provides more information for future research and theoretical development. We know of no

study that specifically examined changes in LTA traits across role positions. Related research, however, has examined changes in leaders' beliefs over time and belief stability, which are pertinent to our question. While not specifically examining the impact of role change, they do provide clues on which traits are most likely to change and when. Many have examined the trait of complexity. Dille and Young (2000), for example, examined the temporal stability of cognitive complexity in their study of Carter and Clinton. Finding that Carter's complexity trait remained stable (and high) across his term, while Clinton's scores for complexity change (becoming simpler), the authors conclude that their results "indicate that conceptual complexity is stable for some people, but not for others" (p. 594). Suedfeld and Wallace (1995) also find Clinton's integrative complexity changed across time. Overall, these studies reinforce the notion that trait stability is itself a personality variable. They also suggest that complexity is a trait that is particularly susceptible to change. Others have focused on changes in operational code beliefs across time and also point to variability in the stability of beliefs. Crichlow (1998), for example, noted changes in Israeli Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres across time, while Malici and Malici (2005) found little change in the beliefs of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung. Walker, Schafer, and Young (1999) also found only minor changes in the operational codes of George H. Bush and Bill Clinton across time.

Many previous studies were interested in the effects of exogenous events on leaders' beliefs, comparing their beliefs before and after events. Walker and Schafer (2000) attribute changes in Carter's and Johnson's beliefs to events in their environments, as does Feng (2005) in her study of Mao's operational code before and after events in the Korean War. Renshon (2008) hypothesized that George W. Bush's beliefs would change considerably after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. While some parts of Bush's operational code did change, others did not, leading Renshon to conclude: "Bush's overall operational code can still be described as relatively stable, with only three out of ten indices experiencing a statistically significant change" (p. 836). This is consistent with Tetlock's (2005) finding that dramatic and unexpected events can serve to consolidate beliefs rather than change them, and Robison's (2011) finding that in periods of international and domestic hardship, U.S. presidents show considerable stability in their belief systems.

Renshon's study of Bush is also in line with others who have found changes in some beliefs, but not others (e.g., Malici, 2006a, 2006b; Robison, 2011). As Renshon (2008) notes, "An interesting trend that emerges from these studies concerns which beliefs were stable and which were prone to change. The results indicated that philosophical beliefs are more prone to change than instrumental beliefs" even though these findings "directly contradict the social psychological theories of belief change" (p. 827). For the purposes of this study, the research on change and stability in beliefs over time reinforces the idea of variation in susceptibility to change across leaders and suggests that some aspects of leaders' personalities are more likely to change than others. The puzzle of which *leaders* are more likely to change personality traits or which *traits* are more likely to change when they change roles, however, remains.

The theoretical conceptualization of Hermann's LTA research suggests some answers to this question. Specifically, Hermann (1993) argues that certain traits are particularly important and can act as intervening variables between triggers from leaders' environments and the other aspects of leaders' personalities. Some leaders are more sensitive to their environments and will adapt themselves to the demands of that environment, including the demands of their institutional roles. For less sensitive leaders, their personality characteristics are likely to remain consistent across different situations and environments. Sensitivity to the environment can be assessed in a number of ways in the LTA framework, including some of the trait combinations. Those with the combination of traits, for example, that make them constraint respecters (see Table 2) are more likely to change other traits with role changes since changing roles involve new constraints. Similarly, those leaders who are open to information (see Table 2) are more likely to change other traits when they take on new roles and are exposed to and attend to new information environments.

Building on this prior research, we offer Hypothesis 1 and specific subhypotheses indicating certain LTA traits (conceptual complexity) and trait combinations (responsiveness to constraints and openness to information) acting as intervening variables for other traits will affect the likelihood of changes in other personality characteristics when leaders change roles.

H1: Personality characteristics are more likely to change when certain types of leaders change roles.

H1a: Leaders who respect constraints (low in belief in ability to control events and low in need for power) are more likely to change other traits when they change roles.

H1b: Leaders open to information (high in complexity and high in self-confidence) are more likely to change other traits when they change roles.

H1c: Leaders with higher scores on complexity are more likely to change other traits when they change roles.

Support for the hypothesis on openness to information also comes from Van Esch's (2014) study that found openness to information correlated with change and stability in leaders' beliefs during the Euro financial crisis. Leaders open to information were more likely to change fundamental beliefs in specific directions. Van Esch also found that leaders who are more complex were more likely to change some beliefs in response to the crisis. Conceptually complex individuals are expected to be more capable of integrating new and contradictory information from their contexts (Van Esch, 2014). This implies that leaders high in conceptual complexity may be more open to new role demands, thus triggering change in other traits. This expectation also builds on other research that singles out complexity as a particularly important trait for distinguishing changes in personality across time (e.g., Dille & Young, 2000; Suedfeld & Wallace, 1995).

Leaders' personalities may also respond to role change depending on the particular role demands of their institutional positions. We can reasonably expect that with significant differences between the old role and the new role, the greater chance there is for changes in individual traits. Going from the post of prime minister to the post of president in a parliamentary democracy, for example, might prompt changes in specific directions of personality characteristics, given the different role expectations and responsibilities these roles carry. These differences are visible in the Turkish context and in most parliamentary political systems with presidential offices. According to the Turkish Constitution, the president, as the *head of the State*, "represents the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation." In this role "she/he shall ensure the implementation of the Constitution," and "the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of State" (Article 104). With regard to foreign policy, Turkish presidents have less "power," in both legislature and executive branches, than do prime ministers and the cabinet. Again, according to the Constitution (Article 104), the specific foreign policy functions of the president include: (1) to ratify and promulgate international treaties, (2) to represent the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and most importantly, (3) to decide on the use of the Turkish Armed Forces.

In comparison, the prime minister, who is appointed by the president from among the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, is "chairperson of the Council of Ministers" (Article 112), meaning that she/he is the *head of the government*.³ The Prime Minister "supervise[s] the implementation of the government's general policy" (Article 112). These roles also differ from other key cabinet positions—for example, a minister in charge of a specific policy area, such as trade or foreign affairs. Ministers in the cabinet are expected to advocate for their agency and policies, which support their

³ This has changed when the president became elected by popular vote, first with Erdogan in 2014. All leaders examined in this study served before this change.

Table 3. Leaders and Roles

Leader	Role	Term
Süleyman Demirel	Prime Minister	27 Oct. 1965 – 26 March 1971
		31 March 1975 – 05 Jan. 1978*
		12 Nov. 1979 – 12 Sept. 1980**
		21 Nov. 1991 – 16 May 1993***
Abdullah Gül	President	16 May 1993 – 16 May 2000
	Minister of Foreign Affairs	14 March 2003 – 28 Aug. 2007
	Prime Minister	18 Nov. 2002 – 14 March 2003
	President	28 Aug. 2007 – 28 Aug. 2014
Turgut Özal	Prime Minister	13 Dec. 1983 – 9 Nov. 1989
	President	9 Nov. 1989 – 17 April 1993

Sources. Turkish Grand National Assembly's website http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/e_kaynaklar_kutuphane_hukümetler.html, the website for The Presidency of the Republic of Turkey at <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/>, Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpages at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/list-of-former-ministers-of-foreign-affairs.en.mfa> (last access to all pages, September 1, 2015).

*Demirel led two cabinets, with a one-month break in between two.

**Demirel's prime ministership ended with a coup d'état.

***Demirel government continued until June 26 under Deputy PM Erdal İnönü's leadership.

agencies' worldviews, status, and budget. However, it should be noted that in the Turkish and many other contexts, each minister is responsible to the prime minister, not the president, in the exercise of their duties and powers (Articles 112 and 117). The different roles and powers the president and the prime minister are given by the Turkish Constitution would, according to an institutional perspective, lead to different priorities and decision-making processes by these individuals.

Our expectations on which traits are most likely to change across these institutional roles are presented in Hypothesis 2, with additional subhypotheses.

H2: Some personality characteristics are more likely to change when new roles carry with them specific expectations and responsibilities.

H2a: Task focus may be more likely to shift from goal-oriented to relationship-oriented if the leader shifts to a less policy-focused position (e.g., from prime minister to president position).

H2b: Ingroup bias is likely to decrease when the leader shifts from a partisan role (e.g., prime minister elected from a political party) to a less partisan role (e.g., president).

H2c: Belief in ability to control events is likely to decline with a change from the prime minister to president role because prime ministers are considered the "doer" role, and presidents are more symbolic in parliamentary systems.

Task focus, ingroup bias, and belief in ability to control events are the personality characteristics most likely connected to the different role demands faced by presidents and prime ministers in parliamentary democracies like Turkey. The nature of these roles also allows us to hypothesize the specific direction expected with changes in these roles.

Data and Methods

We use the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) at-a-distance method to profile three Turkish leaders: Süleyman Demirel, Abdullah Gül, and Turgut Özal. Individually, and as a set, these leaders offer a natural quasi-experimental design for examining personalities across roles as each leader has served

Table 4. LTA Analysis Results

	Özal		Demirel		Gül		
	<i>PM</i>	<i>PRES</i>	<i>PM</i>	<i>PRES</i>	<i>PM</i>	<i>FM</i>	<i>PRES</i>
BACE	.391	.357↓	.369	.346 ↓	.338	.361	.268*↓
PWR	.249	.216↓	.282	.278↓	.276	.245	.211↓
CC	.664	.642↓	.598	.579↓	.540	.591	.580↑
SC	.482	.433↓	.411	.405↓	.446	.534	.484↑
TASK	.676	.644↓	.627	.579*↓	.796	.704*	.660**↓
DIS	.142	.129↓	.124	.120↓	.168	.094	.134↓
IGB	.126	.109↓	.120	.143↑	.118	.129	.129↑
<i>No. of interviews</i>	29	44	64	77	11	20	40

Note. The statistically significant result for the task trait for Demirel is from a comparison of his prime ministership and his presidency $t(138) = 1.78, p = .07$. For Gül, the significant results for the task trait is from a comparison of prime minister to president $t(49) = 2.41, p < .05$ and also between prime minister, foreign minister, and president $F(2, 68) = 3.31, p < .05$. The significance result for Gül's BACE traits is from a comparison of his foreign ministership to his presidency. ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$.

as both the prime minister and the president of Turkey. Gül also served as Turkey's foreign minister. Table 3 presents the dates each leader held these positions.

LTA assumes that certain words spoken by a leader reflect specific personality traits: the more frequently leaders use certain words and phrases in their speeches, the more apparent and salient such content is to them and the more it reflects underlying personality traits (Hermann, 2003). Coding is quantitative and employs frequency counts taking the word or phrase as the unit of analysis. Extensive dictionaries have been developed for each trait. Early LTA research used hand-coding techniques; now computer programs have been developed to code leaders' speeches to produce more reliable assessments at greater speeds and volume (Walker, 2000; Young, 2000). ProfilerPlus, a language-parsing software program developed by Social Science Automation⁴ determines the percentage of particular words and phrases used by the leaders based on the length of the text.⁵ The percentages for any leader can be compared to a reference group to determine whether the particular leader is high, low, or average on a trait (Hermann, 2003). Hermann's studies have produced a large sample of 284 world political leaders to which new profiles can be compared.

Although LTA and other at-a-distance assessments are now, with machine coding, reliable, they continue to face a central question of validity: Do the words of leaders truly reflect their personal beliefs and personality characteristics? This question revolves around authorship, audience effects and deception, temporal stability, and language differences. For this study, we address these issues by using only interviews and other spontaneous material and not prepared speeches; we aggregate across audience; and we assume that these leaders' characteristics can be meaningfully assessed in English (if the text was originally spoken in English) or in English translations. We build on previous scholarship and assert that leaders do have some control over their speech acts and that LTA can capture leaders' *public* personalities (if not their private ones) which matter more for explaining their decision-making style and policy choices.⁶ We also directly address this question by comparing personality traits across role positions. If traits are fairly stable, this lends greater confidence in the validity of the LTA approach.

For our research, we collected spontaneous statements, mainly from interviews, for the three Turkish leaders. We selected statements that are exclusively about foreign policy issues. After we

⁴ See www.socialscience.net.

⁵ See Hermann (2003) for more information on how scores are calculated on each personality trait.

⁶ For discussions and examinations of these issues, see Dille and Young (2000); Marfleet (2000), Schafer (2000), Schafer and Crichlow (2000), Schafer and Walker (2006), Renshon (2008, 2009), and Schafer and Crichlow (2010).

Table 5. Leaders in Comparison to World Leaders

	World Leaders (<i>n</i> = 284) average	Özal		Demirel		Gül		
		<i>PM</i>	<i>PRES</i>	<i>PM</i>	<i>PRES</i>	<i>PM</i>	<i>FM</i>	<i>PRES</i>
BACE	.35 (.05)	above	average	above	average	below	above	1 low
PWR	.26 (.05)	below	1 low	above	above	below	below	1 low
CC	.59 (.06)	1 high	above	average	below	below	average	low
SC	.36 (.10)	1 high	above	above	above	above	1 high	1 high
TASK	.63 (.07)	above	above	above	below	1 high	1 high	above
DIS	.13 (.06)	above	average	below	below	above	below	average
IGB	.15 (.05)	below	below	1 low	below	below	below	below

classified leaders' statements according to the dates they stayed in each role (prime minister, president, and [for Gül only] foreign minister), we then conducted an LTA analysis for each period separately.

Results and Discussion

In Table 4, each leader's traits are listed separately for each of their leadership positions. Arrows indicate the movement in their scores from prime minister to president for Özal and Demirel and from prime minister to foreign minister and then to president for Gül. To facilitate comparability, the direction of change in traits is only indicated between these leaders as prime minister and as president. Table 4 also indicates the statistically significant differences. For Özal and Demirel, we ran two-tailed *t*-tests with independent samples in SPSS to test whether the differences in trait scores for prime minister and president roles were significant. We ran the same test for Gül's prime minister and presidency traits as well. In addition, for Gül we also did an additional significance test using ANOVA for within and between groups to compare trait scores on his prime minister, president, and foreign minister roles. Table 5 lists the comparison outcomes for the three leaders based on the 284 world-leader comparison group. Table 6 indicates the classification for the three leaders in terms of the combinations of traits, as suggested by Hermann (2003). It is important to note that the classification of these leaders in terms of their orientation towards constraints, sensitivity to information, motivation, and leadership style is solely based on the content analysis of their statements, consistent with other LTA research. In this article, we do not trace the process to examine if the leaders actually behave this way in decision-making.⁷

In general, the results indicate that the LTA scores of Özal, Demirel, and Gül vary from one another, across their roles, and in comparison to other world leaders. To interpret these results and assess our hypotheses, we first examine each leader individually across their role positions. Specifically, we examine which trait scores changed and in what direction, how they relate to world averages (i.e., Are they above/below the average? Do they move from within to beyond one standard deviation from the mean?), and which scores are statistically significant across roles. We then analyze the combined trait classifications, including respect for constraints, openness to information, motivation toward the world, and leadership style (presented in Table 6). For each leader individually, we examine the specific hypotheses noting which expectations received strong or partial support. Finally, we examine our hypotheses across our set of leaders. Although we only developed specific hypotheses about some traits and some combined characteristics, we are interested in all traits and combinations, given the exploratory nature of this study.

⁷ See Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin, and Ozkececi-Taner (2015) for process tracing of the effects of leadership traits on decision-making processes in Turkish foreign policy.

Table 6. Turkish Leaders: Combined Trait Classifications

	Respects or Challenges Constraints	Openness to Information/ Sensitivity	Motivation Toward the World	Leadership Style
Özal	Challenges (PM & PRES)	Open (PM & PRES)	Takes advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant (PM & PRES)	Actively Independent (PM & PRES)
Demirel	Challenges (PM & PRES)	Open (PM) Closed (PRES)	Takes advantage of opportunities and relationships; world is not threatening (PM & PRES)	Actively Independent (PM) Evangelist (PRES)
Gül	Respects (PM & PRES) Challenges (FM)	Closed (PM, PRES, and FM)	Focus is on eliminating potential threats and problems (PM) Takes advantage of opportunities and building relationships; world is not threatening (FM & PRES)	Incremental (PM & PRES) Expansionistic (FM)

Turgut Özal

Turgut Özal exhibits some differences in the office of prime minister and of president. Özal’s scores on all seven traits decline after he moves from prime minister to president. These declines change his scores in relation to the world leaders mean; yet, comparing between his prime minister term and presidency terms, none of these changes are statistically significant. In terms of combined-traits classifications (Table 6), Özal is an “actively independent” leader who would seek to maintain his own and his government’s flexibility and independence in the world. His scores suggest that Özal would challenge constraints, but not always successfully due to his directness, explicit use of power, and inability to read and manipulate others. Although this classification applies to both Özal the prime minister and Özal the president, his reaction to constraints may be more role-specific during his presidency due to the decline in his belief in ability to control events. Across both roles, Özal can be classified as open to information. He is a leader who perceives the world as conflict-prone and takes advantage of opportunities and builds relationships while remaining vigilant, although the vigilance may decline in his presidency with his decline in distrust.

Overall, the results for Özal suggest that his personality characteristics are fairly stable across role changes. While changes in Özal’s traits are in the direction consistent with our expectations, these differences are not significantly significant. The stability is expected given our classification of him as a constraint challenger (Hypothesis 1a), but inconsistent with his openness to information (Hypothesis 1b) and his high complexity (Hypothesis 1c). Consistent with Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, Özal is more problem-focused as prime minister and less so as president and his scores for both ingroup bias and belief in ability to control events decline as he moves from prime ministership to presidency.

Süleyman Demirel

Our results indicate some differences between Demirel the prime minister and Demirel the president. Demirel’s scores on belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, self-confidence,

and task focus decline after he moves from prime minister to president. For three of these traits (belief in ability to control events, complexity, and task focus), Demirel's scores change relative to the mean of the world leaders comparison group. For self-confidence, his scores remain below the mean across his role positions. The scores for his other traits (need for power, distrust, and ingroup bias) increase across his roles, but only the ingroup bias scores change relative to the world leaders mean. Demirel's task orientation is the only trait that exhibits a statistically significant change across roles. As prime minister, Demirel is more goal and problem-focused; as president, he is more relationship-focused.

In terms of combined-traits classifications (Table 6), Demirel exhibits two different types of leadership styles. As prime minister, Demirel is categorized as an "actively independent" leader who seeks to maintain his own and his government's flexibility and independence in the world. Due to his declining complexity and his change in task focus during his presidency, Demirel as president moves to the "evangelistic" category and would likely focus on persuading others to join his mission and mobilizing others around his message. Given his scores across different roles, we would expect Demirel to challenge constraints, in an indirect, behind-the-scenes manner, because of his high control and power scores, although less so in the president's office due to his declining belief in ability to control events. Demirel moves from being open and sensitive to information as prime minister to closed and insensitive as president, due to his declining complexity score. In both of his roles as prime minister and president, Demirel is classified as a leader who does not see the world as a threatening place and his focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships.

Thus, Demirel is a leader with some traits changing, although not drastically, from one role to the other, and with other traits remaining consistent across his different roles. Overall, the results for Demirel show that his personality characteristics are fairly stable across role changes, with only one trait (task focus) showing a statistically significant difference. Demirel's trait stability is consistent with him being a constraint challenger (Hypothesis 1a), closed to information (Hypothesis 1b), and his average conceptual complexity (Hypothesis 1c). As his complexity scores change across his roles, it is difficult to assess Hypotheses 2b and 2c—although his higher complexity and openness to information as prime minister should have translated into more change in other traits across roles, according to an interactionist perspective. Hypothesis 2a is strongly (statistically significant) supported: Demirel shifts from a task/problem focus to a relationship focus after becoming president. Hypothesis 2b is not supported: Demirel's scores for ingroup bias increase with his move to the presidency. Hypothesis 2c has some support as his score for belief in ability to control events declines across these roles.

Abdullah Gül

With Abdullah Gül, we have three role positions across which to compare his leadership traits: prime minister, foreign minister, and president. One must note that Gül's tenure as prime minister is short, from November 2002 to March 2003, whereas the time period for his foreign ministership and presidency is longer. When we compare Gül the prime minister to Gül the president (similar to our comparisons for the other two leaders), we see a decline in the scores for four traits: belief in the ability to control events, need for power, task orientation, and distrust, and ingroup bias. For all four of these traits, Gül's scores change in relation to the world leaders mean. Gül's scores for complexity, ingroup bias, and confidence increase as he moved from prime minister to president, all changing in relation to the world leaders mean. As with Demirel, the only trait with a statistically significant change in Gül is his task orientation. Like Özal and Demirel, Prime Minister Gül is more problem-focused than President Gül, although as president, Gül is still above the world average in his task-focus score.

In terms of combined-traits classifications (Table 6), we would expect Gül, in both the prime minister and the president role, to respect constraints, working within established parameters. He is

also closed and insensitive to information across both roles, although slightly less insensitive as president, due to the increase in his complexity score. Prime Minister Gül sees international politics as centered upon a set of adversaries and focused on eliminating potential threats and problems. President Gül, however, does not see the world as a threatening place and takes advantage of opportunities and builds relationships while remaining vigilant. Gül's trait scores as prime minister and president lead to a classification of him as an "incremental leader" who tries to improve his state's position in the world while avoiding any obstacles.

Looking at Foreign Minister Gül, we see a somewhat different personality profile. Compared to both his prime minister and presidency scores, Foreign Minister Gül has a higher belief in his ability to control events and lower distrust. The change in belief in ability to control events is statistically significant across his role as foreign minister and president. Foreign Minister Gül also is distinct in terms of the trait-combination classifications. Although he remains closed to information, as foreign minister he challenges constraints, and in a more direct way. Foreign Minister Gül is more similar to President Gül, in terms of his motivation toward the world; he does not see the world as threatening. Foreign Minister Gül, however, is classified as an "expansionistic" leader, who would focus his attention on expanding his, his government's, or Turkey's control in the world.

Thus, Gül shows slight changes across his roles. Overall, the results for Gül suggest that his personality is also fairly stable across role changes, given that there are only two statistically significant differences. Gül's trait stability is inconsistent with him being a constraint respecter as prime minister and president but consistent with him as a constraint challenger as foreign minister. Thus Hypothesis 1a receives mixed support for Gül. His trait stability is consistent with him being closed to information (Hypothesis 1b) and low in complexity (Hypothesis 1c). Hypothesis 2a is again strongly (statistically significantly) supported: Gül is more problem-focused as prime minister and less so as president. Hypothesis 2c is supported but not strongly as there is change in the expected direction and only significant at the .10 level. As expected, Gül's scores for belief in the ability to control events is lower for his presidency than for his prime ministership. Hypothesis 2b is not supported at all in case of Gül, as his score on ingroup bias hardly changes between different roles and remains below average all along.

Across-Leader Analysis

Looking at all three leaders as a set, we can say that the personality characteristics for these leaders remain fairly stable across role changes. Across all analyses, there are only three instances of statistically significant changes in LTA scores when they change roles. In terms of the trait combination classifications, when these leaders' prime ministerships are compared to their presidencies, all three show no change in their orientation towards constraints. Only Demirel changes with regard to openness to information and leadership style, and Gül changes in his motivation toward the world, but these are not necessarily significant changes.

While no LTA score is the same across leaders' role changes, they seem to vary within parameters. Our leaders are not static, but their personalities may limit the degree of change that is possible. This is consistent with modern personality theory, which sees interaction between the person and the situation. Moreover, given the great variation we see in these leaders' scores across all seven traits, it is clear that the roles are not forcing particular characteristics in their leaderships. All three prime minister profiles are different from one another, as are all three presidents' profiles: we see no single "prime minister profile" or "president profile." Leaders vary despite similar role expectations and role demands.

Our three leaders allow us to preliminarily assess Hypothesis 1 and the view that certain types of leaders are more likely to change personality characteristics than others. Hypothesis 1a expects that those leaders who respect constraints will be more likely to change other characteristics. Of our leaders, only Gül respects constraints as prime minister, but we do not see more significant change in other

traits across roles than we do for the other leaders who challenge constraints. With Özal and Demirel, we find changes as predicted in Hypothesis 1a. As constraint challengers, we would expect the trait stability we see in these two leaders. Hypothesis 1b also receives mixed support across our set of leaders. Only Gül's trait stability is consistent with him being closed to information while being prime minister.

Hypothesis 1c is also only supported with Gül, although Özal's scores on complexity, in comparison with the other leaders, is consistent with other research that complexity is an important mediating personality trait. Özal stands apart from the other leaders with his exceptionally high score in conceptual complexity, and Özal is also the only leader of the three to see no statistically significant difference in any trait with his move from prime minister to president. Özal is also one standard deviation above the mean in self-confidence and differs from both Demirel and Gül in this respect. This suggests that leaders who are highly complex and self-confident may be least likely to change in other traits. This may be especially true for changes in leaders' task orientations as both Demirel and Gül (lower than Özal in complexity and confidence) significantly change in their task orientation when they move from prime minister to president, while Özal's change is not statistically significant. Overall, this study suggests that leaders' orientations to constraints, and very high levels of complexity and self-confidence, may be the most important mediating characteristics for personality stability across roles.

Finally, our set of leaders allow us to assess Hypothesis 2 and the expectation that some traits are more likely to change with certain changes in role demands. Hypothesis 2a has partial support with our leaders—all three move from more problem-focused to more relationship-focused orientation when they change from prime minister to president role. Two of these differences are statistically significant. While we do see this change with Özal and Gül, these leaders remain problem focused, just less so. Hypothesis 2b receives minimal support. Leaders' scores for ingroup bias only decrease for Özal, from prime minister to president, and these changes are not statistically significant. Hypothesis 2c receives qualified support. All three leaders' scores for belief in ability to control events are lower during their presidencies than during their prime ministership, but these differences are not significant. Gül's score for his belief in the ability to control events is significantly lower when he moves from the foreign ministership to the presidency. Overall, the expectation that the less policy-driven and less partisan-based nature of the Turkish presidency will be reflected in the personality profiles of leaders is somewhat supported for our three leaders.

Conclusions

Institutional perspectives in political science have been critical of personality theories, arguing that individuals' behaviors can easily vary with different institutional incentives, constraints and opportunities, and role expectations. On the other hand, personality approaches see individual characteristics as resilient and resisting change in case of situations and contexts. Although this debate remains unresolved, there is an emerging consensus that structural constraints and personal characteristics are co-constitutive. Yet, there are still few empirical studies on political leaders that illustrate this dynamic.

In this study, by using the LTA framework, a trait-based approach to the study of political leadership, we assessed how leaders respond to one of the major structural constraints in political life: changing political roles. We took advantage of the Turkish political context in which prime minister and presidency roles are defined very differently by the Turkish constitution and in which three leaders served in both of these roles. Using a quasi-experimental design, we constructed personality profiles with LTA and examined three Turkish leaders comparatively across roles. By assessing trait changes for these leaders across roles, we tested two sets of hypotheses.

Our results support the expectation that leaders' personalities can remain stable across different institutional roles. Personality characteristics for the three Turkish leaders exhibited little change,

when these leaders changed roles. We observed change in the same direction—all declined from prime minister to president profile—in three of the traits: belief in ability to control events, need for power, and task focus. However, in only one of these traits (task focus) do we see significant difference across roles. Thus, personality is not directly determined by institutional incentives. We also find that our leaders vary from one another, and from other world leaders; there is no single Turkish leader profile and no single Turkish president or prime minister profile. This helps us to evaluate another theoretical suggestion: that certain types of leaders may be more likely to change traits when they change roles. Our assessment provided mixed support for this argument. The trait stability we see in two leaders is consistent with their orientations to challenge constraints, but this did not hold for all leaders. There was no clear pattern for openness to information as a mediating variable and mixed support for complexity (hypothesized here) and self-confidence (not specifically hypothesized). Although our study does not provide clear direction for the argument that some leaders are more susceptible to change than others, this conclusion is limited to the types of leaders we have in our sample and requires further testing with other leaders.

Finally, building on previous research that suggests some traits and beliefs vary across roles and time, we offer more specific expectations regarding how different traits interact with institutional roles. We see little change across roles (both from individual analysis and looking across the set), although task orientation is the one trait that varies most and significantly. We conjecture that this is expected by the changes in demands and expectations of the Turkish prime minister and president roles as articulated in the constitution. While the prime minister is a more active executive position emphasizing problem solving and policy implementation, the presidency is highlighted for its consensus building and above-politics status. We encourage future research to take seriously the specific role demands associated with institutional positions and how leaders' personalities interact with those demands. A particularly promising avenue for future research would integrate work on role identities (how individuals perceive their roles) and their effects on personality traits (Wood & Roberts, 2006).

The relative potency of individual differences and institutional positions is an important question, worthy of further empirical exploration and theoretical development. We suggest that further research should be conducted on this question with a bigger sample of world leaders, with even greater variability in traits and role demands. Future research in the form of case studies can focus on the processes and mechanisms by which leaders interact with role demands. This study provides a start in terms of suggesting hypothesis and testing some of the alternative ideas on the interaction of leaders and their roles.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was supported by a TUBITAK Evren grant (110K112) and a BAGEP award to E. Cuhadar from the Science Academy. We would like to thank Ryan Beasley for his comments on the earlier versions of our article. We also thank Margaret Hermann, Michael Young, and Meryem Mudara for their support to the research project at various stages. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to C. Esra Cuhadar, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey 06800. E-mail: esracg@bilkent.edu.tr

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